Himachal Pradesh High Court
Reserved On: 29Th May vs Himachal Pradesh National Law ... on 16 June, 2025
Author: Jyotsna Rewal Dua
Bench: Jyotsna Rewal Dua
2025:HHC:18256 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA CWP No.1434 of 2024 Reserved on: 29th May, 2025 Decided on: 16th June, 2025
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Sanjay Singh .....Petitioner
Versus
Himachal Pradesh National Law University .....Respondent
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Coram Ms. Justice Jyotsna Rewal Dua Whether approved for reporting?1 Yes.
For the Petitioner: Mr. Prem Chand Verma and Mr. Aakash Thakur, Advocates.
For the Respondent: Mr. Sai Amar Vivek Aggrawal, Senior Advocate through video conference with Mr. Rajesh Kumar Parmar, Advocate.
Professor (Dr.) S.S. Jaswal, Registrar, H.P. National Law University, present in person.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Jyotsna Rewal Dua, Judge Petitioner was a regular Class-IV employee of the respondent. His services were terminated by the respondent during probation period. He has assailed the termination order in this petition.
1Whether reporters of print and electronic media may be allowed to see the order? Yes.
2 2025:HHC:18256
2. Facts:-
2(i). On the basis of recommendations of the selection committee, which were also approved by the Executive Council, petitioner was appointed as Sweeper on 20.03.2022 on regular basis in the pay scale of Rs.4900-
10680+Rs.1300/- Grade Pay in the respondent-H.P. National Law University. Some of the terms & conditions of appointment order relevant to the context are as follows:-
"On the recommendations of the Selection Committee, approved by the Executive Council, you are, hereby, offered the Post of Sweeper in the Pay Scale of Rs.490010680+1300 GP, along with other allowances as per the relevant Regulations of the Himachal Pradesh National Law University, Shimla. This Offer is made on the following terms and conditions.
1. You shall remain on probation for a period of two years, extendable by another period of one year, from the date of your joining at Himachal Pradesh National Law University, Shimla. Your services shall be confirmed only on your satisfactory work performance during the probation period.
2. That your services can be terminated at any time during the probation period on the ground of unsatisfactory work performance............."
In terms of above, petitioner was to remain on probation for a minimum period of two years, extendable by one more year. During probation, his services could be terminated any time on ground of unsatisfactory work performance.
3 2025:HHC:18256 2(ii). Petitioner had completed 01 year and 07 months of probation period, when on 06.11.2023, he received following order terminating his services forthwith:-
"Subject: Re: Bringing Probation Period to an End Mr. Sanjay Singh, Sweeper.
In terms of Clause 2 of the appointment letter, the probation period of Mr. Sanjay Singh, Sweeper is being brought to an end.
Consequently, his services are, hereby, terminated forthwith with immediate effect. Sd/ Registrar HPNLU, Shimla"
Petitioner seeks quashing of the above order and his reinstatement with all consequential benefits.
3. Submissions:-
Learned counsel for the petitioner was at pains to submit that the respondent-University had not issued any warning, reprimand, notice or any kind of advisory, whatsoever, to the petitioner that his work and conduct was not satisfactory during his entire tenure.
Petitioner had always performed his work to the satisfaction of all concerned with no complaints whatsoever. There was no occasion to terminate his service invoking Clause 2 of the appointment order.
As against above, the pleaded case of the respondent as also urged by learned Senior Counsel is as under:-
4 2025:HHC:18256 a. "The overall assessment of the work and conduct of the probationer during the period of probation are the yardsticks, which justify the retention or discharge after or during the period of probation. Therefore in case of probationer, only on the basis of the assessment of work and conduct by the appointing authority his services could be brought to an end any time."
b. "The answering respondent thoroughly evaluated the petitioner's performance across various parameters during the probationary period and determined that he was unsuitable for continuation of his services and strictly in accordance with Petitioner's terms of appointment letter, his services have been brought to an end without assigning any reason." c. "The non-extension of the Petitioner's services and certain deficiencies in the work and conduct of the petitioner, led to the assessment of his work and conduct upon which Petitioner's services were discharged. Similarly, there was abject failure on the part of the Petitioner in carrying out specific tasks and duties assigned. Due to which the petitioner did not achieve the desired results and the Petitioner was a non- performer in estimation of the BOG."
d. "The Petitioner during his probationary period, has displayed a consistent pattern of behavior that raised serious concerns regarding Petitioner's work and conduct, coupled with utter lack of his commitment, dedication and loyalty towards the organization. Throughout his tenure, the Petitioner has exhibited a profound disregard for the core responsibilities associated 5 2025:HHC:18256 with his position. His performance has been marred by a palpable lack of dedications, and a general apathy towards the duties assigned to him."
e. "The Petitioner's services have been subjected to reassessment by the Answering Respondent, which formed basis for not extending Petitioner's services and relieving the Petitioner's services in terms of his appointment letter."
f. "It is well-established law that any termination of a Probationer upon an assessment of an employee's performance during probation is ordinarily not subject to judicial review."
g. "This Hon'ble Court would not sit as an appellate authority in reviewing and reassessing the instant decision of the Answering Respondent University, who had undertaken an exercise to review Petitioner's work and conduct by a highly academic body, due to which the instant Writ Petition by the Petitioner is not maintainable before this Hon'ble Court."
h. "In any case, the decision of the academic body in assessing the work and conduct of the Petitioner in accordance with terms of his appointment, would not be re-appreciated by this Hon'ble Court in writ proceedings, due to self-imposed restrictions by this Hon'ble Court through a catena of its rulings."
