Madras High Court
Nankachi Enterprises vs The Secretary To Government on 7 September, 2013
Author: S. Manikumar
Bench: S. Manikumar
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
DATED: 07.09.2013
CORAM:
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE S. MANIKUMAR
W.P.No.24218 of 2013
M.P.No.1 of 2013
Nankachi Enterprises,
rep. by its Proprietor,
S.Romeo ... Petitioner
Versus
1. The Secretary to Government,
Department of Geology and Mining,
Thiru.Vi.Ka.Industrial Estate,
Guindy, Chennai 600 032.
2. The District Collector,
Coimbatore District,
Coimbatore.
3. The Deputy Director,
Department of Geology and Mining,
Coimbatore.
4. The Inspector General of Police,
Commissioner of Police Campus,
Coimbatore 641 018.
5. The Superintendent of Police,
No.5, Red Field, Grd Road,
Coimbatore Central,
Coimbatore 641 018.
6. The Deputy Superintendent of Police,
Pollachi. ... Respondents
Writ Petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, praying for issuance of Writs of Mandamus, forbearing the respondents herein and their men from preventing the petitioner from transporting crusher dust from Tamil Nadu to Kerala through Gopalapuram Check post Pollachi, Nadupani Check Post Pollachi, Ennai Pettai Koil Check Post Pollachi, Ozlina Palli Check Post Pollachi, Valaiyar Check Post Coimbatore, Meenakshipuram Check Post Pollachi in Tamil Nadu.
For Petitioner .. Mr.I.Abrar Md. Abdullah
For respondent .. Mr.R.Vijayakumar,
Addl. Government Pleader
O R D E R
The petitioner, who is the proprietor of Nankachi Enterprises, has sought for a Mandamus, forbearing the respondents herein and their men from preventing the petitioner from transporting crusher dust from Tamil Nadu to Kerala, through Gopalapuram Check post Pollachi, Nadupani Check Post Pollachi, Ennai Pettai Koil Check Post Pollachi, Ozlina Palli Check Post Pollachi, Valaiyar Check Post Coimbatore, Meenakshipuram Check Post Pollachi in Tamil Nadu.
2. According to the petitioner, he is a dealer in construction materials, duly registered under the State and Central Sales Tax Acts. He is engaged in transporting goods, through lorries and heavy vehicles. He has submitted that crusher dust is a waste product of the mining industry and it is used as an effective alternative for sand to fill in sites, as it is much cheaper than sand. Therefore, there is a demand for crusher dust in Tamil Nadu and Kerala. He regularly buys crusher dust from authorised Mining quarries and crushing units, and transport the same, within Tamil Nadu and also to the State of Kerala.
3. It is the case of the petitioner that while transporting crusher dust from Coimbatore and Pollachi to Kerala, the consignment is checked by Police, at the border check posts of both the States and only after ascertaining the same, the consignment is allowed to enter into another State. According to him, a person, transporting crusher dust, need not obtain any prior permission from any authority and there is no provision in the mining laws, to that effect. While transporting crusher dust from Tamil Nadu to Kerala, the vehicles are checked at various check posts in Tamil Nadu, viz., Gopalapuram Check post Pollachi, Nadupani Check Post Pollachi, Ennai Pettai Koil Check Post Pollachi, Ozlina Palli Check Post Pollachi, Valaiyar Check Post Coimbatore, Meenakshipuram Check Post Pollachi, and also in the State of Kerala.
4. While that be so, the vehicles, engaged by the petitioner, carrying crusher dust, are stopped at the above check posts, by the police, stating that there is an order from the District Administration, prohibiting transportation of crusher dust and in such circumstances, all the vehicles have been turned back. According to the petitioner, the fourth respondent and his men, have no authority to prevent transportation of crusher dust, under the guise of any check. In the abovesaid circumstances, the petitioner has sought for a Writ of Mandamus, as stated supra.
