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Delhi District Court

State vs Accused on 15 February, 2013

IN THE COURT OF DR. T. R. NAVAL, ADDITIONAL SESSIONS
  JUDGE, (SPECIAL FAST TRACK COURT) KARKARDOOMA
                    COURTS, DELHI

Unique Case I.D. No.02402R0003872012

SC NO. 03/13                  Date of Institution :22.02.2012
FIR No.131/10                 Date of Argument :13.02.2013
PS Mayur Vihar                Date of Order       :15.02.2013
U/S 493/376 IPC


State              Versus     Accused

                              C. Laxman
                              S/o Sh. Chella Kannu
                              R/o H.No. 22/423,
                              Trilokpuri, Delhi.

JUDGMENT

The facts in brief of the prosecution case are that on 17.04.2010 Ms. __X__, here in after referred to as the prosecutrix, arrived at P.S. Trilok Puri and lodged a complaint by stating that she had been living as a tenant in Trilokpuri Delhi and she had been doing a work of maid in the different houses at Pocket-I, Mayur Vihar-I, Delhi. Around 4 years ago, she became familiar with a boy Laxman who belonged to her caste and had been working as a driver at Pocket-II, Mayur Vihar-I, Delhi. After acquaintances they started meeting each other. After SC No.03/13 State vs. C. Laxman Page 1 of 23 sometime, he proposed for his marriage with her. Under the allurement of marriage, he took her at the house of his cousin Raju, son of his mother's sister who resided at 21 Block, Trilokpuri, and made physical relations with her under said allurement of marriage. He had been making physical relations with her up to 4 months prior to the date of reporting. She came to know that he was marrying with other girl. On her statement, police recorded a FIR bearing No. 131/10 at P.S. Mayur Vihar-I for the offences punishable u/s 493/376 IPC. She was taken to LBS Hospital where her medical examination, including her internal medical examination was conducted vide MLC. The doctor obtained samples during medical examination of the prosecutrix and handed over the same to W/Ct. Shakuntala who later on handed over the same to IO and that were taken into possession vide seizure memo. Accused Laxman surrendered in the court on 29.04.2010. He was formally arrested. His one day police remand was obtained. His arrest memo and personal search memo were prepared. He was interrogated and his disclosure statement was recorded. Accused was taken to LBS hospital on the same day and his MLC was prepared. Doctor also obtained various samples and those samples were handed over to Ct. Abhay Singh who handed over to I.O. and those were seized by the IO. Samples were deposited in PS malkhana SC No.03/13 State vs. C. Laxman Page 2 of 23 and later on sent to FSL. After recording of evidence, collection of FSL report, police filed a charge sheet against the accused for his trial for the offences punishable u/s 493/376 IPC.

2. Ld. Metropolitan Magistrate after supplying of copies of charge sheet and documents to the accused committed this case to the court of sessions.

3. Ld. District Judge/ASJ I/C, East District, vide his order dated 23.03.2012 opined that prima facie case for framing of charge against accused for the offences punishable u/s 376/493 IPC was made out. Therefore, charge against the accused for his trial for the said offences was framed and read over to him in vernacular language. He pleaded not guilty and claimed trial.

4. The prosecution, in order to prove its case examined W/Ct. Shakuntala as PW1; Ct. Satvir Singh as PW2; Ct. Abhay Singh as PW3; Retired ASI Chander Pal Singh as PW4; Ct. Ashok Kumar as PW5; HC Anil Kumar as PW6; Ms. __X__ as PW7; Smt. ___X___ as PW8; Dr. O.S. Tomar, Retired CMO, LBS Hospital, Delhi as PW9; SI M.K. Manoj as PW10; and Dr. Indresh Kumar Mishra, Sr. Scientific Officer (Biology) FSL, Rohini as PW11.

SC No.03/13 State vs. C. Laxman Page 3 of 23

5. Vide order No.20/372-512/F.3.(4)/ASJ/01/2013 dated 04.01.2013, on constitution of Special Fast Track Courts for trial of sexual offences, Hon'ble District & Sessions Judge, transferred this case to this court.

