Jammu & Kashmir High Court
S.K. Khajuria vs State Of J And K And Ors. on 1 December, 2004
Equivalent citations: 2005(1)JKJ169
JUDGMENT S.N. Jha, C.J.
1. The dispute in this letters patent appeal arising from a writ petition, SWP No. 866/1989, relates to seniority between the appellant on the one hand and respondent No. 3, Shamim Ahmad Leharwal, on the other hand. The facts, briefly, are as follows.
2. The appellant was appointed as Stores Officer in the State Motor Garages in 1973 upon his selection for the post by the Jammu and Kashmir Public Service Commission, pursuant to advertisement notice No. PSC/TR/67 of April, 1967. He claims to be a diploma holder in Automobile Engineering. On 31st October, 1981 he was posted as incharge Works Manager. On 21st October, 1983, he was given ad hoc appointment on the post for six months. After a few extensions, finally on 31st May, 1989 the ad hoc appointment was regularized in terms of Rule 3(2) of the Jammu and Kashmir State Motor Garages (Gazetted) Service Recruitment Rules, 1986 (hereinafter referred to as 'the recruitment rules') with effect from 21st July, 1986. In the meantime, respondent No. 3, Shamim Ahmad Leharwal, had been appointed to the post of Works Manager by direct recruitment on 16th June, 1987. The appellant's services having been regularized with retrospective effect from a date prior to the date of appointment of respondent No. 3, he filed writ petition, SWP No. 866/1989, challenging the relevant government order dated 31st May, 1989 contending that the order affecting his seniority had been passed without hearing him. The respondent also challenged eligibility of the appellant for appointment. On 12th March, 1991 the writ petition was allowed. The learned Single Judge held that the order had been passed affecting respondent's seniority -- without giving any opportunity to him. The learned Single Judge also held that retrospective promotion of the appellant was contrary to rules. He did not interfere with the appointment of the appellant but quashed the order to the extent it was retrospective i.e. for the period from 21st July, 1986 to 31st May, 1989 (Sic for 30th May, 1989). Learned Single Judge directed that the appointment shall have prospective effect from the date of order i.e. 31st May, 1989 and the seniority on the post of Works Manager in the State Motor Garages shall be maintained accordingly.
3. Mr. K.S. Johal, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the writ petition was decided ex-parte without hearing the appellant. Though the appellant had filed objections the same was not taken into consideration. It was stated that when the writ petition was finally heard in 1991, militancy was at its peak and the entire Kashmir Valley was in a state of turmoil and it was not possible for the appellant to have representation at the time of hearing. On merit, Mr. Johal submitted that Rule 23 of the Jammu and Kashmir Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1956 permits retrospective appointment and, therefore, the impugned order making the appellant's appointment retrospective from 21st July, 1986 cannot be said to be contrary to rules. In support of the submission, he placed reliance on Suraj Parkash Gupta v. State of Jammu and Kashmir, AIR 2000 SC 2386 : (2000) 7 SCC 561. Mr. Johal also submitted that the appellant had been officiating on the post of Works Manager right since 31st October, 1981 and the entire period of officiation could be counted for the purposes of seniority, but as the Jammu and Kashmir State Motor Garages (Gazetted) Service Recruitment Rules, 1986 came into force on 21st July, 1986, his appointment on the post of Works Manager could not relate back to a date prior to the commencement of the Rules and, therefore, it was made effective from 21st July, 1986. In support of the submission that the period of officiation or ad hoc appointment is to be counted for the purpose of seniority, reliance was placed on L. Chandrakishore Singh v. State of Manipur, 1999 AIR SCW 3631 : (1999) 8 SCC 287 and L.K. Sukhija v. Union of India, (1997) 6 SC 406, As regards the question of opportunity of hearing to the respondent, counsel submitted that much water has flown since 1991 when the writ petition was decided. Considering that only two persons i.e. the appellant and respondent No. 3 are involved and both of them have been promoted on the higher posts in the meantime, the question of opportunity of hearing at this stage is merely academic, but if still the Court is of the view that the respondent should have been given opportunity of hearing, as retrospective appointment of the appellant was likely to affect his seniority, the matter may be sent back to the Government for fresh decision after giving opportunity of hearing or, alternatively, this Court itself may decide the issue.
