Central Administrative Tribunal - Bangalore
Smt. Raminder Duggal vs Kendriya Vidayalya Sangathan And Anr. on 25 October, 2004
Equivalent citations: 2005(2)SLJ357(CAT)
JUDGMENT Mukesh Kumar Gupta, Member (J)
1. Since issues raised in these cases are interlinked and have common facts, they are being taken up by the present common order.
2. In O.A. No. 781/2003, validity of Memorandum of Charge dated 14.10.2003 has been questioned, while in O.A. No. 1063/2003, the Office Memorandum dated 7.11.2003 has been impugned.
3. Core admitted facts are that: the applicant, who holds Bachelor Degree in Science from Delhi University and did Shiksha Bharati (equivalent to B.Ed.) from Mahila Gram Vidyapitha Prayag - Allahabad, in the year 1989, was appointed as Primary School Teacher, Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan and joined the said post with effect from 4.10.1993. Prior to said date, she also worked as Assistant Teacher as well as part-time Teacher in certain Private School/Kendriya Vidyalaya. All of a sudden, Memorandum dated 4th March, 2003 was issued under Rule 14 of CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965, alleging, that she "has produced a Certificate of Shiksha Bharati (Bachelor of Education) of Mahila Gram Vidyapitha, Prayag and got appointment". In KVS, which had been declared "by the University Grant Commission as fake University, since inception" and therefore, she committed misconduct under Rule 11 of CCS (CCA) Rules read with Rule 3(1)(i) and (iii) of CCS (Conduct) Rules, 1964 as applicable to the employees of KVS. She submitted her explanation dated 17th March, 2003 denying the said allegation, besides seeking permission to obtain required educational qualification within reasonable time, considering the impeccable service in the Sangathan. Instead of considering the said prayer, an enquiry officer was appointed, which proceedings were challenged before this Tribunal by instituting O.A. No. 227/2003.
4. The respondents opposed the said claim and filed their reply. During the pendency of the said O.A., respondents filed Memo dated 24th June, 2003 along with Memorandum dated 20th June, 2003 stating that since the Article of Charge needs modification, Memorandum dated 4th March, 2003 was withdrawn. Based on the said memo dated 24th June, 2003, the said O.A. was disposed of by observing that as Charge Memo dated 4.3.2003 stood withdrawn, to the said extent, O.A had become infructuous. As far as issuing other direction in the totality of the circumstances as prayed was concerned, it was observed that:
"it is for the respondents to consider and pass appropriate orders on the said request made by the applicant, keeping in view the law laid down by the Hon'ble High Court of Punjab and Haryana in the cases of Satnam Kaur v. State of Haryana and Ors., and Maruti Udyog Ltd. v. State of Haryana and two Ors. referred to supra. This goes without saying that if the applicant is aggrieved of any decision so taken, she will be at liberty to approach the appropriate forum for redressal of her grievance".
(Emphasis supplied)
5. Vide application dated 25th June, 2003, the applicant applied to Indira Gandhi National Open University (hereinafter referred to as IGNOU) for admission to B.Ed. Degree Programme 2004, which was duly certified by the Principal of Kendriya Vidyalaya, Yelahanka, Bangalore, where the applicant is posted. Based on oral instructions issued by the Principal of the school, on 11th July, 2003, she submitted one more copy of attestation form on 19th July, 2003 (Annexure-A11) though such attestation form was already filled by her when she initially joined KVS in October, 1993. It is only after submitting such form and due verification of all such documents, she was allowed to join duty. However, a fresh (August-260) attestation form was submitted by her. It appears that on 28th July, 2003, respondent no. 2 through the Principal, asked the applicant to submit details of her stay during the last 5 years prior to her joining KVS, without serving any copy to her. The applicant protested to the said action by submitting a letter dated 14th August, 2003 (Annexure-A12) addressed to the Principal as to why such piecemeal information at this late stage were sought particularly when all such information had been submitted at the time of her joining itself. Vide communication dated 8th September, 2003 (Annexure-A13), the applicant submitted details of her stay during the period from October, 1988 to October, 1993.
6. Immediately thereafter, respondent no. 2 issued Memorandum dated 14th October, 2003 (Annexure-A14), under Rule 14 of CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965, alleging that she "got offer of appointment in KVS to the post of Primary Teacher on the basis of furnishing academic qualification including professional qualification acquired from a fake University", which is a misconduct amounting to unbecoming of a Teacher under Article 61A(34) of the Education Code as applicable to the Teachers of KVS and also violated Rule 3(1)(iii) of CCS (Conduct) Rules, 1964.
In Annexure-III appended to the said Memo, 8 documents were listed, and under Annexure-IV, being the list of witnesses, no oral evidence was proposed to be led. The said allegations were denied vide communication dated 21st October, 2003 (Annexure-A15). Attention of the authorities was invited to document listed at Sl. No. 8 in Annexure-III of the said Memo by stating that the genuineness of the (manipulated) documents produced in so far as it related to page-2 be kindly confirmed and also requested to supply certified copy of the same. The applicant also stated that she had not committed any misconduct and the entire allegation made therein was nothing but false; that said Charge Memorandum was issued with mala fide intentions to harass her; respondent No. 2 was harassing her by asking information through the Principal though the same were already available with the administration; that she would have to approach this Tribunal seeking initiation of contempt proceedings apart from challenging said memorandum; that she has obtained admission for B.Ed in IGNOU and be allowed to complete the said course with peace of mind, without further obstacle. Since no response was forthcoming, she instituted O.A. No. 781/2003 on 30th October, 2003. She also filed Contempt Petition No. 151/2003 on the same date.
7. The O.A. No. 781/2003 as well as the C.P. were listed for preliminary hearing on 7.11.2003 before two different Benches. At the time of admission of the said O.A. it was contended that the said Charge Memorandum dated 14.10.2003 has been issued without passing "appropriate order" in terms of the directions issued vide Order and judgment dated 24th June, 2003 passed in O.A. No. 227/2003. As there was no averment made in the O.A. as well as C.P., about the non-compliance of the aforesaid directions, she was allowed to file an affidavit to the said effect and an affidavit of even date was filed, which was placed in the Contempt Petition. Para 2 of the said affidavit stated in specific that the Assistant Commissioner, KVS, Bangalore, had not passed any order on her representation dated 17th March, 2003 to the said date despite directions issued, deliberately.
