V. Vinod Rao And Others vs Government Of Andhra Pradesh, Revenue ... on 27 November, 1998

[Cites 15, Cited by 2]

Andhra HC (Pre-Telangana)

V. Vinod Rao And Others vs Government Of Andhra Pradesh, Revenue ... on 27 November, 1998

Equivalent citations: 1999(1)ALD147, 1999(1)ALT58

1. All these petitioners arc erstwhile part-time Village Officers. The post of part-time Village Officer was abolished by the Government of Andhra Pradesh by issuing an Ordinance, with effect from 6-1-1984. In pursuance of the said Ordinance No. 1 of 1984, about 37,000 posts of part-time Village Officers stood abolished. Challenging the said ordinance, the petitioners herein and several others filed a batch of Writ Petitions before this Court. At the time of hearing of those batch of writ petitions, the then learned Advocate-General produced an Assurance Letter dated 10-1-1984 issued by the Government giving an undertaking to appoint/absorb the eligible Village Officers in the Revalue Department as Village Assistants. Subsequently, the Government issued G.O. Ms. No.1048 dated 11-9-1985 creating 4,800 vacancies of Village Assistants for absorption of eligible Village Officers as Village Assistants.

2. While so, the Andhra Pradesh Public Service Commission (APPSC) conducted recruitment to the posts of Junior Assistants all over the State. Pursuant to Selections, attempts were made by the Government toappoint such of those candidates who were selected by the APPSC in the year 1982 as Village Assistants in the Revenue Department, though the posts of Village Assistants were created purely for the purpose of absorption of erstwhile Village Officers only.

3. On the basis of the undertaking letter dated 10-1-1984 produced by the then Advocate-General before this Court, those batch of Writ Petitions was disposed of. Some candidates, aggrieved by the judgment of this Court in the said batch of writ petitions, have preferred a Special Leave Petition before the Supreme Court. In the meantime, the Government of A.P., sought to fill up the posts of Junior Assistants in the Revenue Department with the candidates selected by the APPSC in the year 1982 and 2,300 candidates were also appointed. Aggrieved by the said appointments, petitioners and similarly placed persons moved the Supreme Court by filing WP No.13798 of 1994 and batch. Initially, the Supreme Court granted stay of all further proceedings by an order dated 29-8-1994. Pursuant to the stay granted by the Supreme Court, the rest of the vacancies were kept vacant from out of 4800 posts created for accommodating the erstwhile part-time Village Officers. The Supreme Court finally disposed of the SLPs by an order dated 27-3-1985, as a result of which, the petitioners and similarly placed persons were appointed in the Revenue Department as Village Assistants.

4. While making appointments to the posts of Village Assistants, it is stated by the Government that the Ad Hoc Rules issued in G.O. Ms. No,1056, dated 12-9-1985 are applicable to the services of Village Assistants. Under the said Rules, a District Selection Committee is constituted and in pursuance of the said Rules, the Government issued a notification calling for applications for the posts of Village Assistants. Questioning the same, WP Nos.12620 of 1985 and batch was filed on the ground that the erstwhile Village Officers cannot be subjected to fresh selection by the District Selection Committee and alsoon the ground of fixing the age limit. This Court disposed those writ petitions by an order dated 4-2-1986 holding that the Ad Hoc Rules have no application insofar as the requirement of estwhile Village Officers is concerned, however, upholding the age-limit prescribed in the said notification. The matter was again carried to the Supreme Court in SLP Nos.846 and 1804 of 1987. The Supreme Court disposed of the said SLPs by an order dated 8-5-1987 holding that the erstwhile Village Officers shall not be subjected to the selection and the age-limit prescribed by the Rules is also invalid having regard to the undertaking given by the Government.