4. Mr. J.P. Singh appearing for respondent No. 3 submitted that retrospective promotion of the appellant has been held to be illegal by the learned Single Judge and there is no scope for taking a different view. According to the learned counsel, as a matter of fact, the learned Single Judge could have quashed the impugned order dated 31st May, 1989 entirely as being violative of the rules, but applying judicial discretion, moulding the relief he did not interfere with the promotion; he set aside only retrospective part of the order. Counsel pointed out that apart from equity involved, there was another ground for not interfering with the appellant's appointment as the appellant and respondent came from different sources. While the appellant's services were regularized on the post of Works Manager in terms of Rule 3(2) of the recruitment rules, the respondent was appointed by direct recruitment. Mr. Singh submitted that more significant aspect of the case is that the appellant was not holding any post in the cadre of the Service i.e. Jammu and Kashmir State Motor Garages (Gazetted) Service and, therefore, was not covered by Rule 3(2) of the recruitment rules. His appointment as incharge Works Manager was in his own pay and grade and though extension was granted to said appointment from time to time, the extended period finally expired on Ist November, 1985, and on the date of commencement of the recruitment rules i.e. 21st July 1986, the effective date of his appointment, the appellant was not holding the post and, therefore, could not be taken in Service by virtue of the provisions of Rule 3(2) of the recruitment rules. Counsel submitted that Rule 3(2) could be applied only in case of a person who at the commencement of the rules was "holding any post included in the cadre of the Service "in its sanctioned scale of pay". Mr. Singh also submitted that the appointment cannot also be treated as one made in relaxation of the rules in terms of Rule 9 of the recruitment rules, for, such relaxation can be made only for reasons to be recorded in writing and in consultation with the Public Service Commission. Mr. Singh also referred to the proviso to Rule 3(2) of the recruitment rules and submitted that in view of the matter, the power under Rule 3(2) could be exercised only within 15 days of commencement of the rules, Finally, he submitted that the rules do not contemplate retrospective appointment. The rules in fact contemplate appointment on probation vide Rule 6. In support of the submissions counsel placed reliance on State of Bihar v. Akhouri Sachindra Nath, 1991 Supp (1) SCC 334 and Sanjay K. Sinha-II v. State of Bihar, 2004 (5) Supreme 312.
5. Mr. B.S. Salathia, learned AAG, appearing for the official respondents, submitted that the appellant was holding the post of Working Manager --a post in the cadre of Jammu and Kashmir State Motor Garages (Gazetted ) Service at the commencement of the rules and, therefore, was covered by Rule 3(2) of the recruitment rules. He further submitted that though the recruitment rules do not specifically provide so, Rule 23 of the the Jammu and Kashmir Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1956, which are applicable by virtue of Rule 11 of the recruitment rules, provided for retrospective appointment in certain situations and, therefore, the impugned order dated 31st May, 1989 regularizing the appellant's service in terms of Rule 3(2) with effect from the date of commencement of the rules cannot be said to be illegal or violative of the rules. Regarding opportunity of hearing, Mr. Salathia submitted that during pendency of this case both, the appellant and respondent were promoted as Deputy Director and Director. While the appellant now is Director, State Motor Garages, respondent is Officer on Special Duty (OSD) in the Transport Department in the same rank.
6. Before considering the rival submissions of the counsel for the parties, it would be appropriate to notice the relevant provisions of the recruitment rules.
7. The rules titled the Jammu and Kashmir State Garages (Gazetted) Recruitment Rules, 1986 framed under proviso to Section 124 of the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir (corresponding to Article 309 of the Constitution of India) came into force on 21st July, 1986. Rule 3 provides for constitution of Service, i.e. the Jammu and Kashmir State Motor Garages (Gazetted) Service. Rule 4 provides for strength and composition of the Service. Rule 5 lays down the qualification and method of recruitment. Rule 6 deals with probation. Rule 9 confers power on the Government to relax any of the provisions of the rules with respect to any class, category of persons or posts. Rule 11 lays down that in regard to matters not specifically covered by these rules the members of the Service shall be governed by the rules, regulations and orders applicable to the State Civil Services in general.
8. In terms of Rule 5 no person shall be eligible for appointment on promotion to any post in any case, category or grade in the Service unless he possesses the qualification as laid down in Schedule II and fulfils the requirement of recruitment as provided in the rules and orders for the time being in force. Sub-rule (2) of Rule 5 provides for three modes of appointment
(a) by direct recruitment (including appointment by transfer);
(b) by promotion; and
(c) partly by direct recruitment and partly by promotion.
