Patna High Court
Maheshwar Prasad Sharma vs Shobha Dvei on 6 January, 1998
Equivalent citations: 1998(1)BLJR704
JUDGMENT Sachchidanand Jha, J.
1. This revision by the defendant under Section 14(8) of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent & Eviction) Control Act, 1982 (in short 'the Act') arises from an order of eviction passed by the Munsif Sadar (East), Muzaffarpur, in Title (Eviction) Suit No. 9 of 1985.
2. The opposite party and her mother Deo Sarani Devi (original plaintiff No. 1, since dead) filed the aforementioned suit for eviction of the petitioner from the suit premises situate at Diwan Road. Kalyani Bara, in the town of Muzaffarpur, on the ground of personal necessity. According to the plaintiff, the suit premises originally belonged to Rash Bihari Lal, who died in the year 1965 leaving behind two widows Saraswati Devi, since dead, and Deosarani Devi, and one daughter Shobha Devi, plaintiff No. 2, opposite party herein, born from Deosarani Devi. After his death, the entire property including the suit premises devolved on the two widows and the said daughter. On 14.12.70 Saraswati Devi executed a registered deed of gift transferring her half share in the properties in favour of Deosarani Devi. The two plaintiffs, thus, became the absolute owner of the properties including the suit premises. Saraswati Devi later died in the year 1978. The petitioner, in the meantime, had been inducted as tenant in the suit premises on monthly rental of Rs. 60 in the year 1963. He paid rent to Smt. Saraswati Devi as she was the seniormost member of the family, and continued to do so upto November. 1977, whereafter he stopped paying rent. It may be stated here itself that the plaintiff filed a separate suit for eviction on the ground of defaulter being Title (Eviction) Suit No. 11 of 1985, which is still pending.
The opposite party filed Partition Suit No. 83 of 1977 as she experienced difficulty in managing the properties, against Saraswati Devi and Deosarani Devi as defendant Nos. 1 and 2. Later, one Suresh Bihari claiming to be the adopted son of late Ras Bihari Lal intervened in the suit and he was added as defendant No. 3. The suit was decreed on 25.1.83. It may be stated here itself that againsi the judgment and decree passed in the Partition Suit Suresh Bihari filed First Appeal No. 168 of 1983. One Tara Devi, said to be the sister's daughter of late Ras Bihari Lal and Shobha Devi i.e. plaintiff of the Partition Suit and the opposite party herein, also preferred appeals being First Appeal Nos. 216 of 1983 and 234 of 1983. The dispute in those two appeals appear to relate to the question of share to Tara Devi with which we are not concerned in this case. It may also be mentioned here that First Appeal Nos. 168 of 1983 and 216 of 1983 were dismissed in default for non-compliance of some peremptory orders for restoration of which M.J.C. No. 437 of 1990 and 451 of 1990 were filed and are said to be pending.
During pendency of the aforesaid partition suit the defendant-petitioner taking advantage of his relationship with Suresh Bihari, got a sale deed with respect to the suit premises executed by him in favour of his relative, one Umeshwar Prasad Thakur. It may be mentioned here that the petitioner is an advocate by profession practicing in Muzaffarpur Civil Courts, while Suresh Bihari is a Karpardaz (Advocate's clerk) by profession practising in the same Court. The petitioner admittedly was the Counsel for Suresh Bihari in the partition suit.
According to the plaintiff, the portion of the house at Kalyani in which she lives with her husband and six children consisting of only two rooms and small verandah is too small to fulfil her requirement. The house is also very old and in a dilapidated condition which requires reconstruction. In the circumstances, she requested the defendant to vacate the suit premises which went unheeded. The defendant ultimately refused to vacate. The plaintiff accordingly, filed the suit.
