Delhi District Court
2- Railway Main Service (Rms) vs Estate Officer on 20 October, 2012
IN THE COURT OF MS. SUNITA GUPTA,
DISTRICT & SESSIONS JUDGE : DELHI
1- PPA No.23/2011
Unique ID No. 02401C0393072011
1- Union of India,
Through Secretary,
Ministry of Communication & IT,
Department of Posts,
Sanchar Bhawan, New Delhi.
2- Railway Main Service (RMS)
3/16-A, Saraswati Insurance Building,
Asif Ali Road, New Delhi-110 002.
Through Sr. Superintendent. ................ Appellants
Versus
1- Estate Officer,
Life Insurance Corporation of India,
Northern Zone, Jeevan Prakash Bldg.,
2nd Floor (Mezzanine),
25, Kasturba Gandhi Marg,
New Delhi.
2- Life Insurance Corporation of India,
having its Northern Zonal Office at
Jeevan Bharti Building,
Tower-II, 124, Connaught Circus,
New Delhi-110 001. ......... Respondents
2- PPA No.24/2011
Unique ID No. 02401C0393972011
1- Union of India,
Through Secretary,
Ministry of Communication & IT,
Department of Posts,
(PPA Nos.23/24/25/26 of 2011 (Page 1 of 19)
Sanchar Bhawan, New Delhi.
2- Railway Main Service (RMS)
3/16-A, Saraswati Insurance Building,
Asif Ali Road, New Delhi-110 002.
Through Sr. Superintendent. ................ Appellants
Versus
1- Estate Officer,
Life Insurance Corporation of India,
Northern Zone, Jeevan Prakash Bldg.,
2nd Floor (Mezzanine),
25, Kasturba Gandhi Marg,
New Delhi.
2- Life Insurance Corporation of India,
having its Northern Zonal Office at
Jeevan Bharti Building,
Tower-II, 124, Connaught Circus,
New Delhi-110 001. ......... Respondents
3- PPA No.25/2011
Unique ID No. 02401C0394002011
1- Union of India,
Through Secretary,
Ministry of Communication & IT,
Department of Posts,
Sanchar Bhawan, New Delhi.
2- Railway Main Service (RMS)
3/16-A, Saraswati Insurance Building,
Asif Ali Road, New Delhi-110 002.
Through Sr. Superintendent. ................ Appellants
Versus
1- Estate Officer,
Life Insurance Corporation of India,
(PPA Nos.23/24/25/26 of 2011 (Page 2 of 19)
Northern Zone, Jeevan Prakash Bldg.,
2nd Floor (Mezzanine),
25, Kasturba Gandhi Marg,
New Delhi.
2- Life Insurance Corporation of India,
having its Northern Zonal Office at
Jeevan Bharti Building,
Tower-II, 124, Connaught Circus,
New Delhi-110 001. ......... Respondents
4- PPA No.26/2011
Unique ID No. 02401C0394012011
1- Union of India,
Through Secretary,
Ministry of Communication & IT,
Department of Posts,
Sanchar Bhawan, New Delhi.
2- Railway Main Service (RMS)
3/16-A, Saraswati Insurance Building,
Asif Ali Road, New Delhi-110 002.
Through Sr. Superintendent. ................ Appellants
Versus
1- Estate Officer,
Life Insurance Corporation of India,
Northern Zone, Jeevan Prakash Bldg.,
2nd Floor (Mezzanine),
25, Kasturba Gandhi Marg,
New Delhi.
2- Life Insurance Corporation of India,
having its Northern Zonal Office at
Jeevan Bharti Building,
Tower-II, 124, Connaught Circus,
New Delhi-110 001. ......... Respondents
(PPA Nos.23/24/25/26 of 2011 (Page 3 of 19)
Date of Institution of all the four appeals: 27.08.2011
Date of Arguments: 10.10.2012
Date of judgment : 20.10.2012
JUDGMENT:
Vide this common judgment, I proceed to dispose of above numbered four appeals preferred by the appellant under Section 9 of the Public Premises Act ( hereinafter referred to as "the PP Act) as common questions are involved in these appeals and even the subject matter i.e. Public Premises is almost the same and parties are also the same.