9. It is relevant to point out that apart from the aforesaid modes -- which are usual modes of appointment -- another mode or a different kind of appointment is envisaged in Rule 3(2). It was under Rule 3(2) that the appellant was appointed. Having regard to its significance, it may be quoted as under:
"3. Constitution of Service.- (1) ...
(2) The Government may at the commencement of these rules, appoint to the Service any person who at the commencement of these rules is holding any post in its sanctioned scale of pay included in the cadre of the Service.
Provided that for purposes of initial constitution of the Service, the person holding any post included in the cadre of the service in its sanctioned scale of pay shall be given an opportunity before such appointment to opt for the service within fifteen days from the commencement of these rules."
10. The entire dispute, it would appear from the submissions of the learned counsel for the parties, hinges on the question whether the appellant was "holding any post in its sanctioned scale of pay included in the cadre of the Service"? According to the appellant as well as official respondents he was holding a cadre post and, therefore, covered under Rule 3(2) of the recruitment rules. It is not in dispute that the post of Works Manager is included in the cadre of the Service, as is also evident from Schedule 'I' appended to the recruitment rules. The question is whether the appellant was holding the said post and was in receipt of sanctioned scale of pay?
11. Referring to various orders brought on record, Mr. Singh submitted that the appellant was made incharge Works Manager in his own pay and grade pending appointment on the post in regular manner by the Director, State Motor Garages on 31st October, 1981. On 4th April, 1983 he was allowed charge allowance. On 21st October, 1983 another order was issued by the Government continuing ad hoc appointment of the appellant for a period of six months. His continuance from Ist May, 1984 to 30th April, 1985 was regularized by another government order dated 5th March, 1985. Finally, on 22nd August, 1985, he was continued for a further period of six moths with effect from 2nd May, 1985 which period expired on Ist November, 1985. No further extension was allowed to the appellant and thus, as on the date when the recruitment rules came into force, i.e. 21st July, 1986, he was not holding the post of Works Manager and could not be appointed in terms of Rule 3(2) of the recruitment Rules.
12. It is relevant to point out here that by order dated 22nd June, 1982 issued in- between by Secretary to Government in the Transport Department, the appellant was continued as Works Manager in the State Motor Garages "against the available vacancy of Works Manager". He was initially paid salary in his own pay and grade with effect from 31st October, 1981 but by order dated 4th April, 1983 (supra) he came to be paid charge allowance under Article 87 of the Jammu and Kashmir Civil Service Regulations. The order dated 21st October, 1983 (supra) was issued with the concurrence of the Public Service Commission wherein his appointment was described as 'ad hoc appointment'. The order dated 5th March, 1985 (supra) carried the same nomenclature of ad hoc appointment. In the order dated 22nd August, 1985 (supra) the arrangement was described as "appointment by promotion on ad hoc basis".
13. On the submissions made on behalf of respondent No. 3, the question is whether the appellant held the post of Works Manager on 21st July, 1986? In view of the provisions of Rule 3(2) of the recruitment rules only a person holding "any post included in the cadre of the Service at the commencement of these rules" could be appointed to the Service. It is true that no express order continuing the appellant's appointment -- ad hoc or otherwise -- on the post of Works Manager for the period subsequent to Ist November, 1985 has been brought on record. The appellant, however, produced photocopy of the service book. From perusal of the entries made therein it is evidenced that the appellant was through out paid salary in the scale of Rs. 1050 --1710 from 21st October, 1983 vide Government Order No. 88-TR of 1983 until the pay came to be revised in the revised scale of pay under SRO 370 dated 17th July, 1987. It is relevant to state here that scale of Rs. 1050 --1710 finds mention in Schedule 'I' of the recruitment rules against the post of Works Manager and was the prescribed scale of pay of that post.
