Karnataka High Court
Vishwanath Swami vs Bar Council Of India on 24 April, 2013
Bench: Chief Justice, B.V.Nagarathna
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA, BANGALORE
DATED THIS THE 24TH DAY OF APRIL, 2013
PRESENT
THE HON'BLE MR. D.H.WAGHELA, CHIEF JUSTICE
AND
THE HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE B.V.NAGARATHNA
W.P.No.8155/2012 (GM-RES-PIL).
BETWEEN:
VISHWANATH SWAMI,
AGED ABOUT 61 YEARS,
S/O ADIVAYYA AGGIMATH,
R/AT #303, BALDOTA RESIDENCY,
BANK COLONY, UTTARAHALLI MAIN ROAD,
BANGALORE-560 061. ... PETITIONER
(BY SRI: S.S.NAGANAND, SR. COUNSEL, AND
SRI.K.CHANDRANATH ARIGA, ADV. SRI.M.R.NAIK AMICUS
CURIAE AND SRI.SAJAN POOVAYYA, ADDL. AG AS AMICUS
CURIAE)
AND:
1.BAR COUNCIL OF INDIA,
REPRESENTED BY ITS SECRETARY,
BAR COUNCIL BHAVAN,
21, ROUSE AVENUE, INSTITUTIONAL AREA,
NEW DELHI-110 002
2.KARNATAKA STATE BAR COUNCIL,
REPRESENTED BY ITS SECRETARY,
OLD KGID BUILDING,
VIDHANA VEEDI,
BANGALORE-560 001
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3.ADVOCATES ASSOCIATION OF BANGALORE,
REP.BY ITS SECRETARY,
VAKILARA BHAVANA,
CITY CIVIL COURT COMPLEX,
BANGALORE-560 009.
4.THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA,
REP.BY ITS REGISTRAR GENERAL,
DR.AMBEDKAR ROAD,
BANGLAORE-560 001. ... RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI: M.P.GEETHADEVI, ADV. FOR M/S.M.P.ASSTS.
FOR R1, SRI.R.L.PATIL, ADV. FOR R2,
SRI.D.R.RAVISHANKAR, ADV. FOR M/S. LEX NEXUS FOR
R3, SRI.R.DEVDAS, AGA FOR R4)
*****
THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLE 226
OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO DIRECT TO
R1 TO FRAME RULES ON THE BASIS OF THE LAW
DECLARED BY APEX COURT IN PARA 35, 42 TO 46 IN THE
CASE OF EX. CAPT HARISH UPPAL VS. UNION OF INDIA
(2003) 2 SCC 45, AND TO ISSUE NECESSARY DIRECTION
TO R2 TO DEAL WITH THE STRIKING ADVOCATES UNDER
SECTION 35 OF ADVOCATES ACT, 1961, ON ACCOUNT OF
MISBAHAVIOR IN STRIKING WORK IN THE COURTS AS
ALREADY CONCLUDED BY THE APEX COURT AND SINCE
THE SAID DECLARATION IS ENFORCEABLE UNDER
ARTICLE 141 OF CONSTITUTION OF INDIA.
THIS PETITION BEING RESERVED AND COMING ON
FOR PRONOUNCEMENT OF ORDER, THIS DAY,
NAGARATHNA J., MADE THE FOLLOWING:
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ORDER
1. The petitioner, who has filed this writ petition in public interest has sought a direction to respondent No.1 to frame Rules pursuant to the law declared and directions issued by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Ex.Capt.Harish Uppal v. Union Of India and Another [(2003) 2 SCC 45] (Harish Uppal) and to issue necessary directions to the second respondent having regard to Section 34 of the Advocates' Act, 1961 [hereinafter, referred to as the "Act"].
