Gujarat High Court
Special Land Acquisition Officer, ... vs Punjabhai Narshibhai Patel And Etc. on 7 December, 1990
Equivalent citations: AIR1991GUJ161, (1991)1GLR482, AIR 1991 GUJARAT 161
JUDGMENT S.D. Dave, J.
1. This common judgment shall govern the disposal of these 10 appeals arising out of the awards pronounced by the Ld. Assistant Judge, Broach dated 2510-1978, awarding the additional compensation in 10 L.A.R. Cases on his file.
2. The following Table shows the First Appeal No., L.A. R. No., Survey No., and the area of the lands concerned (See table below)
3. The facts and circumstances under which the present appeals arise may be noticed thus:
4. The lands described in the above suit Table situated at Ankles war Town under the Ankles war Taluka of the Broach District came to be acquired for the public purpose, namely for the construction of the Southern Approach Road to the New Narmada Bridge near Zadeshwar.
5. So far as the land comprises in L.A.R. No. 161/77 at Sr. No. 1 is concerned, the necessary Notification under S. 4 of the Land Acquisition Act was published on 6-2-1975. The Notification under Section 6 of the Act was published on 11-2-78. So far as the lands pertaining to the L.A.R. No. 164/ 77, 165 / 77 (contd. on col. 2) and L.A.R. No. 166/77 are concerned, the Notification under Section 4 of the Act was published on 19-9-1973. The necessary Notification under Section 6 of the Act came to be published on 23-11-74. So far as the lands concerning the L.A.R. No. 167/77, 168/77 and L.A.R. No. 169/77 are concerned, the Notification under Section 4 of the Act was published on 19-9-73, while the Notification under Section 6 of the Act was published on 16-4-75. So far as the land concerning L.A.R. No. 170/77 is concerned, the Notification under Section 4 of the Act was published on 18-10-73, the Notification under Section 6 of the Act in respect of the above said land was published later on. The record does not show the date of the publication of the Notification under Section 6 of the Act, but that aspect of the matter is not in dispute-before us.
6. The Land Acquisition Officer 'had fixed the compensation at the rate of Rs. 80.00 per Are for the lands comprised in L.A.R. No. 162/77 to L.A.R. No. 166/77. So far as the lands concerning to L.A,R. No. 167/77 to L.A.R. No. 170/77 are concerned the rate of compensation accepted by the Land Acquisition Officer is of Rs. 180/- per Are. It is not in dispute that the lands, which have been acquired for the above said purpose, are the agricultural lands and they were used for the agricultural purposes at the time of the acquisition. As noticed above, the lands were acquired for the public purpose, namely for the purpose of construction of South Approach Road to new Narmada Bridge near Zadeshwar.
Sr. No. F.A. No. L.A.R. No. Survey Area of the Land H. A. Sq. M. 1 918/79 161/77 485 (O.T.) 0- 3-20
2. 919/79 162/77 250 (O.T.) 0--57-76
3. 920/79 163/77 247/1 (O.T.) 0-28-32
4. 921/79 164/77 255/1 (N.T.) 0- 3-36
5. 922/79 165/77 207 / 2 (N.T.) 0-59-20
6. 923/79 166/77 209 (O.T.) 210 (N.T.) 0-64-80
7. 924/79 167/77 490/1 (N.T.), 0-31 -98
8. 925/79 168/77 490 3 (N.T.) 0- 8-85
9. 926/79 169/77 487 (O.T.) 0- 1- 1
10. 927/79 170/77 490 2 (N.T.) 0-56-00
7. The landowners who were dissatisfied with the above said award made by the L.A. Officer had applied for making a reference to the Competent Court and, therefore, the matters were referred to the District Court at Broach. Ultimately the matters came up for hearing and decision before the Ld. Assistant Judge, Broach. On the appreciation of the evidence on record the Ld. Trial Judge has awarded the compensation at the rate of Rs. 325/- per Are for the acquired lands together with the solatium at the rate of 15% on the amount of awarded compensation. It appears that some of the above said lands were new tenure lands and therefore placing reliance upon the resolution issued by the Govt. of Gujarat in Revenue Dept. dated 174-78 the Ld. Trial Judge has ordered the deduction of 5% only of the additional compensation. The Ld. Trial Judge has also awarded the interest at the rate of 4.5% per annum on the additional compensation awarded by him. The above said rate of interest is available to the claimants from the date of taking over the possession till the date of payment or the depositing of the amount in his court, Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the above said consolidated award dated 25th October, 1978 that the present appeals have been preferred by the Special Land Acquisition Officer, Broach.