8. The applicant has challenged the said Memorandum dated 14.10.2003 on the ground that she had no knowledge that the Mahila Gram Vidyapitha Prayag, Allahabad is a fake University, as alleged. It is only after a decade of service as a Teacher she was told that the said University was a fake one; she had not obtained the said employment either by fraud or misrepresentation; respondent No. 2 being unhappy with the order passed by this Tribunal on 24th June, 2003 harassed her by instructing the Principal to get information from her during July, August and September, 2003 with mala fide intentions; respondent No. 2 disregarded the order passed by this Tribunal.
When the said O.A. 781/2003 was taken up for admission, Counsel for the respondents submitted before this Tribunal that respondent No. 2 had already passed an order pursuant to direction issued vide order dated 24th June, 2003. Notice was issued in O.A. on 7.11.2003.
9. Immediately thereafter, respondent No. 2 issued O.M. dated 7.11.2003 rejecting applicant's representation dated 17th March, 2003 holding that the charges cannot be dropped at that stage since it needs detailed investigation for which an enquiry officer was appointed; that the order of appointment issued on the basis of misrepresentation needs thorough investigation and the judgment cited by her is not applicable as the same excluded the case of misrepresentation. The applicant's request to obtain the required qualification within reasonable time was also not acceded to.
10. The said office memorandum dated 7.11.2003 has been challenged in O.A. No. 1063/03 on diverse grounds including that the same was ante-dated and served on 10.11.2003 in person though almost all the orders/memorandum were issued by post; that the said action was taken with vengeance and mala fide intention by respondent No. 2 to scuttle both the O.A. 781/2003 as well as the Contempt Petition No. 151/2003 pending before this Tribunal; that as applicant was already allowed to Join B.Ed course from IGNOU, the impugned memorandum dated 7.11.2003 denying her permission to obtain required qualification was violative of Education Code, besides being illegal and arbitrary and all actions suffer on account of malice and non-application of mind; that the impugned memorandum was not a speaking and reasoned order; that the applicant's request was squarely covered by the decisions reported in 1986 (68) FJR 406, Maruti Udyog Ltd. v. State of Haryana and Two Ors., 1995(5) SLR 699, Satnam Kaur v. The State of Haryana and Ors.; that the allegation of misrepresentation was an after thought particularly when no such allegation was made in the Memorandum of Charge; the enquiry officer appointed earlier on 16.4.2003 and not on 10.11.2003 as the Charge Memo dated 4th March, 2003 had already been withdrawn; that the respondent No. 2 took entire exercise to harass her and the said respondent No. 2 had already disclosed his intention to terminate her service in the reply filed to O.A. No. 227/2003.
11. The respondents filed their reply opposing applicant's claim stating that though she was appointed during the year 1993 by the Assistant Commissioner, Ahmedabad Region but after her transfer to K.V., Bangalore, examination of her records revealed that professional qualification of B.Ed acquired by her was from a fake University. After locating the mistake, it was decided to conduct a departmental enquiry into the whole issue, Since the charge memo dated 4th March, 2003 had some technical defect, it was decided to withdraw the same reserving liberty to issue fresh article of charge. The direction of this Tribunal vide order dated 24th June, 2003 was duly complied with and decision taken duly communicated. The allegations of illegality, arbitrariness and harassment were denied. It was stated that she made false misrepresentation about her educational qualification in as much as the name of University etc. was withheld in the application form. The enquiry was constituted to "find out the genesis of the mistake/misrepresentation". The existence of fake Universities was pointed out by KVS and UGC in 1990 itself and reiterated in the year 1995. In the additional reply the respondents laid much emphasis on applicant's alleged misrepresentation, though it was admitted that the same allegation was not included in Charge Memo dated 14.10.2003. The applicant's allegation that order dated 7.11.2003 was ante-dated was denied.
12. We heard learned Counsel for the parties at considerable length and perused the pleadings carefully.
13. Mr. N.G. Phadke, learned Counsel for the applicant vociferously contended that a perusal of the Prospectus and Syllabus issued by Manila Gram Vidyapitha Prayag, Allahabad, in the year 1988-89 (Annexure-A16) would show that Ministry of Education, Government of India, vide D.O. letter No. F-35/65, HI dated 29th September, 1965 in specific stated that: "As the examinations conducted by your vidyapitha have already been accorded recognition by several universities, no further recognition is needed. For all purpose, the Government will accept this recognition". Similarly, the Bar Council of India, New Delhi, vide their letter No. BCI/D/474/1283 (LE/Mtg) dated 19th February, 1983 conveyed their approval to the Bharati Examination of the Mahila Gram Vidyapitha, Prayag, as equivalent to graduation for the purpose of admission to the 3 year LL.B. Course. Similarly, our attention was drawn to the various letters incorporated in the said prospectus from various Universities/Board etc. Granting recognition to the courses conducted by it. As such it was urged that the applicant had no doubt in her mind about the genuineness of the said Institute and its recognition when she joined the said course in the year 1988 and passed out the Shiksha Bharati in the year 1989. This being so, it was contended that the applicant had committed no misconduct in pursuing the said course and relying upon the said certificate for the purpose of appointment in the KVS. It was further contended that neither the Charge Memo dated 14.10.2003 contain any documents indicating the withdrawal of the said recognition by the Ministry of Education, Government of India, as referred herein above nor it specify any oral witness to be produced in support of the charge levelled against her.
14. Learned Counsel for the applicant placing strong reliance on Punjab and Haryana High Court Division Bench judgment, Satnam Kaur v. The State of Haryana and Ors. (supra), contended the applicant ought to have been afforded an opportunity to acquire the requisite qualification within a reasonable period as she had rendered impeccable service of almost 10 years and for this purpose our attention was drawn to paras 21 and 22 of the said judgment, which reads as under:-
"21. Before parting with the case, we consider it our constitutional obligation not to ignore the stark fact that various officials of the Government of Haryana have been instrumental in recruiting various persons who are not qualified to hold the posts of Teachers. It is, therefore, necessary that the Government of Haryana takes prompt steps for preventing such recruitment in future and at the same time take corrective measures to dispense with the service of the unqualified/untrained teachers. We, therefore, direct the Government of Haryana to issue written instructions to all the concerned officers that in future no appointment be given on the posts of Teachers to the persons who do not possess the minimum academic training qualifications. We, also, direct the Government of Haryana to take steps for termination of services of all those Teachers who have secured employment on the basis of degrees/ diplomas/certificates issued by the bogus institutions like the Gandhi Hindi Vidyapeeth, Prayag and who have not completed three years service. However, before passing any adverse order the competent authority must afford an opportunity of hearing to the concerned person.
