Central Administrative Tribunal - Delhi
Kushal Gupta vs Department Of Posts on 13 January, 2026
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Item No. 10 (C-2)
O.A. No. 135/2025
Central Administrative Tribunal
Principal Bench, New Delhi
O.A. No. 135/2025
This the 13th day of January, 2026
Hon'ble Mr. R.N. Singh, Member (J)
Hon'ble Shri B. Anand, Member (A)
Kushal Gupta S/o Sh. Sunil Dutt Gupta, Age 28,
RIo H No. 3/182, Rajinder Nagar, Sector II
Sahibabad, Ghaziabad, UP 201005
... Applicant
(By Advocate: Mr. Anoop Kumar and Mr. U Srivastava )
Versus
1. Union of India through the Secretary
M/o communications & IT Deptt. of Post,
Sanchar Bhawan, New Delhi. 110001
2. The Director General of Post,
Deptt. of post, Dak Tar Bhawan, New Delhi. 110001
3. The Chief Post Master General
Kerla Circle, Trivandrum, Kerela-0695001
4. The Senior Superintendent, Deptt. of Posts,
O/o Senior Superintendent of Post Offices,
Ernakulam Postal Division Kochi 682011 .
... Respondents
(By Advocate: Mr. Hilal Haider)
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Item No. 10 (C-2)
O.A. No. 135/2025
O R D E R (ORAL)
Hon'ble Mr. R.N. Singh, Member (J)
1. We have heard the learned counsels for the parties. With their assistance we have also perused the pleadings available on record.
2. In the present O.A., the applicant has challenged the order dated 01.04.2024 vide which the respondents have terminated the services of the applicant by invoking the provisions of Sub Rule 1 of Rule 5 of the CCS (Temporary Service) Rules, 1965, forthwith.
3. In the present O.A. the applicant has prayed for the following relief(s):-
(a) Directing the respondents to place the relevant records pertaining to the present O.A. before the Hon'ble Tribunal for the proper adjudication in the matter.
(b) Quash and setting aside the impugned termination order dt. 01.04.24 (Annexure A/1) after declaring the same is as illegal, biased, perverse, unjust, arbitrary, malafide, unconstitutional, against the principles of natural justice, violative of articles 14, 16 & 21 of the constitution of India and against the mandatory provision of law accordingly the applicant may be reinstated with all consequential benefits further allowing to continue in services in accordance with relevant rules and instructions on the subject.
(c) Allowing the OA with consequential benefits and costs.
(d) Any other fit and proper relief may also be granted."
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4. The claim of the applicant has been contested by the respondents by filing the counter reply.
5. The matter is taken up for consideration and disposal with the consent of the learned counsels for the parties.
6. It is undisputed that the applicant was appointed as Temporary (Leave Reserved) Postal Assistant in the office of the Senior Superintendent of Post Office, Ernakulam Postal Division, Kochi, based on Combined Graduate Level Examination 2022 conducted by the SSC.
7. He was allotted Ernakulam Head Post Office and was assigned the charge on 08.11.2023. Learned counsel for the applicant submits that though the order dated 01.04.2024 on face of it appears to be an order simpliciter, however, in fact, the same is stigmatic inasmuch as the same is founded on misconduct of the applicant. He submits that inasmuch as the respondents have admitted in the counter reply that the involvement of the applicant in the FIR No. 680/2024 registered with Station House Officer, Ernakulam Central Police Station, Kochi City is a direct consequence of the gross negligence and misconduct of the applicant, a central government employee. Learned counsel for the applicant DEEKSHA DHINGRA 2026.01.29 DEEKSHA DHINGRA 10:52:44 +05'30' 4 Item No. 10 (C-2) O.A. No. 135/2025 submits that the impugned order of termination is admittedly founded on misconduct of the applicant and the termination of the applicant from service by invoking the provisions of Rule 5 of the CCS (Temporary Service) Rules, 1965, is not sustainable in law. In support of his arguments, learned counsel for the applicant has placed reliance on the order/judgment of the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in the case of Nina Lath Gupta Versus Union of India and Anr. in W.P.(C) No. 10385/2021 dated 01.05.2023.