8. Mr. S. T. Mehta, the Ld. A.G.P has appeared on behalf of the appellant and 'Mr. M. C. Shah the L.A. for respondent in F.A.No. 923/ 79, while the respective respondents have been represented by the L.A. Mr. V. J. Desai.
9. The contention raised by the Ld. A.G.P. Mr. Mehta before us is that the Ld. Trial Judge has committed an error in coming to the conclusion that the compensation should be awarded at the rate of Rs. 325 / - per Are. Mr. Mehta has urged that the Ld. Trial Judge was not justified in placing reliance upon the sale instance, namely awards regarding similar lands exhibited at Exs. 10, 11 and 12. It is also the contention raised by Mr. Mehta that the resolution of the Govt. of Gujarat in Revenue Dept. dated 17-4-1978 does not come into play because the Land Acquisition Officer duly pronounced the awards before the specified date i.e. 29th March, 1978. Mr. Mehta therefore has urged that the Ld. Trial Judge was not justified in deducting the amount equal to 5% only but that he was required to make a deduction of an amount equal to 1/3rd of the additional awarded compensation. Mr. Mehta therefore has urged that the present appeals deserve to be allowed and the awards pronounced by the Ld. Trial Judge require to be modified accordingly.
10. But Mr. Desai, the Ld. Advocate who appears on behalf of the respondents in these appeals -has contended that the Ld. Trial Judge was perfectly justified in placing reliance upon the awards at Exs. 10, 11 and 12, because they provide comparable instances. Mr. Desai has urged that moreover one of the above said awards, namely the award evidenced by Ex. 12 ultimately came to be upheld and confirmed by this Court in First Appeal No. 981 of 1979, which came to be decided along with certain other similar matters by the Division Bench of this Court by the orders dated 10/ 11-7-1989. Mr. Desai therefore has urged that the Ld. Trial Judge, was perfectly justified in placing reliance upon the above said sale instances to come to a proper conclusion. In view of Mr. Desai, therefore the above said finding recorded by the Ld. Trial Judge does not deserve to be disturbed by us.
11. So far as the question of the deduction at the rate of 5%, as has been done by the Ld. Trial Judge is concerned, Mr. Desai has urged that the deduction is to be made according to the Govt. of Gujarat Resolution dated 17-4-1978. Mr. Desai has urged that though the Resolution says that it would be effective from 29th March 1978 it was applicable to the facts of the case before the Ld. Assistant Judge because he was also deciding the case regarding the compensation to be awarded to the claimants and that he was also pronouncing the "Award" under the Land Acquisition Act. Mr. Desai therefore has urged that the Ld. Trial Judge was perfectly justified in ordering the deduction at the rate of 5% only. He therefore has urged that the present appeals deserve to be dismissed with costs.
12. When the reference is made to the judgment and award pronounced by the Ld. Trial Judge, it becomes clear that he had placed reliance upon the awards at Exs. 10, 11 and 12. In those cases also the lands were acquired for the similar purpose namely for the purpose of the construction of the South Approach Road to the new Narmada Bridge, which was under construction at the relevant time. So far as the award at Ex. 10 is concerned, the Notification under Section 4 of the Act was issued on 4-5-73. After considering the evidence on record though the claimant had asked for the compensation at the rate of Rs. 375/- per Are the Court had awarded the compensation accepting the price of the land at the rate of Rs. 325/- per Guntha. In view of this position the Ld. Trial Judge had placed reliance upon the above said Award at Ex. 10. In the same way he has placed reliance upon another Award at Ex. 11. The cases covered under that Award also were concerning the similar lands and that Section 4 Notification was issued on 13-3-1973. In that case also the lands were acquired for a similar purpose, namely for the construction of the South Approach Road to the New Narmada Bridge. The market value of the lands in that case was accepted at the rate of Rs. 325/- per Guntha. The Ld. Trial Judge has also placed reliance on the Award at Ex. 12. In that case the Notification came to be published in the months of March and July 1973. It is indeed true that the lands in that case were acquired for a different purpose, namely for the purpose of the construction of GIDC Estate. But again the lands were situated in the sim of Ankleshwar. The Court had awarded the compensation after accepting the market price of Rs. 325/per Are.
