Karnataka High Court
Seshadri Iyengar (Deceased) By L.Rs vs P.V. Ramadas on 29 July, 2003
Equivalent citations: 2004(3)KARLJ451, 2004 AIR - KANT. H. C. R. 979, (2004) 3 KANT LJ 451, (2004) 2 RENCJ 117, (2004) 1 RENCR 551
Author: V. Gopala Gowda
Bench: V. Gopala Gowda
ORDER V. Gopala Gowda, J.
1. All these three revision petitions pertain to the same property bearing No. 24/37, Surveyor Street, Basavanagudi, Bangalore, which is the petition schedule premises. Since the parties are also common, these three revision petitions were heard together and disposed of by this common order.
2. The petitioner-P.V. Ramadas in H.R.R.P. No. 184 of 2000 is the tenant and deceased K. Seshadri Iyengar, represented by his legal heirs, who are petitioners in H.R.R.P. Nos. 118 and 230 of 2000 is the landlord. For the sake of convenience, the parties are referred to as 'landlord and tenant'.
3. The landlord filed petition under Section 21(1) of the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961 (now repealed, hereinafter called as the 'Act') seeking eviction of the tenant under Clause (a) on the ground that he is in arrears of rent; under Clause (d) on the ground that the tenant is causing nuisance; and under Clause (h) on the ground that the landlord require the petition schedule premises for their bona fide use and occupation. According to the landlord, the monthly rent is Rs. 3,000/- but the according to the tenant it is Rs. 1,500/-. The tenant resisted the petition denying the case of the landlord. After trial, the Trial Court by its order dated 13-1-2000 allowed the petition under Section 21(1)(d) of the Act and rejected the eviction under Clauses (a) and (h) granted four months time to the tenant to vacate and deliver vacant possession of the premises. Being aggrieved by the same, the landlord has filed H.R.R.P. No. 230 of 2000 insofar as dismissal of eviction petition under Section 21(1)(a) and (h) of the Act. At the same time, the tenant filed H.R.R.P. No. 184 of 2000 against the order allowing the eviction petition under Section 21(1)(d) of the Act.
4. While the eviction petition was pending, the tenant approached the Rent and Accommodation Controller seeking fixation of fair rent to the schedule premises. By an order dated 11-1-2000 the rent of the premises was fixed at Rs. 2,000/-. Aggrieved by the same, the landlord has filed H.R.R.P. No. 118 of 2000.
5. So far as H.R.R.P. No. 118 of 2000 fixing rent for the schedule premises is concerned, the order is passed under Section 14 of the Act. Section 14 of the Act has been struck down by this Court holding that the same is unconstitutional. As a result of which, there was no power for the Rent and Accommodation Controller to exercise for fixing the rent, The order passed by him is non est in the eye of law. Therefore, nothing survive for consideration in the revision petition. Consequently, H.R.R.P. No. 118 of 2000 is dismissed as wholly unnecessary.
6. As far as the quantum of rent is concerned, the Trial Court deter mined the rent at Rs. 3,000/- per month in respect of the schedule premises and the same was questioned by the tenant in H.R.R.P. No. 254 of 1998. This Court by its order dated 5-3-1998 rejected the said revision petition. Thus, the rent determined at Rs. 3,000/- by the Trial Court is conclusive.
7. Insofar as the other two revision petitions pertaining to eviction order are concerned, learned Counsel for the landlord fairly submitted that if the eviction order passed under Section 21(1)(d) is confirmed, he will not press H.R.R.P. No. 230 of 2000. In view of this submission, this Court proceeds, to consider the correctness of the order of eviction passed under Section 21(1)(d) of the Act.
8. Learned Counsel for the tenant contended that there is no sufficient pleading and legal evidence regarding nuisance. According to him, the findings of the Trial Court in this regard are contrary to the decisions in Rafat All v. Sugni Bai, Gopal Vaman v. Krishnaji Tatyarao and Joseph D'Souza v. State of Mysore, for the proposition that the burden to prove the nuisance alleged is on the landlord. The Counsel contends that the said burden is not discharged by the landlord. Hence, the learned Counsel for the tenant seeks to allow H.R.R.P. No. 184 of 2000 of the tenant and to set aside the order of eviction passed under Section 21(1)(d) of the Act.
