Central Administrative Tribunal - Allahabad
Dinesh Kumar vs M/O Communications on 17 November, 2025
RESERVED ON 14.11.2025.
CENTRAL ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL
ALLAHABAD BENCH ALLAHABAD
Dated: This the 17th day of November 2025.
Hon'ble Mr. Justice Om Prakash VII, Member (J)
Original Application No. 330/00569 of 2019
Dinesh Kumar aged about 55 years son of Shri Natthu Ram Sharma,
presently posted as Accountant (U/S), Head Post Office, Bareilly
under Senior Superintendent of Post Offices, Bareilly Division,
Bareilly R/o- 25- Chaudhary Mohalla Bareilly U.P. 243003
..Applicant.
By Advocate : Shri Santosh Kumar Kushwaha
VERSUS
1. Union of India through Secretary, Ministry of Communication
and I.T., Government of India, Dak Bhawan, New Delhi.
2. Director Postal Servcies, in the office of Post Master General,
Bareilly Region, Bareilly.
3. Senior Superintendent of Post Offices, Bareilly Division,
Bareilly.
Respondents
By Advocate: Shri Sharad Kumar.
ORDER
The present O.A has been filed by the applicant under section 19 of the Administrative Tribunal Act, 1985 seeking following reliefs:-
"(i) Issue a Writ, order or direction in the nature of certiorari quashing the impugned suspension order dated 08.03.2018 (Annexure A-1), extension of suspension order dated 28.5.2018 alongwith with recommendation (Annexure A-2), impugned order of appellate authority dated 17.7.2018 (Annexure (Annexure A-3) and 2nd extension of suspension order dated 14.11.2018 (Annexure A-4) and further quash the impugned order dated 22.4.2024 passed by respondent No. 3 and treat the whole suspension period on duty for all purposes with all consequential benefits.
MANISH KUMAR SRIVASTAVA 2
(ii) issue any other Writ, order or direction which is deemed fit and proper in the circumstances of the case, may be issued in the favour of the appellant.
(iii) Cost of the application may be awarded in favour of the applicant".
2. The brief facts of the case are that the applicant was appointed as a Postal Assistant on 01.11.1983 through direct recruitment and throughout his long service career no adverse material was ever recorded against him. On 05.03.2018 he was placed under suspension on the basis of false and vague allegations, and on 28.05.2018 he was served with a major penalty charge sheet. On the same date, the Disciplinary Authority extended his suspension for a further period of 180 days on the recommendation of the Review Committee. The applicant preferred an appeal on 20.06.2018 against both the suspension and its extension, which was rejected by the Appellate Authority on 17.07.2018 on the ground that the suspension had already been reviewed. Thereafter, on 17.10.2018, the Inquiry Officer and Presenting Officer were appointed, and on 14.11.2018 the suspension was again extended for another 180 days without supplying the applicant a copy of the Review Committee's recommendation. On 16.11.2018 the Inquiry Officer fixed the first date of inquiry. Aggrieved by the prolonged and unjustified suspension, the applicant has approached this Tribunal seeking appropriate relief. During the pendency of the Original Application, the Disciplinary Authority, by order dated 22.04.2024, directed that the suspension period from 05.03.2018 to 18.11.2019 shall be treated as duty only for pensionary purposes, but not for any other consequential benefits. Thus at this stage applicant seeks to quash the impugned order dated 22.04.2024 and treat the whole suspension period as duty for all purpose.
3. In their counter affidavit, the respondents state that a major financial fraud of Rs. 2,73,25,774/- was committed by Shri Y.K. Sharma, Dy. Post Master-I, Bareilly HO, by issuing 47 irregular cheques in his own name and in the names of his family members MANISH KUMAR SRIVASTAVA 3 and associates. These cheques were falsely shown as remittances with "zero" value, while the actual cheques were deposited in various bank accounts controlled by him. The applicant, who was serving as Assistant Post Master (Accounts), failed to detect these irregularities as he did not properly verify bank scrolls, did not compare cheques drawn with bank records, and did not supervise the PA (AC-IV) responsible for entering bank data. Owing to these lapses, 35 irregular cheques issued during the applicant's tenure went unnoticed, causing a departmental loss of Rs. 2,22,49,076/-. For this grave negligence, the applicant was issued charge sheets under Rule 14 of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 and was placed under suspension on 05.03.2018. His suspension was periodically reviewed and extended by the Suspension Review Committee on 28.05.2018, 13.11.2018 and 22.05.2019 in accordance with rules. The applicant's appeal dated 20.06.2018 was rejected as the Review Committee had already recommended continuation of the suspension. The respondents stated that the suspension and its extensions were lawful, justified, and essential considering the gravity of the financial irregularities and the applicant's supervisory failures. They further contend that the applicant's challenge to the order dated 22.04.2024 regarding treatment of the suspension period is misconceived, as the order has been issued in accordance with applicable rules and does not suffer from any illegality from the respondents' side.
