Jharkhand High Court
D.M. Minerals Pvt. Ltd vs The State Of Jharkhand Through The ... on 16 October, 2025
Author: Sujit Narayan Prasad
Bench: Sujit Narayan Prasad
2025:JHHC:32261-DB
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
W.P.(C) No.4561 of 2019
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D.M. Minerals Pvt. Ltd., a company incorporated under the
Companies Act having its registered office at 114/1 Bauri
Para Lane, P.O. & P.S. Bauri Para Lane, District Kolkata,
West Bengal through its Director Shyam Sunder Joshi,
aged about 55 years, son of Late Ram Swaroop Joshi,
resident of 14/1 Sovaram Basak Street, C.I.T Park, P.O. &
P.S. Barabazar, District- Kolkata, West Bengal.
... ... Petitioner
Versus
1. The State of Jharkhand through the Principal Secretary,
Department of Mines and Geology, Government of
Jharkhand, Yojana Bhawan, P.O. & P.S.- Doranda,
District- Ranchi.
2. The Director, Department of Mines and Geology,
Government of Jharkhand, Yojana Bhawan, P.O. & P.S.-
Doranda, District- Ranchi.
3. The Deputy Commissioner, West Singhbhum, P.O.
Chaibasa, P.S. Sadar, District West Singhbhum.
4. The District Mining Officer, West Singhbhum, P.O.
Chaibasa, P.S. Sadar, District West Singhbhum.
5. The Union of India through the Secretary, Ministry of
Mines, Government of India, Shashtri Bhawan, Dr.
Rajendra Prasad Road, P.O., P.S. and District New Delhi.
... ... Respondents
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CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ARUN KUMAR RAI
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For the Petitioner : Mr. Indrajit Sinha, Advocate
: Mr. Rahul Kumar, Advocate
: Mr. Ankit Vishal, Advocate
For the State : Mr. Ratnesh Kumar, SC(L&C)-I
: Mr. Rakesh Kr. Shahi, A.C. to A.G.
For the U.O.I. : Mr. Shiv Kumar Sharma, C.G.C.
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C.A.V. on 22.09.2025 Pronounced on 16/10/2025
Per Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.
1. The writ petition is under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for issuance of following reliefs: - 1
2025:JHHC:32261-DB "1(i) For issuance of appropriate Writ(s) /Order (s) /Direction(s) in the nature of certiorari to quash and declare the Rule 9(10) of the Jharkhand Minor Mineral Concession Amendment Rules, 2017 notified vide Notification No. 149 dated 02.03.2017 as ultra vires to be in contravention with Sections 8A(3) and 8A(6) of the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Amendment Act, 2015.
(ii) For issuance of appropriate Writ(s) /Order (s) /Direction(s) commanding upon the Respondents to extend the lease-hold of the Petitioner for China Clay for a period of 50 years as stipulated in terms of Mines and Minerals Development and Regulation Amendment Act 2015 which, provided for deemed extension of the mining lease for a period till 31.03.2020 or 50 years, whichever is later."
Factual Matrix
2. The brief facts of the case as stated in the writ petition which are required to be enumerated, are being referred herein: -
The Petitioner was granted a mining lease for China Clay over an area of 38.40 hectares of land in village Gondkida, District West Singhbhum for a period of ten years w.e.f. 09.01.1979.
3. The said mining lease was renewed for a period of 10 years w.e.f. 09.01.1989 and the lease deed for the said renewal was executed on 30.03.1999.
4. The Petitioner filed an application for second renewal of the aforesaid mining lease on 01.07.1997 for a period of 20 years w.e.f. 09.01.1999 which was duly 2 2025:JHHC:32261-DB acknowledged in Form-D by the Assistant Mining Officer, Chaibasa and a recommendation was made by the Deputy Commissioner, West Singhbhum for the grant of approval and was subsequently forwarded to the Director (Mines), Department of Mines and Geology, Government of Bihar vide letter contained in Memo No. 1117/M dated 20.07.2000.
5. The Petitioner had applied for a renewal of lease deed for a further period of 20 years w.e.f. 09.01.1999 and application was made on 09.01.2009 which was again duly acknowledged by the District Mining Officer in Form-D dated 04.01.2008 and recommended and forwarded by the Deputy Commissioner to the Director (Mines) vide letter contained in Memo No. 916/M dated 07.05.2008.
6. It is the case of the petitioner that the above- mentioned renewal applications were kept pending by the Respondent authorities for long, hence the Petitioner Company continued working under deemed extension of the lease deed applicable then.
7. During the pendency of the renewal applications, the Central Government promulgated the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Amendment Ordinance, 2015 which was passed as an Amendment Act, 2015 on 27.03.2015 w.e.f. 12.01.2015.
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8. The said Amendment brought about a notable change in Section 8 of the MMDR Act, 1957 and inserted a new section 8A for regulating the period of mining leases of minerals. Said amendment brought about remarkable changes in the power of State Government in matters of grant of and extension of mining leases.
9. Since the Petitioner Company has been granted the mining lease for non-captive purposes, hence, Section 8A(6) is attracted in the matter and in view of the fact that the Petitioner fulfills all the terms and conditions of the lease deed, the Petitioner Company became entitled for deemed extension of its mining lease for a period of 50 years w.e.f. 09.01.1979.
10. Subsequent to the amendment in the MMDR Act, 1957, the Central Government vide its notification dated 10.02.2015, notified China Clay as minor mineral in exercise of power conferred upon it under Section 3(e) of the MMDR Act, 1957.
11. It is the case of the petitioner that the said notification pronouncing China Clay as a minor mineral came into force on 10.02.2015, but prior to the coming into force of the said notification when China Clay was still a major mineral, the mining lease of Petitioner Company has already deemed to have been extended by operation of law for a period of 50 years w.e.f. 09.01.1979 under the Mines 4 2025:JHHC:32261-DB and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Amendment Ordinance, 2015 which was later enacted as Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Amendment Act, 2015 with effect from 12.01.2015.
12. It is the case of the petitioner that since China Clay was a major mineral on the date when the Amendment Act, 2015 came into force, the Petitioner Company vide its representation dated 08.10.2015 and dated 12.10.2015 requested the Respondent authorities to pass appropriate orders under the Jharkhand Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 2004 for the grant of extension of its mining lease till 08.01.2029 i.e. 50 years from the date of grant of original deed.
13. After lapse of about two years, the State Government belatedly notified 31 minerals including China Clay as minor minerals within the ambit of Jharkhand Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 2004 vide notification dated 06.09.2016 which was later published as Gazette Notification No. 108 dated 27.01.2017.
14. Since there was an inordinate delay in the matter of passing an order regarding the pending renewal applications of the Petitioner Company, it was compelled to approach the High Court by filing writ petition being W.P. (C) No. 932/2017 for extension of its mining lease for 50 years with effect from date of first grant. 5
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15. During pendency of the said writ application, the State Government notified the Jharkhand Minor Mineral Concession Amendment Rules, 2017 vide Gazette notification no. 149 dated 02.03.2017 and inserted Rule 9(10) allowing deemed extension of the mining lease of the 31 recently notified minor minerals for a period upto 31.03.2020 and in view of the above-mentioned notification, the Petitioner withdrew its writ application which was allowed by the Hon'ble Court vide order dated 27.03.2017.
16. It is the further case of the writ petitioner that thereafter, the Deputy Commissioner, Chaibasa granted an extension of the mining lease of the Petitioner Company for a period upto 31.03.2020 by executing a supplementary lease deed registered on 31.08.2017 and subsequently the consent to operate was granted by the Jharkhand State Pollution Control Board vide letter contained in Memo No. 2064 dated 29.12.2017.
17. It is contention of the petitioner that the development and regulation of Mines is a subject matter of both Union and State List, and hence, the deemed extension of mining lease in terms of MMDR Act shall prevail over any other enactment curtailing the period of lease. The Central Legislation i.e. amended M.M.D.R. Act provides for the deemed extension of the mining lease for a 6 2025:JHHC:32261-DB period of 50 years or a period upto 31.03.2020, whichever is later, but the State Law has omitted to incorporate the words "for a period of 50 years" and only stipulates for the extension of mining lease for a period upto 31.03.2020, which is in contravention to the Central enactment. Submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner
18. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, at the outset, has submitted that he is not pressing the prayer being prayer No.1(i) which pertains to assailing the validity of Rule 9(10) of the Jharkhand Minor Mineral Concession Amendment Rules, 2017. However, it has been submitted that prayer No.1(ii) is being pressed.
19. The learned counsel, in order to press the prayer No.1(ii), has taken the following grounds: -
(i) The lease of the writ petitioner has been granted sometime in the year 1979 for China Clay, the day when the China Clay was under the major mineral.
(ii) Initially the lease was for 10 years and it has been extended up to the year 1999.
(iii) The due application was submitted for extension of the lease deed but the said application was kept pending.7
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(iv) It has been submitted that in the meanwhile, the nature of China Clay has been changed from major mineral to minor mineral.