14. On behalf of respondent No. 3 reference was made to the appellant's representation dated 18th April 1987 and it was submitted that herein he had admitted that he was continuing on the post of works Manager "in my own pay (viz. Storekeeper's grade)". We find little substance in the submission. The representation has to be read as a whole and not piecemeal. The words (referred to above within quotation) are part of the sentence which reads, "I have been asked to continue as Works Manager in my own pay and grade..." This does not mean that he was not in receipt of pay of the post of works Manager. As seen above, the government had sanctioned drawal of pay of the post vide government order No. 88-TR of 1983 dated 21st October, 1983. The order reads:
"As agreed by the Public Service Commission sanctioned is hereby accorded to the continuous ad hoc appointment of S/Shri S.K. Khajuria and K.K. Kapoor as Works Manager in the State Motor Garages Department for a period of six months for purpose of drawl of their pay.
By order of the Government of Jammu and Kashmir."
15. The service book contains entry to the above effect and also shows that the pay was accordingly fixed in the scale of Rs. 1050-1710 and paid to the appellant. The representation aforesaid was made to regularize the appointment. Thus we do not find anything adverse to the appellant's case in the representation, and the submission of the counsel is accordingly rejected.
16. From the aforestated facts two things are clear. First, assuming that no formal Government order extending the appellant's ad hoc appointment was issued on expiry of the extended period on Ist November, 1985, the appellant continued to de facto hold the post of Works Manager lest he would not have been paid pay on that post. Though not so stated in the pleadings of the appellant or the official respondents, it is not difficult to find an explanation for such omission. It is a somewhat usual practice in the government set-up that sanction orders are issued for the anterior period(s) later and given retrospective effect. In the instant case itself, as seen above, after the ad hoc appointment made by order dated 21st October, 1983 came to an end after expiry of six months as stipulated therein, it took more than 16 months to issue another order on 5th March, 1985 continuing the ad hoc appointment of the appellant for the periods Ist May, 1984 to 31st October, 1984 and 5th November, 1984 to 30th April, 1985. It was a coincidence of sorts, if we may say so, that the recruitment rules came into force soon after on 21st July, 1986 in terms of which the appellant finally came to be appointed under Rule 3(2) of the rules.
17. The question is whether it would be just and proper to take a narrow view of the matter and hold in the circumstances set out above that merely because no formal government order was issued after Ist November, 1985, the appellant ceased to hold the post of Works Manager so as to disentitle him to the benefit of Rule 3(2) of the recruitment rules? In our opinion, an affirmative answer in favour of the appellant would more serve the ends of justice. The impugned order came to be passed more than 15 years ago and, in the meantime, both the appellant and the respondents have been promoted first as Deputy Director and then as Director. The question of inter se seniority, however, may still survive -- which is the real issue under consideration in this appeal.
18. But before we deal with the question of inter se seniority, we must refer to another aspect which is whether the appellant was drawing pay in the sanctioned scale of pay of the post of Works Manager? It may be recalled that in terms of Rule 3(2) of the recruitment rules the benefit of appointment is available only to a person who at the commencement of the rules is holding any post "in its sanctioned scale of pay". As a matter of fact, in the foregoing paragraphs we have already in a way dealt with this aspect while referring to the pay the appellant was receiving at the relevant time. As seen above, pursuant to Government order dated 21st October, 1983 (supra) the appellant started getting his pay in the scale of Rs. 1050-1710 -- the scale of pay prescribed for the post of Works Manager in the recruitment rules itself. It must, therefore, be held that the appellant was in receipt of sanctioned scale of pay of the post of Works Manager. In the above premises, we hold that the appellant satisfied the twin test, namely, that he was holding the cadre post of Works Manager at the commencement of the recruitment rules and that he was also receiving the sanctioned scale of pay of that post. Rule 3(2) of the recruitment rules, therefore, clearly covers his case.
19. Adverting to the question of inter se seniority, certain facts which are not disputed may be kept in mind. First, no statutory rules were in vogue with respect to recruitment on the post of Works Manager. The Jammu and Kashmir State Motor Garages (Gazetted) Service was constituted with the coming into force of the recruitment rules, on 21st July, 1986 and, therefore, there was no specific bar to making 'ad hoc appointment'. Secondly, on the promotion of the last incumbent the post of Works Manager had fallen vacant and the appellant's incharge appointment or ad hoc appointment was against a sanctioned vacant post. Thirdly, the the Public Service Commission had concurred in the ad hoc appointment vide Government Order No. 88-TR of 1983 dated 21st October, 1983. Lastly, respondent No. 3 came to be appointed by direct recruitment on 16th June, 1987. The appellant was already holding the post of Works Manager since 31st October, 1983 and getting pay of the post since 21st October, 1983. The appellant's appointment, therefore, not being contrary to any statutory rule, made with concurrence of the Public Service Commission, the appellant being otherwise eligible for appointment on the post and holding the post since much before, we find no reason why he should be relegated to a lower position than the respondent.
