Karnataka High Court
Pandurang Ganpat Aundkar vs Anant Hari Gaurav on 21 January, 1992
Equivalent citations: ILR1992KAR1751, 1992(2)KARLJ93
ORDER Shivashankar Bhat, J.
1. W.P.No. 7571 of 1987 has become this Revision Petition. Petitioner is the tenant residing in the premises in question. Present proceedings were commenced in the year 1976 by the respondent seeking eviction of the tenant under Section 21 (1)(a), (h), (j) and (k) of the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1971 ('the Act', for short). Premises is in Chikodi town;
monthly rent is Rs. 13/-. It is unnecessary to refer to the claim under other clauses, except the one made under Clauses (j) and (k) because the trial Court rejected the claim of the landlord under those clauses and directed eviction under Clauses (j) and (k) ofSection21 (1) of the Act. Landlord did not challenge this finding. Tenant filed the Revision Petition under Section 50, which was dismissed by the District Court. Hence the present Revision Petition under Section 115 of the C.P.C. by the tenant.
2. The order of the District Court is basically under Section 21 (1)(j); it ordered:
"The revision petition is dismissed. The revision petitioner-tenant is directed to hand over the vacant possession of the petition premises to the respondent landlord within three months from this day.
The petitioner-landlord is directed to put up a new construction within one year from the date of taking actual possession of the petition premises from the respondent-tenant and after the completion of the new building, the revision petitioner-tenant is entitled to get reasonable accommodation in the new construction on the reasonable rental amount."
3. Mr.Visveswara, the learned Counsel for the petitioner contended that when a claim under Clause (h) is rejected, there is no scope to order eviction under Clause (j). In support of his contention, DINANATH AND ANR. v. GOPALA KRISHNA (dead) BY LRs, was cited. The said Decision pertains to the interpretation of Section 21 (1)(I) and it was said that,-
"The High Court, in our view, had misunderstood the scope of Clause (I). The learned Judges understood it to mean that all that the landlord had to prove was that he had the financial capacity and had acquired the necessary sanction of the concerned authority. That the expression 'reasonably' and bona fide require more than mere financial capacity and the sanction of the authorities was not appreciated by the High Court. These two expressions are present in Clause (h) also, but that clause deals with a different situation and it cannot, therefore, be read into Clause (I). But the expressions in both the provisions must be adduced by the landlord as to the reasonableness and the bona fide character of his requirements. While Clause (h) refers to a landlord's requirement of occupation of an existing building, Clause (I)refers to a vacant land required by the landlord for construction of new building. His reasonable and bona fide requirements must be established by the landlord, irrespective and independent of any sanction which he may have obtained from the local authority. That the landlord has obtained the necessary sanction of the local authority and that he is financially capable of constructing a building will not by themselves mean that his requirements are reasonable and bona fide. Although his financial capacity may be one of the elements which may be taken into account, that by itself, in our view, would not be sufficient to establish the reasonableness and the bona fide character of his requirements.
These are aspects which must be considered solely with reference to the pleadings and the evidence on record. The High Court does not seem to have properly and correctly interpreted Clause (I) or appreciated the evidence on record."
4. In fact, situation under Clause (h) is quite different from the one under Clause (I) and the subject matter under Clause (I) has to be land on which new building is proposed to be put up.
5. Under Clause (h), the leased premises is required by the landlord for his own occupation and the said requirement for His own occupation has to be proved to be reasonable and bona fide. The requirement thus, to be established is with reference to the requirement to occupy the premises by the landlord. Under Clause (j) the requirement is of another kind; here, landlord requires the premises for the immediate purpose of demolition, with a view to erect a new building thereon. This requirement has nothing to do with the requirement of accommodation for the occupation of the landlord. The premises is required, under Clause (j) for the purpose of immediate demolition etc. The user to which the constructed building is to be put up is not the concern of Clause (j), by itself, though the requirement to be established is the requirement of the landlord, without reference to the existing structure.
6. In NETA RAM AND ORS. v. JIWAN LAL AND ANR., the Supreme Court considered a provision similar to Clause (j) of Section 21(1). That matter arose out of East Punjab Rent Restrictions Act. Supreme Court held, at page 502:
"The Controller has to be satisfied about the genuineness of the claim. To reach this conclusion, obviously the Controller must be satisified about the reality of the claim made by the landlord, and this can only be established by looking at all the surrounding circumstances, such as the condition of the building, its situation, the possibility of its being put to a more profitable use after construction, the means of the landlord and so on. It is not enough that the landlord comes forward, and says that he entertains a particular intention, however strongly, said to be entertained by him. The clause speaks not of the bona fides of the landlord, but says on the other hand, that the claim of the landlord that he requires the building for reconstruction and re-erection must be bona fide, that is to say, honest in the circumstantces. It is impossible therefore, to hold that the investigation by the Controller should be confined only to the existence of an intention in the mind of the landlord to reconstruct."