2. Though the writ petition is filed in the background of the call for boycott of Courts on 6.3.2012 given by the second respondent on 05/03/2012, on the basis of a resolution dated 03/03/2012 and the subsequent boycott of Courts for a few days thereafter particularly in Bangalore, the matter has not been considered on the aforesaid factual background but in the context of the directions issued by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Harish Uppal and Section 34 of the Act.
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3. We have heard learned senior counsel Sri S.S.Naganand, appearing for the petitioner and Sri M.R.Naik, learned senior counsel and Sri Sajan Poovayya, learned Addl. A.G. appearing as Amicus Curiae, Smt.M.P.Geethadevi, learned counsel for Respondent No.1, Sri R.L.Patil, learned counsel for Respondent No.2, Sri D.R.Ravishankar, learned counsel for Respondent No.3 and Sri R.Devdas, learned AGA for Respondent No.4.
4. Indeed, the proceedings in this writ petition have assumed importance having regard to the significant role and responsibilities an Advocate has in the system of dispensation of justice in India and in the context of the Act.
5. In Harish Uppal, the Hon'ble Supreme Court was dealing with the question as to whether lawyers have a right to strike and/or give a call for boycott of Courts. In the petitions before the Hon'ble Supreme Court, a declaration was sought that such strikes and/or calls for 5 boycotts are illegal. The Constitution Bench of the Apex Court heard the matter.
6. Hon'ble Variava J., and three other Hon'ble Judges, after considering the observations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in various cases, dealing with the right of the lawyers to strike work or boycott Courts, considered the Affidvit filed by the Bar Council of India, wherein extracts of the joint meeting of the various State Bar Councils and Members of the Bar Council of India held on 28/09/2002 and 29/09/2002 was annexed. After adverting to the same in detail it was observed as follows:-
"35. In conclusion, it is held that lawyers have no right to go on strike or give a call for boycott, not even on a toke strike. The protest, if any is required, can only be by giving press statements, TV interviews, carrying out of court premises banners and/or placards, wearing black or white or any colour armbands, peaceful protest marches outside and away from court premises, going on dharnas or relay fasts etc. It is held that lawyers holding vakalats on behalf of their clients cannot not attend courts in pursuance of a call for strike or boycott. All lawyer can be visited with any 6 adverse consequences by the Association or the Council and no threat or coercion of any nature including that of expulsion can be held out. It is held that no Bar Council or Bar Association can permit calling of a meeting for purposes of considering a call for strike or boycott and requisition, if any, for such meeting must be ignored. It is held that only in the rarest of rare cases where the dignity, integrity and independence of the Bar and/or the Bench are at stake, courts may ignore (turn a blind eye) to a protest abstention from work for not more than one day. It is being clarified that it will be for the court to decide whether or not the issue involves dignity or integrity or independency of the Bar and/or the Bench. Therefore in such cases the President of the Bar must first consult the Chief Justice or the District Judge before advocates decide to absent themselves from court. The decision of the Chief Justice or the District Judge would be final and have to be abided by the Bar. It is held that courts are under no obligation to adjourn matters because lawyers are on strike. On the contrary, it is the duty of all courts to go on with matters on their boards even in the absence of lawyers. In other words, courts must not be privy to strikes or calls for boycotts. It is held that if a lawyer, holding a vakalat of a client, abstains from attending court due to a strike call, he shall be personally liable to 7 pay costs which shall be in addition to damages which he might have to pay his client for loss suffered by him.
36. It is now hoped that with the above clarifications, there will be no strikes and/or calls for boycott. It is hoped that better sense witll prevail and self-restraint will be exercised. The petitions stand disposed of accordingly."