4. The applicant has filed Rejoinder Affidavit to the Counter Affidavit as filed by the respondents refuting the contentions made by the respondents in their Counter Affidavit while reiterating the averments made in the O.A.
5. Heard Shri Santosh Kumar Kushwaha, learned counsel for the applicant, and Shri Sharad Kumar, learned counsel for the respondents and perused the record.
6. Submission of learned counsel for the applicant is that once the Disciplinary Authority, vide order dated 22.04.2024, has MANISH KUMAR SRIVASTAVA 4 expressly treated the suspension period from 05.03.2018 to 18.11.2019 as duty for the purposes of pension, the same period cannot be bifurcated or given a partial effect in law. Treatment of a period as "duty" in service jurisprudence carries a settled legal meaning and necessarily entitles the employee to all consequential service benefits, including pay, allowances, increments, qualifying service, seniority, and other admissible benefits. It is a settled principle that an order cannot be partly beneficial and partly punitive for the same period. Treating the suspension period as duty for pension only, but not for other purposes, is contradictory, arbitrary, and unsupported by any rule under CCS (CCA) Rules, FR 54, or any Postal Manual provisions. Once the authority has held that the suspension was not wholly justified, it is bound to restore full benefits of duty. Learned counsel for the applicant further argued that under FR 54-B(1), when suspension is revoked without imposition of a major penalty, or where the suspension is found to be unjustified or wholly unjustified, the employee is entitled to full pay and allowances as if he had not been suspended. Even when the disciplinary proceedings are pending, FR 54-B(5) requires that orders regarding treatment of suspension period must be reasoned and supported by legal grounds. The impugned order dated 22.04.2024 provides no legal justification for limiting the benefit only to pension. Learned counsel for the applicant also argued that in service law, similarly situated benefits cannot be granted selectively. If the period is treated as duty in one aspect, it must also be treated as duty for all other aspects. Otherwise, the action violates Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. Thus, learned counsel for the applicant argued that the impugned order dated 22.04.2024 is mechanical, without reasoning, and contrary to settled legal principles governing the treatment of suspension period. Hence, it deserves to be set aside.
7. Learned counsel for the respondents in rebuttal argued under FR 54-B(1), (3), and (7), the competent authority is empowered to decide the manner of treating the suspension period depending on MANISH KUMAR SRIVASTAVA 5 facts and circumstances of the case. The rule does not mandate that the period must be treated as duty for all purposes. Partial treatment i.e., for pension alone is legally permissible where the authority is not satisfied about full exoneration or justification. Learned counsel for the respondents further argued that mere revocation of suspension does not automatically entitle an employee to full pay, increments, seniority, or other consequential benefits. These arise only after a finding of complete exoneration, which has not taken place. Hence, treating the suspension period for pension alone is reasonable and consistent with service rules. Learned counsel for the respondents next argued that the competent authority has exercised its statutory power under FR 54-B, considering the pendency of serious charges involving substantial financial loss. The classification of the period for pension purposes only is neither illegal nor arbitrary. The applicant cannot claim full benefits when the departmental proceedings for negligence and supervisory failure are still alive. Learned counsel for the respondents next argued that the applicant continues to receive all admissible benefits as per rules. The impugned order does not violate any statutory provision, and therefore, no interference is called for by this Tribunal.
8. I have carefully considered the arguments of both sides and examined the documents on record.
9. Before proceeding further, it is important to clearly state what kind of disciplinary matter this case involves, and whether it can be decided by a Single Member Bench under Section 5(6) of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985. After reading the pleadings and the order dated 22.04.2024, it is clear that this case does not involve any major punishment like dismissal, removal, compulsory retirement, or reduction in rank. The applicant has not been given any major penalty. The issue here is only about how the period of suspension should be treated under FR 54-B and whether the applicant should get full service benefits for that period. These matters relate to suspension and service benefits, not to any major MANISH KUMAR SRIVASTAVA 6 punishment. Therefore, they fall under minor service issues or administrative consequences of suspension. Since no major penalty is involved and the applicant only seeks correction of service benefits, the case properly falls within the powers of a Single Member Bench. Hence, under Section 5(6) of the Act, this Original Application can rightly be heard and decided by this Single Member Bench.
10. On merit, I am of the view that the order dated 22.04.2024, which treats the suspension period from 05.03.2018 to 18.11.2019 as "duty" only for pension purposes but not for other service benefits, cannot be upheld. This approach of the disciplinary authority goes against the purpose and meaning of FR 54-B and the established legal principles relating to suspension. For better understanding, FR 54-B is reproduced below:
"54-B (1) When a Government servant who has been suspended is reinstated or would have been so reinstated but for his retirement (including premature retirement) while under suspension, the authority competent to order reinstatement shall consider and make a specific order-
(a) regarding the pay and allowances to be paid to the Government servant for the period of suspension ending with reinstatement or the date of his retirement (including premature retirement). as the case may be; and
(b) whether or not the said period shall be treated as a period spent on duty.