3. On receipt of summons the petitioner appeared on 11.5.85 and filed affidavit seeking leave to contest the suit, as required under Section 14 of the Act, which was granted. The petitioner, thereafter, filed written statement. According to the petitioner, apart from the ornamental objection as to defect of party, maintainability of the suit etc. neither Deosarani Devi nor Shobha Devi had any right or interest in the suit premises and the suit for eviction, therefore, was not maintainable at their instance. He stated that Ras Bihari Lal had only one wife, namely, Saraswati Devi from whom he had no issue. Deosarani Devi was never his wife. She was, in fact, his maid-servant, who later lived with him as his concubine. Shobha Devi was born to Deosarani Devi from another person. Therefore, neither of them has any vestige of title with respect to the premises. The petitioner further pleaded that Ras Bihari Lal, who had no issue of his own, had adopted Suresh Bihari as his son, who after his death became the owner of the entire property. Saraswati Devi never executed any deed of gift in favour of Deosarani Devi and the deed dated 14.12.70 is forged and fabricated and the same was never acted upon. According to the petitioner, the suit premises was originally let out by Saraswati Devi to one Fateh Bahadar Rai. After Fateh Bahadur Rat vacated the premises, Sarswati Devi inducted him as tenant at monthly rental of Rs, 60/-. He paid rent al! along to Sarswati Devi until her death in May, 1978. After her death, the petitioner started paying rent to Suresh Bihari. The petitioner at times paid the rental in advance for the purpose of payment of municipal tax etc. He had also spent money on construction of septic latrine, repairs of the premises, white washing etc. After sale of the half portion of the house to Umeshwar Prasad Thakur the petitioner started paying rent half and half to Suresh Bihari and Umeshwar Prasad Thakur. During the pendency of the suit, the petitioner himself purchased the half portion, which had been sold to Umeshwar Prasad Thakur from him and, thus, became the owner of the half portion of the house. He continued to pay rent for the other half portion to Suresh Bihari. (It may be mentioned here that this part of the defendant's case regarding purchase from Umeshwar Prasad Thakur was sought to be incorporated by amendment in the written statement. The order allowing amendment was, however, initially stayed by this Court in C.R. No. 1857 of 1995 on 19.1.96 and ultimately set aside on 2.1.97). In these premises, the defendant-petitioner contended that there was ho relationship of landlord and tenant between the plaintiff and himself and, accordingly, prayed for dismissal of the suit.
4. The parties led evidence-oral as well as documentary in support of their respective case. The Court below by the impugned judgment and order has decreed the suit and directed the petitioner to vacate the premises within period of 60 days of the order.
5. Mr. Shashi Shekhar Dwivedi, learned Counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the Court below has decided the case on a wrong assumption of fact that the judgment and decree in Partition Suit No. 83 of 1977 has attained finality by reason of the dismissal of First Appeal Nos. 168 of 1983 and 216 of 1983. The fact of the matter is that applications for restoration, vide M.J.C. Nos. 437/90 and 451/90, are pending. He submitted that there are good chances of the appeals being restored. Therefore, the judgment and decree of the trial Court in the Partition Suit cannot be said to be finals Secondly, the plaintiff's requirement of the suit premises, in the facts and circumstances of the case, cannot be said reasonable and bona fide, therefore, the Court below committed error in decreeing the suit. Counsel also assailed the finding on the point of partial eviction.
5-A. It will first take up the first point. It may well be, as contended by Mr. Dwivedi, that if the applications for restoration of F.A. No. 168 of 1983 and F.A. No. 216 of 1983 are ultimately allowed, the appeals would stand restored and, therefore, in that sense, the judgment and decree in the partition suit cannot be said to be final for the present. However, it is well settled that in a suit for eviction the Court is not required to decide the title of the plaintiff in a full-fledged manner. The Court is rather required to see weather there is relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties or not. It is for that purpose that the Court is required to see whether the plaintiff is the owner of the premises, whether the defendant is the tenant and whether he is liable to pay rent to the plaintiff: The defendant may admit both that he is tenant and that he is liable to pay rent to the plaintiff, that is, admit the relationship of landlord and tenant and yet contend that no ground for eviction is made out. He may also while admitting his status as tenant, challenge the ownership of the plaintiff and contend that he is tenant of some other person, that is, deny the relationship of landlord and tenant. He may also claim independent title in himself. Where complicated question of title arises, the Court may ask the plaintiff to seek relief in a properly constituted suit or may covert the suit into a regular title suit, decide the question as to title on payment of proper Court fee and, in or appropriate case, grant the plaintiff the decree of eviction on the basis of title under Order VII, Rule 7 of the Civil Procedure Code.
