Jharkhand High Court
Kumar Satyendra Prasad vs Coal India Ltd. & Ors on 19 July, 2012
Author: D. N. Patel
Bench: D. N. Patel
1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
W.P.(S) No. 880 of 2010
Kumar Satyendra Prasad ...... Petitioner
Versus
The Coal India Limited & others ......Respondents
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE D. N. PATEL
For the Petitioner : M/s Ajit Kumar, Kumar Sundaram, Advocates
For the Respondents : M/s Anoop Kumar Mehta, Arnima Sinha,
Amit Kr. Sinha, Advocates
th
11/Dated: 19 July, 2012
1.The present writ petition has been preferred mainly against the order passed by the respondents dated 14th October, 2009, which is at Annexure 7 to the memo of the present petition whereby, the resignation which was tendered on 11th June, 2008 and which was withdrawn on 9th April, 2009, has been accepted and thereby, the services of the present petitioner as Superintendent of Mines have been brought to an end.
2. Counsel for the petitioner submitted that as per Rule 15.3 of the Common Coal Cadre Rules, which has been accepted by the Board of Directors of Coal India Limited and which has force of law and which governs the service conditions of the Executives/Officers of the Coal India Limited and its subsidiary companies, an employee may resign from the job by informing the appointing authority through his controlling officer in writing of his intention to do so either by giving three months notice or by payment of salary in lieu thereof. Thereafter, the controlling authority will make necessary recommendation to the appointing authority for acceptance or otherwise of the resignation and the employee will be relieved from his duties only after he is communicated the acceptance of resignation in writing. In pursuance of this provision, the present petitioner tendered his resignation on 11th June, 2008, which is at Annexure1 to the memo of the present petition. Thereafter, the said resignation was withdrawn on 9th April, 2009, which is at Annexure3 and 3/1 to the memo of the present petition. The reasons for withdrawal have also been mentioned in those two annexures, but, after long lapse of six months from withdrawal of the resignation by the petitioner, the Management on 14 th October, 2009 accepted the resignation tendered by the petitioner, which is Annexure7 to the memo of the present petition. This is not permissible in the eye of law as stated by the counsel for the petitioner. Counsel for the 2 petitioner further submitted that looking to Rule 15.3 of the Common Coal Cadre Rules, the resignation tendered by the employee has to be accepted in writing by the respondentsemployer and if any employee is withdrawing the resignation prior to acceptance he should be allowed to resume his duties.
3. Counsel for the petitioner is relying upon the decisions rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported as under:
(i) (1978) 2 SCC 301;
(ii) (2001) 1 SCC 158; and
(iii) (2005) 8 SCC 314.
On the basis of all three decisions, it is vehemently submitted by the counsel for the petitioner that prior to acceptance of the resignation by the employer petitioner has right to withdraw the resignation. In the facts of the present case even Exit Interview was taken on 22 nd August, 2008 and the respondents had not accepted the resignation even for more than 12 months period thereafter. Meanwhile, the whole family of the petitioner had not at all interested for withdrawal of the resignation and ultimately, he withdrew the resignation in the month of April, 2009. During this thinking process, for getting the livelihood, the petitioner had worked with some private agency, but, that was also not continued because he wanted to withdraw his resignation. These facts have also been given in the letter dated 30th July, 2009 written by the petitioner to the Management, which is at Annexure6 to the memo of the petition. Thus, the intention to withdraw the resignation was running in the mind of the petitioner since long and once the resignation was already withdrawn it cannot be accepted and that too after long lapse of six months period and hence, the order at Annexure 7 deserves to be quashed and set aside.
