Bombay High Court
Tekchand Khanchandani vs State Of T.N. & Ors. - (2004) 3 Scc 514 on 22 August, 2014
Author: M. S. Sonak
Bench: M. S. Sonak
dss j-WP-930-08
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
ORDINARY ORIGINAL CIVIL JURISDICTION
WRIT PETITION NO. 930 OF 2008
Tekchand Khanchandani ]
proprietor of Vikas Garments ]
Motilal Nagar No. 1, ]
162/1291, Road No. 3, ]
Sai Naath Marg, Goregaon (W) ]
Mumbai 400062 and also at ]
O.P.P. Goregaon ]
Anand Nagar, Mumbai 400 102 ] ..Petitioner
versusig
Tribhuvandas Dhoria ]
C/o. A.B.G.K. Union, ]
Rm. No. 91, Mukadam Chawl, ]
Behind Satyam Laundry, ]
Opp: Hotel Yatri, Santacruz (W) ]
Mumbai 400 055 ] ..Respondent
Mr. Mahendra Agvekar i/b. Mr. Rajesh Gehani for Petitioner.
Mr. Dilip N. Mandavia for Respondent.
CORAM : M. S. SONAK, J.
Judgment reserved on : 25 July 2014
Judgment pronounced on : 22 August 2014.
JUDGMENT :-
1] The employer-Tekchand questions the Labour Court award dated 8 June 2006 ('impugned award') which holds that termination of the workman-Tribhuvandas' service with effect from 7 October 1993 is illegal and directs his reinstatement with full back-wages and continuity of service.
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2] Tribhuvandas claims that he was employed as a Tailor with
M/s. Vikas Garments, M/s. Vikas Fashions and M/s. Prakash Garments, proprietary concerns of Tekchand, which were engaged in manufacturer of readymade garments. On 7 October 1993, when Tribhuvandas reported for work, he was physically prevented from even entering into the work premises and told by Tekchand that his employment 'stands terminated'. By this date, Tribhuvandas had completed over three years employment with Tekchand. Around the same time, Tekchand, in a similar fashion 'orally terminated' services of almost 19 workers, 11 of whom are respondents in the connected writ petitions. Tekchand, on his part, has completely denied ever having employed Tribhuvandas, or for that matter 11 other workmen in his factory. Tekchand says that there is no 'employer-employee relationship' and therefore, he is not at all concerned with the workers in these batch of petitions.
3] By letter dated 1 November 1993, Tribhuvadas protested against the treatment meted out to him and demanded reinstatement. As there was no response, by the justification statement dated 8 November 1993, Tribhuvandas raised an industrial dispute. The machinery of conciliation was set into motion. Tekchand claims to have sent some reply, but participated no further. Upon conciliation proceedings ending in failure, the appropriate Government, in exercise of powers under Section 10 read with Section 2(A) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 ("said Act") made a reference to the Labour Court, resulting in the impugned award.
2/19 ::: Downloaded on - 22/08/2014 23:49:38 :::dss j-WP-930-08 4] Mr. Mahendra Agvekar and Mr. Rajesh Gehani, learned counsels for the employer-Tekchand attacked the impugned award on the following grounds:
(A) That the Labour Court incorrectly placed the burden of proving 'employer-employee relationship' upon employer-Tekchand ;
(B) There is no evidence whatsoever on record to establish that Tribhuvandas was indeed an employee of Tekchand. The finding to the contrary, is vitiated by 'perversity';
(C) The Labour Court has made reference to documents/material which were not a part of the record.
There is, accordingly, clear non-application of mind which vitiates the impugned award;
(D) Without prejudice, there is no material on record that Tribhuvandas had put in 240 days service in the year preceding the alleged date of termination. The burden of establishing this fact was solely upon Tribhuvandas, who has miserably failed to discharge the same. In absence of any proof as to such jurisdictional fact, the Labour Court erred in invoking the provisions of Section 25-F of the said Act.
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5] Mr. Mandavia, learned counsel for the Tribhuvandas, at the
outset, submitted that Tekchand has been far from candid with the Court and therefore ought to be dis-entitled to invoke the extra ordinary and equitable jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In any case, the counsel submitted that the Labour Court has recorded findings of fact which derive support from the material on record. There is neither any perversity nor non- application of mind, in the matter of record of such findings of fact. Accordingly, the counsel urged, that Tekchand had made out no case to warrant judicial review.