6. In the present case the petitioner admits that he was inducted as tenant in the suit building and also paid rent to Saraswati Devi. According to him, the house belonged to Sarswati Devi after the death of Ras Bihari Lal and he paid rent all along until her death in May, 1978 and, thereafter, to Suresh Bihari, as the owner of the building being the adopted son of Ras Bihari Lal, and later, after Suresh Bihari sold half portion of it to Umeshwar Prasad Thakur, to both of them half and half (until he purchased the half portion from Umeshwar Prasad Thakur).
7. The petitioner having thus admitted that he was inducted as tenant and paid rent either to Sarswati Devi or Suresh Bihari and Umeshwar Prasad Thakur, the point for consideration is whether he was/is tenant of Sarswati Devi alone or also of two original plaintiffs, or Suresh Bihari/Umeshwar Pd. Thakur after the death of Sarswati Devi. (The petitioner no doubt claims to have purchased the half portion from Umeshwar Pd. Thakur during pendency of the suit but by reason of the order of this Court in C.R. No. 1857 of 1995 (supra) the same cannot be treated as part of his case). It is significant to mention here that sale deed executed by Suresh Bihari in favour of Umeshwar Pd. Thakur was also during pendency of the suit, on 7.8.78 vide certified copy of the document, marked 'X' for identification at the instance of the plaintiff.
8. The claim of Suresh Bihari as adopted son of Ras Bihari Lal stands rejected in Partition Suit No. 83 of 1977. It may be stated here that the petitioner had been impleaded as proforma defendant (defendant No. 7) in the said partition suit. Later his name alongwith the names of other proforma defendants (defendant Nos. 4 to 15) was expunged on 18.7.82 as "these defendants did not claim any interest in the suit properties" vide the judgment dated 25.1.83 passed in the partition suit, Exhibit 2. The Court below in paragraph 31 of the impugned judgment has quoted the issues framed in the partition suit and the findings thereon vide Exhibit 2 as follows:
(5) Whether the plaintiff is the daughter of Ras Bihari Lal from his legally wedded wife, defendant No. 2?
(8) Whether Suresh Bihari, defendant No. 3 is the adopted son of Ras Bihari Lal Sah?
(10) Whether the gift deed dated 14.12.78 executed by Saraswati Devi in favour of Deosarani Devi and Sobha Devi is legal, valid and operative and whether that affects the alleged share of defendant No. 16?
XX XX XX XX In face of these documentary evidences, it no longer stands to reason that Deosarani Devi was maid servant of Ras Bihari Lal. I, therefore, accept the case of the plaintiff on this point, because it is backed by oral and strong documentary evidence. I, therefore, hold that Deosarani Devi was the married wife of Ras Bihari Lal.
xx xx xx xx It is clear from this discussion that the case of defendant No. 3 that marriage of Deosarani Devi took place in the year 1958 is only afterthought and plaintiff's case on the point is nearer to truth. I, therefore, accept the same.
XX XX XX XX In view of my above findings, I answer issue No. 5 in favour of the plaintiff.
xx xx xx xx Defendant No 3 has no doubt shown by adducing cogent evidence that he was brought up, educated and married as son in the family of Ras Bihari Lal, but he was not succeeded in proving that he was actually adopted as son by Ras Bihari Lal. Because he has not adduced any evidence to show that he was physically transferred from one family to another. I, therefore, answer Issue No. 8 in the negative.
xx xx xx xx In view of the above discussions I hold that Ext. A-1 is an operative document.
Even if the argument of the Counsel for the petitioner is accepted that because of the pendency of MJC Nos. 437/90 and 451/90 these findings are not to he treated as final, there is no difficulty in accepting them, at least, as prima facie finding sufficient for the purpose of an eviction suit. The petitioner cannot he allowed to raise any question of title on behalf of Suresh Bihari. It is significant to mention here that neither Suresh Bihari nor Umeshwar Pd. Thakur was examined as witness, nor the sale deed said to have been executed by Suresh Bihari in favour of Umeshwar Pd. Thakur has been brought on record.
9. The term 'landlord' has been defined under Section 2(f) of the Act to include "the person who for the time being is receiving or is entitled to receive the rent of a building whether on his own account or on behalf of another, or on account or on behalf of for the benefit of himself and others or as an agent, trustee, executor, administrator, lessor, guardian or who would so receive the same or be entitled to receive the rent if the building were let to a tenant." Thus, where the defendant admits his status as tenant of the building and the plaintiff succeeds in establishing his case as the owner of the building entitled to receive rent, relationship of landlord and tenant between them would be established. In the present case, the claim of Suresh Bihari as the adopted son of Ras Bihari Lal and, therefore, owner of the building and the landlord having been rejected, the petitioner would be deemed to be the tenant of the plaintiff-opposite party.
