Bombay High Court
S.R. Thorat Milk Products Pvt. Ltd. vs Sahyadri Dairy on 11 January, 2002
Equivalent citations: 2002(6)BOMCR327, 2003(27)PTC176(BOM)
Author: D.Y. Chandrachud
Bench: D.Y. Chandrachud
JUDGMENT D.Y. Chandrachud, J.
1. In a suit for passing off, the learned Additional District Judge at Pune has declined to grant an ad-interim injunction to the Appellant, the original Plaintiff Aggrieved by that refusal, the Appellant has filed the present Appeal From Order.
2. The Appellant which is a Private Limited Company is engaged in the business of procuring, pasteurizing, homogenizing and marketing Cow's milk and other milk products in the State of Maharashtra. The Appellant has pleased that initially, a proprietary concern by the name of S.R. Thorat milk products carried on production activities in relation to milk and Milk Products since 1994. The Plaintiff was incorporated in the year 1998 and upon incorporation, it has sold and distributed milk under the name of "S.R. Thorat Milk Products". In vitreous paragraphs of the plaint before this Court, an attempt has been made to demonstrate the magnitude of the business of the Plaintiff and the technology employed for carrying on business activities. The Plaintiff claims to have an establishment spread over 10 acres of land in which machinery employing modern technology is deployed. In para 6 of the plaint, details of the machinery and facilities have been adverted to, including (1) Raw Milk Receiving Dock, (ii) Process Section, (iii) Milk Packing, (iv) Pasteuriser, Homogenisers and Storages Silos, (v) Quality Assurance Laboratory, (vi) Utility Services Plant & Effluent Treatment Plant with Zero Discharge, (vii) Boilers ; and (viii) Refrigeration and Air Conditioning. For the financial year 1998-99, the Plaintiff has stated that it has sold and distributed milk under the trade mark "S.R. Thorat Milk Product Pvt. Ltd." to the extent of 72,05,318 liters. For the financial year 1999-2000 the sales are stated to have increased to 2,21,60,883 liters. For the Financial, year 2000-2001 sales are stated to have further increased to 2,84,29,978 liters. The Plaintiff claims that due to the quality and standard of the milk sold and, supplied by it, the Plaintiff has been granted a Certificate of Registration by the, Agricultural and Processed Food Products Ex-port Development Authority, an authority under the Ministry of Commerce, Government of India. There is an averment that the Plaintiff has acquired goodwill in the market over the past several years. The Plaintiff sells cow's milk in polythene pouches of half liter and one liter under the name of "S.R. Thorat" at a price of Rs. 7.50 and Rs. 15/- respectively/The sale every day of Cow's milk in the City of Pune alone is stated to be 35,000 liters which is according to the Plaintiff, the highest amongst other brand names selling cow's milk in the City of Pune and its vicinity. The Plaintiff has stated that it has applied to the Trade Marks Registry, at Mumbai on 11th September, 2000 for the registration of the trade mark. In addition to cow's milk, the Plaintiff sells other products including shrikhand, paneer, ghee, butter, milk powder, and a dairy whitener. The activities of the Plaintiff are governed by the Milk and Milk Products Order, 1992 of the Central Government issued under the Essential Commodities Act, and it has been averred that the said order is applicable only when a person handles milk in excess of 10,000 liters per day or milk products containing solids in excess of 500 tones per annum.
3. The Defendant is a proprietary concern. In para 21 of the plaint, it has been stated that the Defendant obtained registration under the Milk and Milk Products Order, 1992 as it started processing cow's milk effect from 1st May, 2001. Prior thereto, it is stated, the Defendant was in the business of the supply of milk to its customers in tankers out of which the Plaintiff was one purchaser. On 1st May, 2001, the Defendant started marketing cow's milk under the trade name of "P.B. Thorat Milk (Pasteurised Homogenised Cow Milk)". The Defendant also sells its product in polythene pouches of half liter and one liter and the maximum retail price is shown as Rs. 7.50 and Rs. 15/-. The price is exactly the same as the price at which the products of the Plaintiff are sold.