4. Counsel for the respondents submitted that the petitioner after tendering his resignation on 11th June, 2008 from the post of Superintendent of Mines stopped coming to the place of employment on and from 16th June, 2008 thereafter, he got employment somewhere else also. This brings to an end automatically the employee and employer relationship. Moreover, the process of resignation completes no sooner did the petitioner tenders his resignation. Exit Interview was also held on 22 nd August, 2008 as stated in paragraph6 of the counter affidavit, filed by the 3 respondents and therefore, he may not be reinstated by the order of this Court. His resignation has also been accepted on 14 th October, 2009 because process of acceptance of the resignation involves some administrative work like obtaining "NO DEMAND CERTIFCATE". This process has also been written in Rule 15.3 of the Common Coal Cadre Rules, but, merely because of administrative procedure is there for acceptance of the resignation that does not entitle the present petitioner to withdraw the resignation.
5. Counsel for the respondents is relying upon the decisions rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported as under:
(i) (2002) 3 SCC 437;
(ii) 1989 Supp (2) SCC 175; and
(ii) 1995 Supp (2) SCC 582;
On the basis of the aforesaid three decisions, it is vehemently submitted by the counsel for the respondents that the employer and employee relationship have been brought to an end upon tendering the resignation by the petitioner and therefore, he cannot withdraw the resignation. By now it has also been accepted in the year, 2009 and therefore, there is no illegality committed by the respondents while passing the order dated 14th October, 2009, which is at Annexure7 to the memo of the present petition and hence, the petition may not be entertained by this Hon'ble Court.
6. Having heard counsel for both the sides and looking to the facts and circumstances of the case, I hereby, quash and set aside the order, passed by the respondents dated 14th October, 2009, which is at Annexure7 to the memo of the present petition mainly for the following facts and reasons:
(i) The present petitioner was appointed as Overman in the year, 1986 with the respondents. Thereafter, he was promoted on executive post and he was appointed as Superintendent of Mines. The petitioner thereafter tendered his resignation by his letter dated 11th June, 2008, which is at Annexure1 to the memo of the present petition.
(ii) The procedure of the resignation enshrined in Rule 15.3 of the Common Coal Cadre Rules as resolved by the Board of Directors of the Coal India Limited, which is applicable for its own purpose as 4 well as for subsidiary companies reads as under:
"15.3. Resignation An employee may resign from the job by informing the appointing authority through his controlling officer in writing of his intention to do so. While no notice for resignation is required during the initial period of probation on his employment in the company, a temporary employee whose probation period has been closed will have to give at least on month's notice or salary in lieu thereof. In the case of the regular employees confirmed in writing, resignation can be submitted only by giving three month's notice or salary in lieu thereof.
The controlling officer will make necessary recommendation to the appointing authority for acceptance or otherwise of the resignation and the employee will be relieved from his duties only after he is communicated the acceptance of resignation in writing. Provided that the Management reserves the right not to accept the resignation of the executives against whom disciplinary proceedings are pending or a decision has been taken by the Competent Authority to issue a chargesheet etc. against him/her. Before the resignation is accepted, necessary NO DEMAND CERTIFICATE should be obtained from the concerned accounts section and other areas/divisions/sections where the employee was working and/or whose properties were under his control. In respect of an employee who has executed a bond and is undergoing training or serving the period obligatory under the bond, the terms of appointment and the bond will also have to be fulfilled before his resignation is accepted."
(Emphasis Supplied) In view of the aforesaid procedure of resignation after tendering it is to be forwarded through controlling officer and thereafter it is to be accepted by the Management and once it is communicated to the employee that his resignation has been accepted, the employee will be relieved from his duty. The Management reserves the right not to accept resignation. "NO DEMAND CERTIFICATE" is also required to be obtained as part and partial of the procedure of the acceptance of the resignation.
(iii) It appears from the facts of the case that the petitioner was called for 'Exit Interview' on 22th August, 2008 as stated in paragraph 6 of the counter affidavit, filed by the respondents.
(iv) It appears from the facts of the case that the petitioner stopped attending the place of employment on and from 16 th June, 2008 and to get his livelihood, he had also joined some private agency.
(v) It appears that the Management took lot of time in thinking process of, the acceptance of the resignation. Meanwhile, the th petitioner withdrawn his resignation on 9 April, 2009 .