22. Those who have rendered service for more than three years should be given an opportunity to acquire the requisite qualification with a stipulated time and in case of failure of such persons to acquire the requisite qualification appropriate action should be taken by the Government to dispense with their service."
(Emphasis supplied)
15. Reliance was also placed on Maruti Udyog Ltd. v. State of Haryana and Two Ors., (supra), Hon'ble Justice Shri M.M. Punchhi (as his Lordship then was) cautioned that in the larger interest of the industrial peace, the employer should not be allowed to set a precedence for hide and seek. The relevant extract of the said judgment reads as under:-
"On larger interest of industrial peace even, I am of the considered view that the petitioner should not be allowed to set a precedent for hide and seek. Any cunning employer, when faced with an industrial dispute before a Tribunal or Labour Court, could machinate ouster of its jurisdiction by contending that the order which spurted the industrial dispute has been withdrawn and, in the wake of any fresh order it might have passed achieve the same result, requiring the workman and the Government to do the exercise again to have the matter freshly referred for adjudication before a Tribunal or a Court. The game can be kept repeated to tire and bend the spirit of the workman. Such a course, to my mind, would lead to disastrous results. The High Court shall, in no case, take any such step which may even remotely encourage such a calculated game. Far from it, it shall stay its hands from indulging in the matter and leave it to the Labour Court to deal with it in the manner which it thinks fit."
(Emphasis supplied)
16. With reference to above, it was emphasised that the respondents' action in withdrawing the earlier Charge Memorandum dated 4.3.2003 was not fair as the game has been kept repeated by the respondents so that the applicant gets tired and bend. It was further contended that though the applicant had objected the memorandum dated 20th June, 2003 by which the said Articles of Charge dated 4.3.2003 was withdrawn, despite this fact, the Charge Memo dated 14.10.2003 was issued which makes no reference to the alleged misrepresentation. The applicant had produced all the required certificates and it is only after all the particulars checked and found correct", she was appointed to the post in question. Such being the state of affairs, the respondents allegation that the applicant misrepresented about the facts is baseless, misconceived and are contrary to the record.
17. Attention was also drawn to para-6 of Santosh Yadav (Smt.) v. State of Haryana and Ors., to conted that termination of service after 9 years was not proper and justified particularly when the official was confirmed. The said para reads as under:-
"It is not denied that the appellant was taken in service on the basis of the diploma/ certificate she possessed, having obtained it from the Secondary Education Board, U.P., Bareilly and that her six months' terms were kept renewed from time to time, ignoring small gaps in between, as was the pattern. Therefore, we fail to see that when was acceptable in 1980 and her terms were kept renewed from time to time uptil 22.5.1982, and onwards, whereafter she was confirmed in the year 1984, how could her services be terminated in the year 1990, when she had attained regularity in service. It is significant to note that the letter dated 7.7.1981 was itself watered down on 22.7.1981 (Annexure-A) clarifying that the ban imposed on recruitment of persons who had obtained their diplomas/certificates from non-recognised institutions, would not apply to those who were working as teachers on stop gap/ad hoc/six months' basis before the summer vacation of 1981. Concededly, the appellant occupied that position as she was working on six-monthly basis immediately before summer vacation of 1981. Thus, on account of such relaxation being available for her and she having earned regularity in her service, it was wholly wrong and arbitrary on the part of the Education Department and the school to have deprived her of her job. Thus, the impugned order dated 27.3.1990 (Annexure-H) relieving the appellant from her duties as Hindi teacheress with immediate effect, is quashed, putting her back to position with back wages and regularity of service, including other service benefits such as seniority, promotion, increments etc. as would have normally been due to her."
(Emphasis supplied).
In the present case, it was contended that the applicant is a regular and confirmed Primary Teacher and had completed probation period long back and therefore the impugned action cannot be sustained.
18. Heavy reliance was placed on District Collector and Chairman, Vizianagaram Social Welfare Residential School Society, Vizianagaram and Anr. v. M. Tripura Sundari Devi, . In the said case, the respondent held a III Class Degree in M.A against the required qualification of IInd Class Degree for the posts of Grade I and Grade II teacher posts (Post Graduate Teacher and Trained Graduate Teacher posts respectively) and despite such fact she was appointed as PGT subject to the production of original certificates and to comply with other necessary formalities. When she approached the authorities with the certificates, it was noticed that she was not qualified for the said post and therefore not allowed to join services. She challenged the said action before the Andhra Pradesh Administrative Tribunal successfully, against which appeal was preferred by the Department before the Hon'ble Supreme Court. In such circumstances, in para-7 it was held that:
"We are, however, informed that the respondent subsequently acquired another degree in M.A with second class and has qualified herself to be appointed to the said post. Whatever the merits of the decision given by the Tribunal, we cannot forget that she was entitled to rely upon it till this time where she had succeeded. She was not allowed to join service on January 2, 1986 and thereafter she had approached the Tribunal in January 1987. The decision of the Tribunal was of August 31, 1987 and thereafter the present civil appeal was pending in this Court from December 1987 till this day. Considering the fact that she is compelled to serve, that she has acquired the requisite qualification, that today she may be averaged for the post and the further fact that many who were under qualified were appointed to the post earlier, we feel that it will be unjust to deprive her of the post at this stage. We, therefore, set aside the impugned order of the Tribunal but allow the appeal partially and direct that the respondent should be appointed in the post from the beginning of the ensuing academic year 1990-91. Since Shri Madhav Reddy contended that there is no vacant post at present, we further direct that, if necessary, a post be created to accommodate her. She will, however, not be entitled to any benefits including back wages till her appointment."
(Emphasis supplied) Taking clue from the aforesaid observations, Mr. N.G. Phadke, learned Counsel for the applicant contended that as on date the applicant has become overaged and also continues to serve KVS with unblemished records, though in the aforementioned judgment, the appellants therein were directed to accommodate the official by creating a post and therefore, the present application stands on much better footing, contended the learned Counsel.