2. Brief facts of the case leading to the filing of these appeals are as follows. Respondent i.e. Life Insurance Corporation of India (hereinafter referred to as the LIC) rented out to the Appellant i.e. Union of India (hereinafter referred to as the UOI), Ministry of Communication, on lease premises measuring 4294 sq. ft. situated at 2nd, 3rd and half (½) of 4th floor of 3/16A, Saraswati Insurance Building, Asaf Ali Road, New Delhi and 805 sq. ft. situated at half (½) of 4 th floor of 3/16A, Saraswati Insurance Building, Asaf Ali Road, New Delhi. The premises were let out since 25.09.1954 and rent in respect of the premises in question is Rs.255.31 paise per month excluding electricity and water charges. Lastly lease deed dated 08.08.1969 with tenancy commencing w.e.f. 01.04.1969 for a period of one year was executed between the (PPA Nos.23/24/25/26 of 2011 (Page 4 of 19) petitioner Corporation and respondent No.1. After the expiry of lease on 31.03.1970, no fresh lease deed was ever executed between the parties. Respondent Corporation sent a notice dated 30.09.2006 terminating the tenancy w.e.f. midnight of 31.10.2006. Thereafter a notice dated 27.01.2010 under sub section (1) and clause (b)(ii) of sub section (2) of Section 4 of the PP Act was also sent by the Estate Officer informing the appellant that they are unauthorized occupant of public premises mentioned in Schedule. Reply to the show-cause notice under Section 4 & 7 of the PP Act was submitted by the appellant on the ground that proceedings initiated under the PP Act are not maintainable against them. Thereafter, proceedings under the PP Act were initiated against the Appellant and vide impugned order dated 03.08.2011, it was held that the LIC is entitled to an eviction order against the respondent and also for an order of recovery of damages.
3. Feeling aggrieved by the impugned order, four separate appeals have been preferred by the appellant - two against order of eviction passed under Section 5 of the PP Act and two separate appeals have been preferred against order passed under Section 7 of the PP Act, in respect of aforesaid two premises.
4. Notice of the appeals was given to the respondents and record of the learned Estate Officer has been summoned.
(PPA Nos.23/24/25/26 of 2011 (Page 5 of 19)
5. I have heard Shri B.K. Berara,Advocate for the Appellant, Shri M.L. Mahajan, Advocate for the Respondents and have gone through the records carefully.
6. The basic submission of learned Counsel for the appellant is that proceedings initiated under the PP Act are not maintainable against the appellant, as scheme of the PP Act is to enable Govt./Statutory Authority to evict persons in unauthorised occupation of the premises and such "person" is necessarily to be "person" other than Govt./Statutory authority. It was submitted that in this context the definition of "Public Premises" as contained in Section 2(e) is to be understood. The premises would either belong to or taken on lease by the Government. The occupant of such premises who has now become unauthorised occupant should be a person other than Government/Statutory Authority. Reference was made to the definition of "Government" as defined in Section 3(23) of the General Clauses Act and "person" as defined in General Clauses Act. Reliance was also placed on M/s Jaswant Sugar Mills Ltd.Vs. UOI and another AIR 1966 Punjab 229 and Samatha A Rural Development Society Vs. State of A.P., 1995(2) ALT 223, for submitting that "Government" is quite different from "person". The word "person" would not include the Government. Relying on these authorities, it was submitted that since Government does not come under the definition of (PPA Nos.23/24/25/26 of 2011 (Page 6 of 19) "person", as such, provisions of PP Act are not applicable.
