Karnataka High Court
Shivappa Mallappa Jigalur And Ors. vs The Lao And Asst. Commissioner And Anr. on 1 June, 2004
Equivalent citations: ILR2004KAR2784, 2004(5)KARLJ239, 2004 AIR - KANT. H. C. R. 2567, 2004 AIHC 3703, (2004) 5 KANT LJ 239, (2004) 2 LACC 364, (2004) 4 ICC 26, (2004) 3 KCCR 2005, (2004) 3 CIVLJ 729
Author: Ram Mohan Reddy
Bench: Ram Mohan Reddy
ORDER 47 RULE 1 - DOCTRINE OF MERGER - REVIEW PETITION FILED - MAINTAINABILITY - Civil Court after fixing the market value did not award interest on solatium and additional market value - Batch of MFA's filed seeking interest on solatium and additional market value - Batch of MFA's dismissed on the ground that explanation offered for delay was not satisfactory - The land owners thereafter field petitions under Section 114 read with Order 47 Rule 1 of CPCs under Section 151 CPC in the Civil Court seeking to review its judgment and order dated 30.11.98 - Said Review petitions dismissed by Civil Courts - CRP's preferred to High Court - Learned Single Judge referring the same to Division Bench -Whether review petitions filed by the petitioners before the Civil Court under Order 47 Rule 1 read with Section 114 and 151 CPC are maintainable - Whether the award passed by Civil Court on 30.11.98 merges with the order of learned Single Judge in the batch of MFA's - HELD - This Court revises or modifies or affirms an award passed by the Civil Court only if it condones the delay in preferring an appeal against such award and hears such appeal on merit in exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. If this Court in earlier batch of MFA's were to condone the delay in preferring the appeals and dispose of the appeals with or without reasons, by affirmance as otherwise, the orders of the Civil Court would have merged with the judgment of this Court. In that event, it was not permissible for the owners of the acquired lands to move the Civil Court by way of review, because the judgments and awards of the Civil Courts by way of review become the judgments and awards of the Civil Court have merged with the judgment of this Court. This is not the situation in this case. Therefore, the Review Petitions filed before Civil Court is maintainable. (C) LAND ACQUISITION ACT, 1894 - SECTIONS 28, 34 - GRANT OF INTEREST ON SOLATIUM AND ADDITIONAL MARKET VALUE - HELD - It is the duty of the Land Acquisition Officer / the Court to grant interest on solatium and additional market value once the conditions prescribed under Sections 28 or 34 of the Act are satisfied to the owners suo motu, denial of that relief to the owners of the acquired land would be totally unjust, illegal and violative of Sections 28 and 34 of the Act. It becomes imperative for the Land Acquisition Officer or the Court to pay interest on solatium and additional market value as a statutory duty without waiting for a demand or application from the owner on the acquired land. (D) LAND ACQUISITION ACT, 1894 - SECTIONS 28, 34 - GRANT OF INTEREST ON SOLATIUM AND ADDITIONAL MARKET VALUE - PROCEDURAL HAZARDS DELAYING SUCH AMOUNT TO THE OWNERS - HELD - There is a statutory direction to the Land Acquisition Officer/ the Court to pay the interest. Therefore, in all fairness, interests of justice and in performance of statutory obligations, the Land Acquisition Officer ought to have paid interest on solatium and additional market value, particularly, because even according to the State Government, the petitioners are entitled to interest, without waiting for the proceedings being initiated by the affected, uprooted owners of the acquired land. Procedural hazard can never be good and valid reason for the State to deny substantive right of the owners of the acquired land to receive interest on solatium and additional market value. (E) CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, 1908 ( 5/1908) - SECTIONS 115, 151 - REVISIONAL JURISDICTION - The High Court has suo motu power to revise orders of the Civil Court by virtue of the power conferred upon it under Section 115 CPC where total failure of justice would have occasioned or where irreparable loss would have been caused to the parties against whom it was made. This is one of such cases where the Court is convinced that it should exercise its powers under Section 115 conjointly with its inherent power under Section 151 CPC to do justice. Otherwise, it would occasion irreparable substantial loss to the petitioners. CRP's allowed. JUDGMENT S.R. Nayak, J.