(v) The ground, therefore, has been taken that the lease deed was under the major mineral granted in the year 1979 and the due application was pending before the State authority for its extension after the year 1999 and in the meanwhile, due to the amendment incorporated in Section 8A by virtue of amendment in the MMDR Act, 2015, particularly, Section 8A(3) thereof, the subsisting period for the mining lease will be for 50 years which will be counted from the year 1979 and, as such, the validity of the lease deed would be up to the year 2029.
(vi) It has been contended that even accepting that the nature of China Clay has been changed from major mineral to minor mineral, then also in view of the provision of Rule 9(छ) of JMMC Rule 2004 (herein referred as rule 2004), the validity of the lease will be till the date of its operation and by taking aid of Section 8A(3) of the Act 1957, the same will be valid upto the year 2029 even if it has come under the fold of minor mineral.
(vii) The argument has been advanced that the provision as under Rule 9(छ) of Rules 2004 takes care of the 8 2025:JHHC:32261-DB interest of the writ petitioner reason being, the provision has been made therein that even though after 31.03.2022 the allotment is to be made only through auction and there will be no renewal/extension but if the validity of lease is beyond the period of 31.03.2022 then till the date of validity, the lease will be operative. Herein, by virtue of provision of Section 8A(3) of the Act 1957, the validity of lease will be for 50 years from the date of grant of lease, i.e., on 09.01.1979, which will end in the year 2029 and hence, the lease will be valid up to 08.01.2029 even though the statutory restriction is available under Rule 9(छ) of Rules 2004.
(viii) Learned counsel has relied upon the following judgments in support of his argument on the issue of deeming fiction of the statutory provision: -
(i) State of Bombay v. Pandurang Vinayak Chaphalkar and Others [(1953) 1 SCC 425]
(ii) Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. V. P. Kesavan and Another [(2004) 9 SCC 772]
(iii) Manish Trivedi v. State of Rajasthan [(2014) 14 SCC 420]
(iv) Common Cause v. Union of India and Others [(2016) 11 SCC 455]
(v) Krishna Rai (Dead) through legal representatives and others v. Banaras Hindu 9 2025:JHHC:32261-DB University through Registrar and Others [(2022) 8 SCC 713] Submission made by the learned counsel for the State
20. Per contra, Mr. Ratnesh Kumar, learned Standing Counsel (L&C)-I, appearing for the State, while opposing the ground taken on behalf of the petitioner has submitted that it is not a case where the provision of Section 8A is applicable since Section 8A of the Act 1957 does not include the China Clay, rather, the China Clay is under the Second Schedule which is to be dealt with under the relevant provision of Rule 9 of the JMMC Rule 2004 .
21. The ground has been taken that it is incorrect on the part of the writ petitioner to take aid of the provision of Section 8A of the M.M.D.R. Act, 1957, reason being that the petitioner, after the completion of the period of lease of 10 years, which was extended and when it was operative till the year 1999, made due application for extension/renewal but when no order was passed on his application, the petitioner filed writ petition being W.P.(C) No.932/2017 but subsequently the said writ petition was withdrawn.
Thereafter, the writ petitioner has made application for renewal of the lease which has been considered in terms of the provision of Jharkhand Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 2004 after the China Clay having been declared to 10 2025:JHHC:32261-DB be minor mineral. The lease was granted and lost its validity after 31.03.2020.
22. It has, therefore, been contended that once the writ petitioner himself has accepted the jurisdiction of the Jharkhand Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 2004, now it is not available for him to take aid of the provision of Section 8A(3) of the Act 1957 to count the validity of the period of lease of 50 years from 1979, rather, the validity of the lease has already expired on 31.03.2020 and on consideration of the provision of Rule 9(छ) of Rule 2004, there cannot be any extension/renewal of the lease after 31.03.2022.
23. The argument has been advanced that the judgments upon which the reliance has been placed are not applicable in the facts of the present case. Submission of the learned counsel for the Union of India:
24. The Learned Counsel for Union of India has submitted that in exercise of powers conferred by clause (e) of Section 3 of MMDR Act the Central Government vide Notification dated 10.02.2015 declared 31 minerals as minor mineral and in the said list China-Clay was included. Therefore, it has been contended that since as per Section 14 of the Act 1957, provisions of Section 5 to 13 of the Act do not apply to the minor mineral therefore Section 8A will not be applicable herein.
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25. It has further been contended that by virtue of Section 15 of the Act 1957 the State Governments are empowered to make rules for regulating the grant of quarry leases, mining leases or other mineral concessions in respect of minor minerals and for purposes connected therewith, and since the China-clay has been notified as minor mineral and in view thereof, the case of the petitioner has to be regulated in accordance with provisions of JMMC Rule 2004, as amended time to time.
Consideration
26. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and gone through the pleading made in the writ petition as also the relevant provisions of law which require consideration in the present case.
27. This Court, on consideration of the rival submission, needs to consider the following issues: -
(i) Whether the provision of Section 8A of the M.M.D.R. Act, 1957 is applicable once the writ petitioner has accepted the jurisdiction of the Jharkhand Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 2004 by making application and based upon that the lease was extended till 31.03.2020, after change in the nature of China Clay from Major to Minor Mineral?12
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(ii) Whether the supplementary lease can be construed to be the subsisting lease/currency of lease within the meaning of section 8(A)(3)?
28. This Court deems it fit and proper to refer some admitted facts before answering the said issues.
29. The lease was granted in favour of the writ petitioner to carry out the mining operation of China Clay sometime in the year 1979 and in consequence thereof, a lease deed was entered into on 09.01.1979 which was initially for 10 years.
30. The validity of lease was extended for a further period of 10 years making it operative up to 08.01.1999.
31. The writ petitioner, before expiry of the period of lease, has made application for further renewal. While it was lying pending, the nature of China Clay has been changed from Major Mineral to Minor Mineral by virtue of notification issued by the competent authority.
32. The writ petitioner has filed writ petition being W.P.(C) No.932/2017 for extension of its mining lease for 50 years with effect from the date of its initiation.
33. It needs to refer herein that the writ petition being W.P.(C) No.932/2017 was preferred after lapse of about 18 years from the date of expiry of the period of lease which expired in the year 1999 but the same has been withdrawn vide order dated 27.03.2017.
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34. The reason for withdrawal of the writ petition was that the State Government has notified the Jharkhand Minor Mineral Concession Amendment Rules, 2017 vide Gazette Notification No.149 dated 02.03.2017 and inserted Rule 9(10) allowing deemed extension of the mining lease of 31 recently notified minor mineral for the period 31.03.2020.
35. The writ petitioner, in view of the aforesaid notification, withdrew its writ petition which was allowed by this Court vide order dated 27.03.2017.
36. The Deputy Commissioner, Chaibasa, thereafter, has granted extension of the mining lease of the Petitioner Company for a period upto 31.03.2020 by executing a supplementary lease deed registered on 31.08.2017. The aforesaid fact would be evident from averment made in paragraphs 20, 21, 22 and 23 of the instant writ petition which are being referred herein: -
"20. That it is submitted that since there was an inordinate delay in the matter of passing an order regarding the pending renewal applications of the Petitioner Company, it was compelled to approach the Hon'ble High Court vide W.P. (C) No. 932/2017 for extension of its mining lease for 50 years with effect from date of first grant.
21. That it is submitted that during the pendency of the said writ application, the State Government notified the Jharkhand Minor Mineral Concession Amendment Rules, 2017 vide Gazette notification no. 149 dated 02.03.2017 and inserted Rule 9(10) allowing deemed extension of the mining 14 2025:JHHC:32261-DB lease of the 31 recently notified minor minerals for a period upto 31.03.2020.
22. That it is submitted that in view of the above-mentioned notification, the Petitioner withdrew its writ application which was allowed by the Hon'ble Court vide order dated 27.03.2017.
23. That it is submitted that thereafter, the Deputy Commissioner, Chaibasa granted an extension of the mining lease of the Petitioner Company for a period upto 31.03.2020 by executing a supplementary lease 31,08 deed registered on 12.09.2017 and subsequently the consent to operate was granted by the Jharkhand State Pollution Control Board vide letter contained in Memo No. 2064 dated 29.12.2017."
37. From the factual aspect it is evident that the writ petitioner has filed the instant writ petition after the amendment in the M.M.D.R. Act, 1957 inserting the provision of Section 8A wherein the provision has been made with respect to the period of grant of mining lease for minerals other than Coal, Lignite and atomic minerals, for ready reference, Section 8A is being quoted hereunder as :-
"8A. (1) The provisions of this section shall apply to minerals other than those specified in Part A and Part B of the First Schedule.
(2) On and from the date of the commencement of the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Amendment Act, 2015, all mining leases shall be granted for the period of fifty years.
(3) All mining leases granted before the commencement of the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Amendment Act, 2015 shall be deemed to have been granted for a period of fifty years.