5. In support of the relief sought for and inviting the attention of this Court to the definition, "minerals" and "minor minerals" in Sections 3(a) and 3(e) of the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act"), Mr.IAbrar Md. Abdullah, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that crusher dust will not fall under the definition of "mineral". Reference has also been made to Rule 36(1-A)(c)Expl.(ii-a) of the Tamil Nadu Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 1959 (hereinafter referred to as "the Rules"), which defines the word "stone", as rough stones including khandas, boulders, size reduced (broken or crushed) materials including metal jelly, ballasts, mill stones, hand chakais and building and road construction stones other than black, red, pink, grey, green, white or other coloured or multi coloured granites or any other rocks suitable for use as ornamental and decorative stones. He also invited the attention of this attention to a compilation by Dr.T.A.Selvan, Director (Retired), Geological Survey of India, who has stated that "crushed stone" is used mainly as road metal, ballast, and certain types of coarse aggregate used in construction.
6. Referring to Section 36(1) of the Tamil Nadu Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 1959, dealing with general restrictions imposed, in respect of quarrying operations and Section 4 of the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, learned counsel for the petitioner further submitted that both the Central and State laws, refer only to mining of minerals, which require permission from the competent authorities and inasmuch as the petitioner is only a buyer and transporter of crusher dust, mining laws are not applicable to the case of the petitioner and at best, it could be applied only to those, who require permission for mining. Consequently, Rule 3 of the Tamil Nadu Prevention of Illegal Mining, Transportation and Storage of Minerals and Mineral Dealers' Rules, 2011, is also inapplicable to the case of the petitioner.
7. Inviting the attention of this Court to the Appendix to the Tamil Nadu Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 1959, learned counsel for the petitioner further submitted that the petitioner, who is only a transporter of crusher dust, is not obligated to even pay any seineorage fee. He further submitted that no special permission is required for transportation of crusher dust. In support of the relied sought for, he also placed reliance on a common order made in W.P.(MD)Nos.742and 8678 of 2010, dated 10.08.2010, wherein, the petitioners have sought for a Writ of Mandamus, forbearing the the respondents therein, from preventing them, from transporting crusher dust from Tamil Nadu to the State of Kerala. In the said unreported judgment, a learned Single Judge of this Court, following a similar order made in W.P.Nos.12738 to 12741 of 2009, has ordered as follows:
"7. Following the same, the petitioners are also permitted to transport crusher dust from the authorised mining quarters and crushing units, on condition that the petitioners shall produce necessary permits, the particulars, viz., from where they are removing and transporting the consignment, the place of destination, etc. It is further made clear that the fourth respondent in W.P.(MD)No.742 of 2010 and the sixth respondent in W.P.(MD)No.8678 of 2010, respectively, are also entitled to check and allow the transportation, if the vehicles carry necessary documents as stated supra. It is also made clear that if the petitioners are transporting any prohibited items, it is open to the respondents to take any appropriate action in the manner known to law."
On the above materials, he submitted that the respondents have no right or authority, to prevent the petitioner from transporting crusher dust from Tamil Nadu to the State of Kerala.
8. On the basis of the counter affidavit filed by the Deputy Director, Geology and Mining, Coimbatore, Mr.R.Vijayakumar, learned Additional Government Pleader, submitted that in exercise of the powers conferred under Section 23(c)(1) of the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957, the Government have framed the Tamil Nadu Prevention of Illegal Mining, Transportation and Storage of Minerals and Mineral Dealers' Rules, 2011 (hereinafter referred as "the Prevention Rules") for prevention of illegal mining of minerals, vide G.O.Ms.No.19, Industrial (MMD1) Department, dated 25.01.2011. As per Rules 2(xiii) and (xviii) of the Prevention Rules, minerals means, all minerals and minor minerals except sand; and transit pass means a pass issued by the concerned Deputy Director for lawful transportation of any mineral by a carrier from the place of stockyard or from the lease area by the registree under these rules. He further submitted that Rule 3 of the Prevention Rules, dealing with prohibition, states that no person shall transport or cause to be transported any mineral by any carrier from the place of raising or from the place of stockyard or from one place to another without having a valid transit pass.
9. Learned Additional Government Pleader further submitted that there are 10 check posts, viz., (1) Valaiyar, (2) Velathavalam, (3) Veerappagoundanoor, (4) Ramapattinam, (5) Naduppuli, (6) Vadakkukadu, (7) Jameen Kalayapuram, (8) Meenakshipuram, (9) Semmanampathu and (10) Mangarai, are situated, while entering to the State of Kerala. He further submitted that the officials, who are deputed for the purpose of enquiry, about any mineral, being transported from Tamil Nadu to Kerala, are bound to verify, as to whether, there is any proper and valid permit from the competent authorities. In the absence of the same, the carriers are not permitted to transport the mineral, to the State of Kerala.