6. Prosecution further examined Retd. SI Nagender as PW12; Dr. Vinay Kumar Singh, Specialist, Forensic Medicine, LBS Hospital as PW13; and Dr. Anuradha Mishra, SAG (Senior Administrative Grade), LBS Hospital as PW14.

7. After closing of prosecution evidence statement of the accused u/s 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, here in after referred to as the Code, was recorded. All the material and incriminating evidence was put to him. Accused admitted that prosecutrix, who used to do sweeping work at Pocket-I, was known to him for the last 4-5 years and he was working as driver and that he was arrested on 29.04.2010 on his surrender in the court vide memo Ex.PW3/B and his personal search was conducted vide memo Ex.PW3/C and that police took his one day police remand and he was taken to LBS Hospital where his medical examination by PW9 Dr. O.S. Tomar was conducted vide MLC Ex.PW9/A and that his samples of blood and semen were taken and sealed with the seal of LBS Hospital SC No.03/13 State vs. C. Laxman Page 4 of 23 and handed over to Ct. Abay Singh who deposited the same in the malkhana and that PWs correctly identified him. However, he denied the rest of the evidence and pleaded that he never promised to marry her and he never had physical relations with the prosecutrix. He also pleaded that it was impossible to commit sexual intercourse with the prosecutrix in the house of his cousin brother as his family used to reside therein. He also pleaded that sister of the prosecutrix also deposed falsely against him. Accused opted to lead evidence in his defence.

8. In his defence, accused examined Sh. Murgan @ Raju as DW1; his wife Smt. Pooja as DW2; and Ms. Punnaa Jagi as DW3.

9. After closing of evidence by both the parties, I have heard arguments addressed by Ld. Additional Public Prosecutor for the State and Ld. Defence Counsel for accused and perused file.

10. In order to prove its case for the offence of cohabitation caused by a man deceitfully inducing a belief of lawful marriage punishable u/s 493 IPC, the prosecution has to prove firstly, that accused deceitfully made the SC No.03/13 State vs. C. Laxman Page 5 of 23 prosecutrix to believe that she was lawfully married to him, though she was not married with him; and secondly, cohabited or committed sexual intercourse with the prosecutrix under that belief.

11. In order to prove its case for the offence of rape, punishable u/s 376 IPC, the prosecution has to prove firstly that accused committed sexual intercourse with the prosecutrix and secondly, sexual intercourse was committed against her will or without her consent under false pretext to marry her.

12. It has been argued on behalf of Ld. Additional Public Prosecutor that prosecution witnesses have proved both the offences against the accused beyond any reasonable suspicion and shadow of doubt and the accused is liable to be held guilty and convicted for the said offences.

13. On the other hand, Ld. Defence Counsel for accused submitted that testimony of prosecutrix was self contradictory, unreliable and untrustworthy as there are contractions on material points. The prosecutrix even failed to identify the place of alleged commission of offence. She even failed to tell the exact date of commission of offence.

SC No.03/13 State vs. C. Laxman Page 6 of 23

She falsely implicated the accused as she wanted to marry him. He submitted that accused is entitled for acquittal by getting benefit of doubt.

14. Ld. Additional Public Prosecutor for the State submitted that the discrepancies highlighted by Ld. Defence Counse are minor in nature and they are liable to be ignored.

15. In support of her arguments, she relied on a case, State v. Jai Hind, 2012 VI AD (Delhi) 170 wherein it was held by Delhi High Court that:

"32. ***In Rameshwar v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1952 SC 54 where the Court held:
"The rule, which according to cases has hardened into one of law, is not that corroboration is essential before there can be a conviction, but that the necessity of corroboration, as a matter of prudence, except where the circumstances make it safe to dispense with it, must be present to the mind of the judge... The only rule of law is that this rule of prudence must be present to the mind of the judge or the jury as the case may be and be understood and appreciated by him or them. There is no rule of practice that there must, in every case, be corroboration before a conviction can be allowed to stand."*** "38. In State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh & Ors., AIR 1996 SC 1393, the Supreme Court held that in cases involving sexual offences, harassment, molestation etc. the court is duty bound to deal with such cases with utmost sensitivity. It was held that:
"The courts should examine the broader probabilities of a case and not get swayed by minor contradictions or SC No.03/13 State vs. C. Laxman Page 7 of 23 insignificant discrepancies in the statement of the prosecutrix, which are not of a fatal nature, to throw out an otherwise reliable prosecution case. If evidence of the prosecutrix inspires confidence, it must be relied upon without seeking corroboration of her statement in material particulars. If for some reason the court finds it difficult to place implicit reliance on her testimony, it may look for evidence which may lend assurances to her testimony, short of corroboration required in the case of an accomplice. The testimony of the prosecutrix must be appreciated in the background of the entire case and the trial court must be alive to its responsibility and be sensitive while dealing with cases involving sexual molestations."

16. After considering the arguments of Ld. Additional Public Prosecutor for the State and Ld. Defence Counsel and on analyzing the prosecution evidence on record, I come to the conclusion that prosecution has failed to prove its case against accused beyond any reasonable suspicion and shadow of doubt. The reasons which support my conclusion are firstly, that statement of prosecutrix is inconsistent, self contradictory and unreliable. For example, in her statement Ex.PW7/A, the prosecutrix stated that she was familiar with the accused for the last four years and after some time, he assured her that he would marry her and one year prior to the date of reporting, he took her to the house of his cousin brother Raju in 21 Block, Trilok Puri and under the allurement of marrying her, made physical relations with her and he SC No.03/13 State vs. C. Laxman Page 8 of 23 continued to do so up to four months prior to the date of reporting.

17. In the court as PW7, she deposed that before about three months prior to registration of FIR accused took her at the house of his cousin Raju who was residing in Block No.21, Trilokpuri, Delhi and promised to marry her and committed sexual intercourse with her forcibly. She again changed her testimony and in cross examination stated that first time sexual intercourse was committed with her in the month of February 2009. Thus in the statement made to the police, she stated that physical relations were started one year prior to the date of reporting the matter to the police and continued up to the period four months prior to reporting of matter. This is in my view a very material contractions.

18. There is other example of making inconsistent statement by the prosecutrix. In the statement Ex.PW7/A she stated that under the allurement of marriage she made physical relations with her. In the statement recorded u/s 161 of the Code, she stated that accused had also taken her to Madrasi Mata Mandir, 29 Block, Trilokpuri, Delhi about 1 ½ year prior to recording of her statement and he tied a yellow thread in her neck and told her that it was a SC No.03/13 State vs. C. Laxman Page 9 of 23 mangalsutra and that both of them were married. They would get the photo made subsequently and under that belief of marriage, the accused cohabited with her several times. In the court as PW7, she deposed that before four/three months prior to the registration of FIR accused took her at the house of his cousin Raju who was residing in Block No.21, Trilokpuri, Delhi and promised her to marry and then removed her clothes forcibly and committed sexual intercourse forcibly. She asked the accused for marriage with her. Accused promised her to marry within few days and therefore, accused committed sexual intercourse many times under such promise. He tied a 'peela dhaga' in her neck in a mandir and told her not to disclose any facts to anyone. Thus, she told to the police that she was first taken to temple and yellow thread was tied around her neck and she was told that it was manalsutra and that thereafter, accused committed cohabitation with her several times. But in the court she deposed in quiet contractions that he took her to his cousin's house and committed sexual intercourse forcibly and when she asked the accused for marriage, the accused promised her to marry within few days and after that yellow thread was tied around his neck. In my view this is also a contractions on very material point. This has also demolished the prosecution case u/s 493 IPC.

