Bombay High Court
Miraj Taluka Girni Kamgar Sangh vs Manager, Shree Gajanan Weaving Mills ... on 13 September, 1991
Equivalent citations: (1992)IILLJ686BOM
JUDGMENT
1. This petition, under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, impugns the orders dated April 8, 1986, and January 19, 1987, made by the Labour Court, Sangli, in Application (B.I.R.) No. 12 of 1984 as confirmed by the order dated August 10, 1989, made by the Industrial Court, Kolhapur, in Appeal (IC) No. 12 of 1987. The proceedings before both the courts were under the provisions of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act.')
2. The petitioner was employed as a Weaver in the service of the first Respondent, a Textile Mill, from the year 1980. On January 25, 1984, he was given a chargesheet. The charges alleged against him were as follows :
"(1) You do not keep clean the loom on which you are working.
(2) Despite the jobber telling you, you do not put the oil in the loom and work it without caring for the fact that the bearing gets hot.
(3) Before going to the bath-room you do not give indication to the jobber or your department helper or co-worker and nor do you request them to take care of your loom. You have not cared for the suggestion made by the jobber to you from time to time.
(4) Your conduct and behavior with the Departmental jobber, the other weavers and the superior officer is indisciplined, careless and unbecoming.
(5) Your overall behavior in the factory is one of irresponsibility and inconsistent with the discipline of the factory."
These charges the petitioner was called upon to explain. He was also required to face an enquiry. the petitioner attended the enquiry and was found guilty of charges no : 3, 4 and 5, acquitted of charge no. 1 and found partly guilty of charge no. 2. By an order dated March 11, 1984, the first respondent stated that despite being found guilty of the charges, a lenient view was taken in the matter and, instead of being dismissed from the service, the petitioner's services were being terminated by payment of thirteen days' wages in lieu of notice. The Petitioner challenged the order of dismissal before the labour Court, Sangli, under Section 78 of the Act. One of his grievances (indeed, the principal grievance in the petition) was that the principles of natural justice had not been complied with inasmuch as the charges were vague, making it virtually impossible for him to defend himself effectively against the charges. The learned Judge of the Labour Court, by his order dated April 8, 1986, came to the conclusion that the domestic enquiry conducted was proper and according to law and rejected the contentions of the petitioner in this regard. On the basis of the said enquiry, which was found to be proper, the learned Judge of the Labour Court upheld the order of termination as warranted in the circumstances, but directed that the monetary benefits consequential upon termination of service be made available to the petitioner. The petitioner challenged the order of the Labour Court by his Appeal (IC) No. 12 of 1987 under Section 84 of the Act before the Industrial Court, Kolhapur. The Industrial Court gave short-shrift to the argument about the enquiry being illegal and improper by its observation that after being taken through the enquiry proceedings it found nothing wrong with the enquiry and that it agreed fully with the labour Court's finding that the enquiry was just, fair and proper and that the principles of natural justice had been properly followed by the Enquiry Officer. The industrial Court was impressed by the fact that the petitioner had been given opportunity to be represented by an office bearer of the Union and was given a chance to cross-examine the witnesses and give his evidence. It appears that in the enquiry proceedings evidence was led on various aspects of the charges including certain specific instances of quarrels which had taken place in the Department and specific instances of so-called negligences on the part of the petitioner in not keeping his looms clean and not oiling them properly. On a perusal and consideration of the enquiry documents, the learned Judge of the Industrial Court accepted the findings of the Labour Court on the merits of the case and dismissed the appeal by taking the view that the misconducts proved against the petitioner were quite serious and that there was no warrant for any leniency being shown. The petitioner has impugned the judgments of the two Courts below, by this petition.
3. In my view, the petition can be disposed of only on the short contention canvassed by the petitioner, namely, that the chargesheet served on him was delighfully vague and thereby he was not given proper opportunity to effectively defend himself against the charges. From a perusal of the charges, which have been reproduced hereinbefore, it is clear that no specific instances of the misconducts alleged against the petitioner were cited in the chargesheet. The chargesheet was totally lacking in particulars as to instances of the misconducts falling within each of the five categories alleged against the petitioner. An employee faced with a vague charge that he is guilty of a described type of misconduct, would be extremely hard put to defend himself against the charge unless he is informed such particulars as would enable him to give an effective reply thereto and demonstrate that the charges are false or, otherwise not acceptable. Scanning the chargesheet given to the petitioner in the present case, I am of the view that it can be used as a model for what a chargesheet ought not to be. In my judgment, therefore, the chargesheet itself ought to have been quashed and struck down by the two Courts below on this very count. The fact that voluminous evidence is led in enquiry is no substitute for a chargesheet clearly setting forth the allegations with sufficient precision and particulars so as to enable the employee to defend himself. That is the very purpose of a chargesheet. This is the barest requirement of a chargesheet consistent with principles of natural justice and any chargesheet which fails to comply with this requirement is no chargesheet at all. If the chargesheet fails to stand up to this test, the rest of the domestic enquiry is useless and is merely an eye - wash. In my view, the entire enquiry conducted against the petitioner was mere farce. The petitioner was not given sufficient opportunity to defend himself. The principles of natural justice were not complied with. The findings of the Labour Court and the Industrial Court upholding the validity of the enquiry are perverse and are required to be interfered with. Once the conclusion is reached that domestic enquiry was improper and vitiated, I find that the first respondent - employer led evidence on the merits of the charge and there is no material on record supporting the charges. Consequently, the charges must fail. Hence, the order of dismissal needs to be quashed and set aside and the employee would be entitled to get the relief of reinstatement in service with continuity and full back wages from the date of dismissal.
4. The order of dismissal dated March 11, 1984, is set aside and the first respondent is directed to reinstate the employee-petitioner in service with continuity of employment and full back wages from March 11, 1984. The back wages to be paid within a period of two months from today, failing which the amount due shall carry simple interest at 18 per cent per annum from the said date on which they ought to have been paid.
5. Rule is accordingly made absolute with no order as to costs.