10. So far as the plaintiffs are concerned as mentioned above, they claim ownership by inheritance being the widow and daughter of Ras Bihari Lal whose ownership is not disputed. Apart from the oral evidence the plaintiff has brought on record as Exhibit-1 the registered deed of gift dated 14.12.70 executed by Saraswati Devi in favour of original plaintiff No. 1 Deosarani Devi and original plaintiff No. 2 Shobha Devi, opposite party herein, describing Deosarani Devi in no uncertain words as the second wife of Ras Bihari Lal and her gotni (co-widow) entitled to half share in the property, and further describing Shobha Devi as the daughter of Deosarani Devi. If Deosarani had been a concubine of Ras Bihari Lal as alleged by the petitioner, Saraswati would not have described her as the wife nor admitted her entitlement to the extent of half share, nor possibly would have given her own half share to her in gift. The petitioner does not dispute the right, title and interest of Saraswati Devi. In fact, according to him, Suresh Bihari became owner of the property only after her death in May, 1978. Exhibit 1 has been duly proved by P.W. 4 Kedar Prasad, the attesting witness, and P.W. 9 Baleshwar Prasad, an Assistant of the Registry Office (he in fact proved Ext. 4; however Ext. 1 and Ext. 4 are the same). The plaintiff has also brought on record the certified copy of the R.S. Khatian (Ext. 5), notices issued by the Municipal Corporation (Ext. 6 series), certified copies of voter list (Ext. 10 Series) and Municipal Assessment Roll (Ext. 12), etc. in support of her claim. It is worth mentioning that as against the documents produced by the plaintiff, no document having bearing on questions of right, title and interest in the premises, not even the alleged sale deed executed by Suresh Bihari in favour of Umeshwar Prasad Thakur, has been brought on record by the petitioner. In the above premises, I would agree with the Court below that the plaintiff has succeeded in proving her case of being owner of the premises, entitled to receive rent from the petitioner and, therefore, 'landlord' within the meaning of Section 2(f) of the Act.
11. Although I have mentioned more than once that the case of the petitioner sought to be incorporated by way of amendment to the effect that he purchased the half portion of the premises from Umeshwar Prasad Thakur is not to be treated as part of his case, in view of the fact that the order allowing amendment was initially stayed by this Court and finally set aside in C.R. No. 1857/95, I would observed that the petitioner being the alleged transferee pendent elite, with the categorical rejection of the claim of Suresh Bihari, his predecessor-in-interest, he cannot have any semblance of right, title and interest in the premises except those of a tenant.
12. In view of the above discussions, the finding of the Court below on the point of the landlord and tenant relationship is upheld.
13. Coming to the question of reasonable and bona fide requirement of the premises, the plaintiff's case is that she resides in the parental house at Kalyani and not in her 'sasural' because only one room was allotted to her husband's share there. In the Kalyani house also she is in occupation of only two rooms and a verandah on the first floor, which is quite inadequate for the requirement. It is said that the rest of it is either let out on rent or unfit for dwelling. Being dilapidated they are unsafe. They are also unhygienic. The plaintiff has six children. The eldest one is 19 years old. Some of them are school going. They need separate space. The husband also lives in the same house. When guests come, they cannot be properly received and the plaintiff feels embarassed. According to the defendant, on the other hand, the plaintiff lives in her Sasural at Saraiyaganj one of the quarters of Muzaffarpur town. Even in Kalyani house, as many as seven rooms are in her possession/The physical condition of that house is good and the plaintiff can comfortably live there. Besides the Kalyani house (and the suit house at Diwan Road), the plaintiff has another house at Kedarnath Road in Muzaffarpur town. Thus, the plaintiff does not have any reasonably or bona fide requirement of the suit house.
14. On the point of bona fide requirement the plaintiff has examined, besides herself as P.W. 1, 'Anil Kumar P.W. 2, Jai Prakash Gupta P.W. 3. and Om Prakash Gupta P.W. 5. Out of them, Om Prakash is the husband while Anil Kumar and Jai Prakash Gupta are independent witnesses. The defendant, on the other hand, has examined, besides himself as D.W. 1, Sitaram Singh D.W. 4, Md. Salim D.W. 6 and Radheshyam D.W. S, in this regard. The witnesses have supported the respective case of the parties.