(4) On the expiry of the lease period, the lease shall be put up for auction as per the procedure specified in this Act.15
2025:JHHC:32261-DB (5) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-sections (2), (3) and sub-section (4), the period of lease granted before the date of commencement of the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Amendment Act, 2015, where mineral is used for captive purpose, shall be extended and be deemed to have been extended up to a period ending on 31st March, 2030 with effect from the date of expiry of the period of renewal last made or till the completion of renewal period, if any, or a period of fifty years from the date of grant of such lease, whichever is later, subject to the condition that all the terms and conditions of the lease have been complied with.
(6) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-sections (2), (3) and sub-section (4), the period of lease granted before the date of commencement of the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Amendment Act, 2015, where mineral is used for other than captive purpose, shall be extended and be deemed to have been extended up to a period ending on 31st March, 2020 with effect from the date of expiry of the period of renewal last made or till the completion of renewal period, if any, or a period of fifty years from the date of grant of such lease, whichever is later, subject to the condition that all the terms and conditions of the lease have been complied with.
(7) Any holder of a lease granted, where mineral is used for captive purpose, shall have the right of first refusal at the time of auction held for such lease after the expiry of the lease period.
(8) Notwithstanding anything contained in this section, the period of mining leases, including existing mining leases, of Government companies or corporations shall be such as may be prescribed by the Central Government. (9) The provisions of this section, notwithstanding anything contained therein, shall not apply to a mining lease granted before the date of commencement of the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Amendment Act, 2015, for which renewal has been rejected, or which has been determined, or lapsed."
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38. The learned counsel for the petitioner has emphatically relied upon the provision of Section 8A(3) of the Act 1957 wherein it has been provided that "all mining leases granted before the commencement of the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Amendment Act, 2015 shall be deemed to have been granted for a period of fifty years".
39. It needs to refer herein that the writ petitioner has preferred the writ petition initially challenging the validity of Rule 9(10) of the Jharkhand Minor Mineral Concession Amendment Rules, 2017 with subsequent prayer to extend the leasehold of the petitioner for Chine Clay for a period of 50 years as per provision of Section 8A(3) of the M.M.D.R. Act, 1957.
40. The emphasis of argument of the writ petitioner is that the lease deed was operative up to 31.03.2020 and, as such, on the strength of provision of Section 8A(3), the same is to be extended for 50 years from initial grant of lease, i.e., with effect from 09.01.1979 and by virtue of that, the same will be operative till 08.01.2029 and thereby the provision of Rule 9 of the J.M.M.C. Rules, 2004 amended in 2017 will be of the aid of the writ petitioner and for that reason the validity of the provision of Rule 9(10) of Rules 2004, although has specifically been prayed at paragraph 1(i) but has not been pressed and the petitioner is confining 17 2025:JHHC:32261-DB the prayer with respect to prayer No.1(ii) seeking extension of 50 years of the lease.
41. It is on the basis of the aforesaid admitted fact, this Court is now proceeding to answer the issues.
42. It requires to refer herein that minor minerals mean the minerals other than the minerals specified in First Schedule and these therefore become a State subject and are also defined in Section 3(e) of MMDR Act, 1957. For regulation of minor minerals, Ministry of Mines, Government of India has prescribed Minor Mineral Concession Rules to be formulated at the State level. Within these rules, minor minerals are specified under different categories or simply a list of minor minerals is provided. Section 15 of the MMDR Act, 1957 gives power to the State Governments to make rules in respect of minor minerals. Therefore, each State must have Minor Mineral Concession Rules. It is in conjunction with these minor mineral rules that the provisions may facilitate more local governance. For ready reference Section 3(e) of the Act 1957 is being quoted herein:
3. Definitions.―In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires,―
(e) "minor minerals" means building stones, gravel, ordinary clay, ordinary sand other than sand used for prescribed purposes, and any other mineral which the Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, declare to be a minor mineral;18
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43. Thus, from the aforesaid it is evident that Act, 1957 defines "minor minerals" as building stones, gravel, ordinary clay, ordinary sand (excluding that used for prescribed purposes), and any other mineral declared to be a minor mineral by the Central Government through an official notification. The Central Government has the power to add any other mineral to this list as a "minor mineral" by issuing a notification in the Official Gazette. Herein admittedly by virtue of notification dated 10.02.2015 the Major mineral China-Clay became categorized into minor mineral. For ready reference the notification dated 10.02.2015 is being quoted herein:
MINISTRY OF MINES NOTIFICATION New Delhi, the 10th February, 2015 S.O. 423(E). In exercise of the powers conferred by clause
(e) of section 3 of the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957 (67 of 1957), the Central Government hereby declares the following minerals to be minor minerals in addition to the minerals already declared by notification as minor minerals hereinbefore under the said clause:
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(vii) China Clay;
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44. Further by virtue of Section 15(1A) (d) of Act 1957 the State Government has power to make rules in relation to Minor Mineral, for ready reference same is being quoted as under:19
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15.Power of State Governments to make rules in respect of minor minerals.-(1)The State Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, make rules for, regulating the grant of ³(quarry leases, mining leases or other mineral concessions) in respect of minor minerals and for purposes connected therewith.
1[(1A) In particular and without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing power, such rules may provide for all or any of the following matters, namely:-
(d) the terms on which, and the conditions subject to which and the authority by which quarry leases, mining leases or other mineral concessions may be granted or renewed"
45. Thus, from the aforesaid it is evident that the Section 15 of the Act 1957 confers power upon the State Governments to make Rules in respect of Minor Minerals.
Section 15(1A) (d) provides that the State Government may make Rules providing the terms on which, and the conditions subject to which and the authority by which quarry leases, mining leases or other mineral concessions may be granted or renewed.
46. In "Doiwala Sehkari Shram Samvida Samiti Ltd.
v. State of Uttaranchal and Others" reported in (2007) 11 SCC 641 it has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that in so far as Minor Minerals are concerned, Section 15 of the Act 1957 confers power upon the State Government to make Rules.
47. It needs to refer herein that the State Government of Jharkhand had already notified 31 minerals including 20 2025:JHHC:32261-DB China Clay as minor minerals within the ambit of Jharkhand Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 2004 vide notification dated 06.09.2016 which was later published as Gazette Notification No. 108 dated 27.01.2017, for ready reference the same is being quoted herein which reads as under:
झारखण्ड गजट असाधारण अंक झारखण्ड सरकार द्वारा प्रकाशित संख्या- 108 रााँची, िुक्रवार, 6 माघ, 1938 (ि०) 27 जनवरी, 2017 (50) उद्योग, खान एवं भूतत्व शवभाग अशधसूचना 6 शसतम्बर, 2016, संख्या-ख०नि० (निनिध)-71/2016-1653/एम- भारत का राजपत्र संख्या-333, नििांक 10 फरिरी, 2015 में प्रकानित खाि मंगलय, भारत सरकार की अनधसूचिा संख्या-का०आ० 423(3), नििांक 10 फरिरी, 2015 द्वारा खाि और खनिज का (निकास और निनियमि) अनधनियम, 1957 (1957 का 67) की धारा-3 के खण्ड (ड) द्वारा पित्त िक्तियााँ का प्रयोग करते हुए केन्द्र सरकार द्वारा पहले से ही लघु खनिज के रूप में घोनित खनिजों के अनतररि 31 खनिजों को गौण खनिज (Minor Mineral) पोनित नकए जािे के फलस्वरूप निम्ननलक्तखत गौण खनिजों की झारखण्ड लघु खनिज समिुिाि नियमािली, 2004 में लघु खनिज (Minor Mineral) के रूप में िानमल नकया जाता है .-
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vii. नचिी नमट्टी
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48. It requires to refer herein that time-to-time amendment has been carried out in MMDR Act 1957 as well as in Rules 2004 and the said amendments has been 21 2025:JHHC:32261-DB carried out either in compliance of judgment passed by the Hon'ble Apex Court or in order to meet out the objective of sustainable development by adopting transparent method.
49. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Goa Foundation v. Union of India and Others,. [(2014) 6 SCC 590] has observed that it is for the State Government to decide as a matter of policy in what manner the leases of these mineral resources would be granted, but this decision has to be taken in accordance with the provisions of the MMDR Act and the Rules made thereunder and in consonance with the constitutional provisions. For ready reference the relevant paragraph is being quoted as under:
81. We are of the considered opinion that it is for the State Government to decide as a matter of policy in what manner the leases of these mineral resources would be granted, but this decision has to be taken in accordance with the provisions of the MMDR Act and the Rules made thereunder and in consonance with the constitutional provisions and the decision taken by the State of Goa to grant a mining lease in a particular manner or to a particular party can be examined by way of judicial review by the Court. To quote the opinion of four Judges out of five Judges expressed by D.K. Jain, J. in Natural Resources Allocation, In re, Special Reference No. 1 of 2012 [(2012) 10 SCC 1] : (SCC pp. 98-99, para 149) "149. ... Alienation of natural resources is a policy decision, and the means adopted for the same are thus, executive prerogatives. However, when such a policy decision is not backed by a social or welfare purpose, and precious and scarce natural resources are alienated for commercial pursuits of profit maximising private entrepreneurs, adoption of means other than 22 2025:JHHC:32261-DB those that are competitive and maximise revenue may be arbitrary and face the wrath of Article 14 of the Constitution. Hence, rather than prescribing or proscribing a method, we believe, a judicial scrutiny of methods of disposal of natural resources should depend on the facts and circumstances of each case, in consonance with the principles which we have culled out above. Failing which, the Court, in exercise of power of judicial review, shall term the executive action as arbitrary, unfair, unreasonable and capricious due to its antimony with Article 14 of the Constitution."
