Punjab-Haryana High Court
Baba Kashmira Singh vs Mahindra & Mahindra Financial Services ... on 15 January, 2014
CRR No. 104 of 2014 (O&M) 1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA, AT
CHANDIGARH
-----
CRR No. 104 of 2014 (O&M)
Date of Decision: 15.01. 2014
Baba Kashmira Singh ....Petitioner
Versus
Mahindra & Mahindra Financial Services Ltd. ....Respondent
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE MAHAVIR S. CHAUHAN.
Present: Mr. Navdeep Monga, Advocate, for the petitioner.
• Whether Reporters of local papers may be allowed to see the
judgment? Yes
2. To be referred to the Reporter or not? Yes
3. Whether the judgment should be reported in the Digest? Yes
Mahavir S. Chauhan, J.(Oral)
Complainant (respondent herein) has preferred a criminal
complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (for
short, the Act) impleading the petitioner as an accused. After closure of
respondent's evidence and examination of the petitioner under Section 313 of
the Criminal Procedure Code (for short, the Code) the petitioner, while leading
evidence in defence, produced documents dated 11.06.2009 and 13.07.2009
claiming them to be "No Objection Certificates" alleged to be issued by some
officials of the respondent. The respondent moved an application under Section
311 of the Code to lead additional evidence to bring on record movement
register being maintained by it to show that on the date(s) mentioned in the
documents (dated 11.06.2009 and 13.07.2009), referred to above, the officials
who, allegedly, issued that certificate were not present in Patiala and did not
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visit the petitioner on those dates. This application has been allowed by the
court of learned Magistrate, Class-I, Ludhiana vide order dated 10.12.2013,
which is being impugned in this criminal revision under Sections 397 and 401
of the Code.
I have heard learned counsel for the petitioner and have also gone
through the impugned order.
Learned counsel argues that the learned trial Magistrate has gone
wrong in allowing the application for additional evidence, that too without
application of mind, and has, thereby, allowed the complainant-respondent to
fill in the gaps in its case. According to him the documents dated 11.06.2009
and 13.07.2009 were in the knowledge of the respondent and one of these
documents was even placed on record as Mark R1 (later marked as Exhibit
D1).
Noting more has been urged.
Learned trial Magistrate, while allowing the application for
additional evidence observed as under:
"In the present case though the document was well within
the knowledge of the complainant the same was put in the
cross-examination to the complainant witness but keeping
in view the object of Section 311 Cr.P.C., the determinative
factor is whether the document/witness which is required
to be summoned is necessary for the just decision of the
case. The moment (sic. Movement) register ought to be
produced by complainant will enable the court to
effectively adjudicate the case and to decide the
controversy. Further, it is a settled law that parties should
be given the full opportunity to lead the evidence and the
techicalities of procedural law should not be allowed to
come in the way of cause of substantial justice. Hence,
present application of the complainant is allowed subject
to costs Rs. 1000/-. Representative of complainant
company is directed to lead the additional evidence on
17.12.2013 positively."
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Section 311 of the Code reads as under:
"311. Power to summon material witness, or examine
person present. Any Court may, at any stage of any
inquiry, trial or other proceeding under this Code,
summon any person as a witness, or examine any person in
attendance, though not summoned as a witness, or. recall
and re- examine any person already examined; and the
Court shall summon and examine or recall and re-
examine any such person if his evidence appears to it to be
essential to the just decision of the case."
