Madras High Court
K.Natarajan vs Mrs.Gopalasundari on 6 September, 2011
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS DATED: 06.09.2011 CORAM: THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE S.NAGAMUTHU Second Appeal No.1172 of 1996 K.Natarajan .. Appellant - Vs - 1. Mrs.Gopalasundari 2. M.Meenakshi Sundaram (died) 3. M.Murali 4. M.Hari 5. M.Ganesh 6. M.Balaji (RR 3 to 6 were brought on record as the LRs of the deceased R2 vide order dated 07.04.2011 made in C.M.P.No.581/2010) .. Respondents Prayer:- Second Appeal filed under Section 100 of C.P.C., against the Decree and Judgment dated 29.02.1996, made in A.S.No.113 of 1995 on the file of the learned V Additional Judge, City Civil Court, Chennai reversing the Decree and Judgment dated 31.01.1995, made in O.S.No.4339 of 1986 on the file of the learned XII Assistant Judge, City Civil Court, Chennai. For Appellant : Mr.K.Alagappan For Respondents : Mr.R.Krishnasami Senior Advocate for Mr.C.Rajan. - - - - - J U D G M E N T
The second defendant in O.S.No.4339 of 1986 on the file of the learned XII Assistant Judge, City Civil Court, Chennai is the appellant. The first respondent herein is the plaintiff in the suit. The other defendants in the suit have not been arrayed as parties in the second appeal. The above suit was filed by the first respondent for declaration of title in the 'A' scheduled property and for recovery of possession of the 'B' scheduled property. There were as many as six defendants in the suit originally. During the pendency of the suit, the first defendant Mr.Manicka Sastrigal died in whose place, the 7th defendant was brought on record as his Legal Representative. During the pendency of the this second appeal, the second respondent (the 7th defendant) Mr.Meenakshi Sundaram died in whose place the respondents 3 to 6 have been brought on record as his Legal Representatives. The suit was ultimately dismissed by the Trial Court. As against the same, the plaintiff preferred an appeal in A.S.No.113 of 1995 before the V Additional Judge, City Civil Court, Chennai. In the said first appeal, the defendants 2 and 7 alone were arrayed as respondents and the other defendants were not arrayed as parties at all. The lower Appellate Court by decree and judgment dated 29.02.1996, allowed the appeal, set aside the decree and judgment of the Trial Court and decreed the suit as prayed for. As against the same, the second defendant has come up with this second appeal.
2. The case of the plaintiff as could be culled out from the plaint is as follows:
The suit property has been described as 'A' Schedule and 'B' Schedule. The 'B' Schedule property is a portion of 'A' Schedule property. According to the plaintiff the suit property was originally owned by one Mrs.Lakshmi Ammal. She purchased the same by means of a registered sale deed dated 22.12.1938. Mrs.Lakshmi Ammal died on 11.04.1956, leaving behind her daughter by name Mrs.Muthulakshmi Ammal and two sons by name Mr.Manicka Sastrigal and Mr.Ramasamy. Mrs.Muthulakshmi Ammal is the mother of the plaintiff. Mrs.Muthulakshmi Ammal died. Mr.Ramasamy predeceased Mrs.Muthulakshmi Ammal in the year 1969. Mr.Manicka Sasthrigal (since died) is the first defendant in the suit. According to the plaintiff, after the demise of Mrs.Lakshmi Ammal on 11.04.1956, the mother of the plaintiff Mrs.Muthulakshmi Ammal become the absolute owner of the suit property as per law of succession prevailing as on 11.04.1956. Mrs.Muthulakshmi Ammal died in the year 1959 leaving behind the plaintiff as his sole legal heir to succeed to her estate. Thus, the plaintiff has become the absolute owner of the 'A' scheduled property. While so, the first defendant has sold away a portion of the 'A' Schedule property measuring 448 sq.ft. with building at No.15, Namasivaya Mudali Street, Triplicane, Madras by means of a registered sale deed dated 28.02.1986 as though he had title for the said property to convey. The property thus sold away by the first defendant to the second defendant which forms part of 'A' schedule property has been described as 'B' schedule property in the plaint. On coming to know about the transaction, the plaintiff issued a legal notice on 11.04.1986 to the defendants asserting her title and disputing the sale made by the first defendant. But the second defendant has sent a reply denying the claim of the plaintiff. According to him, by virtue of the sale deed dated 28.02.1986, the second defendant has taken possession of the 'B' schedule property and he has become the absolute owner of the same. Since the defendants denied the title of the plaintiff and since the second defendant declined to vacate the 'B' schedule property, the present suit has been filed both for declaration of title in respect of the 'A' scheduled property and for recovery of possession in respect of the 'B' scheduled property.