5. Pursuant to the judgment of the Supreme Court dated 8-5-1987, the Government issued G.O. Ms. No.789, dated 18-8-1987 directing the respondents 1 to 6 herein to absorb the services of the petitioners in the posts of Village Assistants pursuant to which the petitioners and other similarly situated persons came to be appointed as Village Assistants. Pursuant to the appointment of the petitioners as Village Assistants, candidates who were appointed through APPSC in the year 1984 were treated as 'Supernumerary Junior Assistants'. Subsequently', on 5-11-1990, the Government issued Ordinance No.7 of 1990 through which the posts of Village Assistants were abolished with a condition that the Government should create supernumerary posts of Junior Assistants to accommodate all the Village Assistants whose posts were abolished, until they are absorbed in equivalent posts. In pursuance of the above said clause in Ordinance No.7 of 1990, the Government issued G.O. Ms.932, Revenue Department, dated 5-11-1990 creating supernumerary posts of Junior Assistants in the Revenue Department and further specifying that the Village Assistants (whose posts were abolished) shall continue in the newly created posts of Village Assistants and shall be directed to discharge the same duties which they were performing prior to the abolition, till the Village Assistants arc replaced by the Village AdministrativeOfficers (VAOs) to be appointed at that point of time. Thereafter, the matter has taken several twists and turns as the Government sought to bring about changes in the Service conditions of these erstwhile Village Officers, the actions of the Government were questioned before this Court as well as the Supreme Court by the erstwhile Village Officers.

6. While so, the third respondent herein has issued a Memo dated 19-8-1996 directing the concerned Chief Executive Officers and the Collectors to transfer the petitioners, who arc working in supernumerary posts of Junior Assistants in the Revenue Department, and absorb them in the Department of Panchayat Raj as Village Development Officers (VDOs) since the scale of pay in both the posts is the same. Challenging the said memo, unemployees hoping to get the posts of VDOs, filed OA Nos.6422 of 1996 and batch before the A.P. Administrative Tribunal. The A.P, Administrative Tribunal, while disposing of the said OAs, by an order dated 27-8-1997 held that the Government had no power to absorb these petitioners and others in the posts of VDOs in Panchayat Raj Department since the post of VDO has to be filled up by way of direct recruitment instead of transfer from other departments. However, contrary to the earlier GOs. through which the petitioners were absorbed in the Revenue Department, the fourth respondent herein issued G.O. Ms. No.267 dated 17-7-1998 creating an ad hoc Rule for the vacancies available in Subordinate Services and Last Grade Services, empowering the Government to transfer and absorb the surplus staff to various departments where there are vacancies available for absorption. In pursuance of the above said GO, a consequential Memo dated 17-8-1998 was also issued by the third respondent herein authorising the concerned authorities and CEOs to implement the orders issued and to appoint Supernumerary Junior Assistants (who are petitioners herein) by transferring and absorbing them in the posts of VDOs. Thisorder of the third respondent was challenged by an unemployee who is an aspirant for the post of VDO, before the A.P. Administrative Tribunal by filing OA No.6735 of 1998. The A.P. Administrative Tribunal suspended the said Memo dated 17-8-1998 by an order dated 24-9-1998 on the ground that the posts of Junior Assistants held by the petitioners and the posts of Village Development Officers Grade-II are not equivalent posts.

7. However, adding insult to injury, the second respondent herein issued G.O. Ms. No.402, Panchayat Raj & Rural Development (MDL.II) Department, dated 26-9-1998, merely reiterating the contents of G.O. Ms. No.267 dated 17-7-1998 and the consequential Memo dated 17-8-1998 which was suspended by the A.P. Administrative Tribunal on 24-9-1998. Except showing the vacancy position, the contents in G.O. Ms. No.267 and the consequential Memo dated 17-8-1998, are traced in G.O. Ms. No.402, dated 26-9-1998,

8. Pursuant to the issuance of G.O. Ms. No.402 dated 26-9-1998, the respondents are taking steps to issue consequential orders directing the concerned District Collectors including the sixth respondent herein to effect the transfer of the petitioners and others from the Revenue Department to Panchayat Raj Department.

9. At that stage, these petitioners moved the A.P. Administrative Tribunal by filing OA No.7776 of 1998 questioning the validity of G.O. Ms. No.402, dated 26-9-1998 on various grounds and the petitioners have also sought interim suspension of the said G.O. Ms. No.402 pending disposal of OA No.7776 of 1998. However, the A.P. Administrative Tribunal - 7th respondent heard that matter at length on 12-11-1998 and on 13-11-1998 and reserved for orders on 13-11-1998. Finally, order was passed on 16-11-1998 admitting the OA and granting notice to the respondents.