1. In these Civil Revision Petitions, the basic and paramount question that arise for consideration of the Court is whether technicalities, nay, technical tortures should be allowed to have their unrighteous free play and sway so as to frustrate the valuable substantive rights of the owners of the acquired lands to receive interest on solatium and additional market value under Section 28 or Section 34 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, for short, 'the Act' and whether the Court should permit the so called 'welfare state' to make unlawful gains at the peril and cost of its constituents. The State and instrumentalities of the State, wherever they are parties to a litigation, should win or lose the litigation or substantive grounds and not on technical tortures. Such posture on the part of the State and its instrumentalities would add something sensible, something enduring, something praiseworthy to sustain their image of being a "welfare state". The State and instrumentalities of the State should not be cantankerous in their dealings or act like Shylock for a pound of flesh. Alasi in this case, the State Government does not seem to have imbibed the finery to be practiced when it is sued. The entitlement of the owners of the acquired land to receive interest on solatium and additional market value is not disputed by the State Government, but, payment of interest on solatium and additional market value is denied putting forth untenable procedural hazards, if we may say so. The motive behind the impugned State action is apparent and that is to make unlawful gain in violation of the mandatory provision of Section 28 and/or Section 34 of the Act and the binding judgments of the Supreme Court.
2. The background facts leading to the filing of these Civil Revision Petitions under Section 151 of CPC in this Court be noted briefly first and they are as follows: The lands concerned in these Civil Revision Petitions were acquired by Government of Karnataka invoking its eminent domain power for a public purpose, to wit, for submergence of Hirehalla project by issuing Section 4(1) notification dated 27.10, 1994. The land acquisition officer after conducting award inquiry and placing reliance on sales statistics passed awards fixing market value at the rate of Rs. 21,500/- per acre. The owners of the acquired land feeling dissatisfied with the market value fixed by the land acquisition officer sought reference of their claims for higher compensation to the Civil Court under Section 18 of the Act by filing necessary applications. On such reference, the Civil Court, after conducting trial, Fixed the market value at the rate of Rs. 50,000/- per acre by its awards dated 30.11.1998, but, the Civil Court did not award interest on solatium and additional market value.
3. The owners of the acquired lands preferred M.F.A.Nos. 837 of 2002 and batch of appeals to this Court with the delay of 1072 days seeking interest on solatium and additional market value. Since there was delay in preferring the appeals they had filed application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act seeking condonation of delay. A learned Single Judge of this Court (A. M. Farooq, J.) without notice to the respondents, by judgment and Order dated 20.03.2002 dismissed the appeals as barred by limitation on the ground that the explanation offered by the appellants for condoning the delay was not satisfactory. While doing so learned Judge in paragraph 7 of the judgment was pleased to observe: "The appellants could have sought review of the Order before the Reference Court in view of the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court," thereby meaning, in the context, the judgment of the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in SUNDER v. UNION OF INDIA, .
4. The owners of the acquired land, thereafter, filed petitions under Section 114 read with Order 47 Rule 1 and Section 151 CPC in the Civil Court seeking review of its judgments and awards dated 30-11-1998 and for award of interest on solatium and additional market value. There was a delay of about 3 years 8 months in preferring the above petitions and, therefore, the owners of the acquired land filed necessary applications under Section 5 of the Limitation Act to condone the delay in preferring the review petitions. The respondents opposed the review petitions as well as the applications filed by the owners of the acquired land under Section 5 of the Limitation Act mainly contending that if the review petitions are allowed, it would cause heavy loss to the Government.
5. The Civil Court in the premise of the pleadings of the parties, framed the following points in each of the review petitions for consideration and decision.
1) "Whether the petitioner has made out sufficient grounds for condoning the delay that has occurred between 30.11.1998 to 31.07.2002?
2) Whether this petition is maintainable?
3) Whether there are reasonable grounds to review the Judgment and Award?
4) What Order?"
6. The Civil Court having heard the learned Counsel for the parties has answered points 1, 2, 3 in the negative and dismissed IAs filed under Section 5 of Limitation Act and consequently dismissed review Petitions by its Orders impugned in these Civil Revision Petitions.
