Allahabad High Court
Prem Jeet Singh Gujral S/O Late Avtar ... vs Debt Recovery Appellate Tribunal ... on 20 July, 2005
Equivalent citations: AIR2005ALL351, 2005(4)AWC3858-O, II(2007)BC561, [2006]130COMPCAS438(ALL), AIR 2005 ALLAHABAD 351, (2005) 99 REVDEC 409, (2005) 60 ALL LR 677, (2007) 3 BANKCAS 561, (2006) 130 COMCAS 438, (2005) 4 ALL WC 3858
Author: Arun Tandon
Bench: Arun Tandon
JUDGMENT Arun Tandon, J.
1. Heard Sri Sashi Nandan, Senior Advocate assisted by Sri Anurag Jauhari, Advocate on behalf of the petitioner, and Sri Sanjeev Singh, Advocate on behalf of respondent No. 2.
2. The Bank of Baroda, Fatehpur Main. Branch though its Branch Manager (respondent No. 2), which is a banking company duly constituted under the Banking Companies (Acqisition and Transfer of Undertakings), Act, 1970, filed a civil suit in the Judgeship of Fatehpur in the year 1995 for a money decree of Rs. 28,41,263/-, against the principal-borrower,Sri Guru Bachan Singh as well as against the guarantor Sri Prern Jeet Singh Gujral. The suit was registered as Original Suit No. 84 of 1995. During the pendency of the said suit proceedings, a Tribunal was constituted under Section 3 of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institution Act, 1993 (hereinafter referred to as the 1993 Act) at Jabalpur Accordingly the proceedings were transferred to the said Tribunal at Jabalpur. However, a Tribunal was constituted at Allahabad, the proceedings were therefore, transferred to the Tribunal at Allahabad under Section 31 of the 1993 Act
3. The Presiding Officer, Debts Recovery Tribunal at Allahabad by means of the order dated 16th June, 2003 dismissed the suit filed by the Bank. Feeling aggrieved by the aforesaid order of the Presiding Officer Debts Recovery Tribunal, Allahabad the respondent-bank filed an appeal under Section 20 of the 1993 Act The appeal was numbered as Apppeal No. 323 of 2003. The Debt Recovery Appellate Tribunal, Allahabad by means of the judgment and order dated 3rd June, 2005 has allowed the appeal so filed.by the respondent-bank and has remanded the matter for reconsideration to Debt Recovery Tribunal, Allahabad; The said order of demand of the
4. Debt Recovery Appellate Tribunal, Allahabad has been challenged by means of the present writ petition.
5. On behalf of the petitioner various pleas and grounds have been raised for the purposes of challenging the aforesaid Judgment and order of remand passed by the Debt Recovery Appellate Tribunal, Allahabad.
6. However, this Court is not Inclined to interfere wit. the order of remand passed by the Debt Recovery Appellate Tribunal, Allahabad at this stage, inasmuch as the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in its recent Judgment in the case of Mangla Prasad Tamoli (D) by LRs. v. Narvdeshwar Mishra (D) by LRs, and Ors. reported in 2005 (2) AWC 1305 (SC) paras 13,14 and 15, has held as follows:
"13. When we put to the learned counsel as to how, he could in the present appeal filed in the year 2999, challenge the order of remand made by the Judgment of the High Court on January 18,1966 in Second Appeal No. 3033 of 58, the learned counsel drew our attention to the decision of this Court in Kshitish Chandra Bose v. Commissioner of Ranchi, (1981)2 SCC 764, as authority for the proposition that an order of remand by the High Court being an interloctory Judgment which did not terminate the proceedings, it is open to the aggrieved party to; challenge it after the final judgment. This Court in Satyadhyan Ghosal and Ors. v. Smt. Deorajin Debi and Anr., , under similar circumstances, took the view that an order of remand was an interloctory judgment which did not terminate the proceedings and hence could be challenged in an appeal from the final order. This view was again reiterated in K.C. Bose (supra) wherein it is observed (p. 767) :
"Mr. Sinha appearing for the respondent was unable to the any authority of this Court taking a contrary view or overriding the decisions referred to above. In this view of the matter we are of the opinion that it is open to the appeliant to assail even the first Judgment of the High Court and if, we hold that this judgment was legally erroneous then all the subsequent proceedings. namely the order of remand, the order passed after remand, the appeal and the second judgment given by the high Court in appeal against the order of remand would become nonest."
14. Having considered the questions urged by the Seamed counsel, which appear to be backed by the two decisions of this Court, in the background of the facts of the case before us, we are satisfied that the appellants are entitled to succeed on both counts.
15. The trial court and the first appellate court had held that the suit for redemption brought by the plaintiff was premature and rightly dismissed it. It is the High Cant; by its judgment dated 18.1.1956 in Second Appeal No. 3033/58, which took an erroneous view that because of the plaintiffs advocate had stated that he would not seek delivery of possession before stipulated time (26.1.1968)1 the suit could be continued. it was on this wrong understanding of the legal position that the remand order dated January 18, 1966, came to be made by the High Court pursuant to which the appeal and further proceedings continued. If this remand order was bad in law, then all further proceedings consequent thereto would be non-est and have to be necessarily set aside. That the appellants are entitled to urge this point even at this point of time, is supported by the authority of this Court in Gangadhar (supra)."
7. In view of the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court the order of remand being an interlocutory order of the Court, which has not terminated the proceedings, and hence can always be challenged in an appeal from the final order by the petitioner after final judgment The writ petition is accordingly dismissed. However, it shall be open to the petitioner to challenge the order of remand in an appeai from the final order as an when cause for same arises.
8. It has been pointed out on behalf of the petitioner that the Presiding Officer Debt Recovery Tribunal, Allahabad has fixed today as the date for final hearing after remand. In the facts and circumstances of the Case it is provided that the petitioner may make a request to the Presiding Officer, Debts Recovery Tribunal, Allahabad for adjournment of the case to some other date so as to enable them to produce a copy of the order passed today before the Presiding Officer, D.R.T., Allahabad. On such request being made the Court has not room to doubt that the Presiding Officer, Debts Recovery Tribunal, Allahabad shall consider the request of the petitioner sympathetically. However, such adjournment may be granted for a week only.