4. The polythene pouches of the Plaintiff have a distinctive get up and appearance. They are marked by green coloured lines drawn diagonally across the pouch in which the logo 'S.R. Thorat Milk' is written in green ink. The trade name of the Plaintiff appears both in English as well as in Marathi. Insofar as the Defendant is concerned, the polythene pouches contain the same get up in terms of colour, in that their pouches also have the green coloured diagonally drawn lines between which the trade name. "P.B. Thorat Milk" is written both the Marathi and in English. The Plaintiff has averred that the Defendant is selling Cow's milk on a very small scale at the moment in some parts of Pune District packed in half and one liter polythene pouches. According to the Plaintiff, the sale by the Defendant is to the extent of about 10,000 liters per day in or around the District of Pune. According to the Plaintiff, there are marked similarities between the pouches which are now sought to be marketed by the Defendant and those of the Plaintiff, as a result of which, the general public has been misled into believing that the mark which is marketed and sold by the Defendant is in fact milk marketed by the Plaintiff. The similarities between the two pouches are explained in para 28 of the Plaint and it would be worth while to extract the averment in extenso :
"The similarity between the two milk pouches are set out below :-
(i) The trade name under which the plaintiffs 'sell their cow milk is 'S.R. THORAT MILK (HOMOGENISED AND PASTEURISED). The defendants adopted the trade name which phonetically as well as in terms of arrangement of words or construction of sentence is identical to that of the trade name of the plaintiffs, considering the fact that the defendants are now selling cow milk under the following trade name i.e., P.B. THORAT MILK. The trade and the public are easily led to believe by the defendants that their polythene pouches of cow milk is the same as the cow milk belonging and sold by the plaintiffs. This is the main feature of deception on the part of the defendants.
(ii) The polythene pouches of the defendants are identical to the pouches of the Plaintiff Company considering that it is printed in green colour and the size and format of both the sides of the polythene pouches is more or less identical.
(iii) The defendants have the trade name printed on the pouches both in English and Marathi as done by the Plaintiff Company in green ink. (iv) The defendants have designs of milk drops printed on the pouches similar to that of the Plaintiff Company.
(v) The defendants have the design around the layout, the letter type, the distance between the horizontal lines, their inclination the bold types in which the various words appear are all identical on the pouches of the defendants.
(vi) The place and the way of writing the manufacturer's address, the bold types in which the alphabets appear are identical to the pouches of the Plaintiff Company.
(vii) The size of the various letters printed on the pouches and the . general format as well as the overall presentation are identical on the pouches of the Plaintiff Company.
(viii) Even on the back side of the pouches also the defendant has printed that the public should insist on the various products manufactured by them viz., cream, butter, ghee, paneer, shrikhand, similar to the Plaintiff Company's pouches. In fact the defendants do not manufacture shrikhand, ghee, cream or paneer, however, to deceive the public and the trade. The print on the back of the polythene pouches is identical to the Plaintiff Company. Again the printing on the back side is also in green colour and the general composition, structure, format and words are deceptively similar to that of the Plaintiff Company."
5. The Plaintiff claims that the milk marketed by it is commonly addressed as 'Thorat Milk' by the consumers at the counter as a result of which the Defendant is able to practice deception and confusion on unwary consumers by passing of its goods as and for the goods of the plaintiff. In these circumstances, in the action for passing off, the Plaintiff claimed an injunction against the defendant. An interim injunction was also prayed for.
6. The Defendant has squarely admitted in the affidavit-in-reply that it commenced the sale of milk through its dairy known as Sahyadri Dairy under the trade name 'P.B. Thorat Milk' only on 1st May, 2001. In fact during the course of the submissions before this Court, it is an admitted position that prior to 1st May, 2001, the defendant was marketing its products under the logo inter alia of 'Sahyadri Milk'. It is only on 1st May, 2001 that the Defendant has commenced the sale of milk under the mark of 'P.B., Thorat Milk'. Therefore, the allegations of the Plaintiff in paragraph 24 of the Plaint are squarely admitted by virtue of what is stated in paragraph 24 of the reply before the Trial Court. The Defendant claims that it also has applied for the registration of the trademark on 17th April, 2001 and, has claimed user since 1st May, 2001. It would be necessary to emphasise that the statements contained in paragraph 25 of the Plaint have not been expressly denied. Insofar as the similarities between the two sets of pouches are concerned, the Defendant has made a broad and general statement that there is no likelihood of causing confusion in the mind of the purchasers. The Defendants seeks to point out dis-similarities between its pouches and those of the Plaintiff.