7. Hon'ble Shah J., for himself and on behalf of Hon'ble Dharmadhikari J., writing a concurring opinion observed as follows:-
"40. However, by merely holding strikes as illegal, it would not be sufficient in the preset-day situation nor serve any purpose. The root cause for such malady is required to be cured. It is stated that resort to strike is because the administration is having deaf ears in listening to the genuine grievances and even if grievances are heard appropriate actions are not taken. To highlight, therefore, the cause call for strike is given. In our view,whatever be the situation in other fields lawyers cannot claim or justify to go on strike or give a call to boycott the judicial proceedings. It is rightly pointed out by the Attorney-General that by the very nature of their calling to aid and assist in the dispensation of 8 justice, lawyers normally should not resort to strike. Further, it had been repeatedly held that strike is an attempt to interfere with the administration of justice.
*****
44. It is true that advocates are part and parcel of the judicial system as such they are the foundation of the justice-delivery system. It is their responsibility of seeing that justice-delivery system works smoothly. Therefore, it is for each and every Bar Association to be vigilant in implementing the resolution passed by the Bar Council of India of seeing that there are no further strikes any more. The Bar Council of India in its resolution has also stated that the resolution passed by it would be implemented strictly and hence, the Bar Associations and the individual members of the Bar Associations would take all steps to comply with the same and avoid cessation of the work except in the manner and to the extent indicated in the resolution."
8. In the aforesaid background, the following directions were issued:
"45. Further, appropriate rules are required to be framed by the High Courts under Sectin 34 of the Advocates Act by making it clear that strike by advocate/advocates would be considered 9 interference with the administration of justice and advocate/advocates concerned may be barred from practicing before courts in a district or in the High Court.
46. Hence, it is directed that (a) all the Bar Associations in the country shall implement the resolution dated 29/09/2002 passed by the Bar Council of India, and (b) under Section 34 of the Advocates Act, the High Courts would frame necessary rules so that appropriate action can be taken against defaulting advocate/advocates."
It is these directions which are sought to be implemented by the petitioner in this writ petition.
9. One of the arguments raised on behalf of Respondent No.3 was that the aforesaid directions of the Supreme Court are given by only two of the Judges and not the majority of the Bench that heard the matter and therefore, the same cannot be construed as binding directions. We do not think that such an understanding can be implied. The majority opinion voiced by Hon'ble Variava J., has categorically stated that lawyers have no right to go on strike or give a call for boycott, not even on a token strike, except in 10 rarest of the rare cases where the dignity, integrity and independence of the Bar and/or the Bench are at stake, when Courts may ignore (turn a blind eye) to a protest or abstention from work for not more than one day. But Hon'ble Shah J., while concurring with the said view was of the opinion that merely holding strike as illegal would not be sufficient in the present day situation, it would not serve any purpose. Having regard to the resolution dated 29/09/2002 of the Bar Council of India and Section 34 of the Act, directions were issued to all the Bar Associations in the country, to implement the resolution. Also all High Courts were directed to frame necessary rules under Section 34 of the Act, so that appropriate action could be taken against defaulting advocate/advocates.
10. On a holistic reading of the entire judgment, we are of the view that both the opinions supplement and complement each other. In fact, the concurrent judgment of Hon'ble Shah J transforms the majority judgment into a practical and pragmatic one by giving certain directions. 11 Both the opinions being concurrent in nature, they are binding on all courts in India and on the parties thereto.
11. In fact Harish Uppal marks a watershed in the series of precedents of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of strikes and boycott of Courts by advocates. Prior to Harish Uppal, in Mahabir Prasad Singh v. Jacks Aviation Pvt. Ltd. [(1999) 1 SCC 37], it has been held that no Court is obliged to adjourn a cause because of the strike call given by any Association of advocates or a decision to boycott the courts either in general or any particular court. It is the solemn duty of every court to proceed with the judicial business during court hours. No court should yield to pressure tactics or boycott calls or any kind of browbeating. It further held that it is the duty of every advocate who accepts a brief to attend the trial and such duty cannot be overstressed as "having accepted the brief, he will be committing a breach of his professional duty, if he so fails to attend."