SC No.03/13 State vs. C. Laxman Page 10 of 23

19. On the point of showing place of occurrence of offence, the prosecutrix stated that she took the police to the place where accused had committed sexual intercourse with her. In cross examination the prosecutrix deposed that she could tell the location. PW12 IO deposed that the prosecutrix did not tell him any specific date or any specific place where the accused allegedly made physical relations with her. The prosecutrix could not identify the place where accused allegedly made physical relations with her.

20. My attention goes to a case Ashok Narang v. State, 2012 [1] JCC 482 wherein the Delhi High Court observed that:

"104. If one integral part of the story put forth by witness was not believable, then the entire case failed. It is settled law that where witness makes two inconsistence statements in their evidence either at one stage of both stages, the testimony of said witness becomes unreliable and unworthy of credence and in the absence of special circumstances; no conviction can be based on the evidence of said witnesses."

21. My attention also goes to a case, Babu Lal and Others v. State, 1994 JCC 111 wherein, the Delhi High Court observed that:

"10. As far as these appellants, namely Babu Lal, Arjun Das and Leela Ram are concerned, there are material contradictions in the statements of the two injured, Om SC No.03/13 State vs. C. Laxman Page 11 of 23 Parkash and Bhagwan Das who are the real brothers. The other alleged eye witnesses have also contradicted themselves on the most material points and the contradictions cannot be said to be minor and have occurred on account of passage of time. Moti Lal, PW13 on whose statement the case was registered has also not supported the case of prosecution in as much as he has denied that he has seen the incident or he saw these appellants giving injuries to the injured.*** There are serious lapses in the prosecution story in connecting these appellants with the offence. The story put up by the prosecution as far as these appellants are concerned, is unbelievable and doubtful."

22. My attention also goes to a case, Labh Singh v. State of M.P., IX-1986(3) Crimes 176, wherein the accused was acquitted for the offence punishable u/s 376 IPC on the ground that there were material contradictions in the prosecution case which were causing doubt on the prosecution story.

23. Secondly, as the testimony of the prosecutrix is inconsistent and contradictory and it has not been corroborated by any other witness so the principles of law laid down in case State v. Jai Hind, 2012 VI AD (Delhi) 170, relied on by Ld. Addl. Public Prosecutor will not provide any benefit to the prosecution.

24. Thirdly, the prosecutrix in her cross examination, inter alia, admitted that she did not hesitate SC No.03/13 State vs. C. Laxman Page 12 of 23 to meet the accused. She did not tell the hospital authorities that accused happened to be her boyfriend for the last five years. She developed intimacy with the accused and started having faith on him. These admissions further lead to the conclusion that prosecutrix, freely and voluntarily accompanied the accused. This provides benefit to the accused to create doubt about the genuineness of the prosecution case.

25. My attention goes to a case Uday v. State of Karnataka, AIR 2003 SC 163: 2003 AIR SCW 1035. In that case the prosecutrix was a grown up girl studying in a college. She was deeply in love with the accused appellant. She was, however, aware of the fact that since they belonged to different castes, marriage was not possible. In any event the proposal for their marriage was bound to be seriously opposed by their family members. She admits having told so to the appellant when he proposed to her the first time. She had sufficient intelligence to understand the significance and moral quality of the act she was consenting to. That is why she kept it a secret as long as she could. Despite this, she did not resist the overtures of the appellant, and in fact succumbed to it. She thus freely exercised a choice between resistance and assent. The Apex Court held that:

SC No.03/13 State vs. C. Laxman Page 13 of 23
"The consent given by the prosecutrix to sexual intercourse with a person with whom she is deeply in love on a promise that he would marry her on a later date, cannot be said to be given under a 'misconception of fact'. A false promise is not a fact within the meaning of the Code. There is no strait jacket formula for determining whether consent given by the prosecutrix to sexual intercourse is voluntary, or whether it is given under a misconception of fact. The Court must, in each case, consider the evidence before it and the surrounding circumstances, before reaching a conclusion, because each case has its own peculiar facts which may have a bearing on the question whether the consent was voluntary, or was given under a misconception of fact. It must also weigh the evidence keeping in view the fact that the burden is on the prosecution to prove each and every ingredient of the offence, absence of consent being one of them"

26. In re, Anthony alias Bakthavatsalu, AIR 1960 Mad 308, it was observed :

"A woman is said to consent only when she agrees to submit herself while in free and unconstrained possession of her physical and moral power to act in a manner she wanted. Consent implies the exercise of a free and untrammelled right to forbid or withhold what is being consented to; it always is a voluntary and conscious acceptance of what is proposed to be done by another and concurred in by the former."