7. The learned Additional 'District Judge by his order dated 20th August, 2001 declined to grant the interim injunction which was prayed for by the Plaintiff. The learned Judge noted that while the case of the Plaintiff was that the mark "S.R. Thorat Milk Products" was used since 1994, the Company was incorporated much later in 1998 and an application for the registration of the mark under the Trade Marks Act was made on 11th September, 2000. The learned Trial Judge was of the view that the delay of two years in applying for the registration of the mark was unexplained and referred to the provisions of the Trade Mark Act, 1999.
8. The finding of the learned Trial Judge on this point is clearly erroneous. The learned Trial Judge has overlooked the fact that the action which has been instituted was for passing off and not an action for infringement. The entitlement of a Plaintiff in action for passing off cannot be defeated on the alleged delay in applying for the registration of the mark for these are two independent remedies which are available to the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff in an action for passing off complains that the goodwill inherent in his mark is being eroded by the deception practiced or the confusion caused by the use of a similar mark which is placed in the course of business by a competitor. The consequence of such use is that a resultant confusion or deception is caused or practised in the trade. The entitlement of the Plaintiff in an action for passing off is not liable to be defeated, as the Trial Court assumes it can, by a delay in the presentation of an application for registration. In Kerly's Law of Trade Marks and Trade Names (Thirteenth Edition) at page 425, the learned Author notes thus :
"As a matter of legal history, it may be said that the actions for infringement of trade mark and for passing-off have a common origin the latter is a generalisation of the old action for infringement - but they are now distinct. With the new law of trade marks, the two causes of action have converged somewhat ...Nonetheless it remains the case that the cause of action in passing off is wider and more flexible, giving protection to all the means by which the claimant's make or goods may be identified with him, and not just those which he has managed to get registered. It is also more onerous, in the sense that the claimant must prove his reputation and that the defendant's activities involve a false representation damaging to the claimant's goodwill". Kerly's treatise in fact, adverts to the legal position which is that the Plaintiff in a claim for passing off may succeed even if an action for infringement may or has failed.
"A claimant may fail to make out a case of infringement of a trade mark for various reasons and may yet show that by imitating the mark claimed as a trade mark, or otherwise, the defendant has done what is calculated to pass off his goods as those of the claimant. A claim in "passing off has generally been added as a second string to actions for infringement, and has on occasion succeeded where the claim for infringement has failed."
9. In its traditional form, the cause of action for passing off is constituted by three ingredients. These three ingredients have been adverted to as "the classical trinity" (Kerly's Law of Trade Marks Thirteenth Edition at page 413). Kerly refers to the judgment of the House of Lords in the Jif Lemon case where Lord Oliver elucidated what a successful claimant must prove to quality for relief in an action for passing off :
"First, he must establish a goodwill or reputation attached to the goods or services which he supplies in the mind of the purchasing public by association, with the identifying get-up (whether it consists simply of a brand name or a trade description, or the individual features of labelling or packaging) under which his particular goods or services are offered to the public, such that the get-up is recognised by the public as distinctive specifically of the plaintiff's goods or services.
Secondly, he must demonstrate a misrepresentation by the defendant to the public (whether or not intentional) leading or likely to lead the public to belief that the goods or services offered by him are the goods or services of the plaintiff.
Thirdly, he must demonstrate, that he suffers or, in a quia timet action, that he is likely to suffer damage by reason of the erroneous belief engendered by the defendant's misrepresentation that the source of the defendant's goods or services is the same as the source of those offered by the plaintiff"
10. The attention of the learned Trial Judge appears also not to have been drawn to the fact that the Trade Mark Act, 1999 is still to be brought into force.