It is seen that Section 311 of the Code empowers the court to
summon a material witness, or to examine a person present at "any stage" of
"any enquiry", or "trial", or "any other proceeding" under the Code or to
summon any person as a witness, or to recall and re-examine any person who
has already been examined if his evidence appears to it, to be essential for the
arrival of a just decision of the case. Undoubtedly, Section 311 of the Code
confers a very wide discretion upon the court in this respect, albeit, such
discretion is to be exercised judiciously and not arbitrarily or capriciously, for,
an improper or capricious exercise of this power may lead to undesirable
results. An application under Section 311 of the Code must not be allowed
only to fill up a lacuna in the case of the prosecution, or of the defence, or to
the disadvantage of the accused, or to cause serious prejudice to the defence of
the accused, or to give an unfair advantage to the opposite party. Further, the
additional evidence must not be received as a disguise for retrial, or to change
the nature of the case against either of the parties.The power of the court in this
context is very wide, and in exercise of the same, it may summon any person as
a witness at any stage of the trial, or other proceedings. The court is competent
to exercise this power even suo motu where no application has been filed by
either of the parties. Only rider upon exercise of this power is that the court
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must satisfy itself that it is, in fact, essential to examine such a witness, or to
recall him for further examination in order to arrive at a just decision of the
case. The scope and object of the provision is to enable the Court to determine
the truth and to render a just decision after discovering all relevant facts and
obtaining proper proof of such facts, to arrive at a just decision of the
case. Such a power must be exercised, provided that the evidence that is likely
to be tendered by a witness is germane to the issue involved. An opportunity of
rebuttal however, must be given to the other party. The power conferred by
Section 311 of the Code must, therefore, be invoked by the Court only in order
to meet the ends of justice, for strong and valid reasons, and the same must be
exercised with great caution and circumspection.
The very use of words such as 'any Court', 'at any stage", or 'or
any enquiry, trial or other proceedings', 'any person' and 'any such person'
clearly spells out that the provisions of this Section have been expressed in the
widest possible terms, and do not limit the discretion of the Court in any
way. There is, thus, no escape if the fresh evidence to be obtained is essential
to the just decision of the case. The determinative factor should, therefore, be
whether the summoning/recalling of the said witness is, in fact, essential to the
just decision of the case.
Fair trial is the main object of criminal procedure and it is the
duty of the court to ensure that such fairness is not hampered or threatened in
any manner. Fair trial entails the interests of the accused, the victim and of the
society, and therefore, fair trial includes the grant of fair and proper
opportunities to the parties concerned, and the same must be ensured as this is
a constitutional, as well as a human right. Thus, under no circumstances can a
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person's right to fair trial be jeopardized. Adducing evidence in support of the
prosecution and defence versions is a valuable right. Denial of such right
would amount to the denial of a fair trial. Thus, it is essential that the rules of
procedure that have been designed to ensure justice are scrupulously followed,
and the court must be zealous in ensuring that there is no breach of the same.
In Mohanlal Shamji Soni v. Union of India & Anr., AIR 1991 SC 1346,
the Hon'ble Supreme Court examined the scope of Section 311 of the Code
and held that it is a cardinal rule of the law of evidence, that the best available
evidence must be brought before the court to prove a fact, or a point in issue.
However, the court is under an obligation to discharge its statutory functions,
whether discretionary or obligatory, according to law and hence to ensure that
justice is done. The court has a duty to determine the truth, and to render a just
decision. The same is also the object of Section 311 of the Code where-under
the court may exercise its discretion, at any stage of the enquiry, trial or other
proceedings, to summon any person as a witness though not yet summoned as
a witness, or to recall or re-examine any person, though not yet summoned as a
witness, who are expected to be able to throw light upon the matter in dispute,
because if the judgments happen to be rendered on an inchoate, inconclusive
and speculative presentation of facts, the ends of justice would be defeated. It
is, therefore, clear that the Criminal Court has ample power to summon any
person as a witness or recall and re-examine any such person even if the
evidence on both sides is closed and the jurisdiction of the Court must
obviously be dictated by exigency of the situation, fair play and good sense
appear to be the only safe guides and that only the requirements of justice
command the examination of any person which would depend on the facts and
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circumstances of each case.
In Rajeswar Prasad Misra v. The State of West Bengal & Anr.,
AIR 1965 SC 1887, the Hon'ble Supreme Court while dealing with the
amplitude of power and jurisdiction vested in the court with respect to taking
additional evidence, observed, that it may not be possible for the legislature to
foresee all situations and possibilities and, therefore, the court must examine
the facts and circumstances of each case before it, and if it comes to the
conclusion that additional evidence is necessary, not because it would be
impossible to pronounce the judgment without it, but because there would be a
failure of justice without such evidence being considered, and if such an action
on its part is justified, then the court must exercise such power. The Hon'ble
Supreme Court further held as under:-
".....the Criminal Court has ample power to summon any
person as a witness or recall and re-examine any such
person even if the evidence on both sides is closed and the
jurisdiction of the Court must obviously be dictated by
exigency of the situation, and fair play and good sense
appear to be the only safe guides and that only the
requirements of justice command the examination of any
person which would depend on the facts and
circumstances of each case."