3. The second defendant who is the appellant before this Court, in his written statement, contended that though the sale deed dated 22.12.1938, stood in the name of Mrs.Lakshmi Ammal, it was purchased as benami in her name only by the first defendant Mr.Manicka Sastrigal. Mrs.Lakshmi Ammal died on 11.04.1956 leaving behind her only legal representative Mr.Manicka Sastrigal who is the first defendant in the suit. From the first defendant, the second defendant has purchased a portion of the 'A' scheduled property viz., 'B' scheduled property on 28.02.1986. Thus, the second defendant has become the absolute owner of the 'B' scheduled property. The first defendant in his written statement contended that though the property stood in the name of Mrs.Lakshmi Ammal, it was purchased as Benami by him only. Since the first defendant died during the pendency of the suit and since the 7th defendant is his legal heir, the 7th defendant is the absolute owner of the remaining property in 'A' schedule. The 7th defendant has filed a separate written statement in which he has stated that the property was purchased as benami in the name of Mrs.Lakshmi Ammal by his father viz., the first defendant and on the demise of the first defendant, the 7th defendant has title and enjoyment of the suit property.
4. Based on the above pleadings, the Trial Court framed appropriate issues. On the side of the plaintiff, she examined herself as P.W.1 and as many as 13 documents were marked as Exs.A1 to A13. On the side of the defendants, the second defendant examined himself as D.W.2 and examined one more witness besides marking 16 documents as Exs.A1 to A16.
5. Having considered all the above materials, the Trial Court dismissed the suit and the appeal preferred by the plaintiff before the lower Appellate Court was allowed and the suit was decreed as prayed for. That is how the appellant is before this Court with this second appeal.
6. When this second appeal was admitted by this Court, the following substantial questions of law were framed viz., "1. Was the Court below correct in holding that Muthulakshmi acquired full title to the suit property on the death of Lakshmi Ammal and on her death the plaintiff succeeded to the same as her sole heir in accordance with the Hindu Succession Act ?
2. Whether the finding of the lower appellate Court in the absence of any cross appeal by the first respondent on the question of benami transaction is correct in view of the provisions of Rule 22 of Order 41 C.P.C. ?
3. Whether the parties to the suit, particularly, the defendants are entitled to raise the plea of adverse possession and the consequent adjudication of the same by the Court below is correct ?"
7. I have heard the learned counsel on either side and perused the records carefully.
8. As of now there is no dispute that the property was purchased in the name of Mrs.Lakshmi Ammal by means of a registered sale deed dated 22.12.1938 (Ex.A1). Though it is contended by the defendants 2 and 7 that the property was purchased only by the first defendant as benami in the name of his mother Mrs.Lakshmi Ammal, absolutely there is no evidence for the same. It is needless to point out that there shall be a presumption in law that the contents of the document are true and such presumption is available under Section 90 of the Evidence Act. Of course such a presumption is rebuttable. But, the said presumption has not been rebutted in this case by the defendants in any manner. Thus, it has been clearly established from the evidence available on record that the property was purchased only by Mrs.Lakshmi Ammal in the year 1938.
9. There is no dispute that Mrs.Lakshmi Ammal died on 11.04.1956, i.e. some time before the coming into force of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. It is needless to point out that the Hindu Succession Act came into force on 18.06.1956. Therefore, the Hindu Succession Act is not applicable in respect of the suit property left behind by Mrs.Lakshmi Ammal on her demise on 11.04.1956. According to the plaintiff, the suit property is a Shridhana property and so it should be inherited only by the female heirs of Mrs.Lakshmi Ammal as per the Hindu Law which prevailed prior to the Hindu Succession Act, 1956.