20. In the facts and circumstances, reliance on decisions in I.K. Sukhija v. Union of India, (1997) 6 SCC 406 and L. Chandrakishore Singh v. State of Manipur, (1999) 8 SCC 287 appears to be apposite. In the former case the ad hoc service of the appellant -- promotees was found to be not by way of stop-gap arrangement or contrary to recruitment rules. They had been favourably considered by the DPC. They had got the promotions against regular vacancies. In the circumstances the appellants were held entitled to count the period of their ad hoc service for the purpose of seniority. In the latter case, likewise, it was held that unless there is a contrary rule, the officiating appointment / promotion cannot be ignored.
21. As a matter of fact, the retrospective appointment of the appellant --found to be in conformity with Rule 3(2) of the recruitment rules -- also appears to be in consonance with the provisions of Jammu and Kashmir Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1956. It is to be kept in mind that the CCA Rules by necessary implication is applicable by virtue of Rule 11 of the recruitment rules, which provides that in regard to matters not specifically covered by these rules, the members of the Service shall be governed by the rules, regulations and orders applicable to the State Services in general.
22. Under Rule 2(e) of the CCA Rules 'member of Service' is defined as a person holding or appointed to a whole-time pensionable post. Rule 9 refers to first appointment as (a) one by promotion or transfer; and (b) by direct recruitment; or (c) partly by promotion or partly by direct recruitment. Rule 2(f) defines 'period of probation' of a member of the Service as the period prescribed under the rules. Rule 15 permits commencement of probation from an anterior date. It lays down that if such person is subsequently appointed to such service, class or category in accordance with these rules, he shall commence his probation therein from the date of such subsequent appointment or from such earlier date as may be determined. Thus a person temporarily appointed (under Rule 14) can be appointed to Service according to Rules from an anterior date. Rule 23 again envisages appointment with retrospective effect. Specific reference was made to the said rule and in fairness to the appellant and the official respondents, it may be quoted in extenso as under:
"23. (1) A probationer shall, if a substantive vacancy in the permanent cadre of the category for which he was selected exists, be appointed to the service at the earliest possible opportunity in the order of seniority, and if such vacancy existed from a date previous to the issue of the order of appointment, he may be so appointed with retrospective effect from such date or, as the case may be, from such subsequent date from which he was continuously on duty as a member of the service."
23. From a reading of the above rule it is clear that if substantive vacancy in the permanent cadre exists, a probationer may be appointed to the Service at the earliest possible opportunity and if such vacancy existed from an earlier date, he may be so appointed retrospectively from such date or from such subsequent date from which he was continuously on duty as member of the Service. In our opinion, the above rule too provides strength to the appellant's case. The following observations in Suraj Parkash Gupta v. State of Jammu and Kashmir (supra), vide para 52, may usefully be quoted:
"...Rule 23 does not make any distinction between different modes of recruitment. It is well settled that in the case of a direct recruit, the probation can commence only from a date after his selection and he can hold a permanent vacancy only after such selection. According to service jurisprudence (See in fact, discussion under point 4), a direct recruit cannot claim appointment from a date much before his selection. So far as a promotee and also one who is recruited by transfer, are concerned, before such persons are appointed as members of the service under Rule 23, first their probation must commence. Then such person becomes a probationer for purposes of Rule 23. Once he is on probation, and if a substantive vacancy in the permanent cadre existed in which the promotee or a recruitee by transfer can be accomodated, and if such a vacancy has arisen from a date previous to the issue of the order of appointment (i.e. appointment by promotion or transfer) then under Rule 23 he may be appointed to the service (i.e. regularly) with retrospective effect from such anterior date (or, as the case may be, from such subsequent date) from which he has been continuing on duty on a non-pensionable (sic pensionable) post [ see Rule 2(e) defining "member of service"]. This period can certainly be one that a person holds in a stopgap ad hoc manner. The order of "promoting a person in the service" regularly from an anterior date and the order of probation from an anterior date can be simultaneously passed. That is how under Rule 23, a person holding a temporary, stopgap or ad hoc appointment beyond three months can become a probationer and get appointed regularly to the service with retrospective effect."