7. When these Civil Revision Petitions were placed before a learned Single Judge of this Court (V. GOPALAGOWDA J.), His Lordship having heard learned Counsel for the parties, thought it fit to refer these Civil Revision Petitions to the Division Bench under the proviso to Sub-section (2) of Section 8 of the Karnataka High Court Act, 1961 having framed the following two questions for consideration of the Division Bench;
(i) whether non-awarding of interest on solatium amount and the additional market value, even though the same are part of compensation amount either by the Reference Court or the Appellate Court will disentitle the petitioners to claim the same either in execution proceedings or in review petitions to review the judgments and awards for granting the above reliefs under the provisions of Section 28 and 34 of the Act and the law laid down by the Apex Court in the case of SUNDER v. UNION OF INDIA?
(ii) Whether the phrases 'any proceedings' referred to in SHREE VIJAY COTTON MILLS v. STATE OF GUJARATH includes execution proceedings and if so, are the petitioners are not entitled to claim the same on the compensation amount, even though the same is not awarded by the Reference Court?"
8. We have heard Shri G. Gangi Reddy and Shri Laxman T. Mantagani, learned Counsel for petitioners and Shri K.P. Asokumar, learned Additional Government Advocate for Land Acquisition for respondents, Shri G. Gangi Reddy, with his usual forcefulness, would contend that the Civil Court was not justified in dismissing the review petitions filed under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC and thereby denying interest on solatium and additional market value to the owners of the acquired land. Shri Gangi Reddy would contend that once the conditions under Section 28 or Section 34, as the case may be, are satisfied, the award of interest is consequential and automatic. Shri Gangi Reddy would contend that the owners of the acquired land need not put forth their claim for interest on solatium and additional market value by filing any application or petition and it is the duty of the Land Acquisition Officer and the Civil Court to suo motu award interest on solatium and additional market value wherever he or it finds that the conditions prescribed under Section 28 or Section 34 of the Act are satisfied. Shri Gangi Reddy would contend that the Civil Court is duty-bound to award interest in any proceedings and at any stage and, therefore, the dismissal of M.F.A.Nos. 837 of 2002 and the batch as time-barred would not come in the way of the Civil Court granting interest, particularly when, in the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge in the above M.F.A.s, learned Judge himself indicated that the owners of the acquired land could seek review of the awards passed by the Civil Court on 30.11.1998 notwithstanding the dismissal of M.F.As. Shri Gangi Reddy would contend that the refusal to grant interest on solatium and additional market value has resulted in failure of justice and, therefore, this Court should invoke its power under Section 151 of CPC suo moto to do justice. Shri Gangi Reddy would also contend that the review petitions filed by the owners of the acquired land are maintainable notwithstanding the Order of the learned Single Judge of this Court dated 20-03-2002 passed in M.F.A. Nos. 837 of 2002 and batch, because, the judgments and awards passed by the Civil Court on 30-11-1998 did not merge with the Order of the learned Single Judge dated 20-03-2002 passed in M.F.A. Nos. 837 of 2002 and batch. Shri Asokumar learned Additional Government Advocate for Land Acquisition, per contra, would contend that the review petitions filed by the owners of the acquired land under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC after the dismissal of M.F.A. Nos. 837 of 2002 and batch are not maintainable inasmuch as the judgments and awards passed by the Civil Court on 30-11-1998 merged with the Order of the learned Single Judge dated 20th March 2002 passed in M.F.A. Nos. 837 of 2002 and batch. Shri Asokumar would also contend that even on merit the petitioners are not entitled to relief claimed by them, because, the same relief was sought before this Court by preferring the appeals and since the appeals are dismissed by this Court and those awards of this Court have become final, it is not permissible for the owners of the acquired land to go again before the Civil Court and seek the same relief.
9. Having heard the learned Counsel for the parties, the following two questions arise for our consideration and decision:
1. Whether the review petitions filed by the petitioners herein before the Civil Court under Order 47 Rule 1 read with Section 114 and Section 151 CPC are maintainable?
2. Whether in the facts and circumstances of the case the owners of the acquired land are entitled to interest on solatium and additional market value?