10. The learned counsel for the appellant would submit that the suit property cannot be treated as a shridhana property at all. He would submit that since the property was purchased in the name of Mrs.Lakshmi Ammal and not inherited by her, it cannot be treated as her shridhana property at all so as to hold that her daughter will get preference over her son as per the Hindu Law which prevailed prior to the coming into force of the Hindu Succession Act. In this regard, the learned counsel for the appellant would rely on the judgment of this Court in Tadiboyina Peda Punnayya Vs. Dabbakuti Kattamma reported in 1915 II L.W. page 415 wherein this Court has held as follows:
"Now the Full Bench decision of this Court does not by any means proceed on the construction that a woman's property of whatsoever kind always descends to her own heirs. As already pointed out one important exception (property acquired by inheritance) is specially recognised. On the other hand, their Lordships of the Privy Council do not go so far as to say that the dictum of Vijnaneswara regarding property derived from the additional sources specified in cl.2 of the section is devoid of authority. Twice in the course of their judgment they are careful to explain the very limited question for their determination (the devolution of a women's property acquired by partition) and, as I understand them, they go no further in passage relied on than to point out that the Mitakshara passage should not be regarded as an authoritative and conclusive rule of law placing all kinds of woman's property in the same footing as regards devolution. What their decision would have been regarding the devolution of property acquired in the way the suit property was acquired it is impossible to say.
I, therefore, am of opinion that the Privy Council decision is no authority for refusing to follow the ruling in Subramanian Chetti Vs. Arunachelam Chetti. I would therefore, dismiss the second appeal with costs."
In the penultimate paragraph of the Judgment, this Court has further held as follows:
"What, then, is the rule of succession applicable to property which must be taken to have been the absolute property under the entire control of a woman governed by the Hindu Lawproperty, with reference to the succession to which, it was conceded before us, that the woman must be taken to be the stock of descent ? It seems to me that for the reasons indicated in Subramanian Chetti V. Arunachelam Chetti, in the case of property found to be the absolute property of a woman under her entire and unfettered control, there ought to be only one rule of succession recognised in Madras, namely, the rule of succession with reference to Stridhanam property. The learned pleader for the appellant had very great difficulty in suggesting any other rule as being applicable. It was impossible for him not to concede that Subbamma must be taken to be the stock of descent: and his argument could, therefore, be only treated on the basis that Subbamma's heirs must be taken to be her sons, either in preference to, or conjointly with her daughter. It seems to me to be impossible to give effect to a rule of law which cannot even be stated with certainty by the person who desires to rely upon it. The only authorities that could be cited in favour of the nebulous suggestion made by the appellant were drawn from Bombay and based on the Mayukha-- a text which, it is admitted, is not prevalent in Madras. This fact and the great weight due to Subramanian Chetti Vs. Arunachelam Chetti, enable me to omit from consideration the decision given by the Bombay High Court, although Westropp, C.J., and West and Telang, JJ., took part in those decisions (Vijiarangam Vs. Lakshuman)"
11. In yet another case in Andal Ammal Vs. Sivaprakasa Sethurayar reported in AIR 1963 Madras 452 in paragraph 6 of the Judgment this Court has held as follows:
"6...The Hindu Succession Act is not retrospective in its operation but Section 14(1) is one of the exceptions to this, and thereby absolute rights are conferred in property acquired by a female Hindu even before the Act come into force. But Section 14(1) is not retrospective in the sense that its benefit could be availed of by female Hindus who were dead before the Act came into force."
12. The learned senior counsel for the respondents relied on a Full Bench judgment of this Court in Narayani Ammal Vs. Govindaswami Naidu reported in 1975 MLJ 259, wherein in paragraph 12 the Full Bench has held as follows:
"12.....It seems to us that having regard to this trend of legislation reflecting the changing social approach to succession, we will be justified in interpreting the word daughter in the original text as including an illegitimate daughter as well. We are also of opinion that once an illegitimate daughter is an heir, as we hold she is, to succeed to her mother's stridhana property, so long as she is available, the son, who is not in the nearer line of stridhana heirs, cannot have preference and exclude an illegitimate daughter. On that view, we are of opinion that Meenakshi Vs. Muniandi, should be overruled."