10. Learned Additional Government Pleader further submitted that as per Rule 3 of the Tamil Nadu Prevention of Illegal Mining, Transportation and Storage of Minerals and Mineral Dealers Rules, 2011, no person shall transport any mineral without any valid transport pass. Attention of this Court was also invited to Rule 36(1-A)(c)Expl.(ii-a) of the Tamil Nadu Minor Minerals Concession Rules, 1959, which states that stone includes, size (reduced or crushed). According to learned Additional Government Pleader, if the petitioner wants to transport crusher dust, he has to obtain valid transit pass, from the competent authority.
11. Based on the averments made in the counter affidavit, learned Additional Government Pleader further submitted that M/s.Yencees Blue Metals (P) Ltd., represented by its Managing Director, K.T.Chenthamara, Puravipalayam Village, Pollachi Taluk, filed W.P.No.29338 of 2012, before this Court, praying for a Mandamus, directing the respondents therein, from interfering with the petitioners and its customers' right to transport crusher material, ie., M Sand from the crushing unit of the petitioner at SF.No.495/2, Kanalpudur, Puravipalayam Village, Zamin Kaliyapuram Post, Pollachi to the place of petitioner's purchasers destination in the neighbouring State of Kerala with valid bills issued by the petitioner therein. Though this Court has granted an interim order on 05.11.2012, the writ petition was subsequently dismissed as withdrawn.
12. According to the learned Additional Government Pleader, M/s.Yencees Blue Metals (P) Ltd., has a rough stone quarry lease and a crushing unit in Coimbatore District. He further submitted that similar writ petitions are also pending, in which, the petitioners therein are having stone quarry leases and own stone crushing units in Karur District. Inviting the attention of this Court to the forms prescribed under the Tamil Nadu Prevention of Illegal Mining, Transportation and Storage of Minerals and Mineral Dealers Rules, 2011, in particular, to Form-F, he submitted that the petitioner herein, being the buyer and transporter of crushed stone, which is also a mineral, as defined in Rule 36(1-A)(c)Expl.(ii-a) of the Tamil Nadu Minor Mineral (Concession) Rules, 1959 and Rule 2(xiii) of the Tamil Nadu Prevention of Illegal Mining, Transportation and Storage of Minerals and Mineral Dealers Rules, 2011, the petitioner has to obtain necessary permission from the competent authorities for transporting "crusher dust"
13. Mr.R.Vijayakumar, learned Additional Government Pleader further submitted that as per Section 4(1-A) read with Section 21 of the Act read with Rule 3 of the Prohibition Rules, 2011, a transporter or dealer of a crusher unit, should obtain necessary transit pass from the concerned authority. He further submitted that as per Rule 3 of the Prevention Rules, 2011, no person shall transport or cause to be transported any mineral by any carrier from the place of raising or from the place of stockyard or from one place to another without having a valid transit pass.
14. Placing reliance on a decision in W.P.(MD)No.2997 of 2011, dated 20.06.2012, [G.Karthikeyan v. Secretary to Government], learned Additional Government Pleader further submitted that when a Mandamus, forbearing the respondents therein, from preventing the petitioner therein, from transporting the crusher dust, blue metals, M.Sand from Tamil Nadu to Kerala, through Puliyarai Check Post, at Shencottah Taluk, Tirunelveli District, was sought for by Mr.G.Karthikayan, a Transporter, a learned Single Judge, after referring to Rule 3 of the Prevention Rules, 2011 and Rule 36(1-A)(c)Expl.(ii-a) of the Rules, has dismissed the said writ petition, holding that crusher dust is also a mineral, covered by the Prevention Rules, 2011 and hence, the petitioner herein, who does not have transport permits, cannot seek for a Mandamus. For the reasons stated supra, learned Additional Government Pleader prays for dismissal of the writ petition.