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12. In Dr.B.L.Wadehra v. State (NCT of Delhi) and others [AIR 2000 Delhi 266], it has been held that lawyers have no right to strike i.e., to abstain from appearing in court in cases in which they hold vakalath for the parties, even if it is in response to or in compliance with a decision of any association or body of lawyers. Strikes interfering with the administration of justice infringes the fundamental rights of the litigants particularly under trials, as right to speedy trial comes within the purview of Article 21 of the Constitution. The Bar Council of India Rules, 1975 have been cited in the said judgment which state that an advocate is a privileged member of the community and what may be lawful and moral for a person who is not a member of the Bar or for a member of the Bar in his non-professional capacity, may still be improper for an Advocate.
13. After Harish Uppal, there are two notable judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the context of strike or call for boycott by a Bar Association. In Common Cause 13 A Registered Society v. Union of India and Others [AIR 2005 SC 4442], after referring to Harish Uppal, it has been reiterated that in case any Association calls for a strike or a call for boycott, the concerned State Bar Council and on their failure, the Bar Council of India must immediately take action against the person who calls for strike or call for boycott. Therefore, the Bar Councils and the Bar Association can never accept any Association calling for a meeting to consider a call for a strike or boycott.
14. Recently, in O.P.Sharma and Others v. High Court of Punjab and Haryana [AIR 2011 SC 2101], highlighting the advocates' role and ethical standards, the following observations have been made at Para 31 and 32:-
"31. An advocate's duty is as important as that of a Judge. Advocates have a large responsibility towards the society. A client's relationship with his/her advocate is underlined by utmost trust. An advocate is expected to 14 act with utmost sincerity and respect. In all professional functions, an advocate should be diligent and his conduct should also be diligent and should conform to the requirements of the law by which an advocate plays a vital role in the preservation of society and justice system. An advocate is under an obligation to uphold the rule of law and ensue that the public justice system is enabled to function at its full potential. Any violation of the principles of professional ethics by an advocate is unfortunate and unacceptable. Ignoring even a minor violation/misconduct militates against the fundamental foundation of the public justice system. An advocate should be dignified in his dealings to the Court, to his fellow lawyers and to the litigants. He should have integrity in abundance and should never do anything that erodes his credibility. An advocate has a duty to enlighten and encourage the juniors in the profession. An ideal advocate should believe that the legal profession has an element of service also and associates with legal service activities. Most importantly, he should faithfully abode by the standards of professional conduct and etiquette 15 prescribed by the Bar Council of India in Chapter II, Part VI of the Bar Council of India Rules.
32. As a rule, an Advocate being a member of the legal profession has a social duty to show the people a beacon of light by his conduct and actions rather than being adamant on an unwarranted and uncalled for issue."
15. In R.K.Anand v. Registrar, Delhi High Court [(2009) 8 SCC 106], while lamenting on the declining professional standards of lawyers, the Hon'ble Supreme Court stated that ideally, every High Court should have rules framed under Section 34 of the Advocates Act in order to meet eventualities such as boycott of courts, but even in the absence of the rules, the High Court cannot be held to be helpless against such threats. In a matter as fundamental and grave as preserving the purity of judicial proceedings, the High Court would be free to exercise the powers vested in it under the Act notwithstanding the fact that rules prescribing the manner of exercise of power 16 have not been framed. But in the absence of the Rules, a High Court cannot be held to be powerless. However, a direction has been given to all the High Courts, to frame the Rules without any delay and within four months from the date of the judgment but so far no Rules have been framed under Section 34 of the Act for the State of Karnataka as far as boycott of courts by Advocates is concerned.
16. Having regard to the aforesaid elucidation, we think that the directions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Harish Uppal, require implementation both by the Bar Associations as well as by the High Court of Karnataka.