11. The learned Trial Judge has thereafter delay with a comparison of the two sets of pouches-those of the Plaintiff and those of the Defendant. In paragraph 15 of the judgment, the learned Judge does recognise the fact the "Cow milk pouch of the Defendant is similar in size printing and green colour to the cow milk pouch of the Plaintiff. However, according to the learned Judge, the Plaintiff would still not be entitled to an injunction because the milk pouches of the Plaintiff bear a picture of a cow and calf as a result of which "it has a separate identity". On the other hand the Trial Court has held that since the milk pouches of the Defendant bear a green round seal of "Sahyadri Dairy", it has a different identity. Here again, the order of the Trial Court does not take due notice of the law laid down by the Supreme Court in Cadila Health Care Ltd. v. Cadila Pharmaceutical Ltd., . In the said judgment of the Supreme Court, a Bench of three learned Judge inter alia dwelt on the issue as to whether in an action for passing off the dis-similarities of the two marks must be considered. The Bench of three learned Judges considered the correctness of the view which was taken in an earlier judgment of two learned Judges of the Court in S.M. Dyechem Ltd. v. Cadbury (India) Ltd., . In the Dyechem case, it had been held that "where common marks are included in rival trade marks, more regard is to be paid to the parts not common" and, while the proper course is to look at the marks as a whole, at the same time the parts which are not common should not be disregarded. The Court has held that it can be said that in the decided cases, stress is laid on common features rather than on differences in essential features. The Court then held that in the past cases, the Court had not had occassion to deal with an issue where there were also differences in essential features nor to consider the extent to which the differences are to be given importance over similarities.
12. The earlier judgment in Dyechem has been overruled by the subsequent judgment of the Larger Bench in Cadila (supra) where the Supreme Court held thus ;
"18. We are unable to agree with the aforesaid observation in Dyechem case. As far as this Court is concerned, the decisions in the last four decades-off have clearly laid down that what has to be seen in the case of a passing-off action is the similarity between the competing marks and to determine whether there is likelihood of deception or causing likelihood of deception or causing confusion".
Again in para 19 the Supreme Court held thus :
"19. With respect, we are unable to agree that the principle of phonetic similarity has to be jettisoned when the manner in which the competing words are written is different and the conclusion so arrived at is clearly contrary to the binding precedent of this Court in Amritdhara's case where the phonetic similarity was applied by judging the two competing marks. Similarly, in Durga Dutt Sharma case it was observed that :
"In an action for infringement, the plaintiff must, no doubt, make out that the use of the defendant's mark is likely to deceive, but where the similarity between the plaintiffs and the defendant's mark is so close either visually, phonetically or otherwise and the Court reaches the conclusion that there is an imitation. No further evidence is required to establish that the plaintiffs rights are violated".
The judgment of the Supreme Court in Cadila Health Care also emphasises another aspect which was referred to in Amritdhara Pharmacy v. Satya Deo Gupta, . That aspect is that where the product is purchased by both villagers and townfolk, by the literate as well as the illiterate, the question has to be approached from the point of view of a man of average intelligence and imperfect recollection. A trade may relate to goods largely sold to persons who are not necessarily literate or educated in Cadila Health Care Mr. Justice B.N. Kirpal speaking for the Supreme Court held thus :
"In a country like India where there is no single common language, a large percentage of population is illiterate and a small fraction of people know English, then to apply the principles of English law regarding dissimilarity of the marks of the customer knowing about the distinguishing characteristics of the plaintiff's goods seems to overlook the ground realities in India. While examining such cases in India, what has to be kept in mind is the purchaser of such goods in India who may have absolutely no knowledge of English language or of the language in which the trade mark is written and to whom different words with slight difference in spellings may sound phonetically the same. While dealing with a case relating to passing off, one of the important tests which has to be applied in each case is whether the misrepresentation made by the defendant is of such a nature as is likely to cause an ordinary consumer to confuse one product for another due to similarity of marks and other surrounding factors. What is likely to cause confusion would vary from ease to case."
The governing test to be applied in a matter relating to passing off has been formulated thus in the judgment of the Supreme Court :
"35. Broadly stated, in an action for passing-off on the basis of unregistered trade mark generally for deciding the question of deceptive similarity the following factors are to be considered :
(a) The nature of the marks i.e. whether the marks are word marks or label marks or composite marks i.e. both words and label works.
(b) The degree of resemblance between the marks, phonetically similar and hence similar in idea.
(c) The nature of goods in respect of which they are used as trade marks.
(d) The similarity in the nature, character and performance of the goods of the rival traders.
(e) The class of purchasers who are likely to buy the goods bearing the marks they require, or their education and intelligence and the degree of care they are likely to exercise in purchasing and/or using the goods.
(f) The mode of purchasing the goods or placing orders for the goods.
(g) Any other surrounding circumstances which may be relevant in the extent of dissimilarity between the competing marks".