10. This action of the A. P. Administrative Tribunal-7th respondent in granting notices tothe respondents by its order dated 16-11-1998 and without passing any order either way on the interim prayer of suspending G.O. Ms. No.402 dated 26-9-1998 is questioned before this Court invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India.

11. Sri S. Ramachandra Rao, learned senior Counsel representing Sri L. Ravichander, Counsel for the petitioners submitted that pursuant to the abolition of Village Assistants posts in the year 1990, all these petitioners were appointed as Junior Assistants in the Revenue Department and their services were also regularised in that cadre in the year 1993. It is contended by the learned senior Counsel that when these petitioners, who were erstwhile Village Officers, were sought to be removed from the said posts pursuant to the Ordinance No.1 of 1984 with effect from 6-1-1984, several writ petitions were filed before this Court and before the Supreme Court and the entire controversy relating to the absorption of these petitioners and similarly placed persons, the modalities and the implications of their service conditions were settled by the decision of the Supreme Court in SLP Nos.846, 1804 of 1987 dated 8-5-1987. According to the learned senior Counsel, follow up action was also taken by. the Government through various GOs issued from time to time regarding the absorption of these petitioners as Junior Assistants in the Revenue Department. However, when efforts were made by the third respondent through memo dated 19-8-1996 to transfer the petitioners from Revenue Department to Panchayat Raj Department as VDOs, the said memo was challenged before the A.P. Administrative Tribunal by some unemployees who were aspirants of VDO Posts by way of OA Nos.6422 of 1996 and batch and the Tribunal allowed the said OA and batch holding that the Government has no power to absorb the petitioners in Panchayat Raj Department by transferring them from Revenue Department. Learned Counsel further submitted that yet another effort in this directionwas made by the fourth respondent by issuing G.O. Ms. No.267 dated 17-7-1998 creating ad hoc Rules for the vacancies available in Subordinate Services and Last Grade Services, empowering the Government to transfer and absorb the surplus staff to the various departments where there are vacancies available for absorption and pursuant to the said G.O., a consequential Memo dated 17-8-1998 was issued by the third respondent, which was challenged by an unemployee -aspirant of VDO post, before the A.P. Administrative Tribunal by filing OANo.6735 of 1998. The A.P. Administrative Tribunal by an order dated 24-9-1998 suspended the Memo dated 17-8-1998. Learned senior Counsel contended that despite the A.P. Administrative Tribunal passing the above orders thwarting the move of the Government in transferring the petitioners from Revenue Department to Panchayat Raj Department, the second respondent issued yet another G.O. Ms. No.402, dated 26-9-1998 through which the petitioners were sought to be transferred to Panchayat Raj Department though such contemplation is untenable and contrary to the earlier undertaking given by the Government in the form of Assurance Letter dated 10-1-1984 before this Court and also contrary to the above decisions of the A.P. Administrative Tribunal. Petitioners have questioned the said G.O. Ms. No.402, dated 26-9-1998 before the A.P. Administrative Tribunal by filing OA No.7776 of 1998 complaining that issuance of G.O. Ms. No.402, dated 26-9-1998 is contrary to the earlier decisions of the A.P. Administrative Tribunal and also against the letter of Assurance given by the Government before this Court on an earlier occasion, and as such G.O. Ms. No.402 cannot be sustained. The petitioners also sought suspension of the said G.O., pending a final decision in OA No.7776 of 1998. However, learned senior Counsel complains that the A.P. Administrative Tribunal-7th respondent, instead of passing an appropriate order on the request of interim suspension of the said G.O., has only admitted the said OA No.7776 of 1998 and directed notice to therespondents. This action of the Administrative Tribunal-7th respondent, according to the learned senior Counsel, is uncalled for as it tantamount to deriliction of duty since the Tribunal failed to exercise the jurisdiction vested in it. Learned Counsel farther complains that the refusal to pass an order on the interim relief sought in the OA by the Tribunal-7th respondent has resulted in grave injustice to the petitioners as the respondents are now taking steps to transfer these petitioners to Panchayat Raj Department, though such proposal is unsustainable. Learned senior Counsel further submitted that despite bringing to the notice of the Tribunal about the earlier orders passed by the very same Tribunal in OA Nos.6422 of 1996 and OA No.6735 of 1998, the Tribunal - 7th respondent has failed to pass an appropriate order but only ordered notice to the respondents.