Reiterating the above, learned Senior Counsel for the respondent-University also submitted that petitioner's appointment letter dated 20.03.2022 had clearly envisaged a probation period of two years, 6 2025:HHC:18256 extendable by one more year. Services of the petitioner were liable to be terminated during probation period without assigning any reason in the sole discretion of the competent authority as per norms. In view of terms of petitioner's appointment letter, he cannot be heard to complain about denial of opportunity of hearing or non-compliance of the principles of natural justice before terminating his services.
4. The Record and related submissions:-
Reply filed by the respondent only emphasized that the petitioner did not work satisfactorily. Since the reply filed by the respondent-University time and again harped upon petitioners' work, performance and conduct being not upto the mark; way short of standards; alleged lack of his commitment, dedication, loyalty to organization;
him allegedly being a non-performer throughout his tenure "in the estimation of BOG"; and all this leading to termination of his probation on 06.11.2023, it was deemed appropriate to inspect the related record. Vide order dated 16.05.2025, the respondent-University was directed to produce the record.
4(i). Record was produced on 22.05.2025. There were total five loose noting sheets alongwith personal file of the petitioner.
7 2025:HHC:18256 4(i)(a). Looking at the five pages of loose noting sheets, following order was passed on 22.05.2025:-
"Learned counsel for the respondentNational Law University has produced the record. The record also contains loose noting sheets/pages, 05 in number. The pages have been marked/numbered at the center. To the naked eye, it is quite evident that page No.1 has been added to the loose noting sheets subsequently and as a consequence thereof, original page No.1 has been altered in handwriting to '2'. Similarly, original page No.2 becomes '3', '3' becomes '4' and '4' has been altered to '5'.
Before proceeding further in the matter, let the Registrar of the respondentNational Law University remain present in the Court on the next date of hearing.
List on 29.05.2025.
The original record is retained in the custody of the learned Registrar (Judicial)."
The Registrar of the respondent-University attended the next hearing of the case on 29.05.2025 and admitted having himself placed first page subsequently to the noting sheets (originally paginated as 1 to 4) and altering in his own handwriting the pagination consequent upon his pre-fixing one more page to the four pages of loose noting sheets, whereafter, following order was passed in the matter on 29.05.2025:-
"Pursuant to the directions issued on 16.05.2025, the respondentNational Law University produced the record on 22.05.2025. Upon pursuing the record, the order as under was passed: "Learned counsel for the respondent National Law University has produced the record. The record also contains loose noting sheets/pages, 05 in number. The pages have 8 2025:HHC:18256 been marked/numbered at the center. To the naked eye, it is quite evident that page No.1 has been added to the loose noting sheets subsequently and as a consequence thereof, original page No.1 has been altered in handwriting to '2'. Similarly, original page No.2 becomes '3', '3' becomes '4' and '4' has been altered to '5'.
Before proceeding further in the matter, let the Registrar of the respondentNational Law University remain present in the Court on the next date of hearing.
List on 29.05.2025.
The original record is retained in the custody of the learned Registrar (Judicial)."
2. In view of above, Professor S.S. Jaswal, RegistrarNational Law University has attended today's hearing. He admitted the facts noticed in the order dated 22.05.2025, but, submitted that page now numbered as 1 was already in existence, lying loosely in the file. That he in his wisdom, appended the page alongwith loose noting sheets & paginated it as Number 1 and consequently changed the numbering of the loose sheets as noticed in the previous order. That the same was done by him without any mala fide intention whatsoever.
3. To a query of the Court, as to why the pagination of official record of a premier establishmentthe H.P. National Law University had been altered that too by its Registrar, the response was that the same had been done in good faith and without any ill motive.
4. Learned Senior Counsel for the respondentH.P. National Law University apprised that after the last order passed in this matter, the University of its own took cognizance of the issue and found out that not just the file pertaining to this matter but there are several official files containing loose sheets/documents without proper pagination. That the University is contemplating taking appropriate action in accordance with law.
5. Arguments have been heard on merits. Judgment reserved."
4(i)(b). The first two pages of the noting sheets (the first page-admittedly added to noting sheets subsequently, while 9 2025:HHC:18256 producing the record, though stated to be in existence and lying loose in the file) read as under:-
"Page-1 File No.HPNLUB(15)92(R.O.)/2021 Himachal Pradesh national Law University, Ghandal, Shimla Dated 11th April, 2023 OFFICE NOTE ON PERFORMANCE REVIEW OF SANJAY SINGH SWEEPER 21032022 TO 31032023 It is brought to the notice of the authorities that Sanjay Singh has been working as a sweeper for last one year. His annual appraisal is due, as he has been working on 1 probation. During last one year, it has been observed that generally his work and conduct suffers from series of shortcomings.
It has been reported on numerous occasions that he rarely reports on duty, on time. Many times the work carried out 2 by him is not upto the mark and is not upto the satisfaction and repeatedly he has to be told that there are shortcomings and scope of improvement in his work.
The biggest shortfall is his behaviour and conduct. He is basically of aggressive nature and picks up fights at slightest provocation. If he is to be warned, or told anything about his work and conduct by his superior, he would 3 indulge in arguments instead of bringing improvement in his work and behaviour. Often he indulges in name dropping when told to improve.
There have also been verbal complaints from students on cleanliness issues.
It has also been reported that Sanjay Singh regularly indulges in petty politics and at the workplace he is often seen indulging in heated exchanges and arguments over 4 nonissues, with one and all. Under the circumstances, clear cut attractions are solicited as to whether his annual confidential report should be given negative or below average rating.