19. Similarly, placing reliance on , Shri Krishnan v. The Kurukshetra University, Kurukshetra, it was contended that it was the duty of the Appointing Authority to examine that all the conditions and requirements of law were duly complied with before appointing the applicant. As the concerned officials examined the applicant's certificates before appointing her, the question of applicant's misrepresentation, which is not even the case of the respondents in the Charge Memorandum dated 14.10.2003, did not arise. The relevant portion on which reliance was placed is extracted as under:-
"7 ...Equally it was the duty of the Head of the Department of Law before submitting the form to the University to see that the form complied with all the requirements of law. If neither the Head of the Department nor the university authorities took care to scrutinise the admission form, the question of the appellant committing a fraud did not arise. It is well settled that where a person on whom fraud is committed is in a position to discover the truth by due diligence fraud is not proved. It was neither a case of suggestio falsi, or suppressio. The appellant never wrote to the university authority that he had attended the prescribed number of lectures. There was ample time and opportunity for the university authorities to have found out the defect. In these circumstances, therefore, if the university authorities acquiesced in the infirmities which the admission form contained and allowed the appellant to appear in Part I examination in April, 1972, then by force of the university statute the university had no power to withdraw the candidature of the appellant...."
(Emphasis supplied).
With reference to the above law and observations, Shri Phadke, learned Counsel strongly emphasised that in the present case neither fraud nor misrepresentation was committed. The applicant had produced all the certificates before the concerned authority which were duly verified. Our attention was drawn to the observations dated 30th June made on the applicant's application form for the post in question, which reads as:- "All the particulars checked & found correct". (Annexure-R1 in O.A. 1063/2003). As such, it was strongly canvassed that the allegations of misrepresentation made vide Memo dated 7.11.2003 are baseless, misconceived, far from truth and an after thought besides illegal and arbitrary. Moreover the term "misrepresentation" and "fraud" have got a definite connotation in the English and has also its due jurisprudential effect. When all particulars of the application form as well as Certificates were "checked and found correct", where and which aspects were misrepresented remain totally unexplained both in pleadings as well as oral hearing.
20. Strong reliance was also placed on , Mohinder Singh Gill and Anr. v. Chief Election Commissioner, New Delhi and Ors. to contend that when a statutory functionary makes an order based on certain grounds, its validity must be judged by the reasons so mentioned and cannot be supplemented by fresh reasons in the shape of affidavit or otherwise. Otherwise, an order bad in the beginning may, by the time it comes to Court on account of a challenge, get validated by additional grounds later brought out.
In view of the above law it was contended that as the allegation of misrepresentation did not find in Charge Memo dated 14th October, 2003, the same cannot be read into the same and accordingly liable to be ignored.
20A. On the contention that the respondents action is neither fair nor just but suffer from violation of principle of natural justice as well as mala fides, reliance was placed on 2001(1) SCC 182, Kumaon Mandal Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Girja Shankar Pant and Anr.
"35. The test, therefore, is as to whether a mere apprehension of bias or there being a real danger of bias and it is on this score that the surrounding circumstances must and ought to be collated and necessary conclusion drawn therefrom - In the event however the conclusion is otherwise inescapable that there is existing a real danger of bias, the administrative action cannot be sustained: If on the other hand, the allegations pertaining to bias is rather fanciful and otherwise to avoid a particular Court, Tribunal or authority, question of declaring them to be unsustainable would not arise. The requirement is availability of positive and cogent evidence and it is in this context that we do record our concurrence with the view expressed by the Court of Appeal in Locabail case (2000 QB 451)."
(Emphasis supplied)
21. Mr. N.S. Prasad, learned Counsel appearing for respondents disputed the contentions raised by the applicant. It was urged that the present O.A. is not maintainable and reliance was placed on judgment dated 28.11.2001 of the High Court of Jammu & Kashmir in SWP No. 2059/2000, Smt. Ranjana Vashishtha v. Union of India and Ors., to contend that learned Single Judge in the aforementioned case dismissed the petition filed by Smt. Ranjna Vashishta in SWP No. 2059/2000 seeking restrain order in the departmental proceedings initiated against her. In the said case the petitioner was employed as Lab. Attendant in KVS in 1984 and later appointed as Primary Teacher in general category in the year 1992. The criminal case was registered against her in the year 2000 on the same facts as mentioned in the departmental proceedings. The allegation therein was that the petitioner had produced B.Ed certificate from Gandhi Hindi Vidyapeeth, Allahabad, which was fake and as per the CBI report the allegation of forgery/cheating could not be proved against her.
22. Reliance was placed on , Yogesh Kumar and Ors. v. Government of NCT, Delhi and Ors., to contend that B.Ed qualification, although a well recognised qualification in the field of teaching and education, being not prescribed in the advertisement, only some of the B.Ed candidates who took a chance to apply for the post in question cannot be given entry in the field of selection despite the fact that the B.Ed was a higher qualification that the TTC, prescribed qualification for the post in question.
23. Reliance was also placed on , R. Vishwanatha Piliai v. State of Kerala and Ors., particularly to para 19 to contend that a person who seeks equity must come with clean hands. He, who comes to the Court with false claim cannot plead equity nor the Court would be justified to exercise equity jurisdiction in his favour. A person who seeks equity must act in a fair and equitable manner. Equity jurisdiction cannot be exercised in the case of a person who got the appointment on the basis of false caste certificate by playing a fraud. No smooth and equitable consideration can come to his rescue.
Further, it was contended that right to confer degree can be exercised only by a University established or incorporated by/or under the Central Act, a Provincial or State Act or an institution deemed to be a University under Section 3 or an Institution specially empowered by an Act of Parliament to confer or grant degrees, as provided under Section 22 of the University Grants Commission Act, 1956. The Institution, such as a Commercial University limited incorporated under the Companies Act does not satisfy the definition of "University" under Section 2(f) of the aforesaid Act. For this purpose, reliance was placed on , Prem Chand Jain and Anr. v. R.K. Chhabra.
24. Reliance was also placed on , Union of India and Anr. v. Ravi Shankar and Anr., to contend that where the official did not hold the recognised qualification prescribed under the Recruitment Rules, no direction can be issued to the Department to consider the case of such official relaxing the said condition in case of vacancies arising in future.