12. Learned senior Counsel contends that this Court is vested with ample powers under Article 227 of the Constitution of India to correct the injustice caused to these petitioners as a result of the reluctance shown by the Tribunal in passing an order cither way on their prayer of interim suspension of G.O. Ms. No.402. Learned senior Counsel, therefore, pleads to declare the action of the A.P. Administrative Tribunal - 7th respondent in refusing to pass an interim order despite there being an urgency, as illegal, unjust and discriminatory, violative of fundamental rights guaranteed under Articles 14 and 16 and consequently direct the respondents to retain and continue the petitioners in the category of Supernumerary Junior Assistants by setting aside G.O. Ms. No.402, dated 26-9-1998 issued by the second respondent.

13. Learned Government Pleader for Panchayat Raj, appearing on behalf of respondents 1 to 6, on the contrary, justified the action of the A.P. Administrative Tribunal-7th respondent in directing notices to the respondents and contended that when only notice is directed to the respondents without passing any order by the Tribunal-7threspondent, this Court cannot entertain a writ petition under Articles 226 or 227 of Constitution of India and prayed for dismissal of this Writ Petition.

14. In the background of these submissions, we desired to examine whether this Court is competent to exercise powers against the above action of the A.P. Administrative Tribunal - 7th respondent, under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.

15. We, in our endeavour to get appropriate assistance on the powers of the High Court under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, sought the assistance from Sri G. Kaghuram, learned senior Counsel of this Court, in this regard and he readily agreed and assisted us as amicus-curiae in this matter.

16. On the question of the power ofhis Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, Sri S. Ramachandra Rao, learned senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners, lias taken us to the decisions of the Supreme Court reported in L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India, , Achutananda Baidya v. Prafulla Kumar Gayen, , Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab, (1994) 3 SCC 569, M/s. Jetha Bai and Sons, Jew Town, Cochin v. M/s Sunderdas Rathenai, , Dahya Lala and others v. Rasul Mahomed Abdul Rahim, and in Provincial Transport Services v. Slate Industrial Court, Nagpur, .

17. Sri G. Raghuram, learned amicus-curiae has also taken us to the above decisions, particularly, the decision of the Supreme Court in L. Chandra Kumar's case, cited (supra) and submitted that the High Court, under Article 227 of the Constitution of India has got the power of judicial superintendence over the decisions of all Courts and Tribunals within its territorial jurisdiction and it is a part of the basic structure of the Constitution of India.

18. In order to appreciate the submissions advanced before us by Sri S. Ramachandra Rao, learned senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners and Sri G. Raghuram, learned amicus-curiae that the High Court is vested with the power of judicial superintendence over the decisions of all Courts and Tribunals within its territorial jurisdiction, under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, we now proceed to examine the provisions contemplated under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, and the law laid down by the Supreme Court in this regard.

"Article 227 (1): Every High Court shall have superintendence over all Courts and Tribunals throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction."

19. A plain reading of the provisions under clause (1) of Article 227 of the Constitution of India makes it clear that every High Court has superintendence over all Courts and Tribunals throughout its territorial jurisdiction. It is also settled that the power of 'superintendence' conferred upon the High Court by Article 227 is not confined to administrative superintendence only but includes the power of judicial revision also even where no appeal or revision lies to the High Court (vide Banerjee v. P.R. Mukherjee) (1953) SCR 302).

20. The question as to the power of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India had fallen for consideration before the Supreme Court in L. Chandra Kumar's case (supra). In the said decision at para-81 the Supreme Court held thus:

"If the power under Article 32 of the Constitution, which has been described as the 'heart' and 'soul' of the Constitution, can be additionally conferred upon 'any other Court', there is no reason why the same situation cannot subsist in respect of the jurisdiction conferred upon the High Courts under Article 226 of theConstitution. So long as the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226/227 and that of this Court under Article 32 is retained, there is no reason why the power to test the validity of legislations against the provisions of the Constitution cannot be conferred upon Administrative Tribunals created under the Act or upon Tribunals created under Article 323-B of the Constitution.