8. On the other hand, Mr. Hilal Haider, learned counsel for the respondents has vehemently opposed the claim of the applicant. He submits that during the course of the employment of the applicant the respondents have received an email from the Station House Officer Ernakulam Central Police Station Kochi City with information about the arrest of the applicant along with three others in criminal case number 680/2024 for the assault and attempt to murder of one Shri Vinod. Subsequently, the victim died and Section 302 and 109 of the IPC was also added in the said FIR. He submits that as the act of the applicant as alleged in the said FIR was found as gross negligence and misconduct, the applicant has rightly been terminated by the respondents by DEEKSHA DHINGRA 2026.01.29 DEEKSHA DHINGRA 10:52:44 +05'30' 5 Item No. 10 (C-2) O.A. No. 135/2025 invoking the provisions of the aforesaid rules inasmuch as the applicant was still on probation at that time.
9. We have considered the submissions made by the learned counsels for the parties.
10. On perusal, it is prima facie found that the impugned order is order simpliciter. However, in the counter reply, the respondents have categorically asserted as under:-
"4. That Following the death of victim, Police authorities altered the charges under FIR No.680/2024, replacing Section 307 IPC with Sections 302 & 109 IPC. The brutal and unjust death of the victim has ignited widespread media outrage and inflicted irreparable damage on the department's reputation. This incident is a direct consequence of the gross negligence and misconduct by the applicant who is a central government employee. The public's trust has been shattered, and the department now stands disgraced due to the reckless actions of the applicant. Given the seriousness of the offense, which involved moral turpitude, the applicant's continued service in the department was deemed inadvisable, as it was likely to subvert discipline and was against wider public interest. Consequently, the competent authority ordered Termination of the applicant's service forthwith, providing one month's pay & allowances as per Rule 5 of CCS (Temporary Service) Rules 1965."
11. The Hon'ble High Court of Delhi after considering the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in a catena of cases has ruled in Nina Lath Gupta Versus Union of India and Anr. in W.P.(C) No. 10385/2021 dated 01.05.2023 as follows:-
"26. Applying the aforesaid principles and examining the impugned order in the backdrop of the principles propounded therein, the DEEKSHA DHINGRA 2026.01.29 DEEKSHA DHINGRA 10:52:44 +05'30' 6 Item No. 10 (C-2) O.A. No. 135/2025 Division Bench of this Court in Baijnath Mandal v. UOI & Ors., 2014 SCC OnLine Del 7204, after examining the judgments on stigmatic/punitive order held that there can be no doubt that when an employee has been granted a temporary status and the order of termination is stigmatic and punitive and not a discharge simplicitor, then a departmental inquiry has to precede the termination and an order without an inquiry, would be violative of principles of natural justice. This has severe consequences for the employee since it gets printed and submitted with the stigmatic declaration made against him, marring his future prospects of employment. Court held that Respondent should have conducted a departmental enquiry before terminating the services to provide a chance to the Petitioner to meet the accusations of his misbehaviour, since termination was founded on his alleged misbehaviour. Division Bench quashed the termination order and directed the reinstatement of the Petitioner with consequential benefits. In Mangal Singh v. Chairman, National Research Development Corporation & Ors., 2009 SCC OnLine Del 2345, Petitioner was an appointee on contractual basis and his services were terminated by what he alleged was a punitive and stigmatic order, without a departmental enquiry. The Court came to the conclusion that the termination order was not a discharge simplicitor but stigmatic and punitive in character and misconduct was the foundation of the order of termination and not merely a motive. The Court further observed as follows:-
19. No doubt, it has been urged by the Respondent-
Corporation that the order of termination was owing to the coming to an end of the Petitioner's fixed period of service under the contract, but it seems to me that when the Petitioner was terminated, the impugned order dated 4th June, 2004 clearly finds him guilty of misconduct, thereby casting a stigma on the Petitioner, and in that sense must be held to be an order of dismissal and not a mere order of discharge. It further seems that anyone who reads the order in a reasonable way, would naturally conclude that the Petitioner was found guilty of misconduct, and that must necessarily import an element of punishment which is the basis of the order and is its integral part.