7. It was next submitted that the appellants are in possession of the premises by virtue of lease agreement which was executed between the parties from time to time. Since 1970 no lease agreement was executed. However, terms of lease agreement clearly stipulates that Govt. of India may renew the lease agreement without any interference and disturbance of respondents. Therefore, it is only the Government of India who is entitled to renew the lease agreement by giving prior notice of three months to the Lessor in writing. Learned Estate Officer erred in coming to conclusion that after expiry of lease, its terms would not apply. If the appellant continued as month to month tenancy, all other terms are deemed to be continued. No notice under Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure was sent to the appellant. The alleged notice of 15 days to vacate premises under Section 106 of the T.P. Act is clearly an afterthought.
8. It was further submitted that Shri R.K. Premi had no power to delegate authority to another person to appear on behalf of the LIC. Learned Estate Officer erred in relying upon his testimony.
9. Furthermore, since this was a dispute between two departments/bodies of the Government, therefore as held by (PPA Nos.23/24/25/26 of 2011 (Page 7 of 19) Hon'ble Apex Court in Chief Conservator of Forest case, 2003(3) SCC 472, the departments must act in coordination and not in confrontation. He also referred to the pronouncement of Hon'ble Apex Court in Oil & Natural Gas Commission Vs. CCE, 1995 Supp.(4) SCC 541, for submitting that in case of any dispute between the Govt. departments, matter should be referred to High Powered Committee established by the Government pursuant to the order of the Hon'ble Supreme Court dated 11-9-1991 . As such, it was submitted that order passed by Estate Officer is liable to be quashed.
10. Rebutting the submissions of learned Counsel for appellant, it was submitted by ld. Counsel for the respondent that appellant was a tenant by virtue of lease which stands expired. Thereafter, appellant became tenant on month to month basis. Tenancy was terminated by serving a notice whereby appellant was called upon to hand over vacant possession of suit premises. Thereafter they became unauthorised occupants. Reference was made to Section 2(e) of PP Act, for submitting that premises taken on lease by Govt. is also a public premises. It was submitted that authorities relied upon by learned Counsel for the appellant does not help him, inasmuch as none of these authorities is directly under the PP Act. On the other hand, reliance was placed on AIR 1992 P.&H. 248 M/s Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd and another Vs. UOI and others, for submitting that substantially (PPA Nos.23/24/25/26 of 2011 (Page 8 of 19) similar pleas were taken and the same were repelled by Hon'ble High Court and it was held that provisions of PP Act are applicable even in case Govt. is in unauthorised occupation of the public premises. It was submitted that each and every contention of the appellant was dealt with in detail by Estate Officer and the impugned order does not suffer from any infirmity. As such, there is no merit in the appeal. Same is liable to be dismissed.
11. I have given my considerable thoughts to the respective submissions of ld. counsel for parties and have carefully perused the record.
12. Before proceedings with the submissions of learned Counsel for the parties, it will be apt to notice the relevant provisions of the Act. Section 2(e) defines 'public premises' thus-
'Public Premises' means-
(1) any premises belonging to, or taken on lease or requisitioned by, or on behalf of, the Central Government, and includes any such premises which have been placed by that Government whether before or after the commencement of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Amendment Act, 1980, under the control of the Secretariat of either House of Parliament for providing residential accommodation of any member of the staff of that Secretariat;
(2) any premises belonging to, or taken on lease by, or on behalf of,-
(PPA Nos.23/24/25/26 of 2011 (Page 9 of 19)
(i) any company as defined in Section 4 of the Companies Act, 1956(1 of 1956) , in which not less than fifty-one per cent of the paid-up share capital is held by the Central Government or any company which is a subsidiary (within the meaning of that Act) of the first mentioned company,
(ii) any corporation (not being a company as defined in S.3 of the Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956) , or a local authority ) established by or under a Central Act and owned or controlled by the Central Government,
(iii) any University established or incorporated by any Central Act,
(iv) any Institute incorporated by the Institutes of Technology Act, 1961 (59 of 1961),
(v) any Board of Trustees constituted under the Major Port Trusts Act, 1963 (38 of 1963),
(vi) the Bhakra Management Board constituted under Section 79 of the Punjab Reorganisation Act, 1966 (31 of 1966), and that Board as and when renamed as the Bhakra-Beas Management Board under Sub-Section (6) of Section 80 of that Act; and (1) in relation to the Union territory of Delhi,-
(i) any premises belonging to the Municipal Corporation of Delhi, or any municipal committee or notified area committee, and
(ii) any premises belonging to the Delhi Development Authority, whether such premises are in the possession of, or leased out by, the said Authority,"
Section 2(g) defines 'unauthorised occupation'. It reads as under:-
"Section 2(g)-"unauthorised occupation", in relation to any public premises , means the occupation by any person of the public premises without authority for such occupation , and includes the continuance in occupation by any person of the public premises (PPA Nos.23/24/25/26 of 2011 (Page 10 of 19) after the authority (whether by way of grant or any other mode of transfer) under which he was allowed to occupy the premises has expired or has been determined for any reason whatsoever."