10. Point No 1:
We do not agree with learned Additional Government Advocate, for Land Acquisition that the judgments and awards passed by the Civil Court on 30.11.1998 merged with the judgment passed by this Court on 20th March, 2002 in M.F.A. Nos. 837 of 2002 and the batch. At the threshold, it needs to be noticed that there was delay in preferring the above M.F.A.s to this Court and, therefore, the owners of the acquired land in each of the appeals had filed applications under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condoning the delay. The learned Single Judge not being satisfied with the explanation offered in the affidavits filed in support of the application dismissed the applications and consequently dismissed the appeals also as times - barred.
11. The doctrine of merger is neither a doctrine of constitutional law nor a doctrine statutorily recognized. It is a common law doctrine founded on principles of propriety in the justice delivery system. The rationale of the doctrine of merger is that there cannot be more than one decree/order governing the same sub-matter of dispute at a given point of time. When a decree or order passed by a Court below or judicial forum was subjected to a remedy available under law before a Court above or judicial forum above, and once such Court above or judicial forum above has disposed of the lis before it either way -whether the decree or order under appeal is set aside or modified or simply confirmed, it is the decree or order of the Court above or judicial forum above, as the case may be, which is the final, binding and operative decree or order wherein merges the decree or Order passed by the Court below or the judicial forum below. It is however, well settled that the doctrine of merger is not of universal or unlimited application, and that the nature of the jurisdiction exercised by the Court above and the judicial forum above and the content and subject-matter of challenge laid or which could have been laid should be kept in view by the Courts while applying the doctrine of merger in a given case. The doctrine of merger can be pressed into service only to sustain or aid propriety in justice delivery system and not to aid impropriety practised by a party to litigation particularly when such party is the State or an instrumentality of the State. In KUNHAYAMMED AND ORS. v. STATE OF KERALA AND ANR, a three-Judge Bench of Supreme Court had to deal with the contention that the Order of the High Court of Kerala dated 17.12.1982 having merged into the Order of the Supreme Court dated 18.07.1983, the Order of the High Court had ceased to exist in the eye of law and, therefore, an application seeking review of the Order dated 17.12.1982 passed by the High Court is misconceived and not maintainable. In that case SLP filed under Article 136 of Constitution of India seeking leave of the Apex Court to prefer Civil Appeal against the judgment of the Kerala High Court dated 17.12.1982 was dismissed by the Apex Court by its Order dated 18.07 1983. The Order of the Supreme Court dismissing the SLP filed under Section 136 read:
"Special Leave Petition is dismissed on merits"
In this facts-situation, the Supreme Court having considered the doctrine of merger and all important and relevant case law on the point and the effect of dismissal of SLP and speaking through His Lordship R. G. Lahoti, J., recorded its conclusions in paragraph-43 of the judgment. The Supreme Court summed up its conclusions thus:
"To sum up our conclusions are:
(i) Where an appeal or revision is provided against an Order passed by a Court, tribunal or any other authority before superior forum and such superior forum modifies, reverses or affirms the decision put in issue before it, the decision by the subordinate forum merges in the decision by the superior forum and it is the latter which subsists, remains operative and is capable of enforcement in the eye of law.
(ii) The jurisdiction conferred by Article 136 of the Constitution is divisible into two stages. First stage is up to the disposal of prayer for special leave to file an appeal. The second stage commences if and when the leave to appeal is granted and special leave petition is converted into an appeal.
(iii) Doctrine of merger is not a doctrine of universal or unlimited application. It will depend on the nature of jurisdiction exercised by the superior forum and the content or subject-matter of challenge laid or capable of being laid shall be determinative of the applicability or merger. The superior jurisdiction should be capable of reversing, modifying or affirming the Order put in issue before it. Under Article 136 of the Constitution the Supreme Court may reverse, modify or affirm the judgment-decree or Order appealed against while exercising its appellate jurisdiction and not while exercising the discretionary jurisdiction disposing of petition for special leave to appeal. The doctrine of merger can therefore be applied to the former and not to the latter.
(iv) An order refusing special leave to appeal may be a non-speaking Order or a speaking one. In either case it does not attract the doctrine of merger. An Order refusing special leave to appeal does not stand substituted in place of the Order under challenge. All that it means is that the Court was not inclined to exercise its discretion so as to allow the appeal being filed.