20. It is trite to say, that when an authority wants to terminate the services of a temporary employee, it can pass a simple order of discharge without casting any aspersion against the temporary servant or attaching any stigma to his character. As soon as it is shown that the order purports to cast an aspersion on the temporary servant, it becomes idle to suggest that the order is a simple order of discharge. The test in such cases must be: does the order cast aspersion or attach stigma to the officer when it purports to discharge him? If the answer to this question is in the affirmative, then notwithstanding the form of the order, the termination of service must be held, in substance, to amount to dismissal.
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Item No. 10 (C-2)
O.A. No. 135/2025
23. InIndia Literacy Board(supra) the Supreme Court was hearing an appeal against an interim order passed by the Allahabad High Court and issued an order to the Single Judge before whom the writ petition was posted to take up the matter on a priority basis and dispose of the same in accordance with law. It was not a matter that related to termination of services of a tamporary employee, but rather to the issue whether in the case of contractual employment for a fixed term,mandamus can be issued continuing the employees is service.Surendra Prasad Tewari's case(supra) was again a case relating to regularization of services in public employment and the Supreme Court followed the ratio of the earlier Constitution Bench decision in Secretary of State, Karnataka (supra) and held that it would be improper for the Courts to give directions for regularization of services of persons working as daily-wager, ad hoc employee, probationers, temporary or contract employee, appointed without following the procedure laid down under Articles 14, 16 and 309 of the Constitution.
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26. In the light of the discussion above, in my opinion, the Petitioner was dismissed without affording him the opportunity of presenting his case before the disciplinary authority, thereby violating the protection guaranteed to temporary servants under Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India. Further, the order of termination was not a discharge simplicitor but a dismissal, and was stigmatic and punitive in character. Also, the misconduct of the Petitioner was the foundation of the order of termination and not merely the motive. Resultantly, the impugned order of termination is held to be stigmatic and punitive and not sustainable. I, therefore, allow this petition and set aside the impugned orders dated 4th of June, 2004 and the consequent order in appeal dated the 1st of December, 2006 passed by the Respondent-Corporation. The Respondents are directed to reinstate the Petitioner, with all consequential benefits. This, however, will not prevent the Respondents from taking action in accordance with law."
27. Therefore, what emerges from the conspectus of the aforesaid judgments is that if an order is founded on allegations, the order is stigmatic and punitive and services of an employee cannot be dispensed with without affording him an opportunity of defending the accusations/allegations made against him in a full-fledged inquiry. Since this case relates to a tenure appointment, it will be pertinent to look at the law with respect to stigmatic orders in the context of tenure appointments. In Dr. L.P. Agarwal v. Union of India and Others, (1992) 3 SCC 526, Petitioner was Director, AIIMS, who had been appointed for a period of 5 years or till he attained the age of 62 years, whichever was earlier, the Supreme Court examined the meaning and connotation of the term tenure and DEEKSHA DHINGRA 2026.01.29 DEEKSHA DHINGRA 10:52:44 +05'30' 8 Item No. 10 (C-2) O.A. No. 135/2025 observed that tenure is a term during which an office is held. It is a condition of holding office and once a person is appointed to a tenure post, his appointment begins when he joins and comes to an end on completion of the tenure, unless curtailed on justifiable grounds. Such a person does not superannuate, he only goes out of office on completion of his tenure and thus, the question of prematurely retiring him does not arise. In A.P. State Federation of Coop. Spinning Mills Ltd (supra), Respondent was appointed as General Manager (Finance) for a period of 3 years and prior to the said period coming to an end, his services were terminated. Respondent approached the High Court in a writ petition seeking quashing of the order and the learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition after coming to a conclusion that the termination order was innocuous and not penal in nature and