13. In the instant case, it is undisputed case of the parties that premises belongs to the LIC/respondent. Same has been taken on lease by the appellant. As such, premises falls squarely within the provisions of Section 2(e) of PP Act. Further, the occupation of the public premises "by any person" becomes unauthorised when it is "without authority for such occupation"
or when "the authority under which he was allowed to occupy the premises has expired or has been determined for any reason whatsoever.
14. It is the submissions of learned Counsel for the appellant that occupation of the appellant can not be termed as unauthorised, because it is not a person and also because the provision of the Act cannot be interpreted in a manner so as to make them applicable against a government department. The submission is without force inasmuch as the Act was promulgated to provide for the eviction of unauthorised occupants from public premises and other incidental matters. Any premises which belong to or are taken on lease by a Company in which not less than fifty-one per cent of the paid-up share capital is held by the Central Government fall within the expression "Public Premises". The unauthorised occupant as (PPA Nos.23/24/25/26 of 2011 (Page 11 of 19) defined in Section 2(g) of the Act would obviously include a Company or a Corporation mentioned in Section 2(e)(2)(i) and
(ii). Even otherwise, the purpose of the Act and the plain language of the statute do not permit giving of a restricted meaning to the words 'any person' as used in the Statute. A property belonging to a Company or a Corporation , as mentioned in Section 2(e), can be taken on lease by or on behalf of another Company or a Corporation as mentioned in the said provision. Such premises would be public premises and if the lessee continues in occupation after the lease -deed has been duly determined, its occupation would be unauthorised as contemplated under Section 2(g) of the Act. On the plain language of the statute , it is not possible to hold that the said Company or Corporation would not be liable to eviction under the Act. Consequently, the plea of the appellant that the action of the respondent is wholly without jurisdiction or that it is repugnant to the provisions of the PP Act cannot be sustained.
15. The word 'person' has not been defined in PP Act. Reference was made to the provisions of General Clauses Act, 1897. Section 3(42) defines a person to include "any company or association or body of individual, whether incorporated or not. Reliance was also placed on M/s Jaswant Sugar Mills Ltd. (supra) and Samatha A Rural Development Society (supra) where it was held that the Government is quite different from person and the word "person" would not include Government.
(PPA Nos.23/24/25/26 of 2011 (Page 12 of 19) However, Hon'ble Supreme Court also held that in consideration of true meaning of a word or expression used, the Court must have regard to the aims, objects and scope of the statute. None of these authoritaties relied upon by learned Counsel for the appellant was under PP Act, whereas M/s Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. (supra) was a case under PP Act, where also similar plea was taken and it was held by Hon'ble High Court that petitioner company M/s Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd would be included within the definition of "person". Moreover, definition of "person" as defined in General Clauses Act neither include nor exclude Government specifically. Under the circumstances, there is no reason to restrict the meaning to the definition of "person" as defined in General Clauses Act, 1897. Moreover, it is the case of the appellant also that it had entered into lease agreement with LIC which was renewed from time to time. It goes without saying that any lease agreement can be entered into between two persons - whether they are natural, artificial or juristic persons like the appellant and respondent. Under the circumstances, findings of learned Estate Officer that Government is covered under the definition of "person" for the purposes of PP Act does not suffer from any infirmity.