17. The Bar Associations have been directed to implement the resolution dated 29/09/2002 passed by the Bar Council of India. The said resolution is extracted at Para 29 in Harish Uppal as under:-
29. At the meeting it is then resolved as follows:17
"RESOLVED to constitute Grievances Redressal Committees at the taluk/sub-division or Tehsil level, at the district level, High Court and Supreme Court levels as follows: -
(I) (a) A committee consisting of the Hon'ble Chief Justice of India or his nominee, Chairman, Bar Council of India, President, Supreme Court Bar Association, Attorney General of India.
(b) At the High Court level a Committee consisting of the Hon'ble Chief Justice of the State High Court or his nominee, Chairman, Bar Council of the State, President or Presidents High Court Bar Association, Advocate General, Member, Bar Council of India from the State.
(c) At the District level, District Judge, President or Presidents of the District Bar Association, District Government Pleader, member of the Bar Council from the District, if any, and if there are more than one, then senior out of the two.
(d) At taluk/tehsil/sub-division, seniormost Judge, President or Presidents of the Bar Association, Government Pleader, representative of the State Bar Council, if any.
(II)Another reason for abstention at the district and taluk level is arrest of an advocate or advocates by 18 the police in matters in which the arrest is not justified. Practice may be adopted that before arrest of an advocate or advocates, President, Bar Association, the District Judge or the seniormost Judge at the place be consulted. This will avoid many instances or abstentions from court.
(III) IT IS FURTHER RESOLVED that in the past abstention of work by Advocates for more than a day was due to inaction of the authorities to solve the problems that the advocates placed.
(IV)IT IS FURTHER RESOLVED that in all cases of legislation affecting the legal profession which includes enactment of new laws or amendments of existing laws, matters relating to jurisdiction and creation of tribunal, the Government both Central and State should initiate the consultative process with the representatives of the profession and take into consideration the views of the Bar and give utmost weight to the same and the State Government should instruct their officers to react positively to the issues involving the profession when they are raised and take all steps to avoid confrontation and inaction and in such an event of indifference, confrontation etc. to initiate appropriate disciplinary action against the erring officials and including but not limited to transfer.19
(V) The Councils are of the view that abstentions of work in courts should not be resorted to except in exceptional circumstances. Even in exceptional circumstances, the abstention should not be resorted to normally for more than one day in the first instance. The decision for going on abstention will be taken by the General Body of the Bar Association by a majority of two-third members present.
(VI) It is further resolved that in all issues as far as possible legal and constitutional methods should be pursued such as representation to authorities, holding demonstrations and mobilising public opinion etc. (VII) It is resolved further that in case the Bar Associations deviate from the above resolutions and proceed on cessation of work in spite or without the decision of the concerned Grievances Redressal Committee, except in the case of emergency, the Bar Council of the State will take such action as it may deem fit and proper, the discretion being left to the Bar Council of the State concerned as to enforcement of such decisions and in the case of an emergency the Bar Association concerned will inform the State Bar Council.20
The Bar Council of India resolves that this resolution will be implemented strictly and the Bar Associations and the individual members of the Bar Associations should take all steps to comply with the same and avoid cessation of the work except in the manner and to the extent indicated above."
18. The constitution of the Grievance Redressal Committees at the High Court level, District level and Taluk or Sub-division level is mandated and all actions of the Grievance Redressal Committees have to be in accordance with the various clauses of the resolutions. Therefore necessary directions in this regard would have to be given.
19. This takes us to the second direction issued in Harish Uppal which is to the High Court. In this context Section 34 of the Act would have to be adverted to.
20. Section 34 of the Act, reads as follows:-
"34. Power of High Courts to make rules - (1) The High Court may make rules laying down the conditions subject to which an advocate 21 shall be permitted to practice in the High Court and the courts subordinate thereto.
[(1A) The High Court shall make rules for fixing and regulating by taxation or otherwise the fees payable as costs by any party in respect of the fees of his adversary's advocate upon all proceedings in the High Court or in any Court subordinate thereto.] [(2) Without prejudice to the provisions contained in sub-section (1), the High Court at Calcutta may make rules providing for the holding of the Intermediate and the Final examinations for articled clerks to be passed by the persons referred to in section 58AG for the purpose of being admitted as advocates on the State roll and any other matter connected therewith.] [***]."