termination being in accordance with the contract of service, after giving three months salary in lieu of the notice, required no interference. The Division Bench, allowing the appeal held that though the order on the face of it appeared to be innocuous, however, if the attendant circumstances were examined, more particularly, the stand in the counter affidavit, the conclusion was irresistible that the order was penal in nature and since penalty was imposed without affording opportunity to meet the charge, the order was unsustainable. This order of the Division Bench was challenged before the Supreme Court and the contention of the Appellant was that the reasons indicated in the order were the motive for termination and not the foundation, requiring an inquiry, prior to termination. The Supreme Court upheld the order of the Division Bench, to the extent that the order of termination was vitiated and ruled as follows:-
3.The legal position is fairly well settled that an order of termination of a temporary employee or a probationer or even a tenure employee, simpliciter without casting any stigma may not be interfered with by the court. But the court is not debarred from looking at the attendant circumstances, namely, the circumstances prior to the issuance of order of termination to find out whether the alleged inefficiency really was the motive for the order of termination or formed the foundation for the same order. If the court comes to a conclusion that the order was, in fact, the motive, then obviously the order would not be interfered with, but if the court comes to a conclusion that the so-called inefficiency was the real foundation for passing of order of termination, then obviously such an order would be held to be penal in nature and must be interfered with since the appropriate procedure has not been followed. The decisions of this Court relied upon by Mr K. Ram Kumar also stipulate that if an allegation of arbitrariness is made in assailing an order of termination, it will be open for the employer to indicate how and what was the motive for passing the order of termination, and it is in that sense in the counter-affidavit it can be indicated that the unsuitability of the person was the reason for which the employer acted in accordance with the terms of employment and it never wanted to punish the employee. But on examining the assertions made in paras 13 and 14 of the counter-affidavit, in the present case it would be difficult for us to hold that in the case in hand, the DEEKSHA DHINGRA 2026.01.29 DEEKSHA DHINGRA 10:52:44 +05'30' 9 Item No. 10 (C-2) O.A. No. 135/2025 appellant-employer really terminated the services in accordance with the terms of the employment and not by way of imposing the penalty in question.
4.In fact, the letter of the Commissioner for Handlooms and Director of Handlooms and Textiles dated 19-5-1993 was the foundation for the employer to terminate the services and as such the Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court was justified in holding that the order of termination is based upon a misconduct, though on the face of it, it is innocuous in nature. We therefore do not find any infirmity with the said conclusion of the Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court requiring our interference.
28. In the aforesaid case, the letter of the Commissioner for Handlooms and Director of Handlooms and Textiles was the foundation for the termination order and hence found to be stigmatic. It is thus trite that in a tenure employment, if the termination order of the employee is an order simplicitor and casts no stigma, it warrants no interference by the Court, however, if the attendant circumstances lead to a conclusion that termination is founded on allegations, then being penal in nature, the order would be untenable in law, if issued without affording an opportunity to the employee to defend the accusations.
29. Another judgment, which needs a mention and is close on facts, is in the case of Dr. Vijayakumaran C.P.V. v. Central University of Kerala and Others, (2020) 12 SCC 426, wherein the Supreme Court observed that the termination order was issued in the backdrop of Internal Complaints Committee Report and going by the terms and tenor of the order, it was incomprehensible to construe such an order to be an order simplicitor when the report of the Inquiry Committee was the foundation. The Supreme Court also reiterated the position of law that the material which amounts to stigma need not be contained in the termination order and may be in any document referred to therein, which reference will inevitably effect the future prospects of the incumbent and if so, the order must be construed as an ex facie stigmatic order of termination.