Since Sanjay Singh's services are on Probation for a period of two years, let a comprehensive performance review of his work and conduct be carried out after a close monitoring of
10 2025:HHC:18256 5 his work in conduct for one more year. At the end of second year, a call could be taken as to whether further retention is justified or not.
Meanwhile Sanjay Singh's performance should be kept on close watch and any untoward conductor behaviour should 6 be reported to the authorities for appropriate decision. For the time being his ACR / appraisal should be kept on hold and the same should be filled at the expiry of two years' after observing his work and conduct for two years.
Sd/ Registrar, HPNLU, Shimla Page-2 No.59/22HPNLU (Estt.) Himachal Pradesh National Law University Ghandal, Shimla ...............
Dated, the Shimla14 06th November, 2023 Placed below on the file an application, received from Mr. Sanjay Singh (Sweeper) (Annexure I) of this University, regarding complaint against Mr. Rohit Kumar (Caretaker) who allegedly assaulted him on 05/11/2023 at 8:15 AM in the reception area.
In this regard, the undersigned along with the Dean Students Welfare and Registrar looked into the matter and inquire about the veracity of the occurrence with other 7 employees present on the spot and also watched the video record of the incident provided by the IT Cell. After thorough inquiry, it has been found that the complainant was also taking part in the scuffle at parking area of the University. Further, it also appears from the CCTV footage that both the employees were misbehaving and causing physical injury to each other and exchanging abusive languages. The same is placed on record as Annexure II.
In view of the available facts and records, the conduct of both the employees amounts to:
(i) An act of serious misbehaviour and indiscipline which is totally against the code of conduct and nature of their duties.
Therefore, this office is of the opinion that strict action should 8 be taken against both officials as per the relevant provision of conduct rules.
(ii) The abovementioned officials, who visited and inspected the cleanliness of the floor assigned to the complainant (i.e., Mr. Sanjay) were not satisfied with the cleanliness.
11 2025:HHC:18256 Therefore, it amounts to nonsatisfactory work performance on the part of the complainant.
(iii) Mr. Sanjay Singh joined to the post of Sweeper from 20.03.2022 and is on probation till 19.03.2024. His probation may be brought to an end, in terms of Clause 2 of his appointment letter, with immediate effect.
Hence, this office is of the opinion that retains the said employee namely Mr. Sanjay Singh is not in the interest of University and therefore, his probation period may be 9 brought to an end, henceforth his services may be terminated.
Submitted for information and approval please.
Sd/ (Deputy Registrar Estt.)"
4(ii). Learned counsel for the petitioner in relation to the incident referred to at the second page of the noting sheet, submitted that on 05.11.2023, i.e. a day prior to the termination of petitioner's services, while the petitioner was discharging his duties in the respondent-University, a scuffle took place between him and one other co-worker Sh.
Rohit, also a probationer. During this scuffle, petitioner suffered injuries on his head. He complained about the incident to the Police (Police Post Dhami) the same day.
However, he and Sh. Rohit compromised the matter the same day, which was duly taken cognizance of by the Police at G.D. No.18 on 05.11.2023. The dispute between petitioner and Sh. Rohit was resolved. Petitioner himself brought this fact to the notice of the respondent-University.
12 2025:HHC:18256 Learned counsel submitted that the aforesaid stray and minor incident cannot be held against the petitioner for terminating his service.
Commenting upon the incident of 05.11.2023, learned Senior Counsel for the respondent-University elaborated that fight between two probationers employed in the respondent-University had taken place in broad daylight in the campus of the University. Such unbecoming, irresponsible and indisciplined act of employees could not be tolerated by the employer/respondent-University, which could also leave negative impact upon the students and the staff members. Learned Senior Counsel submitted that the CCTV footage of the incident is available with the respondent. The same was seen and accordingly a decision was taken to put an end to petitioner's probation period.
5. Consideration:-
5(i). Legal Position:- 5(i)(a). Krishnadevaraya Education Trust and
others Versus L.A. Balakrishna2, inter alia, holds that if the termination order on the face of it states that employee's services are being terminated because his performance is not satisfactory, the employer runs the risk 2 AIR 2001 SC 625 13 2025:HHC:18256 of the allegation being made that the order itself casts a stigma. Normally, it is preferred that the order itself does not mention the reason why the services are being terminated. If such order is challenged, the employer will have to indicate the grounds on which the services of a probationer were terminated. Mere fact that in response to the challenge, the employer states that services were not satisfactory would not ipso facto mean that services of the probationer were being terminated by way of punishment.
The probationer is on test and if the services are not found satisfactory, the employer has, in terms of letter of appointment, the right to terminate the services. Relevant paras of the judgment are as under:-
"5. There can be no manner of doubt that the employer is entitled to engage the services of a person on probation. During the period of probation, the suitability of the recruit/appointee has to be seen. If his services are not satisfactory which means that he is not suitable for the job than the employer has a right to terminate the services as a reason thereof. If the termination during probationary period is without any reason, perhaps such an order Would be sought to be challenged on the ground of being arbitrary. Therefore, normally services of an employee on probation would be terminated, when he is found not to be suitable for the job for which he was engaged, without assigning any reason. If the order on the face of it states that his services are being terminated because his performance is not satisfactory, the employer runs the risk of the allegation being made that the order itself casts a stigma. We do not say that such a contention will succeed. Normally, therefore, it is preferred that the order itself does not mention the reason why the services are being terminated.
