Gujarat High Court
M/S Magirsha Industries vs M/S Gujarat State Fertilizer And ... on 10 February, 2023
Author: Bhargav D. Karia
Bench: Bhargav D. Karia
NEUTRAL CITATION
C/ARBI.P/13/2023 ORDER DATED: 10/02/2023
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
R/PETN. UNDER ARBITRATION ACT NO. 13 of 2023
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M/S MAGIRSHA INDUSTRIES
Versus
M/S GUJARAT STATE FERTILIZER AND CHEMICALS LIMITED
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Appearance:
RUSHABH H SHAH(7594) for the Petitioner(s) No. 1
MR NISARG DESAI WITH MR DEVARSH TRIVEDI FOR GANDHI LAW
ASSOCIATES for the Respondent(s) No. 1
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CORAM:HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE BHARGAV D. KARIA
Date : 10/02/2023
ORAL ORDER
1. Heard learned advocate Mr.Rushabh H. Shah for the applicant and learned advocate Mr.Nisarg Desai with Mr.Devarsh Trivedi for Gandhi Law Associates for the respondent no.1, who appears on advance copy.
2. This is an application under Section 29A (4) read with Sub-section (5) read with Section 29A of the Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2019 (for short"the Arbitration Act"). It is stated in the application that a reference was made by the Micro Small and Medium Enterprise Facilitation Council to the Gujarat Chamber of Commerce Alternative Dispute Resolution Center under Section 18(3) of the Micro Small and Medium Enterprise Act, 2006.
Page 1 of 19 Downloaded on : Sun Sep 17 21:40:05 IST 2023NEUTRAL CITATION C/ARBI.P/13/2023 ORDER DATED: 10/02/2023 undefined Pursuant to the reference made by the Council, Mr.Amal Dhru was appointed as a Sole Arbitrator in the year 2018.
3. The Arbitral proceedings are conducted as under:-
"i. Submission of statement of claim: on or before 01st January, 2019;
ii. Reply to statement of claim & Counter claim, if any: on or before 9th February, 2019;
iii. Rejoinder/reply to counter claim, if any: on or before 23rd February, 2019;
iv. Rejoinder to reply in case if there is any counter claim: on or before 9th March, 2019;
V. Suggested issues along with admission and denial of documents to be submitted by the Claimant & Respondent on 16th March, 2019;
vi. Hearing for framing of issues and admission and denial of documents: 23rd March, 2019."
4. The claim statement along with the documents was submitted on 1st January, 2019 by the applicant and the statement of defence was filed by the respondent on 9th February, 2019 and rejoinder was filed on 25th February, 2019.
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5. Learned advocate Mr.Rushabh Shah referred to Section 29A(1) of the Arbitration Act which stipulates that the Arbitral Tribunal is required to pass an award within a period of 12 months from the date of completion of the pleadings under Sub-section (4) of Section 23 of the Arbitration Act. It was submitted that the 12 months period for passing the award by the Tribunal would start from 26.02.2019 and would end on 26.02.2020 and 12 months would be completed on 26.02.2020. It was submitted that the parties could not attend the arbitration proceedings and therefore an application was filed being IAAP No.68 of 2020 before this Court under Section 29A(4) of the Arbitration Act for extension of the arbiral proceedings.
6. Learned advocate Mr.Shah invited the attention of this Court to the order dated 04.03.2022 passed by the Hon'ble the Chief Justice of this Court granting extension of 12 months, which reads as under:-
"(ii) Tribunal is granted extension of time namely 12 months from the date of expiry and it is made clear that the period during which this Court and the Hon'ble Apex Court had extended the period of limitation would also stand excluded for the purposes of computation of 12 months period."Page 3 of 19 Downloaded on : Sun Sep 17 21:40:05 IST 2023
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7. Therefore, the period from 20.03.2020 to 26.02.2021 is required to be excluded as per the order dated 10.01.2022 passed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Miscellaneous Application NO.21 of 2022 in Miscellaneous Application NO.665 of 2021 in SUO Motu Writ Petition (C) No.3 of 2020 IN RE: Congnizance For Extension of Limitation With Miscellaneous Application NO.29 of 2022 in Miscellaneous Application NO.665 of 2021 in SUO Motu Writ Petition (C) No.3 of 2020, which reads as under:-
"1. In March, 2020, this Court took Suo Motu cognizance of the difficulties that might be faced by the litigants in filing petitions/ applications/ suits/ appeals/ all other quasi proceedings within the period of limitation prescribed under the general law of limitation or under any special laws (both Central and/or State) due to the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic.