25. It was further contended that the present application is premature and the charge memo dated 14.10.2003 requires to interference at this stage. Reliance was placed on , Union of India v. Upendra Singh, , Union of India v. A.P. Saxena and , District Forest Officer v. R. Rajamanickam and Anr., for the proposition that it is not open to this Tribunal to go into the correctness or otherwise of the charges levelled against the applicant, the Tribunal cannot take over the functions of the Disciplinary Authority as the truth of otherwise of the charges is a matter for the Disciplinary Authority to go into. Indeed even after the conclusion of the disciplinary proceedings, if the matter comes to the Court/Tribunal, they have no jurisdiction to look into the truth of the charges.
26. Reliance was also placed on 1995 Suppl. (1) SCC 185, Deputy Secretary to Government, Prohibition and Excise Department, Fort St. George, Madras v. A. Bappu, to contend that where the departmental enquiry was in progress into the charge of procuring employment by producing a fake school certificate of his qualification, submission of a genuine certificate from another school during the pendency of such enquiry was not a bar to continuance of the enquiry.
27. Similarly, strong reliance was placed on , Rajpal v. State of Haryana and Anr., wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court had noted its judgment in Civil Appeal No. 6870/1995, HSEB v. Rajinder Kumar to the effect that when the Government came to know about the Institution from which the applicant had passed was not recognised by the University Grants Commission, it was permissible for the Government to take appropriate action in the matter.
28. Further reliance was also placed on 1995 Supp(4) SCC 100 : 1996(2) SLJ 25 (SC), Union of India and Ors. v. M. Bhaskaran to suggest that the employment secured by fraud renders it voidable at the option of the employer and the employee cannot plead estoppel.
29. Yet another contention was raised that the practice of entertaining Writ Petitions questioning the legality of show cause notice and stalling enquiries was deprecated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. For this purpose our attention was drawn to Special Director and Anr. v. Mohd. Ghulam Ghouse and Anr., particularly para-5, wherein it was observed that even the question of jurisdiction and the legal premises on which show cause notice were founded could be adjudicated by the authority issuing the very notice.
30. It was further urged that there were totally 22 officials/teachers all over India in the KVS who were found to be possessing B.Ed or equivalent degree from educational institutions which were declared as fake University. For this purpose our attention was drawn to communication originated from KVS, New Delhi dated 9th January, 2003 (Annexure-R4) whereby Assistant Commissioner of Regional Office were directed to issue disciplinary action under Rule 14 of the CCS (CCA) Rules.
31. Mr. N.S. Prasad, learned Counsel laid great emphasis on the contention that the applicant made misrepresentation about her educational qualification at the time of Submitting her application for the said post of Primary Teacher on 3rd August, 1992 and she deliberately withheld the information regarding the name of University, which is a definite case of misrepresentation. As per averments made in reply para-13 disciplinary proceedings were instituted to: "find out the genesis of the mistake/misrepresentation".
32. Mr. N.G. Phadke, learned Counsel for the applicant strenuously disputed the contentions raised by the respondents and urged that the applicant has committed no misconduct and therefore, the impugned charge memorandum could not have been issued. In any case the Chage Memorandum is liable to be set aside.
The meaning of word "misconduct" came up for consideration before the Hon'ble Supreme Court in , State of Punjab and Ors. v. Ram Singh Ex. Constable. By making reference to dictionary meaning of the said term, in para-4 it was observed as follows:
"Misconduct has been defined in Black's Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition at page 999 thus:-
A transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction from duty, unlawful behaviour, wilful in character, improper or wrong behaviour, its synonyms are misdemeanor, misdeed, misbehaviour, its synonyms are misdemeanor, misdeed, misbehaviour, delinquency, impropriety, mismanagement, offence, but not negligence or carelessness."
Misconduct in office has been defined as:
Any unlawful behaviour by a public officer in relation to the duties of his office, wilful in character. The term embraces acts which the office holder had no right to perform, acts performed improperly and failure to act in the face of an affirmative duty to act.
P. Ramanatha Aiyar's the Law Lexion Reprint Edition 1987 at p. 821 defines 'misconduct' thus:-
The term misconduct implies a wrongful intention, and not a mere error of judgment. Misconduct is not necessarily the same thing as conduct involving moral turpitude. The word 'misconduct' is a relative term, and has to be construed with reference to the subject matter and the context wherein the term occurs, having regard to the scope of the Act or statute which is being construed. Misconduct literally means wrong conduct or improper conduct. In usual parlance, misconduct means a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, where no discretion if left, except what necessity may demand and carelessness, negligence and unskillfulness are transgressions of some established but indefinite, rule of action, where some discretion is necessarily left to the actor. Misconduct is a violation of definite law; carelessness or abuse of discretion under an indefinite law. Misconduct is a forbidden act, carelessness, a forbidden quality of an act, and is necessarily indefinite, Misconduct in office may be defined as unlawful behaviour or neglect by a public officer, by which the rights of a party have been affected.
5. Thus, it could be seen that the word 'misconduct' though not capable of precise definition, its reflection receive its connotation from the context, the delinquency in its performance and its effect on the discipline and the nature of the duty. It may involve moral turpitude, it must be improper or wrong behaviour; unlawful behaviour, wilful in character; forbidden act, a transgression of established and definite rule of action or code of conduct but note mere error of judgment, carelessness or negligence in performance of the duty; the act complained of bears forbidden quality or character. Its ambit has to be construed with reference to the subject matter and the context wherein the term occurs, regard being had to the scope of the statute and the public purpose it seeks of serve."
(Emphasis supplied)
33. What constituted misconduct was also considered in Union of India and Ors. v. J. Ahmed, , and it was observed as under:-
"...The inhibitions in the Conduct Rules clearly provide that an act or omission contrary thereto so as to run counter to the expected code of conduct would certainly constitute misconduct. Some other act or omission may as well constitute misconduct. Lack of efficiency, failure to attain the highest standard of administrative ability while holding a high post would not themselves constitute misconduct. There may be negligence in performance of duty and a lapse in performance of duty or error of judgment in evaluating the developing situation may be negligence in discharge of duty but would not constitute misconduct unless the consequences directly attributable to negligence would be such as to be irreparable or the resultant damage would be so heavy that the degree of culpability would be very high."