15. By way of reply, Mr.I.Abrar Md. Abdullah, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that Form-I is applicable only to a person, who is engaged with mining activity. According to him, no transporter would be issued with such forms, by the Assistant/Deputy Director of Geology and Mining. Reiterating that crusher dust, will not fall within the definition of "Minerals", he submitted that the provisions of the parent Act and the Rules, framed thereunder, cannot be made applicable to the petitioner-transporter, who is not engaged any mining activity.
Heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the materials available on record.
16. As the applicability of the statutory provisions of Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957 and the Rules framed thereunder, to the petitioner, is being disputed, it is necessary to have a cursory look, at the statutory provisions. Section 3(a) of the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, defines "Minerals, which includes, all minerals except mineral oils. "Minor Minerals" is defined in Section 3(e) of the Act, as building stones, gravel, ordinary clay, ordinary sand other than sand used for prescribed purposes, and any other mineral which the Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, declare to be a minor mineral. Section 4 deals with the general restrictions on undertaking prospecting and mining operationns to be under licence or lease. As per Section 4(1-A), No person shall transport or store or cause to be transported or stored any mineral otherwise than in accordance with the provisions of this Act and the rules made thereunder.
17. Section 15 of the Act, deals with the power of the State Governments to make rules, in respect of minor minerals and the said Section reads as follows:
"(1) The State Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, make rules for regulating the grant of quarry leases, mining leases or other mineral concessions in respect of minor minerals and for purposes connected therewith.
(1A) In particular and without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing power, such rules may provide for all or any of the following matters, namely:-
(a) the person by whom and the manner in which, applications for quarry leases, mining leases or other mineral concessions may be made and the fees to be paid therefor;
(b) the time within which, and the form in which, acknowledgement of the receipt of any such applications may be sent;
(c) the matters which may be considered where applications in respect of the same land are received within the same day;
(d) the terms on which, and the conditions subject to which and the authority by which quarry leases, mining leases or other mineral concessions may be granted or renewed;
(e) the procedure for obtaining quarry leases, mining leases or other mineral concessions;
(f) the facilities to be afforded by holders of quarry leases, mining leases or other mineral concessions to persons deputed by the Government for the purpose of undertaking research or training in matters relating to mining operations;
(g) the fixing and collection of rent, royalty, fees, dead rent, fines or other charges and the time within which and the manner in which these shall be payable;
(h) the manner in which the rights of third parties may be protected (whether by way of payment of compensation or otherwise) in cases where any such party is prejudicially affected by reason of any prospecting or mining operations;
(i) the manner in which the rehabilitation of flora and other vegetation, such as trees, shrubs and the like destroyed by reasons of any quarrying or mining operations shall be made in the same area or in any other area selected by the State Government (whether by way of reimbursement of the cost of rehabilitation or otherwise) by the person holding the quarrying or mining lease;
(j) the manner in which and the conditions subject to which, a quarry lease, mining lease or other mineral concession may be transferred;
(k) the construction, maintenance and use of roads, power transmission lines, tramways, railways, aerial ropeways, pipelines and the making of passage for water for mining purposes on any land comprised in a quarry or mining lease or other mineral concession;
(l) the form of registers to be maintained under this Act;
(m) the reports and statements to be submitted by holders of quarry or mining leases or other mineral concessions and the authority to which such reports and statements shall be submitted;
(n) the period within which and the manner in which and the authority to which applications for revision of any order passed by any authority under these rules may be made, the fees to be paid therefor, and the powers of the revisional authority; and
(o) any other matter which is to be, or may be prescribed.
(2) Until rules are made under sub-section (1), any rules made by a State Government regulating the grant of quarry leases, mining leases or other mineral concessions in respect of minor minerals which are in force immediately before the commencement of this Act shall continue in force.
(3) The holder of a mining lease or any other mineral concession granted under any rule made under subsection (1) shall pay royalty or dead rent, whichever is more in respect of minor minerals removed or consumed by him or by his agent, manager, employee, contractor or sub-lessee at the rate prescribed for the time being in the rules framed by the State Government in respect of minor minerals:
Provided that the State Government shall not enhance the rate of royalty or dead rent in respect of any minor mineral for more than once during any period of three years."
18. Section 21 of the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act deals with penalties and it reads as follows:
"(1) Whoever contravenes the provisions of sub-section (1) or sub-section (1A) of section 4 shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine which may extend to twenty-five thousand rupees, or with both.