13. The Ld. Trial Judge had placed reliance upon the Supreme Court decision in case of Raghubans Narain Singh v. Uttar Pradesh Government, though Collector of Bijnor, AIR 1967 SC 465. It has been laid down by the Supreme Court, in the above said case law, that the claimants can rely on the awards passed by the Competent Court in respect of similar lands under the Land Acquisition Act if the lands comprised in the said award are in the vicinity of the acquired lands and furnish a comparable instance. As noticed above the Awards at Exs. 10, 11 and 12 do provide comparable instances. The lands acquired under those cases were similar in nature to the lands acquired in the matters on hand. Moreover under two Awards the lands were acquired for the similar purpose, namely for the construction of the Southern side Approach Road to the new Narmada Bridge. We are conscious that in one case the lands were acquired for the purpose of construction of the GIDC Estate but it would not make much difference so far as the price of the similarly situated lands is concerned. In view of this position we feel that the Ld. Trial Judge was perfectly justified in placing reliance upon the above said three instances, namely the three Awards pronounced by the Competent Court while fixing the additional compensation payable to the claimants. Mr. Desai has been able to point out that the Award evidenced at Ex. 12 which speaks of the market value of the land at the rate of Rs. 325 / - per Are was the subject matter of an appeal before this Court in First Appeal No. 981 of 1978 and certain other cognate matters decided by this Court on 10-11-1989. In view of this position we had called for the judgment and the orders pronounced by this Court in First Appeal No. 981 of 1978 and other cognate matters. We have been satisfied that the Award at Ex. 12 was the subject matter before this Court in one of the above said appeals and that ultimately the above said finding of the competent Court fixing the market price of the land at the rate of Rs. 325/- per Are came to be upheld and confirmed by this Court. This is an additional circumstance, which would go to show that the Ld. Trial Judge was perfectly justified in placing reliance upon the Awards at Exs. 10, 11 and 12. Looking to this position it cannot be said that the Ld. Trial Judge has erred in fixing the market price of the acquired lands in the appeals on our hand. This deals with the first contention raised by Mr. Mehta the Ld. A.G.P. appearing on behalf of the appellant in this group of appeals.
14. The Ld. Trial Judge has ordered that the amount equivalent to 5% of the additional compensation shall be deducted from the amount of compensation available to the claimants in respect of the lands, which were of the new tenure lands. The above-mentioned table would show that the F. A. No. 921 / 79, 922/79, 923/79, 924/79, 925/79 and 926/79 relate to the New Tenure Lands. The Ld. Trial Judge while coming to the conclusion that an amount equivalent to 5% requires to be deducted from the additional compensation available to the claimants, had placed reliance upon the resolution of the Gujarat Govt. in Revenue Dept. dated 17th April, 1978, of which he was conscious
15. But Mr. Mehta the Ld. AGP appearing on behalf of the appellants has contended that the above said Govt. Resolution would not apply to the facts of the instant case. Mr. Mehta has urged that the above said Resolution dated l7th April, 1978 would come into play or in operation only after the specified date, namely 29th March, 1978. It is also the contention raised by Mr. Mehta that the Award by the Land Acquisition Officer came to be pronounced before the above said date namely 29th March, 1978, and therefore this Resolution would not be applicable to the facts of the present appeals and that, therefore the Ld. Trial Judge ought to have deducted the amount equivalent to 1/3rd of the additional compensation.
16. With a view to appreciate the above said contention raised by the Ld. AGP, Mr. Mehta, the reference requires to be firstly made to the Govt. Resolution dated 17th April, 1978. The paragraphs, which would be material for our consideration and appreciation, would be the paragraphs Nos. 6 and 7. The above paragraphs run thus:
"Para 6: Government after due consideration is now pleased to direct that out of the compensation awarded for the new tenure lands which are acquired for a public purpose under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 the share of the Government to be deducted under the provisions of Section 11-A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, shall be reduced to 5% (five percent) of the total amount of compensation payable to such persons. Remaining amount of 95% (ninety five percent) shall be paid to the interested persons instead of the 2/ 3rd amount paid at present. This order will be effective from 29th March 1978.