9. The contention of the learned Counsel for the tenant is wholly untenable and cannot be accepted for the reasons mentioned hereunder.--
(a) In paragraphs 8 and 9 of the order under revision the Trial Court has elaborately dealt with the nuisance alleged against the tenant. It is alleged that the tenant has removed the pumpset and shifted it to a different place. The tenant denied the same, in the cross-examination he has admitted shifting of the motor. It has to be held that it was too much on the part of the tenant to do so. When a motor is installed at a particular place by the landlord, the tenant cannot shift the same to the place of his choice. The act of the tenant amounts to behaving as if he is the landlord of the property. From the order of the Trial Court it is seen that the tenant has to pay 40% of water charges. That being his liability, shifting of motor was not within the domain of the tenant and he has no right to do so. It is pertinent to note that the shifting of motor was made when there was difference of opinion regarding quantum of rent in the year 1996, during which period the tenant filed H.R.C. No. 416 of 1996 for depositing the rents under Section 19 of the Act and another suit in O.S. No. 3194 of 1996 seeking permanent injunction.
(b) The other nuisance alleged against the tenant is that the tenant and his family members are parking their vehicles in the common passage causing obstruction to other tenants. The landlord has produced photograph Ex. P. 9 showing parking of vehicle by the tenant. In fact, the tenant has admitted this in the cross-examination. No further proof is necessary in this regard. The landlord pleaded that he has to pass through in this place to his house and the lavatory. Definitely it is a nuisance caused by the tenant.
(c) The Trial Court referred to the law laid down in the decision in Boranna v. M.A. Chandra Raju, wherein it is held that dumping fuelwood or wastage in the common passage by the tenant amounts to nuisance or annoyance.
(d) Another nuisance alleged against the tenant is that the tenant and his family members are playing music and use the T.V. day-in and day-out with high volume by closing the doors and windows, which cause lot of vibration. Evidence has been adduced in this regard and the Trial Court upon appreciation of the documentary arid oral evidence held that nuisance alleged against the tenant is proved.
(e) From what has been observed above, it is clear that the tenant is not in cordial terms with the landlord. He has failed to keep a harmonious relationship with the landlord. The acts of the tenant shifting the motor to other place, the parking of vehicles in the common passage and the playing music and keeping the T.V. with high volume are all nuisance. Added to that, the filing of suit for injunction against the true owner/landlord and also petition under Section 19 of the Act for depositing rents in Court are all prove beyond doubt that the tenant has been causing unnecessary harassment to the landlord. Such an harassment is definitely a nuisance to the landlord. Therefore, the Trial Court has rightly ordered eviction of the tenant on the ground of causing nuisance.
10. Though the learned Counsel for the tenant has relied upon the decision is Rafat Ali's case, supra, in support of his contention to contend that the findings of the Trial Court regarding nuisance are erroneous, learned Counsel for the landlord placed reliance upon the portion extracted from Halsbury's Laws of England in paragraph 15 of the same decision, which reads as under.--
"The damage need not consist of pecuniary loss but it must be material or substantial, that is, it must not be merely sentimental, speculative or trifling, or damage that is merely temporary, fleeting or evanescent".
In view of the above passage, the decision supports the landlord and not the tenant.
11. For the reasons stated above, the finding of the Trial Court that the tenant is guilty of nuisance has to be affirmed. The contention that there is no pleading nor evidence in this regard, is wholly untenable and further there is no rebuttal evidence of the tenant regarding nuisance. Consequently, the revision petition of the tenant is liable to be dismissed and it is accordingly dismissed.
12. In view of the dismissal of H.R.R.P. No. 184 of 2000 of the tenant and the submission made by the learned Counsel for the landlord that if, the order of eviction on the ground of nuisance is confirmed, he will not press the petition of the landlord, H.R.R.P. No. 230 of 2000 is also dismissed as not pressed.
13. In substance, all the three revision petitions are dismissed. The tenant is granted six months time to vacate and delivery vacant possession of the petition schedule premises to the landlord, subject to the condition that he shall file in affidavit undertaking that he will pay the rents regularly; that he will not sublet the premises to others and that he will quit, vacate and deliver vacant possession of the premises to the landlord before the expiry of the stipulated time and shall not commit nuisance in the schedule premises.