(Emphasis supplied) It is well settled law that: "Malafides violating the proceedings may be legal or factual. Former arises as a matter of law where a public functionary acts deliberately in defiance of law without any malicious intention or improper motive whereas the latter is actuated by extraneous considerations". (See ), Similar was the view taken in , Mahesh Chandra v. Regional Manager, U.P. Financial Corporation and Ors., particularly para-15 which is extracted herein under:-
"...Every wide power, the exercise of which has far-reaching repercussion, has inherent limitation on it. It should be exercised to effectuate the purpose of the Act. In legislations enacted for general benefit and common good the responsibility is far graver. It demands purposeful approach. The exercise of discretion should be objective. Test of reasonableness is more strict. The public functionaries should be duty conscious rather than power charged. Its actions and decisions which touch the common man have to be tested on the touchstone of fairness and justice. That which is not fair and just is unreasonable. And what is unreasonable is arbitrary. An arbitrary action is ultra vires. It does not become bonafide and in good faith merely because no personal gain or benefit to the person exercising discretion should be established. An action is mala fide if it is contrary to the purpose for which it was authorised to be exercised. Dishonesty in discharge of duty vitiates the action without anything more. An action is bad even without proof of motive of dishonesty. If the authority is found to have acted contrary to reason...."
(Emphasis supplied) Similarly, fairness in procedure has been emphasised by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in catena of cases and for this purpose we may refer to , Management of M.S. Nally Bharat Engineering Company Limited v. State of Bihar and Ors.
34. In , Tandon Brothers v. State of West Bengal and Ors., it was held that: "Governmental action must be based on utmost good faith, belief and ought to be supported with reason on the basis of the state of law - if the action is otherwise or runs counter to the same the action cannot but be ascribed to be mala fide and it would be a plain exercise of judicial power to countenance such action and set the same aside for the purpose of equity, good conscience and justice". Justice of the situation demands action clothed with bonafide reason and necessities of the situation in accordance with the law. But if the same runs counter, law Courts would not be in a position to countenance the same".
Reasonable and non arbitrariness in the Governmental action, thus is a touchstone for all executive action. In , Kasturi Lal Lakshmi Reddy v. The State of Jammu & Kashmir and Anr., it was held that Governmental action must not be arbitrary or capricious but must be based on some principle which meets the test of reason and relevance. This rule was initiated by the Court as a rule of administrative law and it was also validated by the Court as an emanation flowing directly from the doctrine of equality embodied in Article 14.
35. In our considered view the action taken by respondent No. 2 in issuing the impugned charge memorandum dated 14.10.2003 as well as Memorandum dated 7.11.2003 when examined from the touchstone of the law as noticed herein above it cannot but be held as a mala fide exercise of the power.
36. It is well settled law that the deciding authority must be impartial and without bias, as held in Secretary to Government, Transport Department, Madras v. Munuswamy Mudaliar and Anr. 1988 (Supp) SCC 651. A predisposition to decide for or against one party, without proper regard to the true merits of the dispute is bias. Personal bias is one of the three ' major limbs of bias, i.e. pecuniary bias, personal bias and official bias. Bias, is a condition of mind, and, therefore, it may not always be possible to furnish actual proof of bias. But the Courts, for this reason, cannot be said to be in a crippled state. There are many ways to discover bias; for example, by evaluating the facts and circumstances of the case of applying the tests of "real likelihood of bias" or reasonable suspicion of bias" (see , State of West Bengal v. Shivananda Pathak). The tests of bias were aptly summarised by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in , Rattan Lal Sharma v. Managing Committee, Dr. Hari Ram (Co-Education) Higher Secondary School and Ors., which reads as follows:
"For appreciating a case of personal bias or bias to the subject matter the test is whether there was a real likelihood of bias even though such bias has not in fact taken place. De Smith in his Judicial Review of Administrative Act, (1980) at page 262 has observed that a real likelihood of bias means at least substantial possibility of bias. In R.V. Sunderland Justices it has been held that the Court will have to judge the matter as a reasonable man would judge of any matter in the conduct of his own business. In R.V. Sussex Justices it has been indicated that answer to the question whether there was a real likelihood of bias depends not upon what actually was done but upon what might appear to be done. In Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th Edn., Vol. 2, para 551, it has been indicated that the test of bias is whether a reasonable intelligent man, fully apprised of all the circumstances, would feel a serious apprehension of bias. The same principle has also been accepted by this Court in Manak Lal v. Dr. Prem Ghana. This Court has laid down that the test is not whether in fact, a bias has affected the judgment; the test always is and must be whether a litigant could reasonably apprehend that a bias attributable to a member of the tribunal might have operated against him in the final decision of the tribunal. It is in this sense that it is often said that justice must not only be done but also appear to be done."
(Emphasis supplied)
37. We find justification in the applicant's contention that when her prayer was covered by the judgments rendered by the High Court of Punjab, and which were also directed to be taken into consideration by the respondents in terms of the directions issued vide order dated 24th June, 2003, instead of gracefully accepting her request, respondent No. 2 sat over the said judgments as if he was sitting in appeal, when in impugned office memorandum dated 7.11.2003 he stated that: "whereas the Court case mentioned in her representation is not applicable in this case, as the judgment referred to exclude the case of misrepresentation", which reasoning is clearly perverse, erroneous and baseless. We may observe that the respondent no. 2 has made a false and concocted stand that he had taken a decision on the applicant's representation, on 4th July, 2003. We are of the view that had respondent No. 2 in fact considered such request prior to issuing Charge Memo dated 14.10.2003, particularly with reference to judgment reported in 1995(5) SLR 699, which according to respondent No. 2 excluded the case of misrepresentation, then such vital aspect would have not remained unnoticed. Obviously the important of alleged "misrepresentation" was felt only when the respondent No. 2 considered the applicant's representation dated 17.3.2003, which exercise had been undertaken only after issuing Charge Memo dated 14.10.2003. In our considered view, respondent No. 2 exceeded in his jurisdiction and made such remarks over judgments of the High Court, a Constitutional body and a wing of the State. It is well settled law that the administrative ipse dixit cannot infiltrate on to an arena which stands covered by judicial orders. In , Anil Ratan Sarkar and Ors. v. State of W.B. and Ors., the Hon'ble Supreme Court reacted in the following manner:
"This Court on an earlier occasion unequivocally upheld the reasoning of the learned Single Judge in the earlier writ petition as accepted by the Appellate Bench and in the wake of such a finding of this Court question of decrying a pay scale which is otherwise available to another teacher (in this case the Physical Instructor) does not and cannot arise more so by reason on the earlier order of this Court. Administrative ipse dixit cannot infiltrate on to an arena which stands covered by judicial orders."