50. Herein the State Government has carried out amendment in JMMC Rule 2004 and statutory restriction has been inserted that there cannot be any renewal/extension after 31.03.2020 (later on extended till 31.03.2022) as per the provision of Rule 9, particularly the provision as contained in Rule 9 (छ), wherein it has been provided that if the validity of lease is operative after 31.03.2020, there cannot be extension thereafter on the principle that all the allotment through settlement is to be made by way of auction .
51. It requires to refer herein that the Hon'ble Apex Court in the judgment rendered in the case of Manohar Lal Sharma v. Union of India, (2014) 9 SCC 516 has categorically held that "we are fortified in our view by a recent decision of this Court (3 Judge Bench) in (Goa Foundation v. Union of India and Others,. [(2014) 6 SCC 590) Goa Foundation wherein, following Natural Resources Allocation Reference, it is stated, ".., it is for the State 23 2025:JHHC:32261-DB Government to decide as a matter of policy in what manner the leases of these mineral resources would be granted, but this decision has to be taken in accordance with the provisions of the MMDR Act and the Rules made thereunder and in consonance with the constitution provisions."
52. In the same judgment the Hon'ble Apex Court has declared all allocations of the coal blocks made through Screening Committee and through Government Dispensation route since 1993 as illegal and has cancelled the allocation of 204 coal blocks out of 218 coal blocks (i.e. except, Tasra coal block allocated to Steel Authority of India Ltd. and Pakri Barwadih coal block allocated to National Thermal Power Corporation and 12 coal blocks allocated for Ultra Mega Power Projects) the relevant paragraph of the said judgment is being referred herein:-
110. The above facts show that it took almost 8 years in putting in place allocation of captive coal blocks through competitive bidding. During this period, many coal blocks were allocated giving rise to present controversy, which was avoidable because competitive bidding would have brought in transparency, objectivity and very importantly given a level playing field to all applicants of coal and lowered the difference between the market price of coal and the cost of coal for the allottee by way of premium which would have accrued to the Government. Be that as it may, once it is laid down by the Constitution Bench of this Court in Natural Resources Allocation, In re [Natural Resources Allocation, In re, Special Reference No. 1 of 2012, (2012) 10 SCC 1] that the Court cannot conduct a comparative study of 24 2025:JHHC:32261-DB various methods of distribution of natural resources and cannot mandate one method to be followed in all facts and circumstances, then if the grave situation of shortage of power prevailing at that time necessitated private participation and the Government felt that it would have been impractical and unrealistic to allocate coal blocks through auction and later on in 2004 or so there was serious opposition by many State Governments to bidding system, and the Government did not pursue competitive bidding/public auction route, then in our view, the administrative decision of the Government not to pursue competitive bidding cannot be said to be so arbitrary or unreasonable warranting judicial interference. It is not the domain of the Court to evaluate the advantages of competitive bidding vis-à-vis other methods of distribution/disposal of natural resources.
However, if the allocation of subject coal blocks is inconsistent with Article 14 of the Constitution and the procedure that has been followed in such allocation is found to be unfair, unreasonable, discriminatory, nontransparent, capricious or suffers from favouritism or nepotism and violative of the mandate of Article 14 of the Constitution, the consequences of such unconstitutional or illegal allocation must follow.
160. The entire exercise of allocation through Screening Committee route thus appears to suffer from the vice of arbitrariness and not following any objective criteria in determining as to who is to be selected or who is not to be selected. There is no evaluation of merit and no inter se comparison of the applicants. No chart of evaluation was prepared. The determination of the Screening Committee is apparently subjective as the minutes of the Screening Committee meetings do not show that selection was made after proper assessment. The project preparedness, track record, etc. of the applicant company were not objectively kept in view. Until the amendment was brought in Section 3(3) of the CMN Act w.e.f. 9-6- 1993, the Central Government alone was permitted to 25 2025:JHHC:32261-DB mine coal through its companies with the limited exception of private companies engaged in the production of iron and steel. By virtue of the bar contained in Section 3(3) of the CMN Act, between 1976 and 1993, no private company (other than the company engaged in the production of iron and steel) could have carried out coal mining operations in India. Section 3(3) of the CMN Act, which was amended on 9-6-1993 permitted private sector entry in coal mining operations for captive use. The power for grant of captive coal block is governed by Section 3(3)(a) of the CMN Act, according to which, only two kind of entities, namely, (a) the Central Government or undertakings/corporations owned by the Central Government; or (b) companies having end-use plants in iron and steel, power, washing of coal or cement can carry out coal mining operations. The expression "engaged in"
in Section 3(3)(a)(iii) means that the company that was applying for the coal block must have set up an iron and steel plant, power plant or cement plant and be engaged in the production of steel, power or cement. The prospective engagement by a private company in the production of steel, power or cement would not entitle such private company to carry out coal mining operation. Most of the companies, which have been allocated coal blocks, were not engaged in the production of steel, power or cement at the time of allocation nor in the applications made by them any disclosure was made whether or not the power, steel or cement plant was operational. They only stated that they proposed to set up such plants. Thus, the requirement of end-use project was not met at the time of allocation.
163. To sum up, the entire allocation of coal block as per recommendations made by the Screening Committee from 14- 7-1993 in 36 meetings and the allocation through the Government Dispensation Route suffers from the vice of arbitrariness and legal flaws. The Screening Committee has never been consistent; it has not been transparent; there is no proper application of 26 2025:JHHC:32261-DB mind; it has acted on no material in many cases; relevant factors have seldom been its guiding factors; there was no transparency and guidelines have seldom guided it. On many occasions, guidelines have been honoured more in their breach. There was no objective criteria, nay, no criteria for evaluation of comparative merits. The approach had been ad hoc and casual. There was no fair and transparent procedure, all resulting in unfair distribution of the national wealth. Common good and public interest have, thus, suffered heavily. Hence, the allocation of coal blocks based on the recommendations made in all the 36 meetings of the Screening Committee is illegal.
53. Consequently, the Hon'ble Apex Court in the same case i.e., Manohar Lal Sharma v. Principal Secy., (2014) 9 SCC 614 has cancelled the coal blocks, the relevant paragraphs are being quoted as under:
32. As far as the first category of coal block allotments is concerned, they must be cancelled (except those mentioned in the judgment). There is no reason to "save" them from cancellation. The allocations are illegal and arbitrary; the allottees have not yet entered into any mining lease and they have not yet commenced production. Whether they are 95% ready or 92% ready or 90% ready for production (as argued by some learned counsel) is wholly irrelevant. Their allocation was illegal and arbitrary, as already held, and therefore we quash all these allotments.
33. The learned Attorney General identified 46 coal blocks that could be "saved" from the guillotine, since all of them have commenced production or are on the verge of commencing production. As these allocations are also illegal and arbitrary they are also liable to be cancelled. However, the allotment of three coal blocks in Annexure 1 is not disturbed and they are Moher and Moher Amroli Extension allocated to Sasan Power Ltd. (UMPP) and 27 2025:JHHC:32261-DB Tasra [allotted to Steel Authority of India Ltd. (SAIL), a Central Government public sector undertaking not having any joint venture].
54. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Common Cause v. Union of India, (2016) 11 SCC 455 has also opined that the insertion of Section 8-A into the MMDR Act was to address the hardship faced by the leaseholders, besides other reasons, due to the second and subsequent applications for renewal remaining unattended at the hands of the State Government, for ready reference the relevant paragraph is being quoted as under:
28. The conclusion drawn by us in the foregoing paragraph also emerges from the "Objects and Reasons"
of the amended MMDR Act. The purpose for which the instant amendment came to be made by Parliament whereby the amended Section 8-A was inserted into the MMDR Act reveals that past litigation resulting in different interpretations of the provisions of the MMDR Act and the alleged hardship caused to the mining industry due to second and subsequent renewals remaining pending with the State Government without any decision, had occasioned the passing of the instant amendment. The above position emerges from the following excerpts of the Statement of "Objects and Reasons":
"3. The mining sector has been subjected to numerous litigations in the past few years. Important judgments related to the mining sector have been pronounced by the Supreme Court, besides judgments on the issue of allocation of natural resources which have direct relevance to the grant of mineral concessions.