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6. If such an order is challenged, the employer will have to indicate the grounds on which the services of a probationer were terminated. Mere fact that in response to the challenge, the employer states that the services were. not satisfactory would not ipso facto mean that the services of the probationer were being terminated by way of punishment. The probationer is on test and if the services are found not to be satisfactory, the employer has, in terms of the letter of appointment, the right to terminate the services."
5(i)(b). In Shamsher Singh and Ors. Vs. State of Punjab3, Hon'ble Apex Court reiterated the principles laid down in Purshottam Lal Dhingra Versus Union of India4 that if the termination of service during probation period is sought to be founded on misconduct, negligence, inefficiency or other disqualification, then, it is a punishment; No abstract proposition can be laid down that where the services of a probationer are terminated without saying anything more in the order of termination than that the services are terminated, it can never amount to a punishment in the facts and circumstances of the case. If a probationer is discharged on the ground of misconduct or inefficiency or for similar reason without a proper inquiry and without getting a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against his discharge, it may in a given case amount 3 AIR 1974 SC 2192 4 AIR 1958 SC 36 15 2025:HHC:18256 to removal from service. Paras relevant to the context are extracted below:-
"62. The position of a probationer. was considered by this Court in Purshottam Lal Dhingra v. Union of India (1958) ILLJ 544 SC, Das, C.J., speaking for the Court said that where a person is appointed to a permanent post in Government service on probation the termination of his service during or at the end of the period of probation will not ordinarily and by itself be a punishment because the Government servant so appointed has no right to continue to hold such a post any more than a servant employed on probation by a private employer is entitled to do so. Such a termination does not operate as a forfeiture of any right of a servant to hold the post, for he has no such right. Obviously such a termination cannot be a dismissal, removal or reduction in rank by way of punishment. There are, however, two important observations of Das, C.J., in Dhingra's case (supra). One is that if a right exists under a contract or service Rules to terminate the service the motive operating on the mind of the Government is wholly irrelevant. The other is that if the termination of service is sought to be founded on misconduct, negligence, inefficiency or other disqualification, then it is a punishment and violates Article 311 of the constitution. The reasoning why motive is said to be irrelevant is that it inheres in the state of mind which is not discernible. on the other hand, if termination is founded on misconduct it is objective and is manifest.
63. No abstract proposition can be laid down that where the services of a probationer are terminated without saying anything more in the, order of termination than that the services are terminated it can never amount to a punishment in the facts and circumstances of the case. If a probationer is discharged on the ground of misconduct, or inefficiency or for similar reason without a proper enquiry and without his getting a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against his discharge it may in a given case amount to removal from service within the meaning of Article 311(2) of the Constitution."
16 2025:HHC:18256 5(i)(c). Rajasthan High Court Vs. Ved Priya and Ors.5 holds that the form of an order is not crucial to determine whether it is simpliciter or punitive in nature. An order of termination of service though innocuously worded may also be aimed at punishing the official on probation and in that case it would undoubtedly be an infraction of Article 311 of the Constitution. The Court in the process of judicial review of such order can always lift the veil to find out as to whether or not the order was meant to visit the probationer with penal consequences. If the Court finds that the real motive behind the order was to punish the official, it may always strike down the same for want of reasonable opportunity of being heard. Relevant paras of the judgment are as under:-
"18. Furthermore, there is a subtle, yet fundamental, difference between termination of a probationer and that of a confirmed employee. Although it is undisputed that the State cannot act arbitrarily in either case, yet there has to be a difference in judicial approach between the two. Whereas in the case of a confirmed employee the scope of judicial interference would be more expansive given the protection under Article 311 of the Constitution or the Service Rules but such may not be true in the case of probationers who are denuded of such protection(s) while working on trial basis.
19. Probationers have no indefeasible right to continue in employment until confirmed, and they can be relieved by the competent authority if found unsuitable. Its only in a very limited category of cases that such 5 (2021) 13 SCC 151
17 2025:HHC:18256 probationers can seek protection under the principles of natural justice, say when they are 'removed' in a manner which prejudices their future prospects in alternate fields or casts aspersions on their character or violates their constitutional rights. In such cases of 'stigmatic' removal only that a reasonable opportunity of hearing is sinequanon. Way back in Parshotam Lal Dhingra v. Union of India, AIR 1958 SC 36, a Constitution Bench opined that:
"28.... In short, if the termination of service is founded on the right flowing from contract or the service rules then, prima facie, the termination is not a punishment and carries with it no evil consequences and so Article 311 is not attracted. But even if the Government has, by contract or under the rules, the right to terminate the employment without going through the procedure prescribed for inflicting the punishment of dismissal or removal or reduction in rank, the Government may, nevertheless, choose to punish the servant and if the termination of service is sought to be founded on misconduct, negligence, inefficiency or other disqualification, then it is a punishment and the requirements of Article 311 must be complied with."
20. The order of termination of services of Respondent 1 recites that:
"the Rajasthan High Court, Jodhpur, after examining all the relevant records has been of the opinion that Shri Ved Priya has not made sufficient use of his opportunities and has otherwise also failed to give satisfaction as a probationer in the Rajasthan Judicial Service."
It is explicit from these contents that neither any specific misconduct has been attributed to Respondent 1 nor any allegation made. The order is based upon overall assessment of the performance of Respondent 1 during the period of probation, which was not found satisfactory. Such an inference which can be a valid foundation to dispense with services of a probationer does not warrant holding of an enquiry in terms of Article 311 of the Constitution. It is thus not true on the part of 18 2025:HHC:18256 Respondent 1 to allege that it was a case of an indictment following allegations of corruption against him.