27. The principles of law laid down in case of Uday v. State of Karnataka, (Supra), and In re, Anthony alias Bakthavatsalu (Supra), are applicable on the facts of the present case and therefore, it is held that the prosecution could not prove lack of consent of the prosecutrix or that accused cohabited with her or made physical relations with SC No.03/13 State vs. C. Laxman Page 14 of 23 her without her consent or on false assurance of marriage.

28. Fourthly, the testimony of other witnesses are formal in nature. For example, PW1 proved memo Ex.PW1/A vide which sealed parcels were taken into possession. Ct. PW2 proved the fact that the accused was taken to hospital. PW3 proved arrest memo Ex. PW3/B and personal search memo Ex.PW3/C. He also proved disclosure statement as Ex.PW3/A but that is not admissible in evidence. PW4 proved copy of FIR as Ex.PW4/A and copy of rukka as Ex.PW4/B. PWs proved the fact of sending exhibits to the FSL. PW6 proved entry of the malkhana register as Ex.PW6/A. Testimony of PW8 is of hearsay in nature. PW9, PW10 and PW13 proved MLC Ex.PW9/A of accused showing his potency to commit sexual intercourse. PW11 proved FSL report as Ex.PW11/A and Ex.PW11/B. PW14 proved MLC of prosecutrix. PW12 is I.O. Thus, PW7 is the only material witness of the prosecution. In the absence of reliable and trustworthy testimony of the prosecutrix, these witnesses will not be able to prove the prosecution case.

29. Fifthly, the scientific evidence in the form of MLC of prosecutrix EX.PW7/B and MLC of accused Ex.PW9/A and FSL report Ex.PW11/A and Ex.PW11/B could not prove any SC No.03/13 State vs. C. Laxman Page 15 of 23 link of commission of sexual intercourse by the accused with prosecutrix. The samples were putrified and the result remained inconclusive. These FSL reports could not connect the accused with alleged sexual intercourse with the prosecutrix. In these circumstances, it may be held that there is absence of scientific evidence to support the prosecution case. This has further created doubt about the genuineness of the prosecution case.

30. My decision finds support by a case Sanya alias Sanyasi Challan Seth v. State of Orissa, 1993 CRI. L.J. 2784, wherein it was observed by Orissa High Court that:

"In the absence of any medical opinion which could have corroborated the sole testimony of the prosecutrix, it would not be safe to maintain the conviction. Although it is well settled that the lone testimony of the victim lady can be made the sole basis for conviction and no corroboration is necessary in case the same is accepted as true and free from suspicion, yet as has been mentioned above, because of the inherent defect in presenting the prosecution case, the same is not free from doubt. As has been held in many cases all that is required is that, there must be some circumstance which should not support the version of the victim lady by way of corroboration. But all those elements are lacking in the case. The witnesses are found to be related to each other and there is no independent witness although I find from the materials on record that there were also few others including Sureshwar who were accompanying P.W. 1 but not examined. The medical evidence is also absent with regard to the opinion as to the fact of rape. For the reasons above the conviction is liable to be set aside."