At para 85 of the said decision ( supra), the Supreme Court also held thus:

"The High Courts enjoy extraordinary jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution enabling it to issue prerogative writs, such as, the one in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari."

At para 91 of the same decision, the Supreme Court further held thus:

"Having regard to both the afore-stated contentions, we hold that all decisions of Tribunals, whether created pursuant to Article 323-A or Article 323-B of the Constitution, will be subject to the High Court's writ jurisdiction under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution before a Division Bench of the High Court within whose territorial jurisdiction the particular Tribunal falls."

The Supreme Court went on to observe at para 99 as under:

"In view of the reasoning adopted by us, we hold that Clause 2(d) of Article 323-A and Clause 3(d) of Article 323-B to the extent they exclude the jurisdiction of the High Courts and the Supreme Court under Articles 226/227 and 32 of the Constitution, are unconstitutional. Section 28 of the Act and the 'exclusion of jurisdiction' clauses in all other legislations enacted under the aegis of Article 323-A and 323-B would, to the same extent, be unconstitutional. The jurisdiction conferred upon the High Courtsunder Articles 226/227 and upon the Supreme Court under Article 32 of the Constitution is part of the inviolable basic structure of the Constitution. While this jurisdiction cannot be ousted, other Courts and Tribunals may perform a supplemental role in discharging the powers conferred by Articles 226/227 and 32 of the Constitution."

In the decision cited (supra), the Supreme Court has observed thus:

"Under the scheme of the Constitution, a High Court is the highest Court for purposes of exercising civil, appellate, criminal or even constitutional jurisdiction so far that State is concerned. The jurisdiction possessed by it before coming into force of the Constitution was preserved by Article 225 and by Articles 226 and 227 an extraordinary jurisdiction was conferred on it to ensure that the subordinate authorities act not only in accordance with law but they also function within the framework of law. That jurisdiction of the High Court has not been taken away and in fact could not be taken away by legislation."

21. Thus, from the above conspectus, it is manifestly clear that the power vested in the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is part of the inviolable basic structure of the Constitution and the High Court is empowered to exercise judicial superintendence over the decisions of all Courts and Tribunals within its territorial jurisdiction.

22. The next question is under what circumstances the power under Article 227 of the Constitution of India Could be exercised by the High Court against the orders of the Tribunals or Courts interior to it?

23. The Supreme Court in the decision cited supra), has elaborately considered the above aspect and held as under:

"The power and duty of the High Court under Article 227 is essentially to ensurethat the Courts and tribunals, interior to High Court, have done what they were required tc do. The High Court can interfere under Article 227 in cases of erroneous assumption or acting beyond its jurisdiction refusal to exercise jurisdiction, error of law apparent on record as distinguished from a mere mistake of law, arbitrary or capricious exercise of authority or discretion, a patent error in procedure, arriving at a finding which is perverse or based on no material, or resulting in manifest injustice."

24. Admittedly, in this case, petitioners have complained to this Court that refusal of the A.P, Administrative Tribunal-7th respondent to grant suspension of G.O. Ms. No.402 dated 26-9-1998 pending a final decision in OA No.7776 of 1998 has caused great injustice to them as the respondents 1 to 6 are contemplating to transfer these petitioners from Revenue Department to Panchayat Raj Department though such proposals made by the Government earlier were disallowed by the very same Tribunal-7th respondent. As seen from the submissions made on behalf of the petitioners and on a scrutiny of the series of orders placed before us, it is obvious that the A.P. Administrative Tribunal-7th respondent has set aside the Government Memo dated 19-8-1996 in OA Nos.6422 of 1996 and batch by its order dated 27-8-1997 through which the Government made efforts to transfer the petitioners from Revenue Department to Panchayat Raj Department. When the Government made yet another attempt to create Ad Hoc Rules for the vacancies available in Subordinate Service empowering the Government to transfer and absorb the surplus staff by issuing G.O. Ms. No.267 dated 17-7-1998 and a consequential Memo dated 17-8-1998 issued by the third respondent to appoint the petitioners by transferring and absorbing them in the posts of VDOs, the A.P. Administrative Tribunal, in OA No.6735 of 1998 which is filed by an unemployee, suspended the said Government Memo dated 17-8-1998. However, undeterredby the decisions of the Tribunal, the Government made yet another attempt by issuing G.O. Ms. No.402, dated 26-9-1998 through which the petitioners were sought to be transferred to Panchayat Raj Department from Revenue Department. Aggrieved by the said Action of the Government, the petitioners have filed OA No.7776 of 1998 before the Administrative Tribunal-7th respondent by narrating the above events and complained to it that the issuance of G.O. Ms. No.402 by the Government is uncalled for. Petitioners have also sought interim suspensions of the said G.O. Ms. No.402. However, despite'being aware of the abovementioned earlier moves of the Government, the Tribunal-7th respondent has not passed any order on the prayer of interim relief but has only directed notices to the respondents, which according to the petitioners, has resulted in grave injustice to them.