21. True it is that the form of an order is not crucial to determine whether it is simpliciter or punitive in nature. An order of termination of service though innocuously worded may, in the facts and circumstances of a peculiar case, also be aimed at punishing the official on probation and in that case it would undoubtedly be an infraction of Article 311 of the Constitution. The Court in the process of judicial review of such order can always lift the veil to find out as to whether or not the order was meant to visit the probationer with penal consequences. If the Court finds that the real motive be hind the order was to "punish" the official, it may always strike down the same for want of reasonable opportunity of being heard.
22. There is nothing on record in the present case to infer that the motivation behind the removal was any allegation. Instead, it was routine confirmation exercise. The evaluation of services rendered during the probationary period was made at the end of the first respondent's tenure, along with 92 others. Vigilance reports were called not just for Respondent 1petitioner, but also for at least ten other candidates. It is thus clear that the object was not to verify whether the allegations against the first respondent had been proved or not, but merely to ascertain whether there were sufficient reasons or a possible cloud on his suitability, given the higher standard of probity expected of a Judge."
5(i)(d). In Dipti Prakash Banerjee Versus Satyendra Nath Bose National Centre for Basic Sciences, Calcutta and others6, Hon'ble Supreme Court while considering the case of termination of probationer's services, framed following points for consideration:-
"18. On the basis of the above contentions, the following points arise for consideration:6
(1999) 3 SCC 60 19 2025:HHC:18256 (1) In what circumstances, the termination of a probationer's services can be said to be founded on misconduct and in what circumstances could it be said that the allegations were only the motive?
(2) When can an order of termination of a probationer be said to contain an express stigma?
(3) Can the stigma be gathered by referring back to proceedings referred to in the order of termination? (4) To what relief?"
It was held as under on Point No.1 that if the findings were arrived at in an inquiry as to misconduct, behind the back of the officer or without a regular departmental inquiry, the simple order of termination is to be treated as "founded" on the allegations and will be bad.
But if the inquiry was not held, no findings were arrived at and the employer was not inclined to conduct an inquiry, but at the same time, he did not want to continue the employee against whom there were complaints, it would only be a case of motive and the order would not be bad.
Similarly, if the employer did not want to inquire into the truth of allegations, in such circumstances, allegations would be motive & not the foundation and simple order of termination would be valid:-
"19. As to in what circumstances an order of termination of a probationer can be said to be punitive or not depends upon whether certain allegations which are the cause of the termination are the motive or foundation. In this area, as pointed out by Shah, J. (as he then was) in Madan Gopal v.
20 2025:HHC:18256 State of Punjab7 there is no difference between cases where services of a temporary employee are terminated and where a probationer is discharged. This very question was gone into recently in Radhey Shyam Gupta v. U.P. State Agro Industries Corpn. Ltd.8 and reference was made to the development of the law from time to time starting from Parshotam Lal Dhingra v. Union of India9 to the concept of "purpose of enquiry"
introduced by Shah, J. (as he then was) in State of Orissa v. Ram Narayan Das10 and to the sevenJudge Bench decision in Samsher Singh v. State of Punjab11 and to postSamsher Singh caselaw. This Court had occasion to make a detailed examination of what is the "motive" and what is the "foundation" on which the innocuous order is based.
21. If findings were arrived at in an inquiry as to misconduct, behind the back of the officer or without a regular departmental enquiry, the simple order of termination is to be treated as "founded" on the allegations and will be bad. But if the enquiry was not held, no findings were arrived at and the employer was not inclined to conduct an enquiry but, at the same time, he did not want to continue the employee against whom there were complaints, it would only be a case of motive and the order would not be bad. Similar is the position if the employer did not want to enquire into the truth of the allegations because of delay in regular departmental proceedings or he was doubtful about securing adequate evidence. In such a circumstance, the allegations would be a motive and not the foundation and the simple order of termination would be valid.
22. In the light of the above principles, laid down in R.S. Gupta case, we do not think anything more is to be added. Point 1 is decided accordingly."
On Point No.2, Hon'ble Apex Court held as under:-
7AIR 1963 SC 531 8 (1999) 2 SCC 21 9 AIR 1958 SC 36 10 AIR 1961 SC 177 11 (1974) 2 SCC 831 21 2025:HHC:18256
"23. In the present case before us, the order of termination dated 3041997 is not a simple order of termination but is a lengthy order which we have extracted above. It not only says that performance during probation is not satisfactory but also refers to a letter dated 3041996 by which the period of probation was extended by six months from 251996, and to letters dated 17101996 and 31101996. It concludes by saying that the appellant's "conduct, performance, ability and capacity during the whole period of probation" was not satisfactory and that he was considered "unsuitable" for the post for which he was appointed.
25. In the matter of 'stigma', this Court has held that the effect which an order of termination may have on a person's future prospects of employment is a matter of relevant consideration. In the seven Judge case in Samsher Singh vs. State of Punjab12, Ray, CJ observed that if a simple order of termination was passed, that would enable the officer to "make good in other walks of life without a stigma. "It was also stated in Bishan Lal Gupta vs. State of Haryana13 that if the order contained a stigma, the termination would be bad for "the individual concerned must suffer a substantial loss of reputation which may affect his future prospects".
26. There is, however, considerable difficulty in finding out whether in a given case where the order of termination is not a simple order of termination, the words used in the order can be said to contain a 'stigma'. The other issue in the case before us is whether even if the words used in the order of termination are innocuous, the court can go into the words used or language employed in other orders or proceedings referred to by the employer in the order of termination?