13. A close reading of the above judgments would go a long way to show that irrespective of the fact that the property was purchased by a Hindu female out of her own funds, the said property shall only be her stridhana property and such stridhana property shall devolve upon her female heirs namely her daughters on her demise and not on her sons. In the case on hand, admittedly, the suit property was purchased under Ex.A1 by Mrs.Lakshmi Ammal and it was not inherited by her. Therefore, it was her stridhana property. Since Mrs.Lakshmi Ammal died prior to the coming into force of the Hindu Succession Act, the said stridhana property should have devolved only on her daughter viz., Mrs.Muthulakshmi Ammal, because as held by this Court, Hindu Succession Act is not retrospective in its operation. Had Mrs.Lakshmi Ammal died after coming into force of the Hindu Succession Act, as per Section 14 of the Act, the property would have become her absolute property and inheritance would have taken place as per Section 15. But in this case, since Mrs.Lakshmi Ammal died prior to the coming into force of the Hindu Succession Act, being the only daughter, Mrs.Muthulakshmi Ammal had inherited the same and had become the absolute owner of the said property. Mrs.Muthulakshmi Ammal admittedly died on 23.04.1969, therefore as per the Hindu Succession Act, the plaintiff, being the daughter of Mrs.Muthulakshmi Ammal has become the absolute owner of the suit property. Therefore, there can be no doubt that the plaintiff is entitled for declaration of title as prayed for.
14. An argument is also advanced before this Court that this appeal is liable to be dismissed for non-impleading of necessary parties. It is submitted that the defendants 3 to 6 have not been arrayed as parties and therefore this appeal is bad for non-joinder of necessary parties. But the learned senior counsel appearing for the respondents would submit that under Order XLI Rule 20 C.P.C. they are not necessary parties and therefore there is no need to add them as parties at all. From the records it could be seen that the defendants 3 to 6 did not make any claim over the suit property and they had chosen to remain ex parte before the Trial Court and therefore they were not added as parties in the first appeal and thus, in this second appeal also they were not added as parties.
15. The question is whether the non-impleading of the defendants 3 to 6 shall be a ground to dismiss the second appeal. In my considered opinion, it is not so. Order XLI Rule 20 reads as follows:-
"O.41, R.20:- Power to adjourn hearing and direct person appearing interested to be made respondents:-
(1) Where it appears to the Court at the hearing that any person who was a party to the suit in the Court from whose decree the appeal is preferred, but who has not been made a party to the appeal, is interested in the result of the appeal, the Court may adjourn the hearing to a future day to be fixed by the Court and direct that such person be made a respondent.
(2) No respondent shall be added under this rule, after the expiry of the period of limitation for appeal, unless the Court, for reasons to be recorded, allows that to be done, on such terms as to costs as it thinks fit."
16. A reading of the said provision would make it abundantly clear that unless the party before the lower Court is a necessary party, there is no need to implead him in the appeal simply because he happened to be a party before the lower Court. It all depends upon the fact as to whether he is a necessary party to the appeal. It is crystal clear that the defendants 3 to 6 did not make any claim at all over the suit property and they remained ex parte. Thus, they are not necessary parties and therefore they need not be impleaded at all. Thus, this appeal is not bad for non-joinder of defendants 3 to 6. Thus, all the substantial questions of law are answered against the appellant.
17. In the result the appeal fails and the same is dismissed. The judgment and decree of the lower appellate Court is confirmed. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.
06.09.2011
kk
Index : Yes
Internet : Yes
S.NAGAMUTHU,J.
kk
To
1. The V Additional Judge,
City Civil Court, Chennai.
2. The XII Assistant Judge,
City Civil Court, Chennai.
3. The Section Officer,
V.R. Section,
High Court, Madras.
S.A.No.1172 of 1996
06.09.2011