Para 7: Government is further pleased to direct that the new tenure land holders who have been paid earlier only 66 2/3% based on part award should be compensated by making further payment exgratia of 28 1/3%,,provided that the holders of other new tenure lands covered under the same acquisition are to be paid when the remaining part awards are declared on or after 29-3-78 at the rate of 95% in view of the Government orders in the preceding paragraph."
17. Therefore, upon a plain reading of the above said two paragraphs, it becomes clear that the orders as contained in the above said resolution would be effective from the specified date namely 29th March 1978. The question, which requires to be considered by us, is as to when the above said resolution says that it is effective with effect from 29th March, 1978 only whether the Ld. Trial Judge only could have deducted an amount equivalent to 5%.
18. Paragraph 6 of the above said resolution says that the deduction shall be reduced to 5% of the total amount of compensation payable to the claimants, instead of the deduction of 1/3 of the awarded compensation. But it appears that Section 6 says very clearly that this resolution adopted by the Govt. of Gujarat is to be taken into consideration while deciding the question regarding the deduction "from out of the compensation awarded". Now it is clear that the compensation is awarded not only under Section 11A of the Land Acquisition Act but when the District Court adjudicates the dispute regarding the additional compensation under Section 23 of the Act, then also the Court is deciding and awarding the compensation to the claimants. In view of this position it appears very clearly that the revised policy of the Govt. contained in the above said resolution dated 17th April 1978, can be considered even at the time of the passing of the award under Section 23 of the Act also. In other words when the District Court is deciding the question regarding the adequate compensation to be awarded to the claimants under Section 23 of the Act, the above said resolution requires to be taken into consideration if the Court decides the question of the compensation to be awarded to the claimants, after 29th March, 1978. In our view therefore the Ld. Trial Judge was perfectly justified in not ordering the deduction at the rate of 113 amount but at the rate of 5% only of the additional compensation in view of the above said resolution dated 17th April 1978. We say so, because the compensation is being awarded no -doubt by the Special Land Acquisition Officer, but it is also again awarded after hearing the parties and after appreciating the evidence by the District Court while deciding the reference cases under Section 23 of the Act. In view of this position, it appears very clear that the Ld. Trial Judge was perfectly justified in placing reliance upon the above said resolution dated 17th April 1978.
19. Mr. Desai has invited our attention to a Division Bench decision of this High Court in Hamidkhan Samsherkhan v. Special Land Acquisition Officer, Broach, 22 Guj LR 812: (AIR 1982 Gujarat 157). In this decision also the question was regarding the interpretation of Section 11-A or Section 28 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. While considering this provision the Division Bench of this Court had taken the view that the amount of compensation as mentioned-in Section 11-A of the Land Acquisition Act will cover not only the amount of compensation awarded for the acquired lands under Section 33(l) but also 15% solarium as granted under S. 23(2) of the Act, which would form part and parcel of the amount of compensation awarded for the acquisition of the land. Taking the above said view this Court has held that the amount required to be deducted can be deducted not only from the compensation awarded by the Land Acquisition Officer but also from the amount awarded by the Court. It therefore, becomes clear that the word 'Award' would not be limited to the Award to be pronounced by the Land Acquisition Officer but also from the solatium award or the Court. It therefore becomes clear that the word 'Award' would not be limited to an Award to be pronounced by the Land Acquisition Officer but it would also include the Award to be passed by the Court at a later juncture. This decision therefore rendered by the Division Bench of this Court would go to support the view, which we are taking while deciding these appeals.
20. Mr. Mehta, the Ld. AGP has placed reliance upon the Privy Council decision in T. B. Ramchandra Rao v. A. N. S. Ramchandra Rao, AIR 1922 PC 80. In this decision it has been laid down by the Privy Council that when once the Award as to the amount becomes final, all questions as to fixing up of the compensation come to an end and the duty of the Collector, in case of the dispute, as to the relative rights of the persons entitled to the money is to place the money under the control of the Court. Moreover at page-83 it has also been stated by the Privy Council that the Award as constituted by the Statute is nothing but an Award, which states the area of the land, the compensation to be allowed and the apportionment among the persons, interested in the land when there is no dispute. It is also stated in the above said Privy Council decision that from the moment when the sum has been deposited in Court under Section 31(2) of the Act the function of the Award ceased and that all that is left is a dispute between interested people as to the. extent of their compensation.