2. On 23.03.2020, this Court directed extension of the period of limitation in all proceedings before Courts/Tribunals including this Court w.e.f. 15.03.2020 till further orders. On 08.03.2021, the order dated 23.03.2020 was brought to an end, permitting the relaxation of period of limitation between 15.03.2020 and 14.03.2021. While doing so, it was made clear that the period of limitation would start from 15.03.2021.
3. Thereafter, due to a second surge in COVID-19 cases, the Supreme Court Advocates on Record Association (SCAORA) Page 4 of 19 Downloaded on : Sun Sep 17 21:40:05 IST 2023 NEUTRAL CITATION C/ARBI.P/13/2023 ORDER DATED: 10/02/2023 undefined intervened in the Suo Motu proceedings by filing Miscellaneous Application No. 665 of 2021 seeking restoration of the order dated 23.03.2020 relaxing limitation. The aforesaid Miscellaneous Application No.665 of 2021 was disposed of by this Court vide Order dated 23.09.2021, wherein this Court extended the period of limitation in all proceedings before the Courts/Tribunals including this Court w.e.f 15.03.2020 till 02.10.2021.
4. The present Miscellaneous Application has been filed by the Supreme Court Advocate-on-record Association in the context of the spread of the new variant of the COVID-19 and the drastic surge in the number of COVID cases across the country. Considering the prevailing conditions, the applicants are seeking the following:
i. allow the present application by restoring the order dated 23.03.2020 passed by this Hon'ble Court in Suo Motu Writ Petition (C) NO. 3 of 2020 ; and ii. allow the present application by restoring the order dated 27.04.2021 passed by this Hon'ble Court in M.A. no. 665 of 2021 in Suo Motu Writ Petition (C) NO. 3 of 2020; and iii. pass such other order or orders as this Hon'ble Court may deem fit and proper.
5. Taking into consideration the arguments advanced by learned counsel and the impact of the surge of the virus on public health and adversities faced by litigants in the Page 5 of 19 Downloaded on : Sun Sep 17 21:40:05 IST 2023 NEUTRAL CITATION C/ARBI.P/13/2023 ORDER DATED: 10/02/2023 undefined prevailing conditions, we deem it appropriate to dispose of the M.A. No. 21 of 2022 with the following directions:
I. The order dated 23.03.2020 is restored and in continuation of the subsequent orders dated 08.03.2021,
27.04.2021 and 23.09.2021, it is directed that the period from 15.03.2020 till 28.02.2022 shall stand excluded for the purposes of limitation as may be prescribed under any general or special laws in respect of all judicial or quasijudicial proceedings.
II. Consequently, the balance period of limitation remaining as on 03.10.2021, if any, shall become available with effect from 01.03.2022.
III. In cases where the limitation would have expired during the period between 15.03.2020 till 28.02.2022, notwithstanding the actual balance period of limitation remaining, all persons shall have a limitation period of 90 days from 01.03.2022. In the event the actual balance period of limitation remaining, with effect from 01.03.2022 is greater than 90 days, that longer period shall apply.
IV. It is further clarified that the period from 15.03.2020 till 28.02.2022 shall also stand excluded in computing the periods prescribed under Sections 23 (4) and 29A of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, Section 12A of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 and provisos (b) and (c) of Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 Page 6 of 19 Downloaded on : Sun Sep 17 21:40:05 IST 2023 NEUTRAL CITATION C/ARBI.P/13/2023 ORDER DATED: 10/02/2023 undefined and any other laws, which prescribe period(s) of limitation for instituting proceedings, outer limits (within which the court or tribunal can condone delay) and termination of proceedings.
6. As prayed for by learned Senior Counsel, M.A. No. 29 of 2022 is dismissed as withdrawn."
8. It was therefore submitted by learned advocates for both the sides that the Arbitrator has by e- mail dated 20.01.2023 informed that the period of limitation is required to be extended to pronounce the arbiral award as the hearing is already concluded.
9. Learned advocate Mr.Shah therefore prays for extension of mandate of arbiral proceedings for further two months from 28.02.2023.