(v) If the Order refusing leave to appeal is a speaking Order i.e., gives reasons for refusing the grant of leave, then the Order has two implications. Firstly, the statement of law contained in the Order is a declaration of law by the Supreme Court within the meaning of Article 141 of the Constitution. Secondly, other than the declaration of law, whatever is stated in the Order are the findings recorded by the Supreme Court which would bind the parties thereto and also the Court, tribunal or authority in any proceedings subsequent thereto by way of judicial discipline, the Supreme Court being the Apex Court of the Country. But, this does not amount to saying that the Order of the Court, tribunal or authority below has stood merged in the Order of the Supreme Court rejecting special leave petition or that the Order of the Supreme Court is the only Order binding as res judicata in subsequent proceedings between the parties.
(vi) Once leave to appeal has been granted and appellate jurisdiction of Supreme Court has been invoked the Order passed in appeal would attract the doctrine of merger; the Order may be of reversal, modification or merely affirmation.
(vii) On an appeal having been preferred or a petition seeking leave to appeal having been converted into an appeal before Supreme Court the jurisdiction of High Court to entertain a review petition is lost thereafter as provided by Sub-rule (1) of Rule (I) of Order 47 of the CPC."
In the same paragraph, the Supreme Court has further held:
"We may look at the issue from another angle. The Supreme Court cannot and does not reverse or modify the decree or Order appealed against while deciding a petition for special leave to appeal. What is impugned before the Supreme Court can be reversed or modified only after granting leave to appeal and then assuming appellate jurisdiction over it. If the Order impugned before the Supreme Court cannot be reversed or modified at the SLP stage, obviously that Order cannot also be affirmed at the SLP stage."
12. The ratio of the above judgment squarely answers the contention raised by learned Additional Government Advocate. In the premise of the ratio of the above judgment of the Apex Court, we can very well say that when this Court dealt with the applications filed by the owners of the acquired land under Section 5 of the Limitation Act in M.F.A Nos. 837 of 2002 and batch for condonation of delay in preferring the appeals, there was no occasion for this Court to deal with the merits of the awards. This Court revises or modifies or affirms an award passed by the Civil Court only if it condones delay in preferring an appeal against such award and hears such appeal on merit in exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. Therefore, it cannot be said that the awards passed by the Civil Court dated 30.11.1998 merged with the judgment of the learned Single Judge dated 20th March, 2002 passed in M.FA. Nos. 837 of 2002 and batch. The doctrine of merger and the right of review are concepts which are closely interlinked. If this Court in M.F.A Nos. 837 of 2002 and batch were to condone delay in preferring the appeals and dispose of the appeals with or without reasons, by affirmance or otherwise, the Orders of the Civil Court would have merged with the judgment of this Court. In that event, it was not permissible for the owners of the acquired lands to move the civil Court by way of review because the judgments and awards of the Civil Court by way of review become the judgments and awards of the Civil Court have merged with the judgment of this Court. That is not the situation obtaining in this case. It is, therefore, trite that if the awards passed by the Civil Court on 30.11.1998 were not merged with the Order of the learned Single Judge dated 20th March 2002, in MFA Nos. 837 of 2002 and batch, the owners of the acquired land could invoke review jurisdiction of the Civil Court by preferring necessary applications under Order 47, Rule 1 readwith Section 114 CPC. In conclusion, we answer the first point in the positive and in favour of the owners of the acquired lands.
13. Point No. 2:
It is true there was 1072 days delay in preferring appeals to this Court and the applications filed by the owners of the acquired land seeking condonation of delay were dismissed by this Court on the ground that explanation offered was not satisfactory. It is also true that even in preferring review petition before the Civil Court under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC there was a delay of about 3 years 8 months. In the light of the judgment of this Court dated 20th March, 2002 in M.F.A. Nos. 837 of 2002 and batch, the Civil Court could not have taken a view different from that of this Court. The question of delay in making the claim would come to the fore and it would operate as a legal impediment to secure interest on solatium and additional market value only if it is the requirement of law that the claimant owner should make an application or raise a demand for interest on solatium and additional market value. On the other hand, if the Court finds that the Act does not require the owners of the acquired land to raise a claim for interest on solatium and additional market value, but, it is the duty of the Land Acquisition Officer/the Court to grant interest on solatium and additional market value once the conditions prescribed under Sections 28 or 34 of the Act are satisfied to the owners suo motu, denial of that relief to the owners of the acquired land would be totally unjust, illegal and violative of Sections 28 and 34 of the Act.