6] The counsels did make attempt to argue on the aspect of compliance or otherwise of the interim orders made by this Court in these batch of petitions in the context of motion under Section 17B of the said Act. The counsels for Tekchand complained that despite offer of work, the workmen refused to report for duties. Likewise, counsel for workmen complained that despite the workmen reporting for duties, Tekchand offered them no work. These are seriously disputed questions of fact. Counsel for the workmen, however, submitted that the appropriate proceedings have been taken out before a Forum, where such disputed questions could be effectively gone into. In view of such position, this Court declines to go into the such issue. However, adjudication upon such issue before the appropriate Forum, is expressly kept open.
7] Counsels for Tekchand are right in their contentions that burden of proving existence of 'employer-employee relationship' was upon the workman-Tribhuvandas, who had asserted the same.
4/19 ::: Downloaded on - 22/08/2014 23:49:38 :::dss j-WP-930-08 The Supreme Court, whilst approving the decisions of Kerala and Calcutta High Court as held:
"It is a well settled principle of law that the person who sets up a plea of existence of relationship of employer employee, the burden would be upon him".1 8] In the same decision, however, the Supreme Court went on to observe that the question of existence of 'employer-employee relationship' is a pure question of fact and ordinarily the High Court while exercising its power of judicial review, ought not to interfere, unless the finding is 'manifestly or obviously erroneous or perverse'. To the same effect is the ruling of the Division Bench of Calcutta High Court2.
9] Yet in two other cases3, the Supreme Court whilst reiterating the position regards burden of proof, however, observed that degree of proof so required would vary from case to case and it was neither feasible nor advisable to lay down any abstract rule to determine the existence of such relationship. It was essentially a question of fact to be determined by having regard to the cumulative effect of the entire material placed before the adjudicatory forum by the parties. In the first case, the workman had produced three vouchers evidencing payment of certain sums of money by the employer- bank. The bank, apart from the contention in its written statement denying any relationship, failed to produce any evidence to rebut 'even the piece of evidence produced by the workman'. In such 1 Workmen of Nilgiri Coop. Mkt. Soc. Ltd. vs. State of T.N. & ors. - (2004) 3 SCC 514, N.C. John v. Secy. Thodupuzha Taluk Shop & Commercial Establishment Workers' Union - 1973 Lab IC 398 (Ker) and Swapan Das Gupta v. First Labour Court of W.B. - 1976 Lab IC 202 (Cal) 2 M/s. Reckitt & Colman of India Ltd. vs. Fifth Industrial Tribunal & ors -1980 Lab I.C. 92 3 Bank of Baroda vs. Ghemarbhai H. Rabari - (2005) 10 SCC 792 and Kanpur Electricity Supply Company Limited vs Shamim Mirza - (2009) 1 SCC 20 5/19 ::: Downloaded on - 22/08/2014 23:49:38 ::: dss j-WP-930-08 circumstances, the burden was held to be discharged by workman. In the second case, the workmen did not produce letters of appointment or their salary slips, but produced some contemporaneous documentary evidence like ECR sheets bearing the signatures of the workmen and senior officer of the company, from which it could be deduced that the workmen were engaged in collecting cash on behalf of the company. The company failed to lead evidence in rebuttal and when called upon to produce official records, failed to do so. The adverse inference was drawn against the company and the burden was held to have been validly discharged by the workmen.
10] Therefore, applying the aforesaid tests and being conscious of the clear and marked difference between exercise of judicial review and the exercise of appellate jurisdiction, the merits of the first ground urged on behalf of Tekchand shall have to be examined.
11] In the present case, Tribhuvandas examined himself and was cross-examined by Tekchand, who piloted the proceedings before the Labour Court 'in person'. Tekchand, also stepped into witness box and was cross-examined by the counsel for Tribhuvandas and other workmen.