4. The present legal framework of the MMDR Act, 1957, does not permit the auctioning of mineral 28 2025:JHHC:32261-DB concessions. Auctioning of mineral concessions would improve transparency in allocation. The Government would also get an increased share of the value of mineral resources. Some provisions of the law relating to renewals of mineral concessions have also been found to be wanting in enabling quick decisions. Consequently, there has been a slowdown in the grant of new concessions and the renewal of existing ones. As a result, the mining sector started registering a decline in production affecting the manufacturing sector which largely depends on the raw material provided by mining sector. The Government has therefore felt it necessary to address the immediate requirements of the mining sector and also to remedy the basic structural defects that underlie the current impasse.
5. In view of the urgent need to address these problems, the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Amendment Ordinance, 2015 was promulgated on 12-1-2015. The present Bill is to replace this Ordinance. This Bill is designed to put in place mechanism for:
(i) Eliminating discretion;
(ii) Improving transparency in the allocation of mineral resources;
(iii) Simplifying procedures;
(iv) Eliminating delay in administration, so as to enable expeditious and optimum development of the mineral resources of the country;
(v) Obtaining for the Government an enhanced share of the value of the mineral resources of the country; and
(vi) Attracting private investment and the latest technology;
6. The salient features of the MMDR Amendment Bill, 2015 are as follows:
(i) Removal of discretion; auction to be sole method of allotment : The amendment seeks to bring in 29 2025:JHHC:32261-DB utmost transparency by introducing auction mechanism for the grant of mineral concessions. The tenure of mineral leases has been increased from the existing 30 years to 50 years. There is no provision for renewal of leases.
(ii) Impetus to the mining sector : The mining industry has been aggrieved due to the second and subsequent renewals remaining pending. In fact, this has led to closure of a large number of mines.
The Bill addresses this issue also. The Bill provides that mining leases would be deemed to be extended from the date of their last renewal to 31-3-2030 (in the case of captive mines) and till 31-3-2020 (for the merchant miners) or till the completion of the renewal already granted, if any, or a period of fifty years from the date of grant of such leave, whichever is later."
29. From a perusal of the extract reproduced above, it is apparent that the insertion of Section 8-A into the MMDR Act was to address the hardship faced by the leaseholders, besides other reasons, due to the second and subsequent applications for renewal remaining unattended at the hands of the State Government. The instant amendment to the MMDR Act introduced a uniform original grant period of fifty years for all mining leaseholders. It also excluded renewal(s) after the expiry of the original lease period. Accordingly, no renewal application can now be filed (after 12-1-2015). Under sub-sections (5) and (6) of Section 8-A, in our view such leaseholders who had moved applications for renewal of captive/non-captive mines would be entitled to continue up to 31-3-2030/31-3-2020. The "Objects and Reasons"
for the amendment to the MMDR Act aim at remedying the position which emerged upon the interpretation of the provisions of the MMDR Act as they existed hitherto before. The instant amendment was also directed at remedying the grievances of the mining industry due to "second and subsequent renewals" remaining pending.30
2025:JHHC:32261-DB And also, because the provisions of law relating to renewals had been found to be wanting. The above view is also endorsed by the fact that Section 8-A(9) deals with a situation wherein "... renewal has been rejected...". It is therefore apparent that sub-sections (5) and (6) of Section 8-A of the amended MMDR Act are aimed at situations wherein an application for renewal (validly made) has remained unattended. Therefore, for no fault of the leaseholder he would be subjected to an arbitrary prejudice. It needs to be clarified that since an application for renewal cannot be filed after 12-1-2015, an application for renewal as would be treated as having been validly made, ought to have been made before 12-1- 2015. We are of the view that out of the three contingencies contemplated under Sections 8-A(5) and 8- A(6) referred to above the first of the contingencies positively pertains to a situation wherein applications validly made for renewal were pending without any final decision at the hands of the State Government. Because in the absence of a renewal application, the leaseholder can be taken to have already expressed his disinterest to continue mining operations. Therefore logically, the words "... with effect from the date of expiry of the period of renewal last made...", should relate to an expired lease prior to 12-1-2015 in relation to which a valid application for renewal had already been made.
55. Thus, from the aforesaid it is evident that the reason for incorporating the amendment in the MMDR Act and J.M.M.C. Rules, 2004 was the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Goa Foundation , Manohar Lal Sharma case and Common Cause (supra), which would be evident from perusal of some of the paragraphs which are being referred hereinabove that the practice of renewal/extension of the lease has been deprecated.31
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56. It needs to refer herein that the Hon'ble Apex Court has also appreciated the application of Section 8-A(2) of the amended MMDR Act in the case of Common Cause vs. Union of India and Ors, (supra), for ready reference the relevant paragraphs of the said Judgment are being quoted as under:
6. A leaseholder would have a subsisting mining lease if the period of the original grant is in currency.
Additionally, a leaseholder whose original lease has since expired would have a subsisting lease if the original lease having been renewed, the renewal period is in currency.
20. In terms of Section 8-A(2) of the amended MMDR Act, all future mining grants would be for a uniform period of fifty years. Section 8-A(3) envisages that all original mining lease grants made prior to the insertion of Section 8-A in the MMDR Act (with effect from 12-1-2015) would also be deemed to have been made for a period of fifty years."
57. We, after going through the observation made in paragraph 20 of the judgment rendered in the case of Common Cause vs. Union of India and Ors, (supra) reliance upon which has also been made on behalf of the petitioner, have found that the observation has been made to the extent that in terms of Section 8A(2) of the amended M.M.D.R. Act, all future mining grants would be for a uniform period of 50 years.
58. We have also gone through paragraph-6 of the said judgment, i.e., Common Cause vs. Union of India and Ors, (supra), as referred hereinabove, wherein it has been 32 2025:JHHC:32261-DB observed that a lease holder would have a subsisting mining lease if the period of original grant is in currency. Additionally, a lease holder whose original lease has once expired would have a subsisting lease if the original lease having been renewed, the renewal period is in currency.
It is thus, evident that if the observation made at paragraph 6 will be taken into consideration along with paragraph 20, of the said judgment it would be evident that the applicability of the provision of Section 8A (2) and 8A (3) of the M.M.D.R. Act will depend in a case where the lease holder would have a subsisting mining lease under the MMDR Act 1957, if the period of the original grant is in currency. Further, also in a situation that a lease holder whose original lease has since expired, would have a subsisting lease if the original lease having been renewed and the renewal period is in currency. The paragraphs 6 and 20 of the said judgment have been quoted hereinabove.
59. Further Section 8A (3) of the M.M.D.R. Act, 1957 envisages that all mining lease grants made prior to insertion of Section 8A in the M.M.D.R. Act with effect from 12.01.2015 would also be deemed to have been made for a period of 50 years.
60. It needs to refer herein that in light of the judicial pronouncements, as referred hereinabove, the necessary amendment has been carried out by the State Government 33 2025:JHHC:32261-DB under the provision of Rule 9 of the J.M.M.C. Rules, 2004 in year 2017,2019 and 2020, for ready reference, the relevant provision of Rule 9 of Rules 2004 is being referred herein :-
"9(1) (क)-रै यती भूनम के 03.00 हे० क्षेत्र एिं उससे कम क्षेत्र पर पत्थर, मोरम एिं नमट्टी लघु खनिज के खिि पट्टा उपायुि द्वारा स्वीकृत नकया जाएगा।
परन्तु नक सभी सरकारी क्षेत्र एिं झारखण्ड लघु खनिज समिुिाि (संिोधि) नियमािली, 2019 के नियम-6(ख) के परन्तु में उल्लेक्तखत क्षेत्र एिं खनिज को छोड़कर सभी रै यती क्षेत्र पर बालू छोड़कर अन्य सभी लघु खनिज के खिि पट्टा की स्वीकृनत झारखण्ड लघु खनिज िीलामी नियमािली, 2017 में निरूनपत प्रािधािों के अन्तगगत इलैक्टानिक िीलामी के माध्यम से नििे िक, खाि के द्वारा नकया जाएगा। परन्तु राज्य सरकार आिश्यकतािुसार िीलामी हेतु उपायुि को भी प्रानधकृत कर सकती है.