16. As regards the objections of learned Counsel for the appellant that instead of resorting to action under PP Act, the respondents should have approached High Powered Committee as dispute was between two departments of Government, in (PPA Nos.23/24/25/26 of 2011 (Page 13 of 19) Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. (supra) also such a plea was taken by relying upon M/s Oil & Natural Gas CompanyVs. Collector of Central Excise, 1991(4) JT SC 158 and the plea was repelled by Hon'ble High Court, by observing that Hon'ble Supreme Court had directed Government to set up a Committee. However, there was nothing to indicate that such a Committee is actually functioning. Learned Estate Officer has relied upon the order of Five Judges of Hon'ble Supreme Court dated 17-2-2011 in Electronic Corporation of India Vs. UOI, Civil Appeal No.1903/2008, whereby Hon'ble Supreme Court had recalled the orders reported in :-
(i) 1995 Suppl.(4) SCC 51 daed 11-10-1991
(ii) (2004) 6 SCC 437 dated 7-1-1994
(iii)(2007) 7 SCC 39 dated 20-7-2007
17. In view of the same, this submission of learned Counsel for the appellant has no force.
18. As regards the submission of ld. counsel for appellant that although Shri R.K. Premi was authorised to institute petition but he had no power to further delegate his authority to another person to appear in the proceedings and deposed on behalf of the LIC and Shri Yashwardhan Gupta had no power to depose on behalf of LIC/ respondent, this submission is again devoid of merits, in view of Section 118 of Evidence Act, which stipulates that any person who has knowledge of the facts of the case and (PPA Nos.23/24/25/26 of 2011 (Page 14 of 19) can understand questions put to him and give rational answer to them, is competent to testify. Moreover, in the instant case, as regards factual matrix of the case is concerned, there was hardly any controversy. Thrust of the arguments of appellant was regarding the maintainability of the proceedings under the PP Act. That being so, mere fact that instead of R.K. Premi, Shri Yashwardhan Gujpta had appeared in the witness box is not of much consequence.
19. As regards the submissions that the respondent had no authority to terminate tenancy and as per lease agreement, it was only the Appellant who could exercise powers to renew the Lease, same has no substance, inasmuch as if that had been the case why lease was not renewed after 1970. After expiry of original lease when it was not renewed after 1970, tenancy of appellant became monthly and therefore, by issuing notice, same was terminated and thereafter occupation of the appellant became unauthorised.
20. "Unauthorized occupation" is defined in Section 2 (g) of PP Act, which reads as under :-
" unauthorized occupation" , in relation to any public premises, means the occupation , by any person of the public premises without authority for such occupation and includes the continuance in occupation by any person of the public premises after the authority (whether by way of grant or any other mode of (PPA Nos.23/24/25/26 of 2011 (Page 15 of 19) transfer) under which he was allowed to occupy the premises has expired or has been determined for any reason whatsoever."