(2) Any rule made under any provision of this Act may provide that any contravention thereof shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to one year or with fine which may extend to five thousand rupees, or with both, and in the case of a continuing contravention, with an additional fine which may extend to five hundred rupees for every day during which such contravention continues after conviction for the first such contravention.
(3) Where any person trespasses into any land in contravention of the provisions of sub-section (1) of section 4, such trespasser may be served with an order of eviction by the State Government or any authority authorised in this behalf by that Government and the State Government or such authorised authority may, if necessary, obtain the help of the police to evict the trespasser from the land.
(4) Whenever any person raises, transports or causes to be raised or transported, without any lawful authority, any mineral from any land, and, for that purpose, uses any tool, equipment, vehicle or any other thing, such mineral, tool, equipment, vehicle or any other thing shall be liable to be seized by an officer or authority specially empowered in this behalf.
(4A) Any mineral, tool, equipment, vehicle or any other thing seized under sub-section (4), shall be liable to be confiscated by an order of the court competent to take cognizance of the offence under sub-section (1) and shall be disposed of in accordance with the directions of such court.
(5) Whenever any person raises, without any lawful authority, any mineral from any land, the State Government may recover from such person the mineral so raised, or, where such mineral has already been disposed of, the price thereof, and may also recover from such person, rent, royalty or tax, as the case may be, for the period during which the land was occupied by such person without any lawful authority.
(6) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, an offence under sub-section (1) shall be cognizable.
19. In exercise of the powers conferred by Section 15 of the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957, and in supersession of the Tamil Nadu Minor and Mineral Concession Rules, 1956, published at Pages 371-387 of Part-I Rules Supplement to the Tamil Nadu Government Gazettee, dated the 1st August, 1956, the Government of Tamil Nadu have framed the Tamil Nadu Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 1959, vide G.O.No.3757, Industrias, Labour and Co-operation, dated 24th September, 1959. Rule 36 deals with the general restrictions, in respect of quarrying operations. As per Rule 36(1-A)(c)Expl.(ii-a), the word "stone", is defined as rough stones including khandas, boulders, size reduced (broken or crushed) materials including metal jelly, ballasts, mill stones, hand chakais and building and road construction stones other than black, red, pink, grey, green, white or other coloured or multi coloured granites or any other rocks suitable for use as ornamental and decorative stones.
20. Stones in various sizes, including khandas, boulders, size reduced into different measurements, broken and crushed, etc., are specifically included in the Tamil Nadu Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 1959. In a given case, a person, who takes a quarry licence from the competent authority, may transport boulders or khandas from a quarry site to his own crushing unit, situated at the quarry site or at some other place, crush the khandas or boulders into different sizes. In some cases, the quarry operator may even crush the boulders or the big stones, into dust.
21. In yet another case, after the reduction of boulders or stones, into different sizes, crusher dust would be collected. In the process of reducing the size of a boulder or stone, crusher dust is likely to be another product. Crusher dust can also be the main product, depending upon the lessee, who may intend to sell only dust, which is used for manufacturing hollow blocks, paver blocks, or any other purposes.
22. While interpreting a statute, Courts have consistently held that the preamble, object and headings, under which, the word is used, explanation to the word, in the statute, or the rules, have to be considered, in discerning the legislative intent, object and the applicability of the provisions, to avoid any absurdity. Interpreting a Section or Rule or Explanation, as the case may be, should not frustrate the legislative intent, and enforceability of the provisions.
23. As "crusher dust" is now claimed by the petitioner as a waste product and not falling within the definition of "stone", this Court deems it fit to consider, as to whether, there is any ambiguity in the definition of the word, 'stone' and also to consider some of the decisions, as to how a provision and an explanation to the provision, have to be interpreted.
24. Preamble and Statement of Objects and Reasons to Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957, states as follows:
An Act to provide for the development and regulation of mines and minerals under the control of the Union.
Be it enacted by Parliament in Eighth Year of the Republic of India as follows:-
Statement of Objects and Reasons:- The differentiation made between petroleum and other minerals in items 53 and 54 of the Union List has rendered separate enactments for the two necessary. The present Bill deals only with minerals other than petroleum. At present both are dealt with under the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1948 (53 of 1948).