9(घ) इस अनधसूचिा के निगगत होिेकी नतनि से पूिग में सरकारी क्षेत्र एिं 5.00 हे. क्षेत्र सेअनधक के रै यती क्षेत्र पर खिि पट्टे हेतु प्राप्त आिेिि पत्र स्वतः अयोग्य हो जाएं गे।
9(ङ) सरकारी क्षेत्र एिं 05.00 हे 0 क्षेत्र से अनधक के रै यती क्षेत्र पर प्राप्त िैसे आिेिि पत्र नजसमें इस अनधसूचिा निगगत होिे की नतनि से पूिग झारखण्ड लघु खनिज समिुिाि नियमािली, 2004 के नियम 11 अंतगगत Letter of Intent (आिय का पत्र) निगगत हो चुका है , उसे इस अनधसूचिा के निगगत होिे की नतनि से 180 नििों के अंिर पयागिरण स्वीकृनत एिं खिि योजि अनििायग रूप से समनपगत करिा होगा, अन्यिा उिका आिेिि स्वतः अस्वीकृत हो जाएगा।
9(च) सरकारी क्षेत्र एिं 05.00 हे क्षेत्र से अनधक के रै यती क्षेत्र पर प्राप्त िैसे खिि पट्टे , जो ििीकरण अन्तगगत िे एिं पयागिरणीय स्वीकृनत खिि योजिा प्राप्त िहीं रहिे के कारण कालनतरोनहत हो गये हो, उिके पट्टे की अिनध पट्टा स्वीकृनत/ििीकरण की नतनि से 31 माचग, 2022 तक के नलए अिनध निस्ताररत मािी जाएगी, बिते नक अनधसूचिा की नतनि के पूिग खिि पट्टा के अस्वीकृनत /रद्द/व्ययगत होिे का आिे ि िहीं पाररत नकया गया है , परन्तु िैसे खिि पट्टे पर कोई खिि तब तक िहीं नकया जा सकेगा, जबतक नक खिि हेतु 34 2025:JHHC:32261-DB आिश्यक पयागिरणीय स्वीकृनत/िि एिं पयागिरण निभाग की स्वीकृनत खिि योजिा स्वीकृनत प्राप्त िहीं हो जाता है। आिेिक को सभी िांनछत अिापत्ती 180 नििों के अन्दर समनपगत करिा होगा ।
9(छ) सरकारी क्षेत्र एिं 05.00 हे0 क्षेत्र से अनधक के रै यती क्षेत्र पर स्वीकृत/ििीकृत खिि पट्टे की अिनध यनि उिकी स्वीकृनत/ििीकरण की अिनध 3[31 माचग, 2022 के बाि की नतनि हो, तो उिकी अिनध उिकी स्वीकृनत/ििीकरण की अिनध तक निनधमान्य रहेगी। 9(12) नियम-9 (1) (घ), 9(1)(ङ), 9(1)(च), 9 (1) (छ) तिा 9 (10) पूिग से स्वीकृत/आिनित लघु खनिज के 5.00 हेक्टेयर क्षेत्र से कम क्षेत्र पर भी लागू होंगें।"
61. It is evident that there has been an amendment in the Rules and by virtue of said amendment, under the provisions of Rule 9(1)(क) under the Jharkhand Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 2004, lease for mining purpose can only be granted on holding a proper auction.
62. It is evident from the provision of Rule 9(च) that in any case, ever after renewal of the lease, initially, the same is not to be extended beyond the period of 31.03.2020 by virtue of amendment incorporated w.e.f. 2018, the period has been extended upto the period of 31.03.2022. The specific stipulation has been made that even if the license has been renewed beyond the period of 31.03.2020, the force of the lease will be upto 31.03.2022.
63. Further, the statutory command after the aforesaid amendment is for allotment of the mining lease only on the basis of the auction and a restriction has been put for the renewal of the lease on the basis of the application made by 35 2025:JHHC:32261-DB one or the other. The specific provision has been given under Rule 9 (च) putting complete restriction of renewal on or after 31.03.2022, rather, the allotment is to be made only through auction.
64. It is evident from the provision as contained under Rule 9(छ) as referred above that the license if renewed or extended the validity of which is after 31.03.2022, then, the validity of license will remain there upto the period of lease but there cannot be any extension, thereafter, since as per the mandate of the provision of Rule 9, the lease is to be granted by way of auction.
65. It is evident from perusal of Rule 9(ङ) of Jharkhand Minor Mineral Concession Rules, wherein, it has been stipulated that within 180 days from the issuance of notification, the Environmental Clearance has to be mandatorily produced and if the same is not produced, the letter of intent/application would be deemed to have been rejected.
66. Further, there is a provision under Rule 9(ङ) which was added by way of amendment dated 28.09.2020 and as per the said provision, in case where due to delay in granting Environmental Clearance beyond 180 days, which is not attributable to a lessee, and the lease agreement was 36 2025:JHHC:32261-DB not approved, in those cases the Revisional Authority was given power to decide the matter on merits.
67. It is further evident from the provision of Rule 9 (12) as quoted and referred hereinabove that the mandate of Rule 9 (1) (घ), 9(1)(ङ), 9(1)(च), 9 (1) (छ) तिा 9 (10) will be applicable even if the area of land is less than 5 hectares.
68. It has also been provided therein that the reason for extension from 31.03.2020 to 31.03.2022 is that in the meanwhile all the processes of allotment through auction be completed. The specific provision has been made under Rule 9(छ) that if the lease deed has been granted but operative beyond the period of 31.03.2022, such lease deed will be operative till its validity but thereafter there will be no extension/renewal, rather, the allotment will be made only through auction.
69. The claim of the writ petitioner that by virtue of provision of Section 8A(3) of the M.M.D.R. Act, 1957, the lease is to be extended for further period of 50 years which will be operative till the year 2029 and by virtue of the provision of Rule 9(छ) of the J.M.M.C. Rules the same will be operative till its validity.
70. The petitioner, therefore, wants to take aid of the J.M.M.C. Rules by merging it with the M.M.D.R. Act, 1957 on the basis of the provision of Section 8A(3). 37
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71. Such relief cannot be granted because of the reason that once the rule has been formulated by the State Government in exercise of power conferred under Section 15 of the M.M.D.R. Act, 1957 and if the mineral has come under the fold of the J.M.M.C. Rules, then the lease concerning the minor mineral is to be governed by the provision of J.M.M.C. Rules, 2004 amended in 2017 and therefore there will be no application of section 5 to 13 of the Act 1957 as per the Mandate of the Section 14 of the Act 1957, for ready reference the same is being quoted as under:
"14. [Sections 5 to 13] not to apply to minor minerals. ―The provisions of [sections 5 to 13] (inclusive) shall not apply to [quarry leases, mining leases or other mineral concessions] in respect of minor minerals."
72. Further, it is evident from the factual aspect of the instant case that the aforesaid situation has also been accepted by the writ petitioner, the moment writ petitioner has approached this Court by filing writ petition being W.P.(C) No.932/2017 but the same has been withdrawn after amendment having been carried out in the J.M.M.C. Rules on change of the nature of mineral from major to minor so far as China Clay is concerned and based upon that the lease was also granted to be operative till 31.03.2020.
38
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73. It is further admitted fact that the Deputy Commissioner, Chaibasa, thereafter, has granted extension of the mining lease of the Petitioner Company for a period upto 31.03.2020 by executing a supplementary lease deed registered on 31.08.2017. The aforesaid fact would be evident from averment made in paragraph 20, 21, 22 and 23 of the instant writ petitions which have been referred herein above.
74. Thus, the admitted fact as has been pleaded by the writ petitioner, referred hereinabove in preceding paragraphs, clarifies that the writ petitioner himself has accepted the applicability of the J.M.M.C. Rules, 2004 amended in the year 2017 as also enjoyed the benefit under the said provision by virtue of the extension of the lease up to 31.03.2020.
75. The question to take aid of the provision of Section 8A (3) of the M.M.D.R. Act, 1957, after the aforesaid changed situation and admission by the writ petitioner of applicability of the J.M.M.C. Rules, 2004 amended in the year 2017, cannot be made applicable that too counting the grant of lease from the year 1979 for the period of 50 years, i.e., up to 2029.
76. The law is well settled that once the rule has been formulated by the State on conferment of power under the parent Act, i.e., M.M.D.R. Act, 1957, both cannot overlap 39 2025:JHHC:32261-DB each other which itself is clarified from the arrangement made in the Constitution of India under the 7th Schedule wherein the minerals have been enlisted in Entry No.54 in List-I while in List II it has been referred in Entry No.50.
77. List-I has the subject matter wherein the power to formulate laws has been conferred to the Central Government.
78. List-II has the subject matter wherein the laws making power has been conferred to the State Government being the State subject.
79. List-III, i.e., concurrent list, has the subject matter upon which the Central Government as well as State Government can formulate the law.
80. Under List-I the entry 54 pertains to the minerals. The Central Government in order to take care of its development and regulation, has enacted the Act of 1957.
81. Entry 23 in the list-II speaks about Regulation of mines and mineral development subject to the provisions of List I with respect to regulation and development under the control of the Union. Further, Entry 50 in the List-II also speaks about the Taxes on minerals and, as such, being the State subject, the State is to formulate its own legislation to regulate the issue of minor minerals.
82. The issue of overlapping of the Entry-54 of the List- I and Entry-50 of the List-II has been taken into 40 2025:JHHC:32261-DB consideration by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the judgment rendered by the Constitution Bench in the case of Mineral Area Development Authority & Anr. v. M/S Steel Authority of India & Anr Etc. reported in 2024 INSC 554 wherein it has been held that the Entry-54 in the List I and the Entry 50 of the List-II not overlapped to each other, however, subject to limitation for which the Parliament has been conferred with the power, the relevant paragraph is being quoted hereunder as:
"28. Although, the above entries are substantially similar to the scheme under the GOI Act 1935, one of the differences lies in the removal of "oil fields" from Entry 54 of List I and Entry 23 of List II. The regulation and development of oil fields is now enumerated under Entry 53 of List I.18 The other difference is that while the GOI Act 1935 required a declaration by Federal law, the Constitution now requires a declaration by Parliament. The entry pertaining to taxes on mineral rights is largely similar to Entry 44 of the Provincial Legislative List, except for the fact that Entry 44 provided for imposition of "any limitations" by "any Act" enacted by the Federal Legislature relating to mineral development, while Entry 50 of List II does not include the expression "any Act"
enacted by Parliament. Before we delve into the intricacies of the interpretation of the legislative entries, we need to bear in mind the constitutional philosophy underlying the Indian federal setup.