5(vi) It appears from the facts of the case that after withdrawal several months have been passed and after approximately six months period i.e. on 14th October, 2009 the resignation tendered by the petitioner was accepted. This is not permissible in the eye of law. The petitioner tendered resignation on 11 th June, 2008, which was withdrawn on 9th April, 2009 and it was accepted on 14th October, 2009. Thus, the petitioner has withdrawn the resignation before it was accepted. The respondentsManagement has no power, jurisdiction or authority to accept, the withdrawn resignation and hence, the order at Annexure7 dated 14 th October, 2009 deserves to be quashed and set aside.
(vii) It ought to be kept in mind by the Management that the employees may tender resignation, but, they are sometimes with all reluctance tendering the resignation. It takes time for adjustment. In a country like India where there is highly unequal bargaining power on one side there is Public Sector Undertaking and on other side there is powerless employee. Due to this unequal bargaining power in the developing country sometimes the employees are working under some stress and therefore, they are sometimes tendering their resignation, but, after sometimes because of advise of family members or friends etc. they are withdrawing their resignation. This is always permissible if the tendered resignation is not accepted by an employer. There is a right vested in the employee who has tendered the resignation to withdraw it. Withdrawal of resignation is also a right vested in the employee because tendering of the resignation is a voluntary phenomena. Looking to provisions of Rule 15.3 as cited herein above, there is a long drawn procedure for acceptance of the resignation by the employer. Procedure of resignation as per the Common Coal Cadre Rules framed, enacted and accepted by the Coal India for its own purpose and for its subsidiary companies are as under:
(a) An employee may resign from the job by informing the appointing authority. This can be done through his controlling officer in writing;
(b) In case the employee is already confirmed in the job, the 6 resignation can be submitted by giving three month's notice or salary in lieu thereof;
(c) Thereafter, the controlling officer will make necessary recommendation to the appointing authority for acceptance of the resignation or otherwise thereof;
(d) Before the resignation is accepted "NO DEMAND CERTIFICATE" should be obtained from the concerned accounts section and other areas/divisions/sections where the employee who has tendered resignation was working and if any bond etc. has been executed by the employee the same shall be to be fulfilled before his resignation;
(e) Looking to the proviso of Rule 15.3 of the Common Coal Cadre Rules it is a right of the Management not to accept the resignation; and
(f) The employee will be relieved from his duties only after he is communicated the acceptance of resignation in writing.
Thus, from step (a) to step (f) there is a long drawn procedure as prescribed under the aforesaid Rule 15.3 and before reaching to a procedure as envisaged in step (f) at any time the employee can withdraw his resignation as stated hereinabove. The resignation was accepted in the month of October, 2009 after it was withdrawn on 9th April, 2009. This is an illegal action on the part of the respondents.
(viii) It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of India and Others Vs. Gopal Chandra Misra & others reported in (1978) 2 SCC 301 in paragraph nos. 41 and 46 as under: "41. The general principle that emerges from the foregoing conspectus, is that in the absence of anything to the contrary in the provisions governing the terms and conditions of the office/post, an intimation in writing sent to the competent authority by the incumbent, of his intention or proposal to resign his office/post from a future specified date can be withdrawn by him at any time before it becomes effective, i.e. before it effects termination of the tenure of the office/post or the employment.
46. The rule enunciated above was reiterated by this Court in Raj Kumar v. Union of India (supra), in these words:
"When a public servant has invited by his letter of resignation determination of his employment, his services normally stand terminated from the date on which the letter 7 of resignation is accepted by the appropriate authority, and in the absence of any law or rule governing the conditions of his service to the contrary, it will not be open to the public servant to withdraw his resignation after it is accepted by the appropriate authority. Till the resignation is accepted by the appropriate authority in consonance with the rules governing the acceptance, the public servant concerned has locus poenitentiae but not thereafter."
It was also observed that, on the plain terms of the resignation letters of the servant (who was a member of the IAS), the resignation became effective as soon as it was accepted by the appropriate authority."