15. From the oral evidence adduced by the parties it appears that there is dispute regarding the number of rooms in the Kalyani house in actual occupation of the plaintiff and the general condition of that house and whether she resides in her Sasural house at Saraiyaganj or parental house at Kalyani. However, there is no dispute that portions of that house are in occupation of tenants. There is also no dispute that the entire Kedar Nath Road house consisting of shops are let out on rent. It is the specific case of the plaintiff that house rent is the only source of income to her. She said so in her evidence which was not challenged in cross-examination. In view of the uncontroverted case of the plaintiff that shops comprising the house at Kedarnath Road are in occupation of the tenants, that is, they are not vacant, and that rental income is her only income, the fact that she is the owner of that house is of no significance. Similarly, the fact that there are several rooms/portions of the Kalyani house is also of little consequence. The material point for consideration is as to where she actually resides and how many rooms of Kalyani house she is in actual occupation of and whether the vacant rooms/portions are fit for human dwelling. Even the plaintiff admits that some rooms both on the ground floor and the first floor of the Kalyani house are vacant but they are so damaged and dilapidated that it is unsafe to live in those rooms and repairs would not make them habitable. Reconstruction is the only way out.
16. As regards the controversy as to whether the plaintiff resides in her 'sasural' or in the Kalyani house, the witnesses examined on behalf of the plaintiff and defendant had supported their respective case. Their evidence being in the nature of oath versus oath I do not want to scrutinise the same. However, the plaintiff's case that she resides in the Kalyani house also finds support from the documentary evidence. The deed of gift Ext. 1, municipal notices Ext. 2 series, voter list Ext. 10 series, all describe the plaintiff as resident of Kalyani house.
The point which then has to be considered is as to whether the plaintiff is in occupation of only two rooms on the first floor of the Kalyani house or seven rooms as alleged by the defendant. Secondly, whether the condition of the house is such which requires reconstruction and cannot be made habitable by repairs. From the summary of the evidence referred to in the impugned judgment it appears that there is positive evidence regarding dilapidated condition of the house. There is evidence suggesting that rooms both on the ground floor and on the first floor are lying vacant which is indicative of the fact that the rooms in question are in such a condition in which dwelling is not possible. Counsel for the plaintiff submitted that in course of his cross-examination, in reply to a question, the defendant stated that if those portions of the Kalyani house are offered to him, he would not accept the same. It appears that he took that stand because he claimed ownership of the suit house and, therefore, there was no need for him to take the Kalyani house on rent. The submission of the Counsel for the plaintiff however, was that the aforesaid reply gives an idea as the condition of the house.
The defendant's case that there are nine rooms on the first floor cannot be accepted. If the house has five shops in the front portion of the ground floor and two rooms on the rear side, it is difficult to believe that there would be nine rooms. The case pleaded by the plaintiff that there are only five rooms in first floor appears to be more probable. In view of the positive evidence that two rooms on the first floor are lying vacant ever since the tenants vacated the same and another room is in occupation of a tenant, I am inclined to accept the plaintiff's case that she Is in occupation of only two rooms.
17. The fact that the plaintiff has six children is not disputed. Since some of the children are grown up (eldest of them being 19 years old) and they are prosecuting their studies, it is quite natural that they would require separate space for living and studies. Two rooms obviously cannot satisfy the plaintiff's need. It is true that the plaintiff has another house on Kedarnath Road and there are other rooms in the Kalyani house as well, besides the suit house, which belong to her. However, as indicated above, all of them are let out on rent. The house rent being the only source of her income, it would not he reasonable to expect the plaintiff to ask the concerned tenantsvto vacate the rented promises to enable her to reside therein. That may reduce her income and affect her livelihood. On the other hand, the defendant admittedly has not been paying any rent to her since May, 1978 itself. If in this situation she wants the defendant to vacate the house and not other tenants against whom she has no complaint, it cannot be said that the claim for eviction lacks in bona fide. Besides, the house on Kedarnath Road and the ground floor of the house at Kalyani, it appears, comprise of shops. On the other hand, the suit house is admittedly being used for residential purpose and, therefore, is better suited for plaintiff's need.
18. Counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on M.M. Quasim v. Manoharlal Sharma , in support of the contention that the landlord has no unfettered right to choose the premises. In that case there was evidence to show that the plaintiff had got a decree for eviction- with respect to another house in the same town. The Supreme Court accordingly opined that while examining the case of personal requirement where it is pointed out that there is some vacant premises which the landlord can conveniently occupy, there cannot be an element of need. In that connection it was observed that" it would be a bald statement unsupported by the Rent Act to say that the landlord has an unfettered right to choose whatever premises he wants. Reliance was also placed on Ambika Sharma v. Sahr-e-Alam 1996 (1) PLJR 247. In that case also there was evidence to show that the plaintiffs had got many vacant shops and their main business was to let out shops. This Court, in the circumstances, following the decision in M.M. Quasim's case (supra) set aside the order of eviction and remitted the case to the trial Court for fresh decision. In the present case, undisputedly the entire Kedarnath Road house and portions of the Kalyani house have been let out to tenants and no portion thereof is vacant. The ratio of the abovesaid decisions, therefore, has no application in the present case.
19. In Smt. Prativa v. T.V. Krishnan JT 1987 (1) SC 764. the Supreme Court observed:
The landlord is the best judge of his residential requirement. He has complete freedom in the matter. It is no concern of the Courts to dictate to the landlord how and in what manner he should live or to prescribe for him the residential standard of their own. There is no law which deprives the landlord of the beneficial enjoyment of his property.
The above observations were recently quoted with approval in Meenal Ekna Kshirsagar v. Tradqrs and Agencies . Earlier, a Full Bench decision of this Court in Gulab Chand Prasad v. Bindhwanti 1985 PLJR 622 : 1985 BLJ 573, had made similar observations:
Once the bona fide requirement or need has been established, it is not for the Court to probe further and try to weigh and balance it according to its own preconceived motion or through its own peculiar social philosophy.
The above decision of this Court was upheld by the Supreme Court vide 1987 PLJR 23 (SC).
20. In the circumstances of the case, in my opinion, the plaintiff-opposite party has succeeded in proving her reasonable and bona fide requirement of the premises and the finding of the Court below in this regard also is upheld.
21. As regards the question of partial eviction, which was the last limb of the argument of the Counsel for the petitioner, from the impugned judgment it does not appear that the petitioner had agreed to partial eviction. The proviso appended to Section 11(1)(c) containing the clause regarding partial eviction runs as follows:
Provided that where the Court thinks that reasonable requirement of such occupation may be substantially satisfied by evicting the tenant from a part only of the building and allowing the tenant to continue occupation of the rest and the tenant agrees to such occupation the Court shall pass such orders accordingly....
In view of the judicial pronouncements on the point, it is the duty of the Court to consider the question of partial eviction. But in view of the express language of the statute, part eviction can be allowed only "if the tenant agrees to such occupation". From the judgment it does not appear that the petitioner had expressed any such readiness and willingness to occupy portion of the house as tenant in the event the Court accepts the plaintiff's case as to reasonable and bona fide requirement to be true and, further, is of the opinion that the said requirement can be substantially satisfied by part eviction. However, the Court has gone into that aspect of the matter and held that part eviction is not possible. It appears from the evidence on record that suit premises consists of five interconnected rooms, situate in a row. If a person enters into one room he can go into the adjacent room. In such a situation it is obvious that it would not be proper to compel the two families to live together. Where the tenancy is for residential purpose and the landlord also wants to reside in the same house, the Court should consider the desirability and feasibility of the two families living together in the same house. I do not think, in the facts of the case, that part eviction is a workable proposition. The submission made by the Counsel for the petitioner in this regard is also rejected.
22. Before I conclude I must observe that the Court below has made a very detailed and exhaustive examination of the cases of the parties in coming to its conclusion. The Court has gone into different aspects of the case. In terms of proviso of Section 14(8) of the Act under which this revision has been filed this Court has to see if the order of eviction is "According to law". The scope of the revisional power under Section 14(8) of the Act although not as narrow as Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, is not wide enough to convert this Court into a Court of appeal. The Court below having recorded findings of fact on proper scrutiny of the evidence there is little scope for interference.
23. In the result, I do' not find any merit in this civil revision which is accordingly dismissed but without any order as to costs.