10. Learned advocate Mr.Desai submitted that he has no objection if the time period is extended for further two months.
11. In response to the query raised by this Court, as to whether this application is to be heard by this Court having jurisdiction as per the roster or by the nominee of the Hon'ble the Chief Justice under Section 11(6) of the Page 7 of 19 Downloaded on : Sun Sep 17 21:40:05 IST 2023 NEUTRAL CITATION C/ARBI.P/13/2023 ORDER DATED: 10/02/2023 undefined Arbitration Act, learned advocate Mr.Shah submitted that this aspect is considered by the Hon'ble Chief Justice in the order dated 04.03.2022, referring to the order dated 14.09.2018 passed in Mis.c Civil Application (OJ) No.1 of 2018.
12. It was submitted that under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration Act, the nominee of the Hon'ble the Chief Justice is to pass an order for appointment of an arbitrator if the agreement between the parties fail and any of the parties file application for appointment of the arbitrator and in such circumstances when the arbitrator is appointed as per the order passed under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration Act, which has appointed such arbitrator, in such circumstance the application is required to be heard by the Court which has been conferred with the jurisdiction to hear Arbitration petitions under the roster.
13. In view of the above submissions, it is necessary to refer to Section 11(6) and Section 29A (4) and (5) which read as under:-
"11(6) Where, under an appointment procedure agreed upon by the parties,-- (a) a party fails to act as required under that procedure; or
(b) the parties, or the two appointed arbitrators, fail to reach an agreement Page 8 of 19 Downloaded on : Sun Sep 17 21:40:05 IST 2023 NEUTRAL CITATION C/ARBI.P/13/2023 ORDER DATED: 10/02/2023 undefined expected of them under that procedure; or
(c) a person, including an institution, fails to perform any function entrusted to him or it under that procedure, a party may request 1 [the Supreme Court or, as the case may be, the High Court or any person or institution designated by such Court]to take the necessary measure, unless the agreement on the appointment procedure provides other means for securing the appointment.
[(6A) The Supreme Court or, as the case may be, the High Court, while considering any application under sub-section (4) or sub- section (5) or sub-section (6), shall, notwithstanding any judgment, decree or order of any Court, confine to the examination of the existence of an arbitration agreement.
(6B) The designation of any person or institution by the Supreme Court or, as the case may be, the High Court, for the purposes of this section shall not be regarded as a delegation of judicial power by the Supreme Court or the High Court.] 29A (4) If the award is not made within the period specified in sub-section (1) or the extended period specified under sub-section (3), the mandate of the arbitrator(s) shall terminate unless the Court has, either prior to or after the expiry of the period so specified, extended the period: Provided that while extending the period under this sub-section, if the Court finds that the proceedings have been delayed for the reasons attributable to the arbitral tribunal, then, it may order reduction of fees of arbitrator(s) by not exceeding five per cent. for each month of such delay. 3 [Provided further that where an application under sub-section (5) is pending, the Page 9 of 19 Downloaded on : Sun Sep 17 21:40:05 IST 2023 NEUTRAL CITATION C/ARBI.P/13/2023 ORDER DATED: 10/02/2023 undefined mandate of the arbitrator shall continue till the disposal of the said application:
Provided also that the arbitrator shall be given an opportunity of being heard before the fees is reduced.] 29A (5) The extension of period referred to in sub-section (4) may be on the application of any of the parties and may be granted only for sufficient cause and on such terms and conditions as may be imposed by the Court."
14. On conjoint reading of Section 11(6) with Section 29A(4) of the Arbitration Act, it appears that the application for extension of time as provided under Section 29A (4) of the Arbitration Act is to be heard by the Court and as per the definition of the Court as provided under Section 2(1)(e) of the Arbitration Act, is considered in detail by this Court in the case of Nilesh Ramanbhai Patel Vs. Bhanubhai Ramanbhai Patel in Civil Misc. Application No.1 of 2018 as under:-
"8. As per this definition thus a Court in case of an arbitration other than international commercial arbitration is the Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction in a District and where the High Court exercises its ordinary original civil jurisdiction, would include the High Court also. If the reference is to an international commercial arbitration, the Court would mean the High Court, if it exercises ordinary original jurisdiction or the High Court having jurisdiction to hear appeals of Courts subordinate to that High Court. This definition in Section 2, however, like most other definition provisions starts with a caveat when it provides that in Page 10 of 19 Downloaded on : Sun Sep 17 21:40:05 IST 2023 NEUTRAL CITATION C/ARBI.P/13/2023 ORDER DATED: 10/02/2023 undefined this part unless the context otherwise requires. We may note that this definition was substituted by the Act 3 of 2016 with effect from 23.10.2015. The definition contained prior to such amendment did not contain two clauses as in the present case. Clause (i) in the present form was the full definition without presence of Clause (ii). Effectively so far as our case is concerned, this change in the definition is inconsequential.