Opportunity has been taken of putting forward this legislation to make some necessary changes in the provisions of the existing Act dictated by experience. These changes refer to:-
(i) the prescription of a maximum limit of 50 square miles for a prospecting licence [clause 6(1)];
(ii) the grant of a second renewal to a holder of a mining lease for iron ore and bauxite under certain circumstances [clause 8(2)];
(iii) the authorisation of the Central Government to undertake prospecting and mining operations in any land after prior consultation with the State Government [Clause 16];
(iv) the promulgation of rules for the beneficiation of low grade ores [clause 17(2)(c)];
(v) the recovery of royalty, dead rent and other sums due to Government in the same manner as arrears of land revenue [clause 24]; and
(vi) the delegation of certain powers to State Governments and by State Governments to their subordinate authorities [clause 25].
A number of provisions hitherto dealt with under the rule-making powers of the Central Government have been transferred to the Act in order to restrict the scope of subsidiary legislation. These provisions are:-
(i) no concession shall be granted to a person not in possession of a certificate of approval [clause 5(1)];
(ii) the maximum period for which a prospecting license or a mining lease may be granted [clauses 7 and 8];
(iii) the power to prescribe rates of royalty for various minerals [clause 9 and Schedule II];
(iv) applications for prospecting licenses and mining leases to be made in prescribed forms [clause 10(1)];
(v) the priorities to be observed in the grant of prospecting licenses and mining leases [clause 11(2)]; and
(vi) the power to make rules for regulating the grant of mineral concessions [clause 13].
25. In Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes, page 40 to 42, it is stated that preamble is a good means of finding out its meaning and key to its understanding. Since it usually states the object and the intention of the Legislature in passing the enactment, it may legitimately be consulted to solve any ambiguity, or to fix the meaning of words which may have more than one, or to keep the effect of the Act within its real scope wherever the enacting part is in any of these respects open to doubt. Where the language and object, and scope of the enactment are not open to doubt, the preamble cannot either restrict or extend the enacting part.
26. In Nairin v. University of St. Andrews reported in 1909 AC 147, it is held that, Unless there is any ambiguity it would not be open to the Court to depart from the normal rule of construction which is that the intention of the Legislature should be primarily gathered from the words which are used. It is only when the words used are ambiguous that they would stand to be examined and construed in the light of surrounding circumstances and constitutional principle and practice.
27. In Samrao v. District Magistrate, Thana reported in AIR 1952 SC 324, the Apex Court held that, It is the duty of the Courts to give effect to the meaning of an Act, when the meaning can be fairly gathered from the words used, that is to say, if one construction will lead to an absurdity while another will give effect to what common sense would show was obviously intended, the construction which would defeat the ends of the Act, must be rejected even if the same words used in the same section, and even the same sentence, have to be construed differently. Indeed the law goes so far as to require the Courts sometimes even to modify the grammatical and ordinary sense of the words if by doing so absurdity and inconsistency can be avoided.
28. In Poppatlal Shah v. State of Madras reported in AIR 1953 SC 274, the Supreme Court held that, It is settled rule of construction that to ascertain the legislative intent all the constituent parts of a statute are to be taken together and each word, phrase and sentence is to be considered in the light of the general purpose and object of the Act itself.
29. In Rao Shive Bahadur Singh v. State, reported in AIR 1953 SC 394, the Supreme Court held that, While, no doubt, it is not permissible to supply a clear and obvious lacuna in a statute, and imply a right of appeal, it is incumbent on the Court to avoid a construction, if reasonably permissible on the language, which would render a part of the statute devoid of any meaning or application.
30. In Rananjaya Singh v. Baji Nath Singh reported in AIR 1954 SC 749, the Apex Court held that, The spirit of law may well be an illusive and unsafe guide in the interpretation of the statutes and the supposed spirit can certainly not be given effect to in opposition to the plain language of the sections of the Act, and the rules made thereunder. If all that can be said of these statutory provisions is that construed according to the ordinary, grammatical and natural meaning of their language they work injustice, the appeal must be made to the Parliament and not to the Supreme Court.