12] Tribhuvandas, in his examination-in-chief, has clearly deposed that he was employed by Tekchand as a Tailor and had put in service of about three years, when he was unceremoniously terminated on 7 October 1993. On this date, Tribhuvandas says that he was prevented from entering into factory premises and 6/19 ::: Downloaded on - 22/08/2014 23:49:38 ::: dss j-WP-930-08 threatened with dire consequences, in case, he persisted in his attempts to do so. There was neither notice nor notice pay issued or offered. There was not even the minimum compliance with principles of natural justice and fair play. In the cross-examination, Tekchand has not even put forth the customary suggestion to Tribhuvandas that he was never employed with M/s. Vikas Garments. In response to Tekchand's cross-examination, however, Tribhuvandas deposed that there were about 70 to 75 employees working in the factory, out of which about 19 'karagirs', including himself were unceremoniously removed. Tribhuvandas admitted that there was no appointment letter issued to him, but stated that he was provided with a diary, which would be written upon by the Master. Tribhuvandas deposed that he was paid wages of Rs.1700/-
per month, but no other statutory benefits like Provident Fund or Employees State Insurance were offered to him.
13] The employer Tekchand in his examination-in-chief, which is 'common' to these batch of petitions, merely stated this much:
"The workers who have filed the cases in this court they have not worked with me. I relied on my written statement which I have filed even today. (The witness said that it is enough and he does not want to say anything more)."
14] In his cross-examination, Tekchand admitted to being the proprietor of M/s.Vikas Garment, however, with regard to other two concerns, Tekchand refused to make any comment. Tekchand stated that his factory commenced operating in the year 1984, but claimed that he had no knowledge whether he had obtained any 7/19 ::: Downloaded on - 22/08/2014 23:49:38 ::: dss j-WP-930-08 license from the statutory authorities for the same. Tekchand claimed to have employed hardly two to three persons in the factory, but declined to answer the question as to the manner in which the said employees were paid their wages upon the spacious plea that such questions constitute 'waste of Court's time'. Upon being required by the Court to answer, Tekchand stated that he would pay the wages against 'vouchers'. Surprisingly, Tekchand was unable to even state the names of his two to three admitted employees. Upon being confronted with an attendance card, Tekchand stated that he was not in a position to identify or name the person whose signature it bears. Upon being confronted with an inland letter bearing the address of M/s. Vikas Garments, which was received by the workman at the factory address, Tekchand simply denied that such letter may have been received by the workman at the factory address. Upon being confronted with two newspapers cuttings of 3 rd and 4th November 2011, being advertisements issued by him for appointment of Tailors, Tekchand denied having issued the same, however, not without indulging into shouting and thereby forcing the Labour Court to temporarily suspend the evidence proceedings. Tekchand also deposed that he had closed down the factory 'since last four to five years' which would mean from the year 1999 and 2000. Finally, Tekchand admitted that the workmen had applied to the Labour Court for directions to require him to produce certain documents, but stated that he had filed a reply setting out therein that there was a fire in the factory on 23 October 1994, in which, all the documents were burnt. Finally, Tekchand denied that he had illegally terminated the services of the workmen or that he was deposing falsely.
8/19 ::: Downloaded on - 22/08/2014 23:49:38 :::dss j-WP-930-08 15] Upon consideration of the evidence on record, the Labour Court has returned a finding of fact that there was 'employer-
employee relationship'. This Court is unable to detect any perversity or non-application of mind, in the record of such finding. True, documentary evidence is scarce. However, in matters of appreciation and evaluation of evidence, quality has primacy over quantity. The workmen have deposed to the factum of employment and furnished sufficient details as to the nature of their duties, the location and physical attributes of the factory. As noted earlier, there was no serious challenge during the course of cross-examination. Within hardly three weeks from the date of termination, the workmen made demand upon Tekchand for reinstatement, which was followed by the complaint to the labour authorities. The workmen very specifically identified and asserted that Tekchand was their employer. The workmen have also deposed that Tekchand was the proprietor in respect of three proprietary concerns, which were operated from one and the same premises. The Labour Court has come to the conclusion that the depositions of the workmen stood the test of cross-examination. So also, Tekchand was unable to discharge the onus, which had shifted upon him. There is no real scope to criticize the findings of fact returned by the Labour Court as being perverse or vitiated by non-application of mind.
16] Tekchand, it appears has treated the matter of cross- examination as a mere formality and therefore not bothered to even put his own case to the workmen. It is well established rule of evidence that a party should put to each of his opponent's witness so much of his case as concerns that particular witness. If no such questions are put, then the Court may presume that the witness' 9/19 ::: Downloaded on - 22/08/2014 23:49:38 ::: dss j-WP-930-08 account has been accepted. If it is intended to suggest that the witness was not speaking truth upon a particular point, his attention must be directed to the fact by cross-examination so that he may have an opportunity of furnishing explanation. The usual practice at the bar is to accept matters which are not challenged either in the pleadings or in cross-examination as finally established once a person enters the witness box and swears to it. If the rule were otherwise, parties would be obliged to encumber the record with a mass of material which, in the end result might prove wholly unnecessary. In matters of cross-examination, the requirement to put ones own case to the witness is not a mere formality. In absence of challenge, the deposition of the witness cannot be discredited4.