(Emphasis Supplied) In view of the aforesaid decision, the resignation tendered by the employee can be withdrawn at any time by him before it becomes effective or before it is accepted by the employer.
(ix) It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of India & Another Vs. Wing Commander T. Parthasarathy reported in (2001) 1 SCC 158 in paragraph nos. 6, 7, 8 and 9 as under: "6. We have carefully considered the submissions of the learned counsel appearing on either side. The reliance placed for the appellants on the decision reported in Raj Kumar case is inappropriate to the facts of this case. In that case this Court merely emphasised the position that when a public servant has invited by his letter of resignation determination of his employment his service clearly stands terminated from the date on which the letter of resignation is accepted by the appropriate authority and in the absence of any law or rule governing the condition of the service to the contrary, it will not be open to the public servant to withdraw his resignation after it is accepted by the appropriate authority and that till the resignation is accepted by the appropriate authority in consonance with the rules governing the acceptance, the public servant concerned had locus poenitentiae but not thereafter. This judgment was the subjectmatter of consideration alongside the other relevant case law on the subject by a Constitution Bench of this Court in the decision reported in Union of India v. Gopal Chandra Misra. A request for premature retirement which required the acceptance of the competent or appropriate authority will not be complete till accepted by such competent authority and the request could definitely be withdrawn before it became so complete. It is all the more so in a case where the request for premature retirement was made to take effect from a future date as in this case. The majority of the Constitution Bench analysed and declared the position of law to be as hereunder: (SCC p.317, para 50) "50. It will bear repetition that the general principle is that in the absence of a legal contractual or constitutional bar, a 'prospective' resignation can be withdrawn at any time before it becomes effective, and it becomes effective when it operates to terminate the employment or the office tenure of the resigner.
8This general rule is equally applicable to government servants and constitutional functionaries. In the case of a government servant/or functionary/who cannot, under the conditions of his service/or office, by his own unilateral act of tendering resignation, give up his service/or office, normally, the tender of resignation becomes effective and his service/or office tenure terminated, when it is accepted by the competent authority. In the case of a Judge of a High Court, who is a constitutional functionary and under Proviso (a) to Article 217(1) has a unilateral right or privilege to resign his office, his resignation becomes effective and tenure terminated on the date from which he, of his own volition, chooses to quit office. If in terms of the writing under his hand addressed to the President, he resigns in praesenti, the resignation terminates his office tenure forthwith, and cannot therefore, be withdrawn or revoked thereafter. But, if he by such writing, chooses to resign from a future date, the act of resigning office is not complete because it does not terminate his tenure before such date and the Judge can at any time before the arrival of that prospective date on which it was intended to be effective, withdraw it, because the Constitution does not bar such withdrawal .
(emphasis supplied)
7. This Court had again an occasion to consider the question as to the principle of law to be applied to a case of resignation made to become effective on the expiry of a particular period or from a future date as desired by the employee in Punjab National Bank v. P.K. Mittal. It was held therein that resignation being a voluntary act of employee, he may choose to resign with immediate effect or with a notice of less than 3 months if the employer agrees to the same or he may also resign at a future date on the expiry or beyond the period of 3 months as envisaged under the governing regulation in that case, even though there is no such consent from the employer, and that, it was always open to the employee to withdraw the same before the date on which the resignation could have become effective.
8. So far as the case in hand is concerned, nothing in the form of any statutory rules or any provision of any Act has been brought to our notice which could be said to impede or deny this right of the appellants. On the other hand, not only the acceptance of the request by the headquarters, the appropriate authority, was said to have been made only on 2021986, a day after the respondent withdrew his request for premature retirement but even such acceptance in this case was to be effective from a future date namely 3181986. Consequently, it could not be legitimately contended by the appellants that there was any cessation of the relationship of master and servant between the Department and the respondent at any rate before 3181986. While that be the position inevitably the respondent had a right and was entitled to withdraw or revoke his request earlier made before it ever really and effectively became effective.