21. Under sub-section (1) of Section 34, the High Court may make rules laying down the conditions, subject to which, an Advocate shall be permitted to practice in the High Courts and the Courts subordinate thereto. Under sub-section (1A), introduced by an amendment, the High Court shall make Rules for fixing and regulating by taxation or otherwise fees payable by any party in respect 22 of the fees of his adversary's advocate upon all proceedings in the High Court or in any Court subordinate thereto.
22. Though, sub-section (1) of Section 34 uses the word "may" and sub-section (1A) uses the word "shall", as far as sub-section (1) of Section 34 is concerned, it can no longer be argued that the power of the High Court to make rules laying down the conditions, subject to which the advocate shall be permitted to practice in the High Courts and subordinate Courts as being directory in view of the express directions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Harish Uppal. Thus, for over a decade, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has been consistently directing the State Bar Councils as well as the respective High Courts to frame Rules in the matter of strikes and call for boycotts given by advocates. Hence, it is mandatory to make rules under sub-section (1) of Section 34 of the Act with regard to strikes and call for boycott of courts by advocates. 23
23. During the course of submissions, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner and learned Additional Advocate General, have brought to our notice Rules under sub-section (1) of Section 34 of the Act framed by various High Courts in view of the directions in Harish Uppal. It is also stated that certain rules have been framed by High Court of Karnataka in the year 1969 which have been published on 19/06/2009 with regard to certain matters under sub-section (1) of Section 34 of the Act. All that is necessary is to give a direction to make an amendment to the said Rules, with regard to strikes or call for boycott given by the Advocates.
24. Edward Parry in his "Seven lamps of Advocacy", has referred to the following lamps: "of honesty, of courage, of industry, of wit, of eloquence, of Judgment and of Fellowship". We may add the eighth lamp, that is, "Lamp of commitment to justice."
Re: Costs:
25. Sub-section (1A) of Section 34 of the Act, mandates fixing and regulating fees payable as costs by any party in 24 respect of fees of his adversary's advocate upon all proceedings in the High Court or in any Court subordinate thereto. During the course of hearing it was urged that necessary rules in this regard must also be framed by the High Court.
26. The Law Commission of India, in Report No.240 dated 09/05/2012 on costs in civil litigation, has made several recommendations relating to the award of costs in civil matters pursuant to the observations made by the Supreme Court in Ashok Kumar Mittal v. Ram Kumar Gupta [(2009) 2 SCC 656] and Vinod Seth v. Devinder Bajaj [(2010) 8 SCC 1]. The Law Commission has observed as follows:-
"1.1 The subject relating to award of costs in civil matters has been taken up by the Law Commission of India pursuant to the observations made by the Supreme Court that the legal provisions relating to costs needs to be revisited by the legislature and the Law Commission. The first case which it is relevant to mention in this context is that of Ashok Kumar Mittal vs. Ram Kumar Gupta [(2009) 2 SCC 656]. The second is the case of 25 Vinod Seth v. Devinder Bajaj [(2010) 8 SCC 1]. In another judgment rendered very recently in Sanjeev Kumar Jain v. Raghubir Saran Charitable Trust [JT 2011 (12) SC 435], the Supreme Court took note of various suggestions placed before the court by the Law Commission and Sri Arun Mohan (Sr. Advocate), and reiterated the need to consider appropriate changes in the relevant provisions including the rules of various High Courts.
1.2 This is what the Supreme Court said in Ashok Kumar Mittal's case:
"9. The present system of levying meager costs in civil matters (or no costs in some matters), no doubt, is wholly unsatisfactory and does not act as a deterrent to vexatious or luxury litigation borne out of ego or greed, or resorted to as a "buying-time" tactic. More realistic approach relating to costs may be the need of the hour. Whether we should adopt suitably, the western models of awarding actual and more realistic costs is a matter that requires to be debated and should engage the urgent attention of the Law Commission of India."