In P. Sanjeeva Rao v. State of A.P., AIR 2012 SC 2242, the
Hon'ble Supreme Court examined the scope of the provisions of Section 311
of the Code and held as under:-
"Grant of fairest opportunity to the accused to prove his
innocence was the object of every fair trial, observed this
Court in Hoffman Andreas v. Inspector of Customs,
Amritsar, (2000) 10 SCC 430. The following passage is in
this regard apposite:
`In such circumstances, if the new Counsel thought to have
the material witnesses further examined, the Court could
adopt latitude and a liberal view in the interest of justice,
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particularly when the Court has unbridled powers in the
matter as enshrined in Section 311 of the Code. After all
the trial is basically for the prisoners and courts should
afford the opportunity to them in the fairest manner
possible.'
xxx xxx xxx xxx
We are conscious of the fact that recall of the witnesses is
being directed nearly four years after they were examined
in chief about an incident that is nearly seven years old.....
we are of the opinion that on a parity of reasoning and
looking to the consequences of denial of opportunity to
cross-examine the witnesses, we would prefer to err in
favour of the appellant getting an opportunity rather than
protecting the prosecution against a possible prejudice at
his cost. Fairness of the trial is a virtue that is sacrosanct
in our judicial system and no price is too heavy to protect
that virtue. A possible prejudice to prosecution is not even
a price, leave alone one that would justify denial of a fair
opportunity to the accused to defend himself."
Dealing with corresponding Section in the old Code (Section
540), a three-judge bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court had said in
Jamatraj Kewalji Govani Vs. The State of Maharashtra, 1968 CriLJ 231 as
follows:
"It would appear that in our criminal jurisdiction,
statutory law confers a power in absolute terms to be
exercised at any stage or the trial to summon a witness or
examine one present in Court or to recall a witness
already examined, and makes this the duty and obligation
of the Court provided the just decision of the case demands
it. In other words, where the court exercise the power
under the second part, the inquiry cannot be whether the
accused has brought anything suddenly or unexpectedly
but whether the court is right in thinking that the new
evidence is needed by it for a just decision of the case."
What is the lacunae that cannot be allowed to be filled in by
invoking Section 311 of the Code were spelt out by the Hon'ble Supreme
Court of India in Rajendra Prasad Vs. Respondent: The Narcotic Cell
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Through its Officer in Charge, Delhi, 1999(2) ACR 1575(SC), AIR 1999 SC
2292, 1999(2) ALD(Cri) 345, 1999 CriLJ 3529, 1999(3) Crimes 106(SC),
1999(66) ECC 318, JT 1999(4) SC 496, 1999(2) KLT 779(SC), 1999(2)
OLR 558, 1999(II) OLR (SC) 558, 1999(9) PLJR 81, RLW 1999(2) SC 321,
1999(4) SCALE 58, (1999)6 SCC 110, [1999]3 SCR 818, 1999(2) UJ 1315,
, as under:-
"8. It is a common experience in criminal courts that
defence counsel would raise objections whenever courts
exercise powers under Section 311 of the Code or under
Section 165 of the Evidence Act by saying that the Court
could not 'fill the lacuna in the prosecution case'. A
lacuna in prosecution is not to be equated with the
fallout of an oversight committed by a public prosecutor
during trial, either in producing relevant materials or in
eliciting relevant answers from witnesses. The adage 'to
err is human' is the recognition of the possibility of
making mistakes to which humans are proved. A
corollary of any such latches or mistakes during the
conducting of a case cannot be understood as the lacuna
which a court cannot fill up.
9. Lacuna in the prosecution must be understood as the
inherent weakness or a latent wedge in the matrix of the
prosecution case. The advantage of it should normally
go to the accused in the trail of the case, but an over
sight in the management of the prosecution cannot be
treated as irreparable lacuna. No party in a trial can
before-closed from correcting errors. If proper evidence
was not adduced or a relevant material was not brought
on record due to any inadvertence, the court should be
magnanimous in permitting such mistakes to be rectified.
After all, function of the criminal Court is administration
of criminal justice and not to count errors committed by
the parties or to find out and declare who among the
parties performed better.