9. The reliance placed upon the socalled policy decision which obligated the respondent to furnish a certificate to the extent that he was fully aware of the fact that he cannot later seek for cancellation of the application once made for premature retirement cannot, in our view, be destructive of the right of the respondent, in law, to withdraw his request for premature retirement before it ever became 9 operative and effective and effected termination of his status and relation with the Department. When the legal position is that much clear it would be futile for the appellants to base their rights on some policy decision of the Department or a mere certificate of the respondent being aware of a particular position which has no sanctity or basis in law to destroy such rights which otherwise inhered in him and available in law. No such deprivation of a substantive right of a person can be denied except on the basis of any statutory provision or rule or regulation. There being none brought to our notice in this case, the claim of the appellants cannot be countenanced in our hands. Even that apart, the reasoning of the High Court that the case of the respondent will not be covered by the type or nature of the mischief sought to be curbed by the socalled policy decision also cannot be said to suffer any conformity (sic infirmity) in law, to warrant our interference."
(Emphasis Supplied) In view of the aforesaid decision also a request for the premature retirement which requires acceptance of the competent or appropriate authority will not be complete till accepted by such competent authority and the request could definitely be withdrawn before it so complete. Even if there is a policy, of the respondent authority which is a "State" that once a resignation tendered, it cannot be withdrawn, then also, it has been held in para9, that such policy cannot take away a right of an employee to withdraw a resignation/voluntary retirement. Thus, the philosophy of the resignation is equally applicable to the premature retirement case also. Golden thread running through out the whole decision is that a resignation tendered by the employee prior to acceptance his voluntary retirement can be withdrawn. There is inherent right vested in such employee to withdraw it, prior to its acceptance and if the resignation is tendered with future effect and even it is accepted immediately but before that future date, at any time employee is withdrawing then there will not be any effect of sanction of tendered resignation. In the facts of the present case resignation was tendered on 11th June, 2008, withdrawn on 9th April, 2009 and it was accepted on 14th October, 2009 and looking to the procedure as envisaged in Rule 15.3 the respondents have no right to accept the withdrawn resignation and hence, the order at Annexure7 dated 14th October, 2009 deserves to be quashed and set aside.
(x) It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Srikantha S.M. Vs. Bharath Earth Movers Ltd. reported in (2005) 8 10 SCC 314 in paragraph nos. 11, 15, 17 and 19 as under: "11. The Division Bench, by a cryptic order, dismissed the appeal observing that when the resignation was submitted on 411993 by the appellant and it was accepted on the same day, the fact that he was relieved on 1511993 did not make any difference. To us, both the courts were wrong in taking the view that the appellant was no more in service after 411993.
15. The learned counsel for the parties drew our attention to some of the decisions of this Court on the point. In Punjab National Bank v. P.K. Mittal an employee resigned from service of the Bank by a communication dated 2111986. It was to be effective from 306 1986. The Deputy General Manager who was the competent authority under the Service Regulations, accepted the resignation as per the letter of resignation i.e. with effect from 3061986. The employee, however, received a letter from the Bank on 721986 informing him that his resignation letter had been accepted by the competent authority with immediate effect and consequently he was being relieved from the service of the Bank with effect from that day i.e. from 721986. The employee, therefore, filed a petition challenging the validity of the purported acceptance of his resignation with effect from 721986 and for a direction to the Bank to treat him in service up to 3061986 by granting all consequential benefits. The matter, however, did not end there. On 1541986, the employee addressed a letter to the Bank purporting to withdraw his resignation letter dated 2111986. The question which came up for consideration was as to whether the subsequent development could be taken into account and whether the employee continued in service in view of the withdrawal of resignation dated 1541986. Accepting the contention of the employee that he continued in service, the Court held that his resignation could take effect from 3061986 or on expiry of three months' period provided in the Service Regulations and before that period he could withdraw the resignation. Since he had withdrawn the resignation before 3061986, he continued to remain in service with the Bank.