[Emphasis supplied] SC No.03/13 State vs. C. Laxman Page 16 of 23

31. My decision further finds support by a case Lachhman and another v. State, 1973 CRI. L.J. 1658, wherein the Himachal Pradesh High Court held that:

"It is a very well-settled rule that in rape cases the evidence of the complainant must be corroborated. A charge of rape is a very easy charge to make and a very difficult one to refute, and in common fairness to accused persons, the courts insist on corroboration of the complainant's story. However, the nature of the corroboration must necessarily depend on the facts of each particular case. Where rape is denied, the sort of corroboration one looks for is medical evidence showing injury to the private parts of the complainant, injury to other parts of her body, which may have occasioned in a struggle, seminal stains on her clothes or the clothes of the accused or on the places where the offence is alleged o have been committed; and in all cases importance is attached to the subsequent conduct of the complainant. Whether she makes a charge promptly or not is always relevant. (Emperor v. Mahadeo Tatya, AIR 1942 Bom 121 (FB). In Mahla Ram v. Emperor (AIR 1924 Lah 669), also it has been held that where there is no independent evidence in support of the statement of the complainant that she was raped by the accused it would be most dangerous to base a conviction on her uncorroborated testimony alone." [Emphasis supplied]

32. Sixthly, there is unexplained unreasonable delay in lodging FIR in the present case. Prosecutrix in cross examination admitted that marriage of accused was solemnized on 17.04.2010 and she came to know about this fact on 16.04.2010 but she went to PS only on 19.04.2010. She has not explained as to why she did not SC No.03/13 State vs. C. Laxman Page 17 of 23 lodge the report immediately. The delay has further created doubt about the genuineness of the prosecution case.

33. My decision finds support by principles of law laid down in a case Jagdish v. State, (Delhi), 1987(1) R.C.R. (Criminal) 613 : 1987(1) AICLR 465, wherein the Delhi High Court observed:

"8. This inference is further fortified from the delay of 46 hours and 45 minutes in the lodging of the First Information Report after the alleged occurrence. Regarding the importance of the lodging of the First Information Report at the earliest, the Supreme Court authority reported as Thulia Kali v. The State of Tamil Nadu, 1972 S.C.C. (Crl.) 543, is highly instructive wherein it held as follows at page 547 :- "First Information Report in a Criminal case is an extremely vital and valuable piece of evidence for the purpose of corroborating the oral evidence adduced at the trial. The importance of the above report can hardly be overestimated from the stand point of the accused. The object of insisting upon prompt lodging of the report to police in respect of commission of an offence is to obtain early information regarding the circumstances in which the crime was committed, the names of the actual culprits and the part played by them as well as the names of eye-witnesses present at the scene of occurrence. Delay in lodging the first information report quite after results in embellishment which is a creature of after-thought. On account of delay, the report not only gets bereft of the advantage of spontaneity, danger creeps in of the introduction of colored version, exaggerated account or concocted story as a result of deliberation and consultation. It is, therefore essential that the delay in the lodging of the first information report should be SC No.03/13 State vs. C. Laxman Page 18 of 23 satisfactorily explained.
9. In that case there was delay of more than 20 hours in lodging the F.I.R. though the police station was only at a distance of two miles and it was held that this circumstance would raise considerable doubt regarding the veracity of the case and it was not safe to base conviction upon to."

34. Seventhly, my attention goes to a case reported as Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1984 SC 1622, wherein it was inter alia held by Apex court that:

"It is well settled that where on the evidence two possibilities are available or open, one which goes in favour of the prosecution and the other which benefits an accused, the accused is undoubtedly entitled to the benefit of doubt."

The principles of law laid down in above case are applicable on the facts of present case and therefore, it is held that accused is entitled to get benefit of doubt as in the present case two views, one, leads to his innocence and another leads to his involvement in the crime are possible.

35. Eighthly, the accused has succeeded in creating doubt in prosecution case so he is entitled to get benefit of doubt.

SC No.03/13 State vs. C. Laxman Page 19 of 23

36. My decision finds support by the case Ajmer Singh and another v. State of Haryana, II-1989(1) Crimes 424, it was held by P&H High Court that:

"It is not necessary for the accused to substantially prove their plea. Suffice it to say that if the accused succeeds in creating a doubt, they would be entitled to benefit of it."