13. Applying the tests laid down by the Supreme Court, the facts of the present case may how be analysed. Both the marks are composite marks in that they are word marks and label marks. There is a significant degree of resemblance between the marks in that they are phonetically similar. The nature of the goods is the same and both the marks are used on pouches in which milk is sold. The get-up of the pouches marketed by the Defendant is the same as the get-up of the Plaintiffs pouches. On the pouches which are marketed by the Defendant, there are the same distinctive features as those which appear on the pouches of the plaintiff including (i) the green coloured diagonal lines, (ii) the pictorial representation of drops of milk, and (iii) the logo of Thorat milk. It would be necessary to emphasise in a case such as the present that the product which is sold is a product which is purchased by a mass of consumers in Society. The supply of milk in polythene pouches has now become a widespread phenomenon not only in urban areas, but in the rural areas of the country as well. The purchasers of these pouches cut across the entire spectrum of Society. The purchasers of milk are not merely drawn from the highly educated strata, but the strata composed of the semi literate or the illiterate as well. The common man walks down every morning to a booth of the milk vendor on the roadside the purchases his daily supplies of milk from the vendor who sells his wares of milk in polythene pouches. A purchaser who asks for Thorat Milk could as well be given the milk pouch marketed by the Defendant when what he wanted to purchase was a pouch which is marketed by the Plaintiff. In matters relating to the marketing of goods of mass consumption such as milk, the average consumer has little time or inclination to evaluate the dissimilarities of the product which is actually being sold to him as compared with the product which he intends to purchase. There can be no doubt in my mind that the milk pouches that are sold by the Defendant were calculated to deceive and have the effect of causing deception and confusion.
14. There is one other issue which needs to be dwelt upon in these proceedings. Section 34 of the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958 provides that nothing in the Act shall entitle the proprietor or a registered user of a registered trade mark to interfere with any bona fide use by a person of his own name or that of this place of business, of any of his predecessors in business, or the use by any person of any bona fide description of the character or quality of his goods. Section 34, it must be noticed, affords protection to the proprietor or a registered user of a registered trade mark. The trade mark of the Defendant is not registered and, therefore, Section 34 in its terms has no application. Section 27(2) of the Act provides that nothing in the Act shall be deemed to affect the right of action against any person for passing off goods as the goods of another person or the remedies in respect thereof. Sub-section (2) of Section 27 is prefaced by a non-obstante provision. But, besides this consideration, it must be emphasised that even under Section 34 what is protected is the bona fide use by a person of his own name or that of his place of business or the bona fide description of the character or quality of his goods.
15. In the present case, the facts and circumstances, prima facie show that the use of the name "P.B. Thorat Milk" was clearly not bona fide. It is an admitted position that the Respondent commenced the use of the mark only with effect from 1st May, 2001 and prior thereto the mark "P.B. Thorat Milk" was neyer utilised. The most prominent of the marks which was used by the Respondent was the one which depicts the logo of Sahyadri Dairy. The use of the mark "Thorat Milk" by the Appellant was first in point of time and it is only much later that the Respondent has chosen to adopt the use of the name "Thorat Milk". The Appellant has in support of its claim of commanding a substantial, goodwill in the market furnished relevant figures relating to the sale of milk, copies of the balance-sheet and of the profit and loss account for the years ending 31st March, 1999 and 31st March, 2000. On the other hand, a perusal of the reply which was filed by the Respondent in the Trial Court would only reveal that there were vague and general denials. The Respondent has chosen not to disclose before the Trial Court the exact quality of its sales. In these circumstances, the manner in which the product of the Respondent was sought to be marketed for the first time commencing in May, 2001 under the trade name of "Thorat Milk" would establish that the Act of the Respondent was calculated to and intended to cause confusion and deception amongst consumers, A case of passing off is, therefore, prima facie established. In a case such as the present, the balance of convenience would clearly lie in favour of the Appellant which has deployed lie in favour of the Appellant which has deployed a considerable outlay and acquired goodwill in the product which is sold. The Trial Court has clearly erred in declining to grant the injunction as prayed and this is a fit case where this Court must cor-. rect the error of the Court below. The balance of convenience is in favour of the Appellant.