13. We cannot therefore accept the contention of the
appellant as a legal proposition that the Court cannot
exercise power of re-summoning any witness if once that
power was exercised, nor can the power be whittled
down merely on the ground that prosecution discovered
latches only when the defence highlighted them during
final arguments. The power of the court is plenary to
summon or even recall any witness at any stage of the
case if the court considers it necessary for a just
decision. The steps which the trial court permitted in this
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case for re-summoning certain witnesses cannot
therefore be spurned down nor frowned at."
From the impugned order it cannot be concluded that the
additional evidence has been allowed to fill in gaps in the case of the
complainant, rather it is found to be allowed for just decision of the case. It
may be added here that the documents dated 11.06.2009 and 13.07.2009
having been proved by the petitioner in defence, the respondent deserved an
opportunity to bring evidence in rebuttal thereof, if fairness is taken to be the
guding factor.
Be that as it may, the impugned order happens to be an
interlocutory order in so far as if this revision petition is accepted and the
impugned order is set aside, the proceedings before the learned trial Magistrate
are not going to culminate, and Section 397(2) of the Code says, " The powers
of revision conferred by sub-section (1) shall not be exercised in relation to
any interlocutory order passed in any appeal, inquiry, trial or other
proceedings."
In Bhaskar Industries Ltd. v. Bhiwani Denim and Apparels Ltd.
and Ors., 2001 SCC (Cri) 1254, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held, "The
interdict contained in Section 397(2) is that the powers of revision shall not be
exercised in relation to any interlocutory order. Whether an order is
interlocutory or not, cannot be decided by merely looking at the order or
merely because the order was passed at the interlocutory stage. The safe test is
this : if the contention of the petitioner who moves the superior court in
revision, as against the order under challenge is upheld, would the criminal
proceedings as a whole culminate ? If they would, then the order is not
interlocutory in spite of the fact that it was passed during any interlocutory
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stage." Indisputably, as aforesaid, in the event of this revision petition being
accepted and order dated 10.12.2013 being set aside, the criminal proceedings
pending before the learned trial Magistrate would not reach culmination. The
order, thus, is interlocutory in nature and, as such, the revision petition is not
maintainable.
Faced with the situation, learned counsel for the petitioner has
cited Bhagwana Ram versus State of Rajasthan, 2012 (3) RLW 2335:2012 (5)
WLC 67, a judgment delivered by a Single Bench of Rajasthan High Court,
and Sheikh Madinabibi Mustafabhai versus State of Gujarat, 2005(2) GCD
1379, a judgment delivered by a Single Bench of Gujarat High Court, to
contend that revision is maintainable agianst an order passed on an application
for additional evidence. Effort of the learned counsel for the petitioner,
however, is bound to fail.
High Court of Rajasthan itself, in Surendra Kumar Vs. State of
Rajasthan, 2000(3) WLC 654: 2002(1) WLN 395 refused to interfere with an
order passed by the Sessions Judge dismissing a revision petition against an
order of a Magistrate rejecting an application for additional evidence. The High
Court observed as under:
"5. The Trial Court after considering the entire material
on record came to the conclusion that all the aforesaid
witnesses were cross examined in detail by the learned
counsel for the accused and the application under
Section 311 Cr.P.C. was submitted in the case only with
an intention to delay me trial. The Trial Court also
considered the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court
in case of Rajendra Prasad v. Narcotic Cell (1), cited by
learned counsel for the petitioners and held that the facts
of Rajendra Prasad's case (supra) have no relevance
whatsoever in the Instant case as the facts of that case
were totally different than the facts of the present case
and accordingly, the trial court dismissed the
application under Section 311 Cr.P.C. on 7.3.2001.
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6. This order was challenged by the petitioners in
revision before the Court of Sessions Judge, Jodhpur
which was dismissed by the learned Sessions Judge on
24.4.2001 only on the ground of its maintainability
because according to him, the impugned order passed by
the trial court was an interlocutory one and no revision
would lie against such order as provided under
Section 397(2) Cr.P.C. For dismissing the revision
petition on this ground, the learned Sessions Judge has
relied upon the following judgments of this Court:-
(1) Ummed Singh v. Devi Singh (2), and
(2) Jatnail Singh v. State of Rajasthan (3).