30. In the background of the principles of law elucidated in the aforementioned judgments, if one examines the nuances of the present case, it is luminously clear that several allegations permeated the first order viz: NFDC had not adhered to the prescribed procedures relating to release of advertisement spots to selected private channels; non-refund of 15% commission to the client Ministry; Rs. 4.29 crores charged in excess of actual expenditure from the Ministries; non-adherence to the standing operating procedures for co-production of films; and non-adherence to due process for utilization of funds for restoration of films. There can be no doubt that the order was founded on allegations and was not an innocuous or a simplicitor order of termination. In order to wriggle out of the legal implications that would have been a fall out of the stigmatic order, the order was withdrawn, however, as rightly pointed out by the Petitioner, the allegations were not wiped DEEKSHA DHINGRA 2026.01.29 DEEKSHA DHINGRA 10:52:44 +05'30' 10 Item No. 10 (C-2) O.A. No. 135/2025 out and despite omission of paragraph 2 thereof, the impugned order is a camouflage and founded on the same allegations, as admittedly, there was no fresh or any other reason/ trigger for truncating the five-year tenure. Minus the allegations, there is no cause for termination as it is nobody's case that Petitioner was otherwise unsuitable for the job.
31. Be it ingeminated and underscored that applying the law laid down in Dipti Prakash Banerjee (supra) and Dr. Vijayakumaran C.P.V. (supra), that the stigmatic part may not necessarily be contained in the order itself but if it is referable or traceable to another document which casts a stigma, it is enough to categorize the order as stigmatic, the impugned order cannot sustain. Clearly, the impugned order makes a reference to order dated 23.04.2018, passed by the Court in W.P.(C) No. 2163/2018 and this reference is enough to connect the dots to the previous order, allegations contained therein and the earlier litigation, which shall inevitably affect the future prospects of the Petitioner.
32. Another material fact that needs to be noted is that in furtherance of the constitution of the Committee to look into the complaint filed against NFDC by DAVP, CAG was asked to carry out performance audit of NFDC. Though NFDC had through Chief Financial Officer submitted its comments before the CAG but no final report has been tabled till date. It was pointed out that no other officer or office bearer of NFDC at any level whatsoever was issued a show cause notice or charge sheeted or even blamed for any lapse or irregularity, alleged in the complaint and only the Petitioner has been singled out and visited with the harsh consequence of termination, without even a hearing. The mere fact that despite the allegations levelled against NFDC as an organisation, not a single person, other than the Petitioner, has even been blamed and even CAG found merit in the comments sent by NFDC, which is why the final report was never tabled, speaks volumes of the illegality in the action of the Respondents in terminating the Petitioner. Therefore, for all the aforesaid reasons, the impugned order dated 24.04.2018 cannot be sustained and is hereby quashed and set aside.
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35. Accordingly, it is directed that the Respondents shall pay all outstanding dues of the Petitioner on account of salary and other allowances for the balance tenure of about 2 years 11 months. Petitioner is also held entitled to refund of all amounts recovered from her towards HRA etc., during this period. Payments shall be released within a period of eight weeks from today. "
12.In view of the aforesaid and the law laid down by the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in Nina Lath Gupta (Supra), the O.A. deserves to be allowed and the same is allowed with the following directions:-
DEEKSHA DHINGRA 2026.01.29 DEEKSHA DHINGRA 10:52:44 +05'30' 11 Item No. 10 (C-2) O.A. No. 135/2025 i. The impugned order dated 01.04.2024 is set aside. ii. The applicant shall be reinstated in service and shall be entitled to all consequential benefits in accordance with the relevant rules and instructions on the subject. iii. The aforesaid directions shall be complied with by the respondents as expeditiously as possible and preferably within six weeks from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this order. iv. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, the respondents shall be at liberty to initiate disciplinary proceedings, if they so wish, however, in accordance with the relevant rules and instructions on the subject.
13. There shall be no order as to costs.
(B. Anand) (R.N. Singh)
Member (A) Member (J)
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