31. In Hari Prasad Shivashanker Shukla v. A.D.Divelkar reported in AIR 1957 SC 121, the Apex Court held that, It is true that an artificial definition may include a meaning different from or in excess of the ordinary acceptation of the word which is the subject of definition; but there must then be compelling words to show that such a meaning different from or in excess of the ordinary meaning is intended, Where, within the framework of the ordinary acceptation of the word, every single requirement of the definition clause is fulfilled, it would be wrong to take the definition as destroying the essential meaning of the word defined.
32. In Collector of Customs, Baroda v. Digvijaysinghji Spinning & Weaving Mills Ltd., Jamnagar, reported in AIR 1961 SC 1549, the Supreme Court, held that It is one of the well-established rules of construction is that if the words of a statute are in themselves precise and unambiguous, no more is necessary than to expound those words in their natural and ordinary sense, the words themselves in such case best declare the intention of the Legislature. It is equally well settled principle of construction that where alternative constructions are equally open that alternative is to be chosen which will be consistent with the smooth working of the system which the statute purports to be regulating; and that alternative is to be rejected which will introduce uncertainty, friction or confusion into the working of the system.
33. In State of W.B., v. Union of India reported in AIR 1963 SC 1241, the Apex Court held that in considering the expression used by the Legislature, the Court should have regard to the aim, object and scope of the statute to be read in its entirety.
34. In Commissioner of Sales Tax v. M/s.Mangal Sen Shyamlal reported in 1975 (4) SCC 35 = AIR 1975 SC 1106, the Apex Court held that, "A statute is supposed to be an authentic repository of the legislative will and the function of a court is to interpret it "according to the intent of them that made it". From that function the court is. not to resile. It has to abide by the maxim, ut res magis valiat quam pereat, lest the intention of the legislature may go in vain or be left to evaporate into thin air."
35. In C.I.T., Madras v. T.Sundram Iyengar (P) Ltd., reported in 1976 (1) SCC 77, the Supreme Court held that, if the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous and if two interpretations are not reasonably possible, it would be wrong to discard the plain meaning of the words used, in order to meet a possible injustice.
36. If the words are precise and unambiguous, then it should be accepted, as declaring the express intention of the legislature. In Ku.Sonia Bhatia v. State of U.P., and others reported in 1981 (2) SCC 585 = AIR 1981 SC 1274, the Supreme Court held that a legislature does not waste words, without any intention and every word that is used by the legislature must be given its due import and significance.
37. In M/s.Oswal Agro Mills Ltd., v. Collector of Central Excise and others reported in 1993 Supp (3) SCC 716 = AIR 1993 SC 2288, the Apex Court held that, where the words of the statute are plain and clear, there is no room for applying any of the principles of interpretation, which are merely presumption in cases of ambiguity in the statute. The Court would interpret them as they stand.
38. In Dadi Jagannadham v. Jammulu Ramulu reported in (2001) 7 SCC 71, the Supreme Court held that, 13. We have considered the submissions made by the parties. The settled principles of interpretation are that the court must proceed on the assumption that the legislature did not make a mistake and that it did what it intended to do. The court must, as far as possible, adopt a construction which will carry out the obvious intention of the legislature. Undoubtedly if there is a defect or an omission in the words used by the legislature, the court would not go to its aid to correct or make up the deficiency. The court could not add words to a statute or read words into it which are not there, especially when the literal reading produces an intelligible result. The court cannot aid the legislatures defective phrasing of an Act, or add and mend, and, by construction, make up deficiencies which are there.
39. In Nasiruddin v. Sita Ram Agarwal reported in (2003) 2 SCC 577, the Supreme Court held as follows:
35. In a case where the statutory provision is plain and unambiguous, the court shall not interpret the same in a different manner, only because of harsh consequences arising therefrom. In E.Palanisamy v. Palanisamy [2003 (1) SCC 123], a Division Bench of this Court observed:
The rent legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance with the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration has no place in such matters.