17. This Court, however, did not agree with the interpretation. Dealing with the object underlying such provision as giving opportunity to both, the employer as well as the employee, the Court stated: (SCC pp. 17980, para 7) "We are of the opinion that clause (2) of the regulation and its proviso are intended not only for the protection of the bank but also for the benefit of the employee. It is common knowledge that a person proposing to resign often wavers in his decision and even in a case where he has taken a firm decision to resign, he may not be ready to go out immediately. In most cases he would need a period of adjustment and hence like to defer the actual date of relief from duties for a few months for various personal reasons. Equally an employer may like to have time to make some alternative arrangement before relieving the resigning employee. Clause (2) is carefully worded keeping both these requirements in mind. It gives the employee a period of adjustment and rethinking. It also enables the bank to have some time to arrange its affairs, with the liberty, in an appropriate case, to accept the resignation of an employee even without the requisite notice if he so desires it. The proviso in our opinion should not be interpreted as enabling a bank to thrust a resignation on an employee with 11 effect from a date different from the one on which he can make his resignation effective under the terms of the regulation. We, therefore, agree with the High Court that in the present case the resignation of the employee could have become effective only on or about 2141986 or on 3061986 and that the bank could not have 'accepted' that resignation on any earlier date. The letter dated 721986 was, therefore, without jurisdiction."
(Emphasis Supplied)
19. Deprecating the stand taken by the Government, this Court held that it was not proper for the Government not to accede to the request of the employee. "In the modern age we should not put embargo upon people's choice or freedom", stated the Court (SCC pp. 23536, para 12)."
In view of the aforesaid decision, it will be a graceful on the part of the Management to accept the "withdrawal of the resignation" instead of acceptance of resignation itself. Those institutions who are 'State' within the meaning of Article 12 they must behave like a Model Employer. They should never follow easy method to oust the uncomfortable employees.
(xi) It is contented by the counsel for the respondents that employer and employee relationship came to an end no sooner did the petitioner tendered his resignation and no sooner did the petitioner stopped coming to the place of employment and no sooner did he tried to get his livelihood from some other agency as stated in Annexure6letter written by the petitioner and therefore, this Court may not revive the employer and employee relationship. This contention is not accepted by this Court mainly for the reason that the relationship of the employer and employee never comes to an end by mere tendering of the resignation. Tendering of resignation is not an end to the employment. The arguments canvassed by the counsel for the respondents is running, counter to, Rule 15.3 of the Common Coal Cadre Rules as stated hereinabove. The whole Rule has been divided in different steps from step (a) to step (f). Before reaching to the step (f) as mentioned hereinabove, at any time employee can withdraw his resignation because act of tendering resignation, is a voluntary action of the employee. It is a right of the employee to tender resignation and therefore, there is a right to withdraw the said resignation. Right to tender the resignation, includes the right to withdraw it, provided it has not been accepted.
12There is nothing like an automatic acceptance, immediately upon tendering of the resignation, looking to Rule 15.3 as stated hereinabove.
(xii) It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Shambhu Murari Sinha Vs. Project & Development India Ltd & Another reported in (2002) 3 SCC 437 that when voluntary retirement was withdrawn by an employee, he continued to remain in service. The relationship of an employer and employee did not come to an end and the employee has ' locus penitentiae' to withdraw his proposal for voluntary retirement. He is therefore, entitled to rejoin his duty and the respondents corporation was bound to allow him to work. The jurisprudence which is applicable in the voluntary retirement is equally applicable to the voluntary resignation. As per Advanced Law Lexicon, 3rd Edition, 2005:
"Locus penetentiae : (Lat.) An opportunity to repent, to be penetent. Locus penitentiae: An opportunity to withdraw from the commission of a crime.
Locus poenitentiae [Latin "place of repentance"]
1. A point at which it is not too late for one to change one's legal position; the possibility of withdrawing form a contemplated course of action, especially a wrong, before being committed to it.