37. Ninethly, my decision finds support by a case Bharwada Bhoginbhai Hirjibhai v. State of Gujarat, (SC), 1983 A.I.R. (S.C.) 753, wherein the Apex Court observed:

"The solution of problems cannot therefore be identical. It is conceivable in the Western Society that a female may level false accusation as regards sexual molestation against a male for several reasons such as :-
(1) The female may be a 'gold digger' and may well have an economic motive to extract money by holding out the gun of prosecution or public exposure.*** (3) She may want to wreak vengeance on the male for real or imaginary wrongs. She may have a grudge against a particular male, or males in general, and may have the design to square the account.
(4) She may have been induced to do so in consideration of economic rewards, by a person interested in placing the accused in a compromising or embarrassing position, on account of personal or political vendetta.*** (6) She may do so on account of jealousy.
SC No.03/13 State vs. C. Laxman Page 20 of 23
(7) She may do so to win sympathy of others.
(8) She may do so upon being repulsed.

10. By and large these factors are not relevant to India, and the Indian conditions. Without the fear of making too wide a statements or of overstating the case, it can be said that rarely will a girl or a woman in India make false allegations of sexual assault on account of any such factor as has been just enlisted. The statement is generally true in the context of the urban as also rural Society. It is also by and large true in the context of the sophisticated, not so sophisticated, and unsophisticated society. Only very rarely can one conceivably come across an exception or two and that too possibly from amongst the urban elites."

[Emphasis supplied]

38. In the present case, the prosecutrix also admitted that she wanted to marry accused. The evidence on record has also established that their marriage could not be solemnized. Probably this may be a motive to lodge a complaint against the accused.

39. Tenthly, my decision finds support by a case Pradeep Saini & Anr. v. State, 2010 IV AD (Delhi) 232, wherein the Delhi High Court observed that:

"51. Depositions of witnesses, whether they are examined on the prosecution side or defence side or as court witnesses, are oral evidence in the case and hence the scrutiny thereof has to be without any predilection or bias. No witness is entitled to get better treatment merely because he was examined as a prosecution witness or SC No.03/13 State vs. C. Laxman Page 21 of 23 even as a court witness. It is judicial scrutiny which is warranted in respect of the depositions of all witnesses for which different yardsticks cannot be prescribed. As observed by Supreme Court in the decision reported as Dudh Nath Pandey Vs. State of UP AIR 1981 SC 911:-
".....Defence witnesses are entitled to equal treatment with those of the prosecution; and courts ought to overcome their traditional instinctive disbelief in defence witnesses......"

40. In the present case, accused has examined three witnesses. PW Raju, cousin brother of the accused denied the fact of visiting his house by the prosecutrix and accused together. His wife and other witnesses also deposed that there was a family of Raju consisting of his wife and children and it was impossible for the accused to commit rape on the prosecutrix in the house of Raju. This provides benefit to the accused.

41. Lastly, it is one of the basic principles of criminal jurisprudence that let hundreds of criminal may go unpunished but one innocent person should not be punished. It would be just fair and appropriate, if accused is given benefit of doubt as the prosecution has failed to prove its case against him beyond any reasonable suspicion or shadow of doubt.

SC No.03/13 State vs. C. Laxman Page 22 of 23

CONCLUSION

42. In view of the above reasons, discussion and evidence on record and particularly discussed here in above, it is held that the prosecution has failed to prove beyond reasonable suspicion and shadow of doubt that accused C. Laxman either committed offence of deceitfully causing the prosecutrix to believe that she was lawfully married to him and under that belief he cohabited with her or the accused committed rape on the prosecutrix against her will and without her consent. Consequently, by giving benefit of doubt to the accused, he is acquitted for the offences punishable u/s 493/376 IPC.

43. However, accused is directed to furnish his personal bond for a sum of Rs.20,000/- with one surety of like amount within seven days as per provisions of Section 437A of the Code for a period of six months.

44. After furnishing of surety bonds file be consigned to Record Room.

Announced in the Open Court Dated: 15.02.2013 (DR. T.R. NAVAL) Additional Sessions Judge, (SFTC) Karkardooma Courts, Delhi SC No.03/13 State vs. C. Laxman Page 23 of 23