25. On a notice being directed to the other side by any Court or Tribunal, before granting any relief, and such issuance of notice is challenged before' the High Court, normally, the High Court exercising powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India would not interfere, unless such issuance of notice by the Court or Tribunal is without jurisdiction.

26. In this case, what is complained to this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is the refusal of the Tribunal -7th respondent, to exercise the power conferred on it. As discussed, when a notice is directed to the opposite party by the Courts/Tribunals, High Court would normally refrain from entertaining a complaint against such issuance of notice by any Courts/Tribunals, but in certain circumstances, the High Court is bound to exercise its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution if in the opinion of the High Court, refusal to exercise their jurisdiction by Courts/Tribunals has resulted in grave injustice to the party. Since, these petitioners are sought to be transferred from Revenue Department to Panchayat Raj Departmentthrough G.O. Ms. No.402, dated 26-9-1998 failure on the part of the Administrative Tribunal-7th respondent to pass an order cither way on the interim relief to suspend G.O. Ms. No.402, has undoubtedly, resulted in manifest injustice to all these petitioners. We agree with the submission made by Sri S. Ramachandra Rao, learned senior Counsel in this regard. We are convinced, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, this is a fit case where the High Court could come to the aid of the petitioners by exercising the jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India against the action of the A.P. Administrative Tribunal-7th respondent.

27. Petitioners have not only sought a direction from this Court declaring the action of the A.P. Administrative Tribunal -7th respondent in refusing to pass an interim order as illegal, unjust but also sought a consequential direction to the respondents to retain and continue these petitioners in the same category of junior assistants by setting aside G.O. Ms. No.402, issued by the second respondent. The question would be whether this Court could examine the validity of G.O. Ms. No.402 issued by the second respondent and direct the respondents to retain and continue the petitioners as junior assistants in Revenue Department?

28. The Supreme Court in L. Chandra Kumar's case cited (supra) has held that the Tribunals would continue to act as the Courts of first instance in respect of the areas of law for which they have been constituted. By this, it meant that it will not be open for litigants to directly approach the High Court. Having regard to the law laid down by the Supreme Court, we do not think we can entertain the Writ Petition directly under Article 226 of the Constitution of India unless the petitioners are subjected to a decision from the Tribunal-7th respondent. Petitioners have rightly approached the Tribunal-7th respondent at the first instance by filing OA No.7776 of 1998 questioning G.O. Ms. No.402, dated26-9-1998 issued by the second respondent. Since the matter is pending before the Tribunal-7th respondent, we are of the view that it would be appropriate to direct the 7th respondent to dispose of the said OA No.7776 of 1998 within a reasonable time. Keeping in view the genesis of the litigation, we direct the A.P. Administrative Tribunal - 7th respondent to dispose of OA No.7776 of 1998 filed by these petitioners within a period of three months from receipt of a copy of this order. We further direct the 7th respondent to dispose of OA No.6735 of 1998, which has some nexus with the facts of this case, along with OA No.7776 of 1998 as directed above. Pending disposal of OA No.7776 of 1998 and OA No.6735 of 1998 as indicated above, we hereby suspend the operation of G.O. Ms. No.402, Panchayat Raj & Rural Development (MDL.II) Department, dated 26-9-1998 issued by the second respondent.

29. The Writ Petition is disposed of accordingly.

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