29. We may advert to a few cases on the question of stigma. We shall refer initially to cases where a special Rule relating to termination of probationer required a particular condition to be satisfied and where the said condition was referred to in the order of termination. In Hari Singh Mann v. State of Punjab14, the probationer was governed by Rule 8(b) of the Punjab Service Rules, 1959 and the fact that the word 'unfit' as required by the Rules was used, was held not to be a ground for 12 (1974) 2 SCC 831 13 (1978) 1 SCC 202 14 (1975) 3 SCC 182 22 2025:HHC:18256 quashing the order on the ground of 'stigma', for to hold that it amounted to 'stigma' would amount to robbing the authority of the right under the rule. Similarly where a Rule required a show cause notice issued and an inquiry to be conducted before terminating probation, such as Rule 55B of the Central Civil Services (CCA) Rules, there would be no question of characterizing the simple order of termination as one founded on the allegations which were the subject of the inquiry. That was because, in such a case, the purpose of the inquiry was to find out if the officer was to be continued in service and not to find out if he was guilty (State of Orissa v. Ram Narayan Das15, Ranendra Chandra Banerjee v. Union of India16). In State of Gujarat v. Akhilesh C. Bhargav17, the termination order merely referred to Rule 12(bb) of the Indian Police Service (Probationer) Rules, 1959. It was contended that the reference to the said Rule 12(bb) itself amounted to a stigma but this was rejected following Ram Narayan Das case15."
On point No.3, it was held that words amounting to 'stigma' need not be contained in the order of termination, but may also be contained in an order or proceeding referred to in the order of termination or in an annexure thereto and would vitiate the order of termination. The said point was decided as under:-
"35. The above decision is, in our view, clear authority for the proposition that the material which amounts to stigma need not be contained in the order of termination of the probationer but might be contained in any document referred to in the termination order or in its annexures. Obviously such a document could be asked for or called for by any future employer of the probationer. In such a case, the order of termination would stand 15 AIR 1961 SC 177 16 AIR 1963 SC 1552 17 (1987) 4 SCC 482
23 2025:HHC:18256 vitiated on the ground that no regular inquiry was conducted. We shall presently consider whether, on the facts of the case before us, the documents referred to in the impugned order contain any stigma.
36. It was in this context argued for the Respondent that the employer in the present case had given ample opportunity to the employee by giving him warnings, asking him to improve and even extended his probation twice and this was not a case of unfairness and this Court should not interfere. It is true that where the employee had been given suitable warnings, requested to improve, or where he was given a long rope by way of extension of probation, this Court has said that the termination orders cannot be held to be punitive. [See in this connection Hindustan Paper Corpn v. Purnendu Chakrobarty18, Oil & Natural Gas Commission v. Dr. Md. S. Iskender Ali19, Unit Trust of India v. T. Bijaya Kumar20, Principal, Institute of Postgraduate Medical Education & Research, Pondicherry v. S. Andel21 and a labour case Oswal Pressure Die Casting Industry v. Presiding Officer22. But in all these cases, the orders were simple orders of termination which did not contain any words amounting to stigma. In case we come to the conclusion that there is stigma in the impugned order, we cannot ignore the effect it will have on the probationer's future whatever be earlier opportunities granted by the respondent organization to the appellant to improve.
37. On this point, therefore, we hold that the words amounting to "stigma" need not be contained in the order of termination but may also be contained in an order or proceeding referred to in the order of termination or in an annexure thereto and would vitiate the order of termination. Point 3 is decided accordingly."
5(i)(e). In Pinky Meena Versus The High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan at Jodhpur & Anr., in context of termination of a Judicial Officer in the State of Rajasthan 18 (1996) 11 SCC 404 19 (1980) 3 SCC 428 20 (1992) 5 SLR 855 (SC) 21 1995 Supp (4) SCC 609 22 (1998) 3 SCC 225 24 2025:HHC:18256 during her probation period, the related principles were summarized by the Hon'ble Apex Court as under:-
"24. The services of a probationer could result either in a confirmation in the post or ended by way of termination simpliciter. However, if a probationer is terminated from service owing to a misconduct as a punishment, the termination would cause a stigma on him. If a probationer is unsuitable for a job and has been terminated then such a case is nonstigmatic as it is a termination simpliciter. Thus, the performance of a probationer has to be considered in order to ascertain whether it has been satisfactory or unsatisfactory. If the performance of a probationer has been unsatisfactory, he is liable to be terminated by the employer without conducting any inquiry. No right of hearing is also reserved with the probationer and hence, there would be no violation of principles of natural justice in such a case.
25. As noted, if a termination from service is not visited with any stigma and neither are there any civil consequences and nor is founded on misconduct, then, it would be a case of termination simpliciter. On the other hand, an assessment of remarks pertaining to the discharge of duties during the probationary period even without a finding of misconduct and termination on the basis of such remarks or assessment will be by way of punishment because such remarks or assessment would be stigmatic. According to the dictionary meaning, stigma is indicative of a blemish, disgrace indicating a deviation from a norm. Stigma might be inferred from the references quoted in the termination order although the order itself might not contain anything offensive. Where there is a discharge from service after prescribed probation period was completed and the discharge order contain allegations against a probationer and surrounding circumstances also showed that discharge was not based solely on the assessment of the employee's work and conduct during probation, the termination was held to be stigmatic and punitive vide Jaswantsingh Pratapsingh Jadeja vs. Rajkot Municipal Corporation, (2007) 10 SCC 71.