7. There is a specific bar of second revision under
Section 399(3) Cr.P.C., therefore, the petitioners have
filed this petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. before this
Court and have prayed that the impugned order dated
7.3.2001 passed by the learned A.C.J.M. (CBI), Jodhpur
in criminal case No. 9/99 as well as the order dated
24.4.2001 passed by the learned Sessions Judge,
Jodhpur in criminal revision be quashed and set aside
and the application filed by them Under
Section 311 Cr.P.C. be allowed and the Trial Court be
directed to recall the aforesaid 3 witnesses for the
purpose of further cross-examination.
8. Learned counsel Mr. Dave for respondent CBI raised
a preliminary objection regarding maintainability of this
petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. on the ground that
there is a specific bar of second revision petition under
Section 399(3) Cr.P.C. and with a view to circumvent
that bar, the petitioners have filed this petition under
Section 482 Cr.P.C., therefore, this Court should not
entertain this petition. However, learned counsel Mr.
Punia for the petitioners vehemently submitted that in
view of the specific bar of second revision under
Section 399(3) Cr.P.C., he had no alternative but to file
this petition under Section 482 CrP.C., therefore, in the
interest of justice, this Court should entertain It because
by rejecting an application under Section311 Cr.P.C.,
the trial court has done great injustice to the accused. In
support of his submission, learned counsel Mr. Punia
has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court
in case of Krishnan and another v. Krishnaveni and anr.
(4).
9. In my considered opinion, the object of criminal trial
is to render prompt public justice, to punish the
criminals and to see to it that the trial is concluded as
expeditiously as possible before the memory of the
witnesses fades out. This court can take judicial notice of
the fact that a trend had developed to delay the trial by
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the accused on one or the other ground after they are out
on bail so that ultimately, they are acquitted either by
threatening or inducing the witnesses. Such practice was
required to be curbed, therefore, with a view to ensure
prompt public justice in the criminal trial, the
Legislature in its wisdom introduced two major
provisions in Cr.P.C. (1) Section 397(2) under which
revision against any interlocutory order passed in
appeal, enquiry, trial or other proceedings was barred
and (2) Section 399(3) wherein finality is attached to the
order passed by the revisional court and second revision
at the instance of same party is barred.
10. Thus, when there is a specific bar of revision against
the interlocutory order under Section 397(2) Cr.P.C. or
there is a specific bar of second revision under
Section 399(3) Cr.P.C., then ordinarily this Court would
not like to exercise its jurisdiction under
Section 482 Cr.P.C. and allow such persons to
circumvent the specific bar of maintainability of
revision."
In T. Stanes and Company Limited represented by William
Hobert Assistant General Manager versus Thiru. M.G. Mohamed Iqbal,
B.Sc., (Agri) Agricultural Officer (Quality Control) and The General
Agencies, 2007 CriLJ 4100, 2007(4) CTC 412, Madras High Court ruled as
under:
"From the facts and circumstances of the case, in the
light of the decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court and
various High Courts, it is clear that the trial court
exercising its discretion has allowed the petition filed
under Section 311 Cr.P.C. The impugned order cannot
be said as violative of any provision of the Code of
Criminal Procedure or any other law in force.
Therefore, there is no question of preventing any abuse
of process by the court below, by way of invoking the
inherent power under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. would
arise. Similarly to secure the ends of justice, this Court
need not invoke the inherent power, since marking a
particular page of the register, that was already marked
would not prejudice the revision petitioner / accused,
and he is also at liberty to raise all his defence which are
available under law before the trial court. Therefore, in
the light of the decisions referred above, I am of the
considered view that the inherent power under
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Section 482 of the Code of Criminal procedure cannot
be invoked and hence, in view of Section 397(2) Cr.P.C,
the criminal revision petition, challenging the
interlocutory order passed by the court below is not
legally sustainable and hence, the criminal revision
fails."
High Court of Karnataka, in Sheshayya Ganguli and Ors. Vs.