In Jeevan Das Vs. LIC (1994 SCC Suppl.Vol.III 694) it was held as under :-
" Section 106 of T.P. Act does indicate that the landlord is entitled to terminate the tenancy by giving 15 days notice, if it is a premises occupied on monthly tenancy and by giving a month's notice if the premises are occupied for agricultural or manufacturing purposes, and on expiry thereof proceedings could be initiated. Section 106 of the T.P. Act does not contemplates of giving any reason for terminating the tenancy. Equally the definition of the public premises 'unauthorized occupation' under Section 2(g) of the Act, postulates that the tenancy "has been determined for any reason whatsoever". When the statute has advisedly given wide power to the Public authorities under the Act to determine the tenancy, it is not permissible to cut down the width of the power by reading into it the reasonable and justifiable grounds for initiating action for terminating the tenancy under Section 106 of the T.P. Act. If it is so read section 106 of T.P. Act and Section 2(g) of the Act would become ultra vires. The statute advisedly empowered the authority to act in the public interest and determine the tenancy or leave and license before taking action under Section 5 of the Act. If the contention of the appellant is given acceptance he would be put in a higher pedestal than a statutory tenant under the Rent Act. Take for example that a premises is let out at a low rent years back like the present one. The rent is (PPA Nos.23/24/25/26 of 2011 (Page 16 of 19) unrealistic , with a view to revise adequate market rent tenant became liable to ejectment. The contention then is action is violative of Art. 21 offending of right of livelihood. This contention too is devoid of any substance. An owner is entitled to deal with his property in his own way profitable in its use and occupation. A public authority is equally entitled to use the public property to the best advantage as a commercial venture. As an integral incidence of ejectment of a tenant/licenser is inevitable. So, the doctrine of livelihood cannot indiscriminately be extended to the area of commercial operation. Therefore, we do not find any substance in the contentions of the appellant.
21. Keeping in view the fact that no lease agreement was executed between the parties after the year 1970, therefore in absence of lease agreement appellant became tenant on month to month basis in the premises in question. Tenancy was terminated vide legal notice dated 30-9-2006, Ex.PW1/4 which was duly received by the appellant who also submitted a reply dated 6-12-2006, denying its liability to vacate the premises and it also denied its liability to pay any damages. By virtue of legal notice dated 30-9-2006, appellant was called upon to hand over vacant and peaceful possession of the premises in question within 15 days of the receipt of notice, failing which legal proceedings for recovery of arrears of rent and possession of premises were to be initiated. In the notice, appellant was also called upon to pay damages @ Rs.55 per sq. ft per month, in (PPA Nos.23/24/25/26 of 2011 (Page 17 of 19) case they fail to vacate the premises. Since the appellant failed to vacate the premises, they were in unauthorised occupation of the premises in question and hence, they were liable for eviction. Accordingly, the eviction order dated 3-8-2011 was passed by learned Estate Officer which does not suffer from any infirmity and does not call for any interference from this Court.
22. As regards damages assessed by the learned Estate Officer vide impugned order, perusal of the record goes to show that the appellant herein had not placed on record any evidence regarding market rate of rent in the area, whereas the respondent/LIC had produced a copy of letter dated 18-12-2002 regarding letting of the office space at Laxmi Insurance, Asaf Ali Road, New Delhi to the Corporation Bank @ Rs.55 per sq. ft. Taking stock of the aforesaid letter and the fact that suit premises (Saraswati Building) and Laxmi Insurance Building both are situated in Asaf Ali Road, New Delhi, learned Estate Officer held the appellant to be liable to pay Rs.55 per sq. ft. per month in respect of the respective areas of the suit premises. Counsel for the appellant has failed to point out any infirmity or illegality in the said findings arrived at by learned Estate Officer. As such, I do not find any reason to interfere with the said findings arrived at by learned Estate Officer vide impugned order wherein each and every aspect of the matter has been considered in detail. The appeals are accordingly dismissed.
(PPA Nos.23/24/25/26 of 2011 (Page 18 of 19)
23. Copy of this judgment be placed in PPA Nos. 24/11, 25/11 and 26/11.
24. A copy of this judgment be sent to the Estate Officer while returning the records. Appeal files be consigned to the record room.
File be consigned to the record room.
Announced in open court 20.10.2012 (SUNITA GUPTA) District & Sessions Judge :
Delhi (PPA Nos.23/24/25/26 of 2011 (Page 19 of 19)