26. Even though a probationer has no right to hold a post, it would not imply that the mandate of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution could be violated inasmuch as there
25 2025:HHC:18256 cannot be any arbitrary or discriminatory discharge or an absence of application of mind in the matter of assessment of performance and consideration of relevant materials. Thus, in deciding whether, in a given case, a termination was by way of punishment or not, the courts have to look into the substance of the matter and not the form.
27. Further, the order discharging the appellant from service violates principles of natural justice, as the appellant was not provided an opportunity to be heard during the enquiry that was required to be conducted. At this juncture, reliance is placed on Shamsher Singh v. State of Punjab (1974) 2 SCC 831, which clarified that:
"No abstract proposition can be laid down that where the services of a probationer are terminated without saying anything more in the order of termination than that the services are terminated it can never amount to a punishment in the facts and circumstances of the case. If a probationer is discharged on the ground of misconduct, or inefficiency or for similar reason without a proper enquiry and without his getting a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against his discharge it may in a given case amount of removal from service within the meaning of Art. 311 (2) of the Constitution."
32. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed and the show cause notice dated 17.02.2020 and the discharge order dated 29.05.2020 are quashed. The appellant shall be entitled to reinstatement in service forthwith with all consequential benefits, including, fixation of seniority as per the merit list in the examination in question, notional fixation of pay, except back wages. It is further clarified that the respondent shall treat the appellant as to have successfully completed her probation period and the appellant shall be treated as a confirmed employee."
5(ii). Before delving into merits of the matter against backdrop of above legal position, it needs to be mentioned that the respondent is the National Law University, a 26 2025:HHC:18256 premier legal education institute in the State of Himachal Pradesh. It is expected of it to maintain its records in accordance with the well-established conventions and norms. It has been indeed very astonishing to note that not only the records have not been maintained by the University in accordance with established parameters, but in the instant case, one page of noting sheet had been admittedly pre-fixed to the already existing four noting sheets, while producing the record of the case before the Court thereby also altering the pagination of the noting sheets. And all this was done by none else, but its Registrar-the Senior-Most Officer of the respondent-
University.
Though learned Senior Counsel for the respondent-University has assured that the University is seriously viewing the whole matter as also this particular episode and that it intends to take appropriate action in the matter, yet this Court will be failing in its duty if it does not express its deep displeasure in the matter. It is hoped & expected that the respondent-University will take due & appropriate call and action in accordance with law against all concerned including those involved in producing the record before the Court in this case.
27 2025:HHC:18256 5(ii)(a). Respondent-University has 'terminated' petitioner's services and brought his probation period to an end invoking & also citing Clause 2 of his appointment order in the termination order. The said clause empowered the respondent to terminate petitioner's service at any time during probation period on ground of unsatisfactory work performance. At the time of termination of petitioner's service, he had completed 19 months out of his total 24 months of mandatory probation period, which of course could have been extended by another 12 months by the respondent.
For bringing petitioner's probation period to an end, the respondent in its reply had fixed the cause upon petitioner being non-performer; derelict; his having displayed a consistent negative pattern raising serious concerns about his work & conduct; his lack of commitment, dedication & loyalty to the respondent-
University. But for repetitive use of these adjectives to describe petitioner's work performance, the reply did not elaborate the matter, viz. issuance of any notice, advice, reprimand, warning or action taken against the petitioner concerning his work and conduct. To ascertain this, record was called for. The record so produced opened another 28 2025:HHC:18256 Pandora box, which as observed earlier, this Court is not looking into with hope and trust placed upon respondent-
University's affirmation that it would itself set its house in order & take all appropriate measures for maintaining the record in the manner it ought to be maintained and will take action against all those responsible for not doing the same as per established office procedure including the instant case episode, where a page has been subsequently added to the numbered noting sheets while producing the record in Court.
No warning, reprimand, advice, advisory, oral or written warning, notice ever issued to the petitioner about deficiencies/shortcomings in petitioner's work and conduct was visible in the record produced by the respondent. It is fine to emphatically plead in reply using strong words to emphasize that petitioner's probation period was put to an end on account of unsatisfactory work performed by him during his entire probation period, but this position should have also been reflected by the record. It did not. There was not even a single paper on record, which would demonstrate respondent's issuing any notice, advice, advisory, warning or any letter to the petitioner, adversely commenting upon his work and conduct. Without any 29 2025:HHC:18256 reservation, it can be concluded on facts that the defence taken by the respondent about petitioner being a consistent non-performer, has no foundation. The Registrar of the respondent-University has admitted to having appended the first page of the noting sheet to the existing four pages while producing the record in the Court. In the given admitted facts, the first page of the noting sheet, ideally deserves to be discarded altogether, leaving it for the University to decipher about the veracity of its contents and its existence prior to production of the record in the Court.
Nonetheless, even if this page is taken into consideration, primafacie it gives the impression of having been prepared at a later date to pile up all alleged previous negligent acts of the petitioner and at the same time, keeps the allegations vague. If indeed there had been allegations against petitioner's work, the same are at least not discernible from record. Not a single complaint against the petitioner forms part of record. In case petitioner's performance was way too short of University's standards and his work being adversely commented upon by the teachers and students alike throughout his probation period, this fact ought to find mention and reflect from some contemporary record.
Furthermore, in case petitioner's work and performance 30 2025:HHC:18256 was such as is alluded to in the first page of noting sheet (added subsequently), then it is all the more surprising that the respondent-University did not terminate petitioner's service earlier and allowed him to complete 19 out of 24 months of probationary service period and also deferred recording his Annual Confidential Report. The first page of the noting sheets, its contents and the circumstances surrounding it are not enough to dispel the first impression, which one gets of it having been generated subsequently. Be that as it may, this aspect has been left at the wisdom of the respondent-University to introspect and take requisite action. Having observed this, nonetheless the contents of the page were essential to be considered and have otherwise been examined for the purpose of ascertaining merits of respondent's defence and are not found to be supported by any other document/record. It is a standalone page.