37. The courts jurisdiction to interpret a statute can be invoked when the same is ambiguous. It is well known that in a given case the court can iron out the fabric but it cannot change the texture of the fabric. It cannot enlarge the scope of legislation or intention when the language of the provision is plain and unambiguous. It cannot add or subtract words to a statute or read something into it which is not there. It cannot rewrite or recast legislation. It is also necessary to determine that there exists a presumption that the legislature has not used any superfluous words. It is well settled that the real intention of the legislation must be gathered from the language used. It may be true that use of the expression shall or may is not decisive for arriving at a finding as to whether the statute is directory or mandatory. But the intention of the legislature must be found out from the scheme of the Act. It is also equally well settled that when negative words are used the courts will presume that the intention of the legislature was that the provisions are mandatory in character.
40. In Easland Combines, Coimbatore v. Collector of Centra Excise reported in 2003 (3) SCC 410, the Apex Court held that, It is well settled law that merely because a law causes hardship, it cannot be interpreted in a manner so as to defeat its object. It is also to be remembered that the Courts are not concerned with the legislative policy or with the result, whether injuries or otherwise, by giving effect to the language used nor is it the function of the Court where the meaning is clear not to give effect to it merely because it would lead to some hardship. It is the duty imposed on the Courts in interpreting a particular provision of law to ascertain the meaning and intendment of the Legislature and in doing so, they should presume that the provision was designed to effectuate a particular object or to meet a particular requirement.
41. In Balram Kumawat v. Union of India reported in 2003 (7) SCC 628, the Supreme Court held that, Contextual reading is a well-known proposition of interpretation of statute. The classes of a statute should be construed with reference to the context vis-a-vis the other provisions so as to make a consistent enactment of the whole statute relating to the subject-matter. The rule of "ex visceribus actus" should be resorted to in a situation of this nature.
42. In Institute of C.A. of India v. Ajit Kumar Iddya reported in AIR 2003 Kant. 187, the Karnataka High Court held that, So far as the cardinal law of interpretation is concerned, it is settled that if the language is simple and unambiguous, it is to be read with the clear intention of the legislation. Otherwise also, any addition/subtraction of a word is not permissible. In other words, it is not proper to use a sense, which is different from what the word used ordinarily conveys. The duty of the Court is not to fill up the gap by stretching a word used. It is also settled that a provision is to be read as a whole and while interpreting, the intention and object of the legislation have to be looked upon. However, each case depends upon the facts of its own.
43. In Indian Dental Association, Kerala v. Union of India reported in 2004 (1) Kant. LJ 282, the Court held that, The cardinal rule for the construction of Acts of Parliament is that they should be construed according to the intention expressed in the Acts themselves. The object of all interpretation is to discover the intention of Parliament, "but the intention of Parliament must be deduced from the language used", for it is well-accepted that the beliefs and assumptions of those who frame Acts of Parliament cannot make the law. If the words of the statute are themselves precise and unambiguous, then no more can be necessary than to expound those words in their ordinary and natural sense. Where the laguage of an Act is clear and explicit, the Court must give effect to it, whatever may be the consequences, for in that case the words of the statute speak the intention of the Legislature. Where the language is plain and admits of but one meaning, the task of interpretation can hardly be said to arise. The decision in a case calls for a full and fair application of particular statutory language to particular facts as found. It is a corollary to the general rule of literal construction that nothing is to be added to or taken from a statute unless there are adequate grounds to justify the inference that the Legislature intended something which it omitted to express. A construction which would leave without effect any part of the language of a statute will normally be rejected.
44. In Narendra H.Khzurana v. Commissioner of Police reported in 2004 (2) Mh.L.R. 72, it is held that it must be noted the proper course in interpreting a statute in the first instance is to examine its language and then ask what is the natural meaning uninfluenced by the considerations derived from previous state of law and then assume that it was property intended to leave unaltered. It is settled legal position, therefore, that the Courts must try to discover the real intent by keeping the direction of the statute intact.
45. In Nathi Devi v. Radha Devi Gupta reported in AIR 2005 SC 648, the Apex Court held that, The interpretation function of the Court is to discover the true legislative intent, it is trite that in interpreting a statute the Court must, if the words are clear, plain, unambiguous and reasonably susceptible to only one meaning, give to the words that meaning, irrespective of the consequences. Those words must be expounded in their natural and ordinary sense. When a language is plain and unambiguous and admits of only one meaning no question of construction of statute arises, for the Act speaks for itself. Courts are not concerned with the policy involved or that the results are injurious or otherwise, which may follow from giving effect to the language used. If the