14. The entitlement of the owners of the acquired land to receive interest on solatium and additional market value is settled by the binding judgment of the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in SUNDER v. UNION OF INDIA (supra) holding that the owner of the acquired land is entitled to interest on the amount of compensation worked out in accordance with the provisions of Section 23 of the Land Acquisition Act including all the sub-sections thereof meaning thereby Sub-sections (1), (1A) and (2) of Section 23. The Constitution Bench held thus:
"No judicial exercise is required to quantify the sums mentioned in Sub-section (1-A) or Sub-section (2) because the Section itself specifies the percentage to be worked out for the purpose of adding to the total amount arrived at under Sub-section (1). Otherwise Section 26 is not intended to show that the compensation awarded would be bereft of the additional amount and the solatium envisaged under Sub-section (1-A) or Sub-section (2). This can be clearly discerned from the commencing words of Section 26 itself. They are: "Every award under this Part shall be in writing signed by the Judge". What is referred to therein is Part III of the Act which comprises of a fasciculus of twelve provisions staring with Section 18 and ending with Section 28A of the Act. There can be no doubt that all the three heads specified in the three sub sections in Section 23 are the sums to be 'awarded by the Court". Hence the words "every award under this part" cannot be treated as the award after delinking the amounts awarded under Sub-section (1-A) or Sub-section (2) of Section 23.
The remaining sub-sections in that provision only deal with the contingencies in which the Collector has to deposit the amount instead of paying it to the part concerned. It is the legal obligation of the Collector to pay "the compensation awarded by him" to the party entitled thereto. We make it clear that the compensation awarded Would include not only the total sum arrived at as per Sub-section (1) of Section 23 but the remaining sub-sections thereof as well. It is thus clear from Section 34 that the expression "awarded amount' would mean the amount of compensation worked out in accordance with the provisions contained in Section 23, including all the sub-sections thereof".
15. Learned Additional Government Advocate quite fairly did not dispute the entitlement of the petitioners to receive interest on solatium and additional market value in the light of the judgment of the Apex Court in SUNDER's case(supra) but, his opposition is based on two grounds already noticed above, to repeat, (i) that review petitions filed before the Civil Courts were not maintainable; (ii) that the petitioners even otherwise have not shown sufficient cause to condone enormous delay in preferring the review petitions.
16. The first contention of the learned Additional Government Advocate is already dealt with and rejected by us while considering point No. 1. For the sake of reasoning, we may take it that the explanation offered by the revision petitioners for condoning delay in preferring the review petitions before the Civil Court is not satisfactory. Even then, the question is whether on that ground the petitioners can be denied their substantive legal right to receive interest on solatium and additional market value. In deciding this question, we think that we may derive sufficient guidance as well as force from the judgment of the Supreme Court in SHREE VIJAY COTTON & OIL MILLS LTD. v. STATE OF GUJARAT, . In that case the appellant, Vijay Cotton & Oil Mills Ltd was the owner of 6 acres 38 1/2 guntas of land situated on the Bhachau Rahapar Road in Kutch District. On November 19, 1949. Government of Kutch took possession of the said land under an agreement that the Government would give to the owner in exchange suitable land of equal value. Thereafter the Government did not give any other land in exchange and instead decided to acquire the same. On February, 1955 the Government issued a notification under Section 6(1) of the Act, declaring that the land was needed for public purpose. The Collector awarded Rs. 5075.44 as compensation. Feeling dissatisfied, the claimant asked the Collector to make a reference to the Court under Section 18 of the Act, which was done. The Civil Court found that the claimant was entitled to compensation on the basis of the market value of the land on the date of Notification under Section 6 of the Act. The Civil Court determined the same at the rate of Rs. 3 per square yard. The Civil Court also awarded solatium at the rate of 6% from February 1, 1955. The State Government preferred an appeal against the award of the District Judge before the High Court. The Gujarat High Court came to the conclusion that the compensation under the Act could only be determined on the basis of the market value on the date of the Notification under Section 4(1) of the Act, and since no such Notification was issued, it was not possible to determine the compensation payable under the Act. The claimant, after obtaining a certificate from the High Court, filed civil appeal in the Supreme Court. Taking into consideration the scheme of the Act, Supreme Court held that the notification dated February 1, 1955 issued under Section 6 of the Act could be treated as a composite notification under Section 4(1) and Section 6(1) of the Act and that District Judge could lawfully award the market value of the land on that day. The matter was, thus, remanded to the Gujarat High Court for disposal on merit. After the remand of the proceedings by the Supreme Court, there were two questions for consideration before the Gujarat High Court. The first question was whether the compensation awarded by the Civil Court at the rate of Rs. 3 per square yard was wrong and if so to what extent. The second question was whether the claimant was entitled to interest on the compensation amount from November 19, 1949 instead of February 1, 1955 as awarded by the Civil Court. The claimant contended that under Sections 34 and 28 of the Act he was entitled to interest from the date the possession of the land was taken over from him. The Gujarat High Court accepted the State appeal and reduced the price of the acquired land from Rs. 3 per square yard to Rs. 1.5 per square yard. The Gujarat High Court rejected the claim of the claimant to interest from November 19, 1949 instead of February 1, 1955. Being aggrieved by the above judgment and award of the Gujarat High Court, the claimant preferred appeal to the Supreme Court.