9. Section 11 of the Act, as is well-known, pertains to appointment of arbitrators and makes detailed provision for appointment of arbitrators by the High Court or the Supreme Court. In terms of sub-sections (4), (5) or (6) of Section 11, the High Court would make an appointment in case of an arbitration other than international commercial arbitration. In case of international commercial arbitration such appointments would be made by the Supreme Court.
11. Perusal of this section would show that time limits have been introduced for completion of arbitral proceedings. Sub-section (1) of Section 29A provides that the award shall be made within a period of twelve months from the date the Arbitral Tribunal enters upon the reference. This expression "to have entered upon the reference" is also explained through the explanation below sub-section (1). Sub- section (2) is in the nature of incentive for completing the arbitral proceedings expeditiously. Sub-section (3) of Section 29A provides for extension of such period as specified in sub-section (1) by consent of the parties for a period not exceeding six months. Sub-section (4) of Section 29A provides that if the award is not made within the period specified in sub-section (1) or the extended period specified in sub-section (3), the arbitrator's mandate shall terminate, unless the Court has, either prior to or after expiry of the period, extended the Page 11 of 19 Downloaded on : Sun Sep 17 21:40:05 IST 2023 NEUTRAL CITATION C/ARBI.P/13/2023 ORDER DATED: 10/02/2023 undefined period. Sub-section (5) of Section 29A provides that the extension under sub-section (4) would be granted on an application of any of the parties only for sufficient cause and on such terms and conditions as may be imposed by the Court. Sub-section (6) of Section 29A which is of considerable importance, provides that while extending the period referred under sub-section (4), it would be open for the Court to substitute one or all of the arbitrators and if such substitution is made, the arbitral proceedings shall continue from the stage already reached and on the basis of evidence or material already collected. As per sub-section (7) the re- constituted Tribunal shall be deemed to be in continuation of the previously appointed arbitral Tribunal. Under sub-section (8) the Court is given power to impose actual or exemplary cost on any of the parties. This section makes detailed provisions providing time period for completion of arbitration,for extension of time such time, who can extend such time and under what circumstances and subject to what conditions the time may be extended. It also provides that if the award is not passed within the initial period or extended period, the mandate of the arbitrator would terminate. Section 29A of the Act is thus a complete Code by itself.
12. In case of State of West Bengal vs. Associated Contractors, reported in (2015) 1 SCC page-32, the Supreme Court interpreted the term 'Court' as defined under Section 2(1)(e) of the Act as to mean only the Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction in a District or High Court having civil jurisdiction in the State. No other Court, including the Supreme Court, is contemplated under Section 2(1)(e) of the Act. In case of State of Jharkhand and Ors. vs. Hindustan Construction Company Ltd., reported in (2018) 2 SCC page 602, this was further elaborated by a Constitutional Bench of the Supreme Court holding that the Page 12 of 19 Downloaded on : Sun Sep 17 21:40:05 IST 2023 NEUTRAL CITATION C/ARBI.P/13/2023 ORDER DATED: 10/02/2023 undefined definition of term 'Court' contained in Section 2(1)((e) of the Act was materially different from its predecessor section contained in Section 2(c) of the Arbitration Act, 1940 and that Supreme Court cannot be considered to be a Court within the meaning of Section 2(1)(a) even if it retains seisin over the arbitral proceedings. The decision in case of Associated Contractor was affirmed.
13. Ordinarily therefore I would have accepted the contention of learned advocate Shri Mehta that the term Court defined in Section 2(1)(e) in the context of the power to extend the mandate of the arbitrator under sub-section (4) of Section 29A would be with the principal Civil Court. However, this plain application of the definition of term Court to Section 29A of the Act poses certain challenges. In this context one may recall that the definition clause of sub- section (1) of Section 2 begins with the expression "in this part, unless the context otherwise requires". Despite the definition of term 'Court' contained in Section 2(1)(e) as explained by the Supreme Court in above noted judgments, if the context otherwise requires that the said term should be understood differently, so much joint in the play by the statute is not taken away.