16. In a recent judgment in Mahendra & Mahendra Paper Mills Ltd. v. Mahindra & Mahindra Ltd., Civil Appeal No. 7805 of 2001 decided on 9.11.2001 (reported at 2002 (24) PTC 1/21(SC)), the Appellant before the Supreme Court impugned an interim order passed by a learned Single Judge of this Court, R.M. Lodha, J., injuncting him from using the name Mahendra & Mahendra in its establishment. The Respondent before the Supreme Court, Mahindra & Mahindra instituted a suit in this Court seeking a permanent injunction against Mahendra & Mahendra Paper Mills Ltd., restraining it from using in any manner as a part of its corporate name or trading style the words "Mahendra & Mahendra" or any other word which is deceptively similar thereto. According to the Plaintiff, it has used the name "Mahindra and Mahindra Ltd.", since 13th January, 1948 and the Company was a flagship Company of a group of companies using the same name. Besides being a registered trade mark of the group, the word "Mahindra" formed a dominant and significant part of the plaintiff and its other group companies. The mark, it was contended, had acquired significant goodwill. The Defendant had issued a prospectus in connection with its public issue in August, 1996, using the name "Mahendra" instead of the Plaintiffs "Mahindra" and the contention of the Plaintiff before the Court was that the words which were used by the Defendant were phonetically, visually and structurally almost identical and in any event deceptively similar, Mr. Justice R.M. Lodha, of this Court granted an injunction. (The judgment of the learned Single Judge is reported in Vol 4 No. 1 Inellectual Property Cases page 19). While sustaining the order of injunction granted by the learned Single Judge, the Supreme Court held that certain recognised parameters had emerged from the decided cases and without exhaustively formulating them, some of those principles were as follows :
"Whether there is a likelihood of deception or confusion arising is a matter for decision by the Court and no witness is entitled to say whether the mark is likely to deceive or to cause confusion ; that all factors which are likely to create or allay deception or confusion must be considered in combination ; that broadly speaking, factors creating confusion would be for example, the nature of the market itself, the class of customers, the extent of the reputation, the trade channels, the existence of any connection in course of trade, and others".
The Supreme Court noted that it had been held by the Court in Corn Products Refining Co. v. Shangrila Food Products Ltd., that the question as to whether two competing marks are so similar as to be likely to deceive or cause confusion is one of first impression and it is for the Court to decide it. The question has to be approached from the point of view of a man of average intelligence and imperfect recollection. In the facts and circumstances of the case, the Supreme Court held that the mark "Mahindra and Mahindra" which had been used by the Plaintiff over a long span of time had acquired a distinctiveness and a secondary meaning in business or trade circles. People have come to associate the name Mahindra with a certain standard of goods and services. Consequently, "any attempt by another person to use the name in business and trade circles is likely to and in probability will create an impression of a connection with the plaintiff group of companies". The Supreme Court held that it was true that the question as to whether the claim of passing-off in an action against the Defendant will or will not be accepted will be decided by the Court after evidence is led in the suit. Even so, while considering the prayer for interlocutory injunction which is intended to maintain the status quo, the learned Single Judge of this Court had rightly held that the Plaintiff had established a prima facie case and irreparable prejudice in its favour. The Supreme Court, it must also be noted, has in the course of its judgment referred to the judgment of the learned Single Judge of this Court in Kirloskar Diesel Recon Pvt. Ltd. v. Kirloskar Proprietary Ltd., .
17. Having regard to the principles which have been formulated by the Supreme Court and for the reasons already indicated, the Plaintiff is entitled to an interim injunction as prayed for. The Plaintiff-Appellant has established a prima facie case. The balance of convenience is clearly in favour of the Appellant. The Appellant has established before this Court that it will suffer irreparable loss, harm and injury if the relief as prayed for is not granted.
18. In the circumstances, the Appeal From Order is allowed. The impugned order of the learned Additional District Judge, Pune dated 20th August, 2001 is quashed and set aside. The application for interim relief filed before the Trial Court shall in the circumstances stand allowed in terms of prayer Clause (a), which reads as follows :
"(a) the defendant, its servants, licensees, franchisees, agents, representatives, distributors and assigns be restrained by an order of temporary injunction, till the final disposal of the present suit from manufacturing, marketing, exporting, selling, offering for sale cow milk or other allied goods or business under the mark P.B. THORAT MILK or any other trade mark or name deceptively or confusingly similar to S.R. THORAT MILK or in any other manner whatsoever in doing any other things as may be likely to cause confusion or deception amounting to passing off as and from those of the plaintiff".
The Appeal From Order is accordingly allowed in these terms. No order, as to costs.
Parties to Act on a copy of this order duly authenticated by the Sheristedar/P.S. of this Court.
Certified copy expedited