21. Placing reliance upon the above said observations appearing at page-83, Mr. Mehta, Ld. AGP has urged before us that in the instant cases also when the Awards came to be pronounced by the Land Acquisition Officer the "function of making the award" was over. But it requires to be appreciated that the above said observations of the Privy Council are based upon the special facts and circumstances available and limited to that case. It appears that certain lands were acquired and later on the amount was deposited in the Court. But there was a dispute between the parties regarding the "character and extent" of their rights in the compensation which was awarded under the Act. It is therefore that a reference was made to the court and in view of this position the Privy Council has reached the conclusion that as soon as the process of Award making was over by the Collector it can be said that the work or the duty of pronouncing the Award was over and all that was left, was to decide the dispute between the interested parties regarding the extent and character of their interest in the amount of compensation. But in the instant case the Ld. Trial Judge was not deciding the question regarding the character and extent of the rights of the claimants. On the contrary the Ld. Trial Judge was adjudicating upon the very question regarding the just and appropriate compensation to be awarded to the claimants. In view of this position, though the Land Acquisition Officer initially pronounced the Awards, the function of "making the award" cannot be said to be over. On the contrary in our view the Ld.Trial Judge was invested with the authority and jurisdiction to enquire in to the question is to whether the claimants are entitled to the compensation at an enhanced rate. In our view, therefore, when the Ld. Trial Judge was deciding the above said question, which goes to the very root of the matter, it cannot be said that he was not discharging the function of "making an Award under the Land Acquisition Act. In our opinion the Ld. Trial Judge being a Judicial Institution was discharging the function of making the Award after following a judicial procedure, allowing the parties to adduce evidence both oral the documentary in support of their respective contentions. It therefore becomes clear that only because the Awards came to be pronounced by the Land Acquisition Officer it cannot be said that the process of "making the Award" was over. The function, which was being performed by the Ld. Trial Judge, also was a part & parcel of making the Award. One has also to bear in mind that if the process of "Award making" were to be over only on the pronouncement of the Award under Section 11 of the Act, there would not have been the statutory mechanism of making "Reference to Court" under Section 18 of the Act. One more aspect in respect of the mechanism of the Act, which should not escape the judicial mind and conscience, is the fact that more of the Act makes the award of the Collector final and conclusive evidence between the Collection and the claimants only. A claimant who does not accept the Award of or by the Collector has got an absolutely vested right of reference under S. 18 of the Act, where the Collector does not "decide" anything but merely refers" the work of determining the compensation to a judicial min i.e. a Civil Court, which can have dismiss the reference in default of the claimants presence or his or her non-appearance but has to decide it on merits and according to Law.
22. Incidentally it also requires to be appreciated that if the Award of the Collector was to be the "only Award" under the Act nothing prevented the Legislative from attaching finality to the Award by the Collector. Section- 28 of the Act confers a right of re-determination of the amount of compensation on the basis of the Award of the Court. A person interested in the acquired land is thus entitled to move the Collect orate for reconsideration and re-determination of the compensation awarded to him by the Collector on the ground that, though for the reasons best known to him, he had not carried the matter to the District Court by way of a reference, in some other refers for the similar lands acquired for the same Public Purpose under the same Notification the District Court has awarded higher compensation. Thus the very scheme of the Act and the mechanism provided to ensure that a person who loses his land by way of Compulsory Acquisition under a Statute gets not only adequate and just compensation but also gets an effective remedy for a safeguarding his interest would further go to indicate without any manner of doubt that the Award pronounced by the Court rests on a higher pedestal than the Award passed by the Collector or the "Land Acquisition Officer". In this view of the matter also it requires to be recognised that "the Award making process" can never be said to be over as soon as the Award is made by the Collector or the Land Acquisition Officer but continues up to that stage also when the Court determines the correct market price of the land and the exact amount of additional compensation available to the claimant. In fact the Award by the Collector or the Land Acquisition Officer can be said to be a package offer only which only "offers" the compensation intended to be paid by the Court, the choice to accept the same or not always resting on the option of the claimant.