14. As is well-known, the arbitration proceedings by appointment of an arbitrator can be triggered in number of ways. It could be an agreed arbitrator appointed by the parties outside the Court, it could be a case of reference to the arbitration by Civil Court in terms of agreement between the parties, it may even be the case of appointment of an arbitrator by the High Court or the Supreme Court in terms of sub-section (4), (5) and (6) of Section 11 Page 13 of 19 Downloaded on : Sun Sep 17 21:40:05 IST 2023 NEUTRAL CITATION C/ARBI.P/13/2023 ORDER DATED: 10/02/2023 undefined of the Act. The provisions of Section 29A and in particular sub-section (1) thereof would apply to arbitral proceedings of all kinds, without any distinction. Thus the mandate of an arbitrator irrespective of the nature of his appointment and the manner in which the arbitral Tribunal is constituted, would come to an end within twelve months from the date of Tribunal enters upon the reference, unless such period is extended by consent of the parties in term of sub-section (3) of Section 29A which could be for a period not exceeding six months. Sub-section (4) of Section 29A, as noted, specifically provides that, if the award is not made within such period, as mentioned in sub- section (1) or within the extended period, if so done, under sub-section (3) the mandate of the arbitrator shall terminate. This is however with the caveat that unless such period either before or after the expiry has been extended by the Court. In terms of sub-section (6) while doing so it would be open for the Court to substitute one or all the arbitrators who would carry on the proceedings from the stage they had reached previously.
15. This provision thus make a few things clear. Firstly,the power to extend the mandate of an arbitrator under sub-section (4) of Section 29A beyond the period of twelve months or such further period it may have been extended in terms of sub-section (3) of Section 29A rests with the Court. Neither the arbitrator nor parties even by joint consent can extend such period. The Court on the other hand has vast powers for extension of the period even after such period is over. While doing so the Court could also choose to substitute one or all of the arbitrators and this is where the definition of term Court contained in Section 2(1)(e) does not fit. It is inconceivable that the legislature would vest the Page 14 of 19 Downloaded on : Sun Sep 17 21:40:05 IST 2023 NEUTRAL CITATION C/ARBI.P/13/2023 ORDER DATED: 10/02/2023 undefined power in the Principal Civil Judge to substitute an arbitrator who may have been appointed by the High Court or Supreme Court. Even otherwise, it would be wholly impermissible since the powers for appointment of an arbitrator when the situation so arises, vest in the High Court or the Supreme Court as the case may be in terms of sub-section (4), (5) and (6) of Section 11 of the Act. If therefore there is a case for extension of the term of an arbitrator who has been appointed by the High Court or Supreme Court and if the contention of Shri Mehta that such an application would lie only before the Principal Civil Court is upheld, powers under sub-section (6) of Section 29A would be non-operatable. In such a situation sub-section (6) of Section 29A would be rendered otiose. The powers under sub-section (6) of Section 29A are of considerable significance. The powers for extending the mandate of an arbitrator are coupled with the power to substitute an arbitrator.
These powers of substitution of an
arbitrator are thus concomitant to
the principal powers for granting an
extension. If for valid reasons the Court
finds that it is a fit case for
extending the mandate of the arbitrator
but that by itself may not be sufficient to
bring about an early end to the arbitral
proceedings, the Court may also
consider substituting the existing
arbitrator. It would be wholly incumbent
to hold that under sub-section (6)
of Section 29A the legislature has vested
powers in the Civil Court to make
appointment of arbitrators by substituting
an arbitrator or the whole panel of
arbitrators appointed by the High Court
under Section 11 of the Act. If we
therefore accept this contention of
Shri Mehta, it would lead to
irreconcilable conflict between the
power of the superior Courts to
appoint arbitrators under section 11 of
the Act and those of the Civil Court to Page 15 of 19 Downloaded on : Sun Sep 17 21:40:05 IST 2023 NEUTRAL CITATION C/ARBI.P/13/2023 ORDER DATED: 10/02/2023 undefined substitute such arbitrators under Section 29A(6). This conflict can be avoided only by understanding the term court for the purpose of Section 29A as the Court which appointed the arbitrator in case of Court constituted arbitral Tribunal.