17] There is no merit in the criticism that the Labour Court placed the burden of proof upon Tekchand. This criticism is possibly fueled by the circumstance that at one place in the impugned award the Labour Court has noted that the Tekchand was unable to discharge the burden which had shifted upon him. Obviously, when the observation is construed in the light of attendant observations or circumstances, it is clear that the Labour Court was referring to 'onus' and not 'burden'. The impugned award has to be read in its entirety and there is no scope to extract a sentence or two de hors the context. Besides, the position in law is clear in that the burden of proof never shifts, but the onus of proof shifts and such shifting of onus is a continuous process in the evaluation of evidence. In effect therefore, the Labour Court has only held that on the basis of evidence/material produced on record by the workmen, the onus 4 Sirmal v. Annapurna Devi - AIR 1963 SC 1906, Maroti B. Teli v. Radhabai - AIR 1946 Nag 60 and Chunni Lal Dwarka Nath v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co. Ltd. - AIR 1958 Punj 440 10/19 ::: Downloaded on - 22/08/2014 23:49:38 ::: dss j-WP-930-08 shifted upon Tekchand, which onus Tekchand failed to discharge. As noted earlier, degree of proof in such matters, varies from case to case. The issue of 'employer-employee relationship' is essentially a question of fact which has to be determined having regard to cumulative effect of the entire material placed before adjudicatory forum by the parties. Further, in this context it is necessary to note that once both the parties have led their respective evidence, the question of burden of proof, to a great extent, looses its significance.
18] At this stage, it is necessary to make reference to an application made on behalf of the workmen requesting the Labour Court to direct Tekchand to produce the following documents:
1. Muster Rolls for five years prior to Oct. 1993.
2. Salary Registers for five years prior to Oct. 1993.
OR Payment slips or Vouchers for five years from Oct.
1993.
3. Partnership Agreements of the firms.
4. Licenses under Bombay Shops and Estt. Act for five years prior to 1993.
5. List of persons, workmen employed in the company.
6. Letter heads of the firms with address of Registered Office."
19] In response, Tekchand furnished a reply stating that the documents were quite 'irrelevant' and in any case, on 23 October 1994, there was fire in the factory premises in which all the documents were burnt. Alongwith this reply, Tekchand annexed xerox copies of fire brigade report dated 22 February 1995 and a panchanama.
11/19 ::: Downloaded on - 22/08/2014 23:49:38 :::dss j-WP-930-08 20] The Labour Court made an order dated 5 May 1997 upon aforesaid application, which reads thus:
ORDER Reference is made by the Company with a schedule that second party workman be reinstated with full back wages and continuity of services. First party company by filling its written statement denies its relation with the second party as employer and employee. By this application second party to prove its relation with the first party as an employee wanted this court to pass an order to direct first party company to produce referred documents. Advocate for the second party has submitted that it has no evidence to prove its relation with the first party as an employee and so they want to prove it by way of the documents to be called from the first party. First party by filing its affidavit submitted that the documents called for are not relevant and moreover the entire record of the company was burnt in a fire dated 23.10.94.
Advocate for the second party wanted to draw an adverse inference against first party company even at this stage. However, it does not appear just, fit and proper to come to such a conclusion at this stage. The initial burden of proving the relationship lies on the second party workman only. Hence at this stage with this observations application is rejected.
Mumbai Presiding Officer
Dated: 5.5.97 8th Labour Court, Mumbai.
21] The Labour Court, in its impugned award has however, held that Tekchand has not 'proved' the fire brigade report and the panchanama.
22] Counsels for Tekchand however, submit that since strict rules of evidence did not apply to proceedings before the Labour Court, the report and the panchanama ought to have been taken into consideration. If such documents had been taken into consideration, then there would be no occasion to draw any 12/19 ::: Downloaded on - 22/08/2014 23:49:38 ::: dss j-WP-930-08 adverse inference against Tekchand or record that Tekchand had failed to discharge the onus, which may have shifted upon him in the course of proceedings.