2. The opportunity to withdraw from a negotiation before finally concluding the contract. (Black, 7th Edn., 1999) Latin for "opportunity to repent". It is an option open to the parties of an illegal contract, who may save it by deciding not to carry out that part which is against the law. (Business Term) "The requirement of an overt act before conspirators can be prosecuted and punished exits......to provide a locus poenitentiae an opportunity for the conspirators to reconsider, terminate the agreement, and thereby avoid punishment."
People V. Zamora, 557 P. 2d 75, 82 (Cal.1976).
Place or opportunity for repentance or change of intention."
Thus, there is no cessation of a employer and employee relationship by mere tendering the resignation as stated by the counsel for the respondents. A man who has tendered resignation is always in need of livelihood for himself and for his family members and therefore, the employee might be trying to get his livelihood from anywhere else. The petitioner is not an exception to this routine and regular phenomena. He might have attempted to get his livelihood from any employer other than the respondents by per se never extinguishes the right of the petitioner to withdraw his 13 resignation, before it accepted by the respondents.
(xiii) Counsel for the respondents is also relying upon the decision rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of U.P. & Others Vs. Ved Prakash Sharma (Dr) reported in 1995 Supp (2) SCC 582.
This judgment is not helpful to the respondents looking peculiar facts of the case. Looking to the aforesaid decision, it appears that there is a contract between the parties. There was no procedure for acceptance of the resignation and the resignation was withdrawn after long lapse of time i.e after approximately four years whereas, in the facts of the present case there is a detail procedure for acceptance of the resignation. Rule 15.3 for better understanding has been divided into steps (a) to (f). Moreover, withdrawal is not after long lapse of time at all. On the contrary, after 'Exit Interview' which was held by the respondents on 22nd August, 2008 of the petitioner, the respondents were seating tight upon the resignation of the petitioner for approximately 14 months from the date of the 'Exit Interview' and for 16 months from the date of resignation. Thus, in the facts of the present case, there is a long delay caused by the employer himself. This fact makes the facts of the present case grossly different and hence, the judgment cited by the counsel for the respondents is not applicable to the disputes between the parties.
(xiv) Counsel for the respondents is also relying upon the decision rendered by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Punjab National Bank Vs. P.K. Mittal reported in 1989 Supp (2) SCC 175. This judgment is also not helpful to the respondents because looking to the facts of the case, it appears that there was absence of any provision of acceptance of the resignation and therefore, it was made effective immediately and automatically from the date on which the resignation was tendered whereas, looking to the peculiar facts of the case the resignation was made effective upon completion of the notice period whereas here, there is Rule 15.3 which envisages acceptance of the resignation which also refers the right to the Management not to accept the resignation; which also refers the right of Management to get 'NO DEMAND CERTIFICATE. Thus, the 14 rules of acceptance of the resignation, which were referred in the aforesaid decisions are different from the facts of the present case and therefore, the said judgment is not applicable for resolving the disputes between the parties in the facts of the present case.
7. As a cumulative effect of the aforesaid facts, reasons and judicial pronouncements, I hereby, quash and set aside the order, passed by the respondents dated 14th October, 2009, which is at Annexure7 to the memo of the present petition. The respondents are directed to treat the services of the petitioner as continuous service and will allow the petitioner to resume his duties with immediate effect. Counsel for the petitioner fairly submitted, upon instructions from his client, who is present in the Court, that the petitioner is not claiming any salary/wages or the emoluments for the period running from 11th June, 2008 till he resumes the duties, provided that he is permitted to resume the duties within four weeks from today. Much fairness have been shown by the petitioner, who is present before this Court through his Advocate. His service period from the date i.e. 11th June, 2008 till his joining will be reckoned for any increment in this emoluments and the aforesaid period will also be reckoned for calculation of his service as well as for getting retirement benefits. Counsel for the petitioner submitted that the petitioner is having the age of approximately 51 years and still there is long period of his service. The petitioner shall resume his duties at the place where he was working lastly on 10th June, 2008 at Gopalichak Colliery, Putki Balihari Area, Bharat Cocking Coal Limited, Dhanbad during working hours.
8. Accordingly, this writ petition is allowed and disposed of.
(D.N. Patel, J) VK