5(ii)(b). It is quite evident from the record that real reason for putting an end to petitioner's probation period on 06.11.2023 is the incident that happened on 05.11.2023.
This also finds mention at page 2 of the noting sheets (originally numbered as page '1'). The contents of this page [extracted in para 4(i)(b)] are that:-
31 2025:HHC:18256 Petitioner had lodged a written complaint against his co-worker.
The Deputy Registrar (Estt.), Dean Students Welfare and the Registrar of the respondent-University inquired into the complaint and the incident. Veracity of the occurrence was ascertained from the employees present on spot. Video record of the incident provided by the IT Cell was also viewed, which showed both the employees misbehaving using abusive language (not clear whether CCTV footage also had audio in it) and causing physical injuries to each other.
'After thorough inquiry, it was found that the complainant had also taken part in the scuffle at the parking area of the University'.
In view of above inquiry conducted into the matter, the three officials of the respondent-University concluded that petitioner's probation period against a substantive post should be brought to an end in terms of Clause 2 of his appointment order.
5(iii). From the above sequence of events, definite conclusions can be drawn that:-
32 2025:HHC:18256 It was the petitioner who on 05.11.2023, had lodged a written complaint with respondent-University of his having been assaulted by a co-worker.
Petitioner's complaint was looked into. Three officials of the respondent-University, viz. the Deputy Registrar (Estt.), the Dean Students Welfare and the Registrar, inquired in the matter:-
They obtained information from the employees present on the spot.
Watched the video record of the incident provided by the IT Cell and from the CCTV footage, not only saw the two employees including the petitioner engaged in scuffle with each other, but also 'heard' them using abusive language.
On the basis of above inquiry, the officials deemed it appropriate to put to an end petitioner's service against a substantive post during probation period.
The respondent had admittedly conducted an inquiry into the alleged incident. And, it was on the basis of this inquiry that petitioner's services were terminated. It was a case of stigmatic termination of petitioner's service during probation period. It is not the case of respondent 33 2025:HHC:18256 that petitioner was even associated during inquiry. It is not the case of the respondent that any FIR was registered against the petitioner about the incident or that he was booked and detained in custody in relation to the occurrence that took place on 05.11.2023, prompting them to terminate petitioner's service during probation period.
There is no specific denial to petitioner's pleaded case that he was the victim in the specific assault incident or that he & the other employee had later mutually resolved the issue between them. In the backdrop of law settled by Hon'ble Apex Court, it is writ large from the case file and record that:-
Respondent had terminated petitioner's regular service against a substantive post during probation period citing Clause 2 of the appointment order in the termination order. Clause 2 of the appointment order pertained to bringing probation period to an end on account of unsatisfactory work performance. The reply filed by the respondent uses very strong adjectives to describe petitioner having failed to discharge his duties to the satisfaction of all concerned through his probational tenure, which is said to have prompted the BOG to terminate petitioner's service during this period. However, no particular incident, warning/notice 34 2025:HHC:18256 etc. ever issued to the petitioner had been mentioned in the reply.
Since the reply leveled serious, but generalized allegations against petitioner's work performance during his probation period and this was the given justification for terminating his services, a need was felt for summoning the record of the case. The record manifested altering of pagination of noting sheets in order to accommodate an additional page of noting sheet. Incidentally, this additional page added subsequently does not find mention in the later noting sheets, wherein actual reason to terminate petitioner's services has been elaborated. The later noting sheets originally paginated as 1, 2, 3 and 4 (subsequently altered in handwriting to 2, 3, 4 and 5) puts genesis of termination of petitioner's service during probation period to an incident that took place between petitioner and another worker on 05.11.2023. The record produced by the respondent reveals that it was the petitioner, who had complained in writing to the University on 05.11.2023 about him being a victim of an assault by a co-worker. It is an admitted position that the aforesaid matter thereafter was resolved by both the co-workers amongst themselves. No FIR was registered in the matter. However, the three officials of the respondent- University conducted an inquiry into the matter, 35 2025:HHC:18256 verified the occurrence allegedly from those present at the spot of occurrence, saw the CCTV footage of the occurrence and as the noting sheet puts it, also heard from the CCTV footage the abuses allegedly hurled by the petitioner during scuffle and on the basis of inquiry so conducted drew a conclusion that petitioner was also actively taking part in the scuffle and that his services were liable to be terminated. Petitioner's termination during probation period is based upon an inquiry conducted by the three officials of the respondent-University during which he was not associated. In the given facts and circumstances, termination of petitioner's service during probation period cannot be termed as simpliciter. It is punitive, stigmatic & non-compliant to well established procedural conventions & rules of natural justice and hence, liable to be quashed.
5(iv). The Result:-
For all the foregoing reasons, this writ petition is allowed. Impugned order dated 06.11.2023 (Annexure P-3), terminating petitioner's service during probation period, is quashed and set aside. The respondent is directed to reinstate the petitioner in service forthwith. It shall, however, be open for the respondent-University to extend 36 2025:HHC:18256 the probation period of the petitioner and judge the same in accordance with law.
The writ petition stands disposed of in the above terms, so also the pending miscellaneous application(s), if any.
Jyotsna Rewal Dua
June 16, 2025 Judge
Mukesh