7. The very clause under the Act came up before the Supreme Court in PANCHMAL NARAYANA SHENOY v. BASTHI VENKATESH SHENOY, , it was held :
"The proviso to Section 21(1) enumerates the various circumstances under which a landlord may seek to recover possession of the property from his tenant. The requirement contemplated under Clause (j) of the proviso to Sub-section (1) is that of the landlord and it does not have any reference to the condition of the building as such. What is necessary under that clause is that the landlord must satisfy the Court that he reasonably and bona fide requires the premises for the immediate purpose of demolishing it and the demolition is for the purpose of erecting a new building in the place of the old one. No doubt, as to whether the landlord's requirement is reasonable and bona fide has to be judged by the surrounding circumstances, which will include his means for reconstruction of the building and other steps taken by him in that regard."
"In considering the reasonable and bona fide requirement of the landlord under this clause, the desire of the landlord to put the property to a more profitable use after demolition and reconstruction is also a factor that may be taken into account in favour of the landlord. In our opinion it is not necessary that the landlord should go further and establish under this clause that the condition of the building is such that it requires immediate demolition. That the condition of the property may be such which requires immediate demolition is emphasized in Clause (k) of the proviso. When such a specific provision has been made in Clause (k), the condition of the building cannot come into picture nor could it have been dealt with again in Clause (j). So the requirement under Clause (j) is that of the landlord and cannot have any reference to the building."
8. While testing the reasonableness and bona fide nature of the landlord's requirement, several factors such as his capacity, likelihood of using the new building for a profitable use, the condition of the building, the several developments that had taken place in the locality, etc., will be relevant.
9. Again in METALWARE & CO. ETC., v. BANSILAL SARMA AND ORS., it was held under a similar provision of the Tamil Nadu Act, at page 1562:
"As stated earlier it cannot be disputed that the phrase used in Section 14(1)(b) of the Act is 'the building is bona fide required by the landlord' for the immediate purpose of demolition and reconstruction and the same clearly refers to the bona fide requirement of the landlord it is also true that the requirement in terms is not that the building should need immediate demolition and reconstruction. But we fail to appreciate how the state or condition of the building and the extent to which it could stand without immediate demolition and reconstruction in future would be a totally irrelevant factor while determining 'the bona fide requirment of the land lord'. If the Rent Controller has to be satisfied about the bona fide requirement of the landlord which must mean genuineness of his claim in that behalf the Rent Controller will have to take into account all the surrounding circumstances including not merely the factors of the landlord being possessed of sufficient means or funds to undertake the project and steps taken by him in that regard but also the existing condition of the building its age and situation and possibility or otherwise of its being put to a more profitable use after reconstruction. All these factors being relevant must enter the verdict of the Rent Controller on the question of the bona fide requirement of the landlord under Section 14(1)(b). In a sense if the building happens to be decrepit or dilapidated it will readily made for the bona fide requirement of the landlord, though that by itself in the absence of any means being possessed by the landlord would not be sufficient. Conversely a landlord being possessed of sufficient means to undertake the project of demolition and reconstruction by itself may not be sufficient to establish his bona fide requirement if the building happens to be a very recent construction in a perfectly sound condition and its situation may prevent its being put to a more profitable use after reconstruction. In any case these latter factors may cast a serious doubt on the landlord's bona fide requirement. It is, therefore, clear to us that the age and condition of the building would certainly be a relevant factor which will have to be taken into account while pronouncing upon the bona fide requirement of the landlord under Section 14(1)(b) of the Act and the same cannot be ignored."
10. There is a concurrent finding in the instant case that the building is old and is in a dilapidated condition. !t is true that the landlord tried to take possession of the premises through notices issued by the Municipality. That only shows his anxiety to get vacant possession of the premises. Failure to get possession, because, notices issued by the Municipality were quashed by this Court, does not mean, the requirement of the landlord under Clause (j) lacks in bona fides. Landlord's capacity to put up the new structure, also has been found to be true.
11. The provisions of the Act should not be read so as to stop developmental works altogether.
12. The landlord has filed an affidavit agreeing to allot an accommodation of similar extent to the petitioner-tenant, in the newly constructed premises; he has agreed to complete the construction within eighteen months of his getting vacant possession of the premises. The learned Counsel for the tenant submitted that the tenant would vacate voluntarily within six months from today to facilitate the landlord to put up the new construction under Section 21(1)(j).
13. In the circumstances, Civil Revision Petition is dismissed. The tenant is granted time till the end of July 1992 to vacate and hand over vacant possession of the schedule premises to the landlord. The landlord shall commence demolition work wtihin six months from the date of his getting possession and complete the new construction within a period of eighteen months after he gets possession of the premises. It is ordered accordingly. All the statutory consequences under Sections 21 (1)(j) and 25 to 27 shall govern this Order.