27. The Law Commission has observed that the award of costs is on the basis of the three salutary principles as under:-
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"1.6. The common thread running through all these cases is the reiteration of three salutary principles: (i) costs should ordinarily follow the event; (ii) realistic costs ought to be awarded keeping in view the ever increasing litigation expenses; and (iii) the cost should serve the purpose of curbing frivolous and vexatious litigation."
2.2 "Costs" signifies the sum of money which the court orders one party to pay another party in respect of the expenses of litigation incurred. Except where specifically provided by the statute or by rule of Court, the costs of proceedings are in the Court's discretion."
28. In case of Salem Advocate Bar Association T.N. v. Union of India [(2005) 6 SCC 344], the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed thus:-
"Judicial notice can be taken of the fact that many unscrupulous parties take advantage of the fact that either the costs are not awarded or nominal costs are awarded on the unsuccessful party......The costs have to be actual reasonable costs including the cost of the time spent by the successful party, the transportation and lodging, if any, or any other incidental cost besides the payment of the court fee, lawyer's fee, typing and 27 other cost in relation to the litigation. It is for the High Courts to examine these aspects and wherever necessary make requisite rules, regulations or practice direction so as to provide appropriate guidelines for the subordinate courts to follow."
29. After referring to Section 35-A and 35-B of the code of civil procedure and also to the amendments made thereto, it is observed that it is not easy to ascertain the time spent or the loss incurred in monetary terms.
30. The Law Commissioner has however stated that the Andhra Pradesh Advocates' Fees Rules, 2010 Amendment is quite realistic and reasonable. In its recommendation, the Law Commissioner has stated that the rules framed by the High Courts in relation to the costs especially the advocates' fee should be thoroughly revised so as to accord with the principle of realistic and adequate costs. The language must be made simpler so as to impart clarity.
31. In the light of the aforesaid discussion, it is thus necessary to take steps to formulate rules under Section 28 34(1A) of the Advocates' Act, 1961. Though presently the Rules of Civil Practice and Sections 35, 35-A and 35-B of the Code of Civil Procedure governs, nevertheless comprehensive and special rules as mandated in Section 34(1A) are necessary and required to be enacted.
32. In the result, this writ petition is disposed with the following directions:-
(a)The fourth respondent is directed to take steps for the constitution of the Rule making committee, if not already constituted,
(i) to make suitable amendments to the Rules laying down the conditions, subject to which, an advocate shall be permitted to practice in the High Court and the subordinate Courts in the light of the directions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Ex.Capt.Harish Uppal v. Union of India and Another [(2003) 2 SCC 45].
(ii) to make rules for fixing and regularizing by taxation or otherwise fees payable 29 as costs by any party in respect of the fees of his adversary's advocate upon all proceedings in the High Court or in any subordinate Court in the State, bearing in mind the Report of the Law Commission as well as the recent dicta of the Hon'ble Supreme Court.
In implementing the aforesaid directions, the Committee may take note of the rules framed by various High Courts in this regard.
(b) All the Bar Associations in the State of Karnataka some of whom are served and are represented by counsel herein, are directed to implement the resolution dated 29/09/2002, passed by the Bar Council of India, as directed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, in Harish Uppal (supra), including the establishment of grievance redressal Committees within a period of three months from today.
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Respondent No.2 is directed to circulate this judgment to all the Bar Associations through out the State, so as to give effect to the resolution of the Bar Council of India dated 29/09/2002. We acknowledge the contribution made by each of the learned counsel in these proceedings and place on record our appreciation of the positive spirit and attitude expressed in their submissions for implementing the directions of the Supreme Court in their letter and spirit.
Sd/-
CHIEF JUSTICE Sd/-
JUDGE *mvs/S* Index: Y/N