17. In that case, as seen above, possession of the land was taken from the appellant by the Government on November 19, 1949. The notification under Section 6 was issued on February 1, 1955. The Civil Court in its award granted interest on the compensation amount only from February 1, 1955. The State filed an appeal before the High Court against the award of compensation at Rs. 3 per square yard but the appellant-claimant did not file any appeal against that part of the award which by implication went against him and restricted the amount of interest from February 1, 1955, instead of November 19, 1949. The appellant, however, filed cross-objections under Order 41, Rule 22 of CPC in the appeal filed by the State. Since the objections were barred by limitation an application for condonation of delay was also filed along with the objections. The said application was dismissed with the result that the Gross-Objections stood rejected as time-barred.
18. In the above factual background, the Supreme Court having considered the statutory provisions of Section 23(1), 26, 27, 28 and 34 of the Act held that the award of interest is 'consequential and automatic' (emphasis supplied by the Court). Having said it, the Supreme Court in paragraphs-14 and 15 proceeds to hold thus:
"14. The High Court while appreciating the point in issue did not consider the mandatory provisions of Section 34 of the Act. The said Section specifically provides that when the amount of compensation is not paid on or before taking possession of the land the Collector shall pay interest at 6 per cent per annum from the date of taking over possession. The payment of interest is not dependent on any claim by the person whose land has been acquired. There can be no controversy or any lis between the parties regarding payment of interest. When once the provision of Section 34 are attracted, it is obligatory for the Collector to pay the interest. If he fails to do so the same can be claimed from the Court in proceedings under Section 18 of the Act or even from the appellate Court/Courts thereafter.
15. We have carefully examined the reasoning of the High Court in reaching the conclusion which we have reproduced in the earlier part of this judgment. We do not agree with the interpretation placed by the High Court on various provisions of the Act. Reading Section 23 with Section 26 of the Act it is clear that the award, which is deemed to be a decree, is the sum total of conclusions reached by the Courts in determining compensation under Section 23 of the Act on appreciation of the evidence between the parties. The costs under Section 27 and the interest under Sections 28 and 34 are added to the compensation amount to make it a consolidated award. The costs and interest under the Act if not awarded by the lower Court can always be awarded by higher Courts in any proceedings under the Act and to any party entitled to the same under the Act."
19. The Supreme Court furthermore, while emphasizing on the duty of the collector to pay interest on the amount due to the owners of the acquired land under Sections 28 and 34 of the Act and why procedural hazards should come in the way of the Court granting interest on solatium and additional market value emphatically ruled:
16. There is inherent evidence in the wording of Sections 28 and 34 to show that the framers of the Act intended to assure the payment of interest to the person whose land was acquired and it was not the intention to subject the said payment to procedural hazards. Section 34 lays down that "the Collector shall pay the amount awarded with interest at 6 per cent per annum..." The legislative mandate is clear. It is directive to the collector to pay the interest in a given circumstance. Section 34 nowhere says that the interest amount is to be included in the award decree as prepared under Section 23(1) read with Section 26 of the Act. Similarly Section 28 provides "the award of the Court may direct that the Collector shall pay interest'. Here also the award under Section 23(1) read with Section 26 has been kept distinct from the payment of interest under the Section. The interest to be paid under Section 34 and also under Section 28 is of different character than the compensation amount under Section 23(1) of the Act. Whereas the interest, if payable under the Act, can be claimed at any stage of the proceedings under the Act, the amount of compensation under Section 23(1) which is an award decree under Section 26, is subject to the rules of Procedure and Limitation. The rules of procedure are hand-maiden of justice. The procedural hassle cannot come in the way of substantive right of citizens under the Act.