23. Moreover, as noticed above, looking to the above said Gujarat High Court decision 22 Guj LR 812: (AIR 1982 Guj 157) it is clear that the word "compensation" does not signify only that compensation which is awarded by the Land Acquisition Officer, but the compensation to be awarded by the Court by way of additional compensation and the solatium at the rate of 15% payable to the respective claimants would also be a part & parcel of the Award. In view of this also we are not in a position to subscribe to the view sought to be canvassed by the Ld. AGP Mr. Mehta that as soon as the Award came to be pronounced by the Special Land Acquisition Officer the process of making the award comes to an end. On the contrary as noticed above we are of the opinion that the process of making the Award continues up to that juncture also when the District Court makes the award under Section 23 of the Act. Looking to this view, which we are taking it, appears that the Ld. Trial Judge was perfectly justified in placing reliance upon the above said resolution dated 17th April, 1978.
24. Mr. Mehta, the Ld. AGP has invited our attention to the Division Bench decision of this Court in First Appeal No. 981 of 1978 and certain other cognate matters decided on 10-11-1989. While deciding this group of appeals the Division Bench of this Court has taken a contrary view by holding that the above said resolution comes into play only on or after 29th March, 1979 and that if the Land Acquisition Officer has pronounced the Award before the above said date then the resolution would not apply. With great respects, we find ourselves unable to agree with the above said Division Bench decision of this Court. Looking to the above said decision rendered by the Division Bench of this Court we can also say that the contentions which have been raised by Mr. Desai before us were not raised before the above said Division Bench of this Court. It was not urged before the Division Bench of this Court hearing the above said appeals that the work of "Award making" is also continued up to that juncture on which the District Court pronounces the Award after hearing the parties. In view of the fact that the above said contentions were not raised before the Division Bench of this Court and in view of the fact, that said contentions have been urged before us and looking to the further fact that these contentions do appeal to us, we are in respectful disagreement with the above said Division Bench decision of this Court in First Appeal No. 981 of 1978 and other cognate matters decided on 10-11-1989.
25. One more aspect, which requires to be pertinently noticed, is that now we have got a Supreme Court decision before us after the decision of the above referred Division Bench decision of this Court. The Five Judges Bench of the Supreme Court in Union of India v. Raghubir Singh (dead) by LRs. etc., in AIR 1989, SC 1933, has taken a similar view and has extended the meaning of the word "Award". The question before the Supreme Court was as to whether the increased rate of solatium would be available to the claimants in whose case the Award by the Court were pronounced between 30th April 1982 to 24th September 1984. The words "any such award" was required to be interpreted by the Supreme Court and the intention in utilising those words was required to be ascertained. The Supreme Court has extended the meaning of the term "any such award" to the Award passed by the Civil Court also. This position becomes clear from the following observation of the Supreme Court appearing at page 1947:
"The words "any such award" are intended to have deeper significance, and in the context in which those words appear in S. 30(2) it is clear that they are intended to refer to awards made by the Collector of Court between 30 April, 1982 and 24 September, 1984. In other words S. 30(2) of the Amendment Act extends the benefits of the enhanced, solatium to cases where the award by the Collector or by the Court is made between 30 April, 1982 and, 24 September, 1984 or to appeals against such awards decided by the High Court and the Supreme Court are rendered before 24 September, 1984 or after that date. All that is material is that the award by the Collector or by the Court should have been made between 30 April, 1982 and 24 September, 1984."
(Emphasis is ours)
26. Therefore looking to the above said observations of the Supreme Court it becomes clear that the amendment was also made applicable to those cases in which the award of the Civil Court came to be passed between the above said two dates. It therefore becomes clear that the words "any such award" would take in their sweep the Award passed by the Civil Court also. Needless it is to say that we are also taking the same view when we say that the Award would mean not only the Award passed by the Special Land Acquisition Officer but it would also mean the Award by the Principal Civil Court. The above said Supreme Court decision clarifies the entire situation and therefore also we are required to take a different view than that has been taken by the Division Bench of this Court in the above-referred group of matters.
27. The conclusion therefore would be that the contention raised by the Ld. A.G.P. Mr. Mehta on the second limb of the argument also cannot be accepted, and as such therefore the Appeals would fail and the Awards made by the Ld, Trial Judge shall have to be upheld and confirmed. We accordingly hereby dismiss the Appeals. Anyhow there shall be no order as to costs regard being had to the facts and circumstances of the present appeals.
28. Appeals dismissed.