23] The counsels for Tekchand are right, in that, strict rules of evidence normally do not apply before Labour Courts. However, this principle is surely not a licence to a party to make no efforts whatsoever to prove documents in accordance with law. In this case, there is no justification as to why the original documents were not produced alongwith reply or during the course of examination. There is no explanation as to why no summons was applied for to examine the authorities who are said to have made the report or panchanama. Moreover, what baffles is that there was no whisper in the written statement filed by Tekchand on 13 February 1996 as regards the incident of fire which is alleged to have taken place on 23 October 1994. It is settled position in law that there cannot be any variance between pleadings and proof. In fact, no amount of proof in respect of a matter not pleaded to, can even be looked into.
In such circumstances, really, no fault can be found with the impugned order when it holds that Tekchand has not proved the report and panchanama.
24] However, counsels for Tekchand made a fervent plea that at least this Court looks into the report and panchanama with a view to satisfying itself as to whether Tekchand has or has not been candid with the Court. There is no real warrant to look into the said documents, which have been correctly held has not proved by the Labour Court. However, in deference to the fervent plea, even if such documents were to be looked into, they would only fortify the 13/19 ::: Downloaded on - 22/08/2014 23:49:38 ::: dss j-WP-930-08 position that Tekchand has been far from candid with the Court. In fact, from the conduct of Tekchand it does appear that Tekchand carries an impression that litigation is nothing but a game of chess or one upmanship.
25] In the aforesaid regard, it is pertinent to take note of the specific case set out by Tekchand that he was operating his factory in a slum area by engaging hardly two to three employees, who were paid by vouchers. Tekchand strongly disputed the workmen's evidence that his industry engaged about 70 to 75 workmen for the purposes of manufacture of readymade garments. Now, if the fire brigade report and panchanama, upon which substantial and repeated reliance was placed by counsels for Tekchand is to be looked into, then the following circumstances emerge:
(A) That the entire unit was operated without obtaining trade licence under Section 394 of the BMC Act or for that matter permissions from any statutory authorities;
(B) That the employer was using an electric power for at least 10 electric irons and number of sewing machines without any factory permit or permissions from any other authorities;
(C) That there were at least 14 ironing tables, 10 electric irons, color top, finding machine and other material which is found to be damaged by fire, heat, smoke and water;
(D) The employer has deposed that he had employed services of a security guard Rupesh Kumar Jagdish Singh, who in fact telephonically informed the employer about the fire;
(E) The reports, make reference to 'garment factory' admeasuring about 1000 sq. ft. housed in ground floor 14/19 ::: Downloaded on - 22/08/2014 23:49:38 ::: dss j-WP-930-08 RCC building with A.C. Sheets and roof structures and a loft admeasuring about 800 sq. ft.;
(F) The report makes reference to workers and the employer has himself stated that his relationship with the workers was cordial and therefore he did not suspect any foul play.
26] From the aforesaid, it appears Tekchand was involved in operation of some kind of 'sweat shop' in slum area by disregarding with impunity, all labour and safety regulations. Tekchand, in his deposition, curiously feigned innocence as to whether or not he had obtained any licences to operate his factory. The fire brigade report and panchanama however make it clear that Tekchand was operating his factory without obtaining any permissions or licences from the statutory authorities. In case, such permissions or licences had been obtained, which in fact, Tekchand was duty bound to obtain, then at least some records with regard to employment would be available with the statutory authorities. Tekchand, therefore, is now bent upon taking advantage of his own unauthorized acts of commencing and operating factory without any regard to labour laws and safety legislations. At least a writ court, which exercises equitable jurisdiction, will not permit a petitioner to draw such mileage from out of his own unauthorized acts. It is even otherwise, a settled principle in law, that no person can be permitted to take undue and unfair advantage of his own wrongs. The maxims 'Nullus commodum capere potest de injuria sua propria' (No man can take advantage of his own wrong) is one of the salient tenets of equity. Hence, in the normal course, a party cannot secure assistance of a court of law for enjoying the fruits of his own wrong acts5.