16. Very similar situation would arise in case of an international commercial arbitration, where the power to make an appointment of an arbitrator in terms of Section 11 vests exclusively with the Supreme Court. In terms of Section 2(1)(e) the Court in such a case would be the High Court either exercising original jurisdiction or appellate jurisdiction. Even in such a case if the High Court were to exercise power of substitution of an arbitrator, it would be transgressing its jurisdiction since the power to appoint an arbitrator in an international commercial arbitrator rests exclusively with the Supreme Court.
17. I am conscious that the learned Single Judge of Kerala High Court in case of M/s. URC Construction (Private) Ltd., vs. M/s. BEML Ltd., reported in 2017 SCC Online Ker 20520 has taken a different view. In context of sub-section (4) of Section 29A of the Act the learned Judge has concluded that the power would vest only with the Civil Court. In this judgment the complications which may arise if such a view is adopted in the context of the provisions of sub-section (6) of Section 29A have not been discussed. I am unable to pursue myself to adopt this view.
18. The rest of the decisions of the other High Courts cited before me do not directly touch this issue. In those judgments the High Courts were concerned with the provisions of Sections 14 and 15 of the Act pertaining to the challenge procedure in which context the question of appropriate Court Page 16 of 19 Downloaded on : Sun Sep 17 21:40:05 IST 2023 NEUTRAL CITATION C/ARBI.P/13/2023 ORDER DATED: 10/02/2023 undefined was examined. Shri Abhisek Mehta however had also cited the judgment of Supreme Court in case of Lalitkumar V. Sanghavi (D) Th.Lrs Neeta Lalit Kumar Sanghavi vs. Dharamdas V. Sanghavi, reported in (2014) 7 SCC 255, in which again the question considered by the Supreme Court was that which Court can examine the question whether the mandate of the arbitrator stood legally terminated or not. In this context reference was made to the definition of term Court under Section 2(1)(e) and it was held that it would be the Court of civil jurisdiction alone which can entertain such a question. Again the situation in the present case is vastly different."
15. In view of the above analysis of provisions of Section 11 read with Section 29A and in particular Sub-section (4), (5) and (6) of Section 11 of the Arbitration Act, it is clear that irrespective of the appointment and the manner in which the arbitral tribunal is constituted would come to an end within 12 months from the date of the Tribunal enters upon the reference or the pleadings are completed unless such period is extended by the consent of the parties in terms of Sub-section (3) of Section 29A of the Arbitration Act, which could be a period not exceeding six months. Sub- section (4) of Section 29A of the Arbitration Act provides that if the award is not made within such a period as mentioned in Sub-section (1) of Section 29A of the Arbitration Act or within the extended period, if so done under Sub-section (3) the mandate of the arbitrator Page 17 of 19 Downloaded on : Sun Sep 17 21:40:05 IST 2023 NEUTRAL CITATION C/ARBI.P/13/2023 ORDER DATED: 10/02/2023 undefined shall terminate. However as held by this Court the operation of provision of Section 29A (4) of the Arbitration Act is with a caveat that unless such period either before or after expiry has been extended by the Court in terms of Section 6 of Section 11 of the Arbitration Act, while doing so it would be open for the Court to substitute one or all the arbitrators who would carry on the proceedings before the stage they had reached previously. However, in the facts of the present case the arbitrator is not appointed under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration Act therefore the provision of SWub-section (4), (5) and (6) of Section 29A of the Arbitration Act has to be read being applicable to the cases where the arbitrator is not appointed under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration Act. In such circumstances this application is required to be heard by this Court having jurisdiction to hear Arbitration Petition under the Arbitration Act as per the roster.
16. In the facts of the case, as stated by both the learned advocates hearing of the Arbitration Proceeding is already over and now the award is awaited and for which extension of two months time is sought by both the sides on the request of the learned arbitrator as per the e-mail dated 20.01.2023.
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17. In such circumstance this application is allowed. Extension for time of two months is granted to complete the arbitral proceedings up to 20.04.2023.
(BHARGAV D. KARIA, J) URIL RANA Page 19 of 19 Downloaded on : Sun Sep 17 21:40:05 IST 2023