State by A.P.P., 2010(4) KarLJ 333, while dismissing a revision petition
brought against an order passed under Section 311 of the Code, observed as
under:
"It is relevant to note that aggrieved by the order passed
by the learned Magistrate on the application under
Sections 242 and 311 of Cr. P.C, a revision is preferred
before the Sessions Judge. The said revision petition is
not maintainable in law. Furthermore, the Hon'ble Apex
Court's decision in Bhaskar Industries Limited v.
Bhiwani Denim and Apparels Limited and Ors. AIR
2001 SC 3625 : 2001 Cri.L.J. 4250 (SC) : (2001) 7 SCC
401 : 2001 SCC (Cri.) 1254, held that the powers of
revision shall not be exercised in relation to any
interlocutory order. Whether an order is interlocutory or
not, cannot be decided by merely looking at the order or
merely because the order was passed at the interlocutory
stage. It is relevant to note that during investigation it
was the duty to collect the documents which are essential
for the purpose of the trial and the prosecution has an
opportunity to produce the documents before the
examination of the witnesses. Further, there was a
direction by this Court to dispose of the case
expeditiously on two occasions and the matter is pending
before the Trial Court since from the year 2003. At the
fag end, an application came to be filed by the
Prosecutor, seeking permission to produce the
documents and also to recall P.W. 2. When against an
order under Section 311 of Cr.P.C. or under
Section 242 of Cr.P.C, a revision cannot be maintained,
the Fast Track Court ought not to have allowed the
revision. If it is in the interest of justice or otherwise, the
party is at liberty to file a petition under Section 482 of
Cr.P.C., and not a revision under Section 397 of Cr.P.C.
In that view of the matter, I am of the opinion that the
order of the lower Court in revision granting permission
to produce the documents and to recall the witness is
illegal and not permissible. Hence I proceed to pass the
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following:
ORDER
The revision petition is allowed and the order passed by the learned Sessions Judge in Cr. R.P. No. 83 of 2010, dated 6-4-2010 is set aside."
A Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Asif Hussain vs. State of U.P., 2007 (57) ACC 1036, answered a reference about maintainability of a revision petition against an order passed under Section 311 of the Code, thus:
"We, therefore, answer the reference by holding that the order of the learned Sessions Judge under Section 311 Cr.P.C. refusing to summon witnesses, sought to be called by the accused, is a purely interlocutory order from the point of view of the accused-applicant and no revision against the same is maintainable.."
This Court in Sanjay v. State of Haryana, 2005 CriLJ 287, also held that an order passed on an application under Section 311 of the Code is an interlocutory order and hence revision is not maintainable against such an order.
Above this all, Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in Sethuraman Vs. Rajamanickam, 2009(1) ALD (Cri) 871: 2009 CriLJ 2247: 2009(2) CTC 660: JT 2009(4) SC 164: (2009)43 OCR 97: 2009(1) OLR 915: 2009(1) OLR(SC) 915: 2009(3) SCALE 840: (2009)5 SCC 153: [2009]4 SC 510, ruled as under:
"4. Secondly, what was not realized was that the order passed by the Trial Court refusing to call the documents and rejecting the application under Section 311 Cr.P.C., were interlocutory orders and as such, the revision against those orders was clearly barred under Section 397 (2) Cr.P.C. The Trial Court, in its common order, had clearly mentioned that the cheque was admittedly signed by the respondent/accused and the only defence that was raised, was that his signed cheques were lost and that the appellant/complainant had falsely used one such cheque.
The Trial Court also recorded a finding that the documents Kumar Sudhir S 2014.01.20 17:17 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document chandigarh CRR No. 104 of 2014 (O&M) 15 were not necessary. This order did not, in any manner, decide anything finally. Therefore, both the orders, i.e., one on the application under Section 91 Cr.P.C. for production of documents and other on the application under Section 311 Cr.P.C. for recalling the witness, were the orders of interlocutory nature, in which case, under Section 397(2), revision was clearly not maintainable. Under such circumstances, the learned Judge could not have interfered in his revisional jurisdiction. The impugned judgment is clearly incorrect in law and would have to be set aside. It is accordingly set aside. The appeals are allowed."
In view of all, what has been said and discussed here-in-before, the revision petition must fail and is, accordingly, dismissed being not maintainable.
[MAHAVIR S. CHAUHAN] JUDGE 15.01.2014 Sd Kumar Sudhir S 2014.01.20 17:17 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document chandigarh