32. Article 245 (read with Article 246) is the source of the legislative powers of Parliament and the State legislatures. The entries in the Seventh Schedule delineate the subject matter over which the appropriate legislature can enact laws. The entries are legislative heads and not the source of legislative powers.24 A 41 2025:JHHC:32261-DB legislation could be composite in nature, drawing upon several entries in a particular list.25 Such a legislation is referred to as a "ragbag" legislation.
33. Article 254 clarifies that if the law made by a State legislature is repugnant to any provisions of a law made by Parliament with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List III, the law made by Parliament would prevail and the law made by the State legislature would be void to the extent of the repugnancy. The issue of repugnancy arises only when both the legislatures are competent to legislate on the subject with respect to List III.26 The issue of repugnancy does not arise if the legislations enacted by Parliament and the State legislatures deal with separate and distinct legislative subject matters. By virtue of Article 248, Parliament has exclusive legislative powers to make laws with respect to any of the matters not enumerated in List II or List III.27 However, how should courts deal with a situation where two legislations, enacted by Parliament and State legislature in pursuance of their respective legislative powers, appear to conflict with each other? The answer lies in Article 246 itself.
35. Hoechst Pharmaceuticals (supra) laid down the following principles to resolve any direct conflict between the entries in List I and List II: (i) in case of seeming conflict, the two entries should be read together without giving a narrow and restricted reading to either of them;
(ii) an attempt should be made to see whether the two entries can be reconciled so as to avoid a conflict of jurisdiction; and (iii) no question of conflict arises between two Lists if the impugned legislation in pith and substance appears to fall exclusively under one list and the encroachment upon the other list is incidental.
36. Articles 245 and 246 embody the essence of Indian federalism. The division of legislative powers between Union and States is an emanation of the federal project. This division also serves as a constitutional limitation on legislative powers. Parliament cannot entrench upon the 42 2025:JHHC:32261-DB plenary power of the State legislatures in the ordinary course, except where the Constitution itself specifically allows it. The appropriate legislature must possess legislative competence to enact a law on the subject matter it seeks to legislate.
39. The above position of law has been expressly affirmed by the nine-Judge Bench of this Court in Jindal Stainless Ltd v. State of Haryana. Thus, it is an accepted principle that the subject matter of taxation is dealt with under distinct entries and, therefore, cannot be traced to a non- taxing entry. The taxing powers of Parliament and the State legislatures are mutually exclusive and clearly demarcated. There can be no overlap between the taxing powers of the Union and the States. Entries relating to taxing powers must be construed with clarity and precision to maintain exclusivity and a construction of a taxation entry which may lead to overlapping must be eschewed. If a taxing power is enumerated within a particular legislative list, it is automatically excluded from the purview of subject-matters in other legislative lists. The residuary power of Parliament also includes the power of making any law imposing a tax not mentioned in either List II or List III.
41. Many entries in the Seventh Schedule may appear to overlap because of the language used in the entries. The necessary corollary to the scheme of legislative distribution is that that any invasion by Parliament in the field assigned to the States and vice versa is a breach of the Constitution. Even though the Constitution distributes legislative powers between the Union and the States, there have been situations where a legislation purporting to deal with a subject in one list, touches on a subject in another list. To remedy such situation, the doctrine of pith and substance is used to examine whether the legislature has the competence to enact a law with regard to either of the three lists under the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution. There may arise situations where a legislature may frame a law that in substance 43 2025:JHHC:32261-DB and reality transgresses its legislative competence. Such a piece of legislation is called "colourable legislation"
because the legislature veils its transgression by making it seem as if the legislation is within its legislative competence. To examine whether the legislature has transgressed its legislative competence, the substance of the legislation is material. If the subject-matter is in substance beyond the legislative powers of the legislature, the form in which the law is clothed would not save it from the vice of unconstitutionality.
42. The Constitution has used specific expressions to resolve potential overlaps or conflicts between and among the entries in the three Lists. The entries in the Seventh Schedule have used different phraseologies to either subject or restrict their scope and ambit. Some of the legislative entries in the State List have been made subject to broad or specific limitations or restrictions with respect to the entries in the Union List or Concurrent List.----
43. The above table is an indication of the extent to which the legislative powers of the States have been restricted, limited, or altogether precluded. The use of the expression "other than" or "not including" serves the purpose of redacting from the ambit of the legislative power of the States to the extent suggested. Where the Constitution intends to limit or preclude the legislative powers of the State to a particular extent, it has used specific terminologies such as "other than" and "not including".
44. Where the entries have used the phrase "subject to", the legislative power of the State is made subordinate to Parliament with respect to either the Union List or the Concurrent List. The expression "subject to" conveys the idea of a provision yielding place to another provision or other provisions to which it is made subject.45 Therefore, where the Constitution intends to displace or override46 the legislative powers of the States, it has used specific terminology - "subject to". However, the Constitution has 44 2025:JHHC:32261-DB also indicated the extent to which a particular legislative entry under List II is subordinated. For instance, the subjection is either with respect to provisions of List I or List III, or it can also be to the extent of "any limitations"
imposed by Parliament by law. Thus, it is imperative that the entries in List II must be read and interpreted in their proper context to understand the extent of their subordination to Union powers.
47. The Constitution deploys three expressions to signify the manner in which the legislative power could be exercised by Parliament - "declared by or under law", and "declared by Parliament by law", and "imposed by Parliament by law" The difference in the character of these provisions can be gathered from the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act 1956 which substituted the expression "declared by Parliament by law" with "declared by or under law made by Parliament" in Entry 6748 of the Union List. The object of the amendment was to enable the delegate under the statute to make the required declaration.
49 The expression "by law" means that the legislative power should be effectuated through the provisions of a statute. In comparison, "by or under law" means that the legislative intent could be effectuated either through the provisions of the statute or by any subordinate authority vested with powers in that behalf by the statute.50 It is important to note that Entry 50 of List II use the expression "by law relating to mineral development". We will have to bear the meaning of the expression "by law"
in mind to give an appropriate interpretation to the entry.
57. The principle which emanates from the above discussion is that the State holds all natural resources, including minerals, as a trustee of the public and must deal with them in a manner consistent with the nature of such a trust.
58. The Central Government or the State Government may not always be the "owner" of the underlying minerals. But the Constitution empowers both 45 2025:JHHC:32261-DB Parliament (under Entry 54 of List I) and the State legislatures (under Entry 23 of List II) to regulate mines and mineral development, the entrustment to the State being subject to the power of Parliament to regulate the domain. The Constitution has entrusted the Union and the States with the responsibility to regulate mines and mineral development in consonance with the principles of the public trust doctrine and sustainable development of mineral resources. Under the MMDR Act, the Central Government, acting as a public trustee of minerals, regulates prospecting and mining operations in public interest.80 In the process, the legislation seeks to increase awareness of the compelling need to restore the serious ecological imbalance and protect against damage being caused to the nature. In Pradeep S Wodeyar v. State of Karnataka,one of us (Justice D Y Chandrachud) observed that the essence of the MMDR Act is to "protect humankind and every species whose existence depends on natural resources from the destruction which is caused by rapacious and unregulated mining." The Court noted that the restrictions under Section 4 of the MMDR Act are intrinsically meant to protect the environment and communities who depend on the environment.
83. Further the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of State of Uttarakhand and Ors v. Kumaon Stone Crusher, (2018) 14 SCC 537 has appreciated the issue of overlapping of the two entries of the Seventh Schedule or two legislations and has observed that in the event any overlapping is found in two entries of the Seventh Schedule or two legislations, it is the duty of the Court to find out its true intent and purpose and to examine the particular legislation in its pith and substance, for ready reference the 46 2025:JHHC:32261-DB relevant paragraphs are being quoted herein which reads as under:
"112. This Court has time and again emphasised that in the event any overlapping is found in two entries of the Seventh Schedule or two legislations, it is the duty of the Court to find out its true intent and purpose and to examine the particular legislation in its pith and substance. In Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab [Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab, (1994) 3 SCC 569 : 1994 SCC (Cri) 899] , paras 59 and 60 following has been held: (SCC p. 630) "59. ... But before we do so we may briefly indicate the principles that are applied for construing the entries in the legislative lists. It has been laid down that the entries must not be construed in a narrow and pedantic sense and that widest amplitude must be given to the language of these entries. Sometimes the entries in different lists or the same list may be found to overlap or to be in direct conflict with each other. In that event it is the duty of the court to find out its true intent and purpose and to examine the particular legislation in its "pith and substance" to determine whether it fits in one or other of the lists. [See Synthetics and Chemicals Ltd. v. State of U.P. [Synthetics and Chemicals Ltd. v. State of U.P., (1990) 1 SCC 109] (SCC pp. 150-51, para 67); India Cement Ltd. v. State of T.N. [India Cement Ltd. v. State of T.N., (1990) 1 SCC 12] (SCC p. 22, para 18).]