24. It was submitted that under Rule 6 persons appointed to the Service either by direct recruitment or by promotion are to be kept on probation or trial for two years which was not done in the case of the appellant, is completely misconceived. Rule 6 is applicable in the case of appointment by direct recruitment / transfer or by promotion under Rule 5(2) of the recruitment rules. As indicated above, Rule 3(2) contemplates a different kind of appointment of a person who is already holding any post included in the cadre of the Service in whose case there is no question of making appointment on probation -- like fresh recruits / promotees on the post.
25. The submission on behalf of respondent No. 3 that the appointment could be made within 15 days of the commencement of the rules by reason of proviso to Rule 3(2) of the recruitment rules is totally misconceived. The proviso contemplates that any person holding any post included in the cadre of the Service has option of becoming member of the Service upon its constitution within 15 days of coming into force of the recruitment rules. It does snot debar the government from issuing order of appointment envisaged in the main rule at a later stage.
26. Finally, reference may be made to the provision relating to seniority contained in Rule 24 of the CCA Rules, 1956. Having regard to its significance the same may also be quoted so far as relevant as under:
"24. Seniority. --(1) The seniority of a person who is subject to these Rules has reference to the service, class category and grade with reference to which the question has arisen. Such seniority shall be determined by the date of first appointment to such service, class, category or grade, as the case may be.
Note 1.-.........
Interpretation. -- The words 'date of first appointment' occurring in the above Rule will mean the date of first substantive appointment, meaning thereby the date of permanent appointment or the date of first appointment on probation on a clear vacancy, confirmation in the latter case being subject to good work and conduct and / or passing of any examination or examinations and / or tests.
Provided that.........".
27. There being no specific provision in the recruitment rules governing seniority, it would follow that the ques4tion has to be considered on the parameters laid down in the general rule i. e. the provisions quoted above. A bare reading of the rule makes it evident that seniority is to be reckoned from the date of first appointment, which means first substantive appointment, which further means the date of permanent appointment or the date of first appointment on probation on a clear vacancy. The appellant stood appointed against a clear vacancy, if not on 21st October, 1981, on 21st October, 1983 when on receipt of the concurrence of the Public Service Commission, under Government Order No. 88-TR of 1983, he was appointed as Works Manager on ad hoc basis for a period of six months which post he continued to hold till his appointment under Rule 3(2) of the recruitment rules. Otherwise also, the golden rule is that seniority is to be determined with respect to the date of entry in service. Respondent No. 3 entered service by direct recruitment on 16th June, 1987. On 16th June, 1987 the appellant was already holding the post and performing the duties thereof. By any account he cannot be treated as junior to the respondent merely because the government took about two years to issue necessary order in terms of Rule 3(2) of the recruitment rules.
28. The decisions relied upon by Mr. J.P. Singh on behalf of respondent No. 3 are of no avail to him. In Sanjay K. Sinha-II v. State of Bihar, 2004 (5) Supreme 312 the promotees were found to be occupying posts far in excess of their 15% quota. It was also found that they had been appointed against non-existing posts. In these facts, among others, the final seniority list was quashed and the government was directed to frame fresh seniority list. In State of Bihar v. Akhouri Sachindra Nath, 1991 Supp (1) SCC 334, the facts were that respondents 6 to 23 were allowed seniority over respondents 1 to 5 in the Bihar Engineering Service Class II cadre. Respondents 1 to 5 had been directly recruited on the post of Assistant Engineer. By different orders respondents 6 to 23 were promoted from earlier dates. Upholding the order of the High Court quashing the impugned government order, the Supreme Court laid down that no person can be promoted with retrospective effect from a date when he was snot borne in the cadre so as to adversely affect others. We fail to understand as to how this principle can be applied in favour of the respondent.
29. On the basis of the above discussion, and for the reasons indicated above, the finding of the learned Single Judge that the so called retrospective promotion of the appellant to be illegal and quashing the order of the State Government dated 31st May, 1989 as regards the period 21st July, 1986 to 31st May, 1989 cannot be said to be in accordance with law and deserves to be set-aside.
30. In the result the appeal is allowed. The order of the learned Single Judge allowing the writ petition of respondent No. 3 is set aside. There will be no order as to costs.