(Emphasis supplied) There is no doubt in the settled position that Court/Tribunal have no jurisdiction to go into the correctness or truth of the charge. It is well settled that Tribunal/Court has to see whether the statement of facts and material supplied to the delinquent officer disclose the alleged misconduct. It is the specific case of the applicant that the Charge Memo and the statement of facts do not disclose any misconduct alleged against the delinquent officer i.e. applicant. A perusal of the Charge Memo read along with imputation goes to show that the only allegation made is that she "got offer of appointment" on furnishing academic qualification acquired from a "fake University". Neither there is any allegation of "fraud" or any misrepresentation. Similarly, no Notification/Circular issued by UGC declaring the said Institution as fake University was even relied upon or supplied to the applicant. The document relied upon is the press note, which too is alleged to have appeared in the Newspaper and not in any authentic Notification/Circular etc. The respondents cannot be allowed to read the alleged allegation of misrepresentation emphasised in Memo dated 7.11.2003 into the Charge Memo dated 14.10.2003. They also cannot be permitted to amend the same further at this late stage particularly in the facts and circumstances of the present case. Reliance placed on UGC letter dated February, 2002 is not sufficient, in as much as the reliance placed on said letter was not accepted by Mumbai Bench of the Tribunal in O. A. No. 572/2003.
38. Our attention was also drawn to para 34 of Article 59 of Education Code for Kendriya Vidyalaya, which provides that every teacher shall at all times maintain absolute integrity, maintain devotion to duty and do nothing which is unbecoming of an employee of the Sangathan. Para 34(b) clarifies that nothing contained in part (a), noticed hereinabove, shall be deemed to take away or abridge the right of a teacher to appear at any examination to improve his qualifications etc. When the Code itself empowers a teacher to improve his/ her educational qualification, we are unable to comprehend how the Assistant Commissioner, KVS, could place restriction on the said aspect, i.e. denying her permission to obtain required qualification. In our considered view, Shri Phadke, learned Counsel for the applicant was justified in emphasising that in view of Article 59, para 34(a) & (b) of Education Code, the respondent No. 2 acted illegally, arbitrarily and with malice in rejecting her request to obtain required qualification with a reasonable period of time vide impugned memo dated 7.11.2003, particularly when her application was forwarded by the Principal, KVS, Yelahanka prior to 30th June, 2003 and also furnished undertaking to IGNOU, pursuant to its letter dated 12th September, 2003 that the school will provide facility to the applicant needed for carrying practical work for B.Ed. course.
When such were the facts, what impelled respondent No. 2 to reject the applicant's request to acquire required qualification and that too after almost 2 months time thereafter, remains a mystery besides being unexplained.
39. Learned Counsel for the applicant also raised serious doubt about the genuineness of documents placed at Sl. No. 8 in the list of documents annexed to charge memo dated 14.10.2003, which plea was rejected by the respondents vide communication dated 24.11.2003 (Annexure-A26) stating that the said document is "genuine and she may request for certified true copy during the course of the enquiry". In our quest to reach the truth and to compare the photocopy supplied to the applicant with that of the original, we directed the respondents to produce the original document listed at Sl. No. 8, i.e., Copy of the letter No. F.11-1/90/KVS(RP-II) dated 13th November, 1990 from the Assistant Commissioner addressed to Assistant Commissioner, Patna Region, with a copy endorsed to all the Assistant Commissioner.
40. In compliance with aforesaid directions, the respondents produced the original copy of same and filed attested xerox copy of the same, which is taken on record. On perusal of the said documents from original we find that basically the said communication is dated 8.11.1990 and not 13.11.1990. Besides this, the over leaf page does not begin with the word Uttar Pradesh and carried the details of 9 Institutions, as supplied to the applicant. Rather the over leaf page annexed to the said letter dated 8.11.1990 contains the typed copy of the report from Daily Newspaper "The Hindu". As such it transpires that respondents stand taken vide communication dated 24.11.2003 was contrary to records and applicant's expressing doubt on the genuineness of the said documents is justified. In our considered view there was no fairness in the respondents action and no charge sheet can be issued based on newspapers report, without an official communication/Memo/document on the subject.
41. We are also constrained to note that despite the fact earlier Charge Memo dated 4.3.2003 was withdrawn vide Memo dated 20th June, 2003 as it was felt that the same needs correction, the fresh Charge Memo dated 14.10.2003 did not make out a case of misconduct which is a sine qua non for instituting departmental proceedings. We may make it clear that we have not gone into the correctness of the charge levelled, but only examined as to whether the Article of Charge read with imputation of misconduct show/made out prima facie case of misconduct.
42. We have come across an order dated 6th May, 2004, passed in O.A. No. 572/2003, Smt. Vijaya Laxmi Sinha v. The Commissioner and Ors., passed by the Mumbai Bench of this Tribunal, wherein, a similar allegation as of the present case was made and charge sheet dated 26th April, 2003 was issued alleging that the said applicant "got the offer of appointment in KVS by furnishing academic qualifications including professional qualifications acquired from a fake University i.e. Varanaseya Sanskrit Vishwavidyalaya". After considering the matter in detail, the Mumbai bench quashed the said charge sheet dated 26th April, 2003 and observed as under:
"7. After hearing both the Counsel and going through the facts of the case we are inclined to believe that Varanesaya Sanskrit Vishwa Vidyalaya which awarded the degree of B.Ed. in 1968 to the applicant was a University duly recognised by UGC and not a fake University. However, in the letter of Deputy Registrar (Edn.) addressed to the applicant indicated the date of name and the change as 16.12.1974. On the other hand in the counter affidavit filed by the respondent No. 4 and signed by the Under Secretary UGC mentioned that the name of the university was changed in 1978. However, this will not affect the 1968 status of the university.
8. It is very apparent that the disciplinary action against the applicant was initiated without obtaining requisite information from the UGC that whether the University which awarded the B.Ed. Degree to the applicant in the year 1968 was a genuine one or not. The authorities merely relied on a list of fake universities which essentially indicates the name of Varanaseya Sanskrit Vishwa Vidyalaya being operated from Jagatpuri, Delhi. After going through the contents of the counter affidavit filed on behalf of UGC no further evidence is required to hold that the University which awarded the degree to the applicant in 1968 was genuine one. Thus, the disciplinary proceedings are based on a wrong presumption and, therefore, are not legally sustainable and deserve to be quashed and set aside. We, therefore, direct the respondent Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 5 to drop the disciplinary proceedings initiated against the applicant. No order as to costs."