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in Rule 53, where a Govern-
ment servant under suspension dies before the disciplinary or the Court proceedings instituted against him are concluded, the period between the date of suspension and the date of death shall be treated as duty for all purposes and his family shall be paid the full pay and allowances for that period to which he would have been entitled had he not been suspended, subject to adjustment in respect of subsistence allowance already paid.
(3) Where the authority competent to order reinstatement is of the opinion that the suspension was wholly unjustified, the Government MANISH KUMAR SRIVASTAVA 7 servant shall, subject to the provisions of sub-rule (8) be paid the full pay and allowances to which he would have been entitled, had he not been suspended:
Provided that where such authority is of the opinion that the termi- nation of the proceedings instituted against the Government servant had been delayed due to reasons directly attributable to the Government servant, it may, after giving him an opportunity to make his representation within sixty days from the date on which the communication in this regard is served on him and after considering the representation, if any, submitted by him, direct, for reasons to be recorded in writing, that the Government servant shall be paid for the period of such delay only such amount (not being the whole) of such pay and allowances as it may determine.
(4) In a case falling under sub-rule (3) the period of suspension shall be treated as a period spent on duty for all purposes.
(5) In cases other than those falling under sub-rules (2) and (3) the Government servant shall, subject to the provisions of sub-rules (8) and (9) be paid such amount (not being the whole) of the pay and allowances to which he would have been entitled had he not been suspended, as the competent authority may determine, after giving notice to the Government servant of the quantum proposed and after considering the representation, if any, submitted by him in that connection within such period (which in no case shall exceed sixty days from the date on which the no-tice has been served) as may be specified in the notice.
(6) Where suspension is revoked pending finalization of the discipli-
nary or the Court proceedings, any order passed under sub-rule (1) before the conclusion of the proceedings against the Government servant. shall be reviewed on its own motion after the conclusion of the proceedings by the authority mentioned in sub-rule (1) who shall make an order according to the provisions of sub-rule (3) or sub-rule (5), as the case may be.
(7) In a case falling under sub-rule (5), the period of suspension shall not be treated as a period spent on duty unless the competent authority specifically directs that it shall be so treated for any specified purpose: Provided that, if the Government servant so desires such authority may order that the period of suspension shall be converted into leave of any kind due and admissible to the Government servant.
MANISH KUMAR SRIVASTAVA 8 NOTE-The order of the competent authority under the preceding proviso shall be absolute and no higher sanction shall be necessary for the grant of-
(a) extraordinary leave in excess of three months in the case of temporary Government servant; and
(b) leave of any kind in excess of five years in the case of permanent or quasi-permanent Government servant.
(8) The payment of allowances under sub-rule (2), sub-rule (3) or sub-rule (5) shall be subject to all other conditions under which such allowances are admissible.
(9) The amount determined under the proviso to sub-rule (3) or under sub-rule (5) shall not be less than the subsistence allowance and other allowances admissible under Rule 53".
11. A reading of FR 54-B clearly shows that the rule is meant to protect a government employee who is suspended but later found not to have been rightly kept out of duty. When suspension is revoked and no major penalty is imposed, or when the suspension is found to be not fully justified, the rule requires that the entire suspension period be treated as duty with full monetary and service benefits. The rule does not allow only a partial benefit, for example, treating the period as duty only for pension but denying increments, seniority, or pay. Such selective treatment is unfair, unreasonable, and not permitted under the rule.
12. It is also important to understand that the nature of suspension changes depending on the stage of the case. Before revocation, suspension is a preventive step meant to protect public interest and to help to conduct the inquiry. But after suspension is revoked, this preventive purpose ends. The authorities cannot continue to punish an employee indirectly by denying him normal service benefits. Once the authority itself treats the period as duty for pension, it means that the suspension was not fully justified. In such a situation, there is no reason to deny pay, allowances, increments, or seniority. An order cannot operate as both a benefit and a punishment for the MANISH KUMAR SRIVASTAVA 9 same period. The law does not allow this. Applicant's case is squarely covered under FR 54 B (i), 3 and 4. Rules relied upon by the respondents is not sufficient to deny the benefit to the applicant.
13. Applying these principles to the present case, the action of the respondents in giving the benefit of "duty" only for pension purposes, but not for other benefits, is without any valid reason and is contrary to FR 54-B. Therefore, this part of the order dated 22.04.2024 is arbitrary and cannot stand. As a result, the impugned order dated 22.04.2024 is set aside to the extent it denies other benefits. The respondents are directed to treat the entire suspension period as duty for all purposes, and to give the applicant all consequential benefits including full pay and allowances, increments, seniority, qualifying service, and all other related benefits. These benefits shall, however, be subject to any final lawful decision in the disciplinary proceedings. The respondents shall comply with these directions within three weeks and file a compliance report.
14. With these findings and directions, the Original Application is allowed. There shall be no order as to costs. All connected Misc. Applications are also disposed of.
(JUSTICE OM PRAKASH VII) Member (J) Manish MANISH KUMAR SRIVASTAVA