17. We do not, therefore, agree with the reasoning and the findings reached by the High Court, We are of the opinion that it was not necessary for the appellant claimant to have filed separate appeal/cross objections before the High Court for the purposes of claiming interest under Section 28 or Section 34 of the Act. He could claim the interest in the State appeal. The fact, that he filed cross-objections which were dismissed as time barred, is wholly irrelevant'.
20. If we read the observations of the Supreme Court in paragraphs 13 and 14 of the judgment carefully and conjointly, it makes it abundantly clear that the owners of the acquired land need not raise any claim or make any application for interest on solatium and additional market value. On the other hand, the statement of law that may be culled out from paragraphs 13 and 14 of the judgment is that once conditions specified under Sections 28 or 34 of the Act are satisfied, it becomes imperative for the Land Acquisition Officer or the Court to pay interest on solatium and additional market value as a statutory duty without waiting for a demand or application from the owner of the acquired land. The language employed in Section 34 that "the Collector shall pay the amount with interest______" speaks loudly and clearly the legislative mandate and intendment. It is a statutory direction to the collector to pay the interest. Therefore, in all fairness, interests of justice and in performance of statutory obligations, the Land Acquisition Officer ought to have paid interest on solatium and additional market value, particularly, because, even according to the State Government, the petitioners are entitled to interest, without waiting for the proceedings being initiated by the affected, uprooted owners of the acquired land. Procedural hazard can never be a good and valid reason for the State to deny substantive right of the owners of the acquired land to receive interest on solatium and additional market value. As held and reiterated by the Courts, rules of procedure are hand-maiden of justice. Be that as it may, the High Court has suo motu power to revise Orders of the Civil Court by virtue of the power conferred upon it under Section 115 CPC where total failure of justice would have occasioned or where irreparable loss would have caused to the parties against whom it was made. This is one of such cases where the Court is convinced that it should exercise its powers under Section 115 conjointly with its inherent power under Section 151 CPC to do justice. Otherwise, it would occasion irreparable substantial loss to the petitioners.
21. The Supreme Court in GREEN VIEW TEA AND INDUSTRIES v. COLLECTOR, GOLAGHAT, ASSAM AND ANR, 2004 AIR SCW 1347 while emphasizing the approach to be adopted by the Court while administering justice was pleased to observe:
"15. It is the duty of the Court to rectify, revise and recall its Orders as and when it is brought to its notice that certain of its Order were passed on a wrong or mistaken assumption of facts and that implementation of those Orders would have serious consequences. An act of Court should prejudice none. "Of all these things respecting which learned men dispute", said Cicero, "there is none more important than clearly to understand that we are born for justice and that right is founded not in opinion but in nature". This very idea was echoed by James Madison (The Federalist, No. 51 at p. 352). He said:
"Justice is the end of the Government. It is the end of the civil society. It ever has been and ever will be pursued, until it be obtained or until liberty be lost in the pursuit."
22. In the result and for the foregoing reasons, we cannot sustain the impugned Orders. Consequently, we allow the Civil Revision Petitions with costs and set aside the Orders of the Civil Court impugned in these Civil Revision Petitions. We allow review petitions filed by the petitioners under Order 47, Rule 1 read with Sections 114 and 151 CPC with costs and declare that the petitioner-owners of the acquired land are entitled to interest on solatium and additional market value. The Land Acquisition Officer is directed to pay interest on solatium and additional market value in accordance with law to the owners of the acquired land within a period of one month from the date of receipt of a copy of this Order. Advocate's fee is fixed at Rs. 1500/- in each of the Civil Revision Petitions.