5 Kusheshwar P. Singh Vs. State of Bihar & ors. - (2007) 11 SCC 447 and Ashok Kapil v. Sana Ullah -
(1996) 6 SCC 342
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27] The report and panchanama also indicate that the industry
was operating from ground floor premises having area of about 1000 sq.ft as also a loft ad-measuring about 800 sq. ft. In the industry premises, there were number of sewing machines, electric irons, ironing tables amongst other equipments. In such circumstances, the repeated statement of Tekchand that he employed only two to three employees, was clearly unacceptable. Incidentally, Tekchand was unable to even state the names of such two to three employees, who were admittedly employed by him. Instead, Tekchand was bent upon stone walling the truth, which is evident from his demeanor as recorded by the Labour Court in the course of evidence.
28] Counsels for Tekchand, then contended that that in para 11 of the impugned award, the Labour Court has placed reliance upon the documents which do not form a part of the record. Upon careful examination, it is clear that there is no merit in this submission. In para 11 of the impugned award, there is reference made to Exhibit U-12, which was indeed referred to in the course of evidence of the Tribhuvandas. Athough the evidence is not very clear as to whether letter under Exhibit U-12 pertains to Tribhuvandas or not, one thing is clear that it pertains to one of the workmen involved in the dispute. In any case, since there is specific reference to Exhibit U-
12 in the deposition of the workman, it cannot be said that the Labour Court has referred to some documents, which were not a part of record. Besides, other documents referred to in para 11 of the impugned award, are the documents in respect of which the workmen had made an application under Exhibit U-6 seeking 16/19 ::: Downloaded on - 22/08/2014 23:49:38 ::: dss j-WP-930-08 direction to the employer for production of the same. The mere fact that such documents have been referred, does not mean that the Labour Court has placed reliance upon the same. In fact, such documents were never produced by any of the parties as it was the case of the employer that the same were burnt in fire on 23 October 1994. The Labour Court, upon examination of fire brigade report and panachanama, noted that they do not make any reference to the documents. However, even if some allowance is made to the Tekchand's criticism on this aspect, the contention that the Labour Court has placed reliance upon the material which did not form part of the record, is clearly not borne out. Such contention therefore, deserves to be rejected.
29] Counsels for Tekchand, then contended that there is no proof that the workmen have worked for 240 days in the year preceding date of termination. Again there is no merit in this contention. The workmen have deposed to this fact. Tekchand's only defence was that the workmen were not his employees at all. Once such defence has been adjudged unreliable, there is no question of falling back upon the plea that the workmen have not established the factum of 240 days service in the year proceeding the date of termination. Again, as noted earlier, this is also a finding of fact and in absence of any perversity, there is no question of interference with the same.
30] Counsels for Tekchand, then adverted to some minor errors in the impugned award. The errors, which the counsels point out, are clearly attributable to the circumstance that all references were taken up together for disposal by the Labour Court. In fact, Tekchand led common evidence in all the references. The errors 17/19 ::: Downloaded on - 22/08/2014 23:49:38 ::: dss j-WP-930-08 broadly relate to the number of years of services put in by each of the workmen or salary which they drew. Such errors are minor and irrelevant, if the totality of the context is addressed. The errors are certainly not such as would go to the root of jurisdiction or otherwise make any dent in the case of the workmen. The plea for remand based upon such errors, also does not appeal to this Court, particularly at this length of time. The conduct of the petitioner is also not such, as would really entitle the petitioner to secure the assistance of the Court, particularly in the exercise of extra ordinary and equitable jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
31] In the result, this Court sees no reason to interfere with the impugned award. Rule is, accordingly, discharged. In the facts and circumstances of the case, the petitioner shall pay costs of Rs.5,000/- to the respondent-workman. In case any amounts have been deposited by the petitioner under the interim orders made by this Court, the Registry is directed to pay the same to the respondent - workman within a period of four weeks from today.
(M. S. SONAK, J.) 32] At this stage, Mr. Agvekar learned counsel for the petitioner, seeks stay on the implementation of the impugned award for a period of eight weeks, as the petitioner desirous to seek recourse against the judgment and order, just pronounced in accordance with law. Mr. Dilip Mandavia, learned counsel for the respondent submits that the workmen have been deprived benefits of the impugned award in their favour from the year 2008 and therefore, restraint of four weeks would suffice.
18/19 ::: Downloaded on - 22/08/2014 23:49:38 :::dss j-WP-930-08 33] Taking into consideration the circumstance that there is interim relief operating in favour of the petitioner right from the year 2008, it is only proper that such interim relief continues for a period of eight weeks from today. Accordingly, the implementation of the impugned award is stayed for a period of eight weeks from today.
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