(Emphasis supplied) We may note that Smt. Vijaya Laxmi Sinha's name did not appear in the list of 22 officials who as per the respondents communication dated 9th January, 2003 (Annexure-R4) were in possession of B.Ed. or equivalent degree from fake Universities. The respondents in their reply have specifically averred that the issue of fake University was raised in Lok Sabha and on information collected from all the regions of KVS reveal that there were 22 Teachers working in KVS who obtained B.Ed or equivalent certificates from such fake Universities. Hence, it was stated that the competent authority of KVS decided to proceed against such Teachers and KVS Headquarters issued letter dated 9th January, 2003 to all the Assistant Commissioners of KVS Regional office. In our considered view this statement on the face of it is not supported by facts as noticed herein above and further that the respondents have taken different and inconsistant stand on the aforesaid aspect.
43. The applicant in para-4(h) of O.A. No. 781/2003 specifically stated that she submitted her reply to memorandum dated 14th October, 2003 vide communication dated 21st October, 2003. In answer to the said para, the respondents stated that the averments made were matter of record. It was further pointed out that despite the said fact wherein it was specifically stated that respondent No. 2 had contravened the order dated 24th June, 2003, the respondent No. 2 did not pass any order on the applicant's representation dated 17th March, 2003 and issued fresh charge sheet dated 14.10.2003. The respondents have not stated in their reply that at any stage as to when the said reply dated 21st October, 2003 was received by them. It was therefore, contended that their plea that the decision had already been taken and the memorandum was not ante dated is false. On perusal of the File No. F. 22-Estt/RD/2003-KVS (BGR), particularly Note Sheet page No. 4 it was noticed that draft reply to applicant's request dated 17.3.2003 was placed for consideration on 4th July, 2003 and respondent No. 2 made the observation: "sent along with revised charge sheet". The draft charge sheet (revised) was put up for approval on 28th August, 2003, and approved on the even date, but was issued on 14.10.2003 and despatched only on 15.10.2003. There was no mention as to whether the reply allegedly approved on 4.7.2003 was annexed to the revised charge memorandum or not. It was only on 7.11.2003 it was noticed that approved reply to representation dated 17th March, 2003 was not issued earlier and was ordered to be issued. How it came to be noticed was neither spelt out in the said note dated 7.11.2003 or in the reply.
44. We may also note that Articles of Charge dated 26.4.2003 framed against Smt. Vijaylaxmi Sinha (as noted in paras, herein above) as well as statement of imputation was placed in the aforesaid file at pages 41 to 44, though there was no such nothing appearing in the Note portion. A comparison of Annexure-III of Memo dated 14.10.2003 issued to applicant with the Memo dated 26.4.2003 issued to Smt. Vijalyalaxmi Sinha would show that the documents listed at Sl. No. 5 to 8 were same which was issued/annexed to latter Charge Memo. As such Charge Memo, imputation of misconduct and the documents relied in both the cases were identical. How such papers, which were not concerned with the applicant, were placed in the said file is yet another aspect, which needs to be noticed with concern.
45. We have carefully perused the said Note portion and are of the considered view that if the allegation of misrepresentation, which was the basic plank of the respondents in Memorandum dated 7.11.2003, allegedly approved on 28th August, 2003, then how such a vital aspect was lost sight and not included in the revised charge sheet dated 14.10.2003, remains unexplained. Obviously all these pleas as raised now and the documents produced before us are not convincing. Further, no explanation is forthcoming as to why the applicant's reply dated 21st October, 2003 was not examined prior to issuance of Memo dated 7th November, 2003. A perusal of the said file at pages 100-103 further show that the said reply dated 21.10.2003 was sent by the applicant through Speed Post. On perusal of the same, it appears that the same is not the original copy but a photo copy of the same. Moreover, the envelope under which such reply was sent, is not available on record to answer specifically about the date of its receipt in the respondents office. An Article sent by Speed post in the same city would not take about 28 days for delivery. The cumulative effect of all these aspects lead to one irrefutable and irresistible conclusion that the respondents have not acted fairly and rather made the attempt to mislead everyone. Further, perusal of page 98-99 (Note dated 21st November, 2003) shows that after the alleged receipt of the applicant's reply on 18th November, 2003, an attempt was made to amend the Article of Charge as well as imputation. There is no specific order passed by respondent No. 2 on the said Note, though it was signed on the even date with the remark "P1. issue today itself What was approved, when it was issued, all these remain a mystery.
46. We have carefully considered the judgments cited by respondents and are of the considered view that none of them is applicable in the facts and circumstances of the present case and are clearly distinguishable. We are also of the view that we as a Coordinate Bench are bound by the precedent as noted in Order dated 6th May, 2004 passed in O.A. No. 572/ 2003 by the Mumbai Bench of the Tribunal.
47. On bestowing our careful consideration, analysis and examination of the entire facts of the case, we are of the considered view grounds urged by the applicant cannot be brushed aside though we are not inclined to deal with the issue of malice and motive in detail, suffice however to record that the accepted methodology of Governmental working being fairness and the same is lacking in its entirety in the matter under consideration. It was not the case of respondents that the recognition granted to Mahila Gram Vidyapitha Prayag, Allahabad by Ministry of Education vide D.O. letter dated 29.9.1965, as noted in the prospectus, was withdrawn, cancelled at later stage. The respondents action was actuated by mala fides. We further find that there had been factual inaccuracies in the respondents stand. There had been more than one glaring irregularity committed by the respondents at every stage of the proceedings, which we have noticed in detail herein above. The Memo dated 7.11.2004 was illegal, arbitrary, result of predisposition to decide against the applicant and vindictive, besides violative of principle of natural justice and fair play.
48. Considering all aspects of the matter, we hold that there are no compelling grounds for initiation of any disciplinary proceedings against the applicant and the charge of misconduct against her was not proper and was the end result of non application of mind. It has to be quashed. Therefore, Charge Memo dated 14.10.2003 as well as Memorandum dated 7.11.2003 are quashed with all consequent actions taken thereon.
Accordingly, O.A. Nos. 781 & 1063/2003 are allowed.
Orders in C.P. 151/2003 will be passed separately.
No costs.