60. This doctrine of "pith and substance" is applied when the legislative competence of a legislature with regard to a particular enactment is challenged with reference to the entries in the various lists i.e. a law dealing with the subject in one list is also touching on a subject in another list. In such a case, what has to be ascertained is the pith and substance of the enactment. On a scrutiny of the Act in question, if found, that the legislation is in substance one on a matter assigned to the legislature enacting that statute, then that Act as a whole must be held to be valid 47 2025:JHHC:32261-DB notwithstanding any incidental trenching upon matters beyond its competence i.e. on a matter included in the list belonging to the other legislature.
To say differently, incidental encroachment is not altogether forbidden."
114. Further in Union of India v. Shah Goverdhan L. Kabra Teachers' College [Union of India v. Shah Goverdhan L. Kabra Teachers' College, (2002) 8 SCC 228 : 5 SCEC 370] in para 7 the following was laid down: (SCC pp. 233-34) "7. It is further a well-settled principle that entries in the different lists should be read together without giving a narrow meaning to any of them. Power of Parliament as well as the State Legislature are expressed in precise and definite terms. While an entry is to be given its widest meaning but it cannot be so interpreted as to override another entry or make another entry meaningless and in case of an apparent conflict between different entries, it is the duty of the court to reconcile them. When it appears to the court that there is apparent overlapping between the two entries the doctrine of "pith and substance" has to be applied to find out the true nature of a legislation and the entry within which it would fall. In case of conflict between entries in List I and List II, the same has to be decided by application of the principle of "pith and substance". The doctrine of "pith and substance" means that if an enactment substantially falls within the powers expressly conferred by the Constitution upon the legislature which enacted it, it cannot be held to be invalid, merely because it incidentally encroaches on matters assigned to another legislature. When a law is impugned as being ultra vires of the legislative competence, what is required to be ascertained is the true character of the legislation. If on such an examination it is found that the legislation is in substance one on a matter assigned to the legislature then it must be held to be valid in its entirety even though it might incidentally trench on matters which are beyond 48 2025:JHHC:32261-DB its competence. In order to examine the true character of the enactment, the entire Act, its object, scope and effect, is required to be gone into. The question of invasion into the territory of another legislation is to be determined not by degree but by substance. The doctrine of "pith and substance" has to be applied not only in cases of conflict between the powers of two legislatures but in any case, where the question arises whether a legislation is covered by particular legislative power in exercise of which it is purported to be made."
84. Herein the parameter since has been fixed for applicability of both the Acts, i.e, the Act of 1957 and the JMMC Rules, 2004 formulated under section 15 of the Act of 1957, therefore, is having no overlapping effect rather both provisions are to be enacted by the Central Government and the State Government so far as the Act of 1957 and JMMC Rules, 2004 respectively are concerned.
85. The issue of intermingling the provision of M.M.D.R. Act, 1957 with the J.M.M.C. Rules, 2004 amended in 2017 for the purpose of taking aid of the provision of Section 8A(3) of the M.M.D.R. Act, 1957 and simultaneously also to take aid of Rule 9 of the J.M.M.C. Rules will not be available for the writ petitioner and in view of the law already laid down by Hon'ble Apex Court, such argument is misconceived.
86. Once the writ petitioner has entered into the fold of the provision of J.M.M.C. Rules, 2004, then it is not available for him also to take aid of M.M.D.R. Act, 1957 49 2025:JHHC:32261-DB particularly Section 8A(3) and the moment China Clay has become minor mineral and the same has been notified by the State Government by way of the gazette notification then in such situation the applicability of the section 8A(3) of the Act 1957 is not available for the petitioner.
87. It requires to refer herein that after confining the prayer for questioning the validity of Rule 9(10) of the J.M.M.C. Rules, meaning thereby, the writ petitioner is accepting that after 31.03.2022 there will be no extension/renewal of the lease. However, if the lease is valid after 31.03.2022 then it will be allowed to be operative.
88. But, as has been discussed hereinabove by us that the benefit of Rule 9(10) of the J.M.M.C. Rules, 2004 amended in 2017, is only available if the lease has been granted under the provision of J.M.M.C. Rules, 2004 amended in 2017 and the said provision is not allowed to be taken aid of on the basis of the other provisions, i.e., M.M.D.R. Act, 1957, particularly Section 8A (3). This is for the reason that the applicability of the provisions of M.M.D.R. Act, 1957 particularly Section 8A (3) will only be taken aid of if the lease has been granted under the provision of M.M.D.R. Act, 1957.
89. Initially the lease was granted under the provision of M.M.D.R. Act, 1957 but subsequently after expiry of the validity, sometime in the year 1999, although application 50 2025:JHHC:32261-DB has been said to be filed for its renewal but no endeavour has been taken fairly for a long period of 17 - 18 years and this Court has been approached in the year 2017 by filing writ petition being W.P.(C) No.932/2017, which has been withdrawn after the State Government has notified J.M.M.C. Rules, 2017 by virtue of notification no. 149 dated 02.03.2017 by inserting the provision of Rule 9(10) allowing deemed extension of mining lease of the 31 recently notified minor minerals for the period up to 31.03.2020.
90. The writ petitioner, thereafter, has withdrawn the writ petition vide order dated 27.03.2017. The Deputy Commissioner, Chaibasa has granted the extension up to 31.03.2020. The writ petitioner, therefore, has taken aid of the JMMC Rule 2004 without insisting the pending representation which is now being claimed that the representation submitted for extension/renewal of the lease granted under M.M.D.R. Act, 1957 was lying pending.
91. But, once the writ petitioner has shifted under the provision of the J.M.M.C. Rules on effect of change of nature of mineral from major to minor, then the pending representation by virtue of the extension already granted in favour of the writ petitioner in terms of the Government Notification dated 02.03.2017 will also lose its sanctity and, hence, it is not acceptable to this Court that the pending representation for extension of the mining lease which was 51 2025:JHHC:32261-DB granted in the year 1979 is deemed to be extended up to 2029.
92. The deeming fiction will only come to help the party if the subsisting right has been created in favour of the concerned party that could have been on the following situations: -
(i) If the writ petitioner would have taken the legal recourse against pending representation submitted for extension/renewal of the lease as is being said that for extension of the lease, the application was made in the year 1999.
(ii) The writ petitioner has taken no legal recourse, rather, sat idle for about 17 - 18 years.
(iii) The force of the said pending representation will be deemed to lose its force the moment the writ petitioner has accepted the benefit under the provision of Rule 9(10) which has been notified by virtue of Gazette Notification No. 149 dated 02.03.2017.
(iv) The right would have been said to be available in a case of accrued/vested right if created under any provision of law, herein, the M.M.D.R. Act, 1957. But it is not a case of accrued or vested right since the petitioner himself has shifted to J.M.M.C. Rules, 2004 amended in 2017.52
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(v) Even the reliance which has been placed by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner in the case of Common Cause vs. Union of India and Ors, (supra) is not applicable in the facts of the present case since the primary requirement is of a subsisting mining lease and in the said case it has been observed that a lease holder would have a subsisting mining lease if the period of original grant is in currency. Additionally, a lease holder whose original lease has once expired would have a subsisting lease if the original lease having been renewed, the renewal period is in currency.
(vi) It is not the case of the writ petitioner that the lease holder was having with the subsisting mining lease, since the original grant was under the provision of MMDR Act 1957, the day when China Clay was in the category of Major Mineral.
(vii) Further, it is not the case based upon the facts as referred hereinabove that the original lease has since expired but by virtue of its renewal the subsisting lease is there and the renewal period is in currency, rather, it is a case where there was no subsisting lease as the lease was already expired in the year 1999 as was granted in the year 1979 under the M.M.D.R. Act, 1957.
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(viii) Further, the lease which was granted on the strength of provision of Rule 9(10) of the J.M.M.C. Rules, 2004 amended in 2017 cannot be said to be available under the MMDR Act, 1957 so as to take aid of Section 8A(3) of MMDR Act, 1957. Moreover, the said lease has also expired on 31.03.2020.
93. This Court, in view of the aforesaid discussion, is hereby answering the issues against the writ petitioner.
94. In consequence thereof, the writ petition lacks merit and accordingly, dismissed.
95. Pending interlocutory applications, if any, accordingly disposed of.
I agree (Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.)
(Arun Kumar Rai, J.) (Arun Kumar Rai, J.)
Dated 16th October, 2025
N.A.F.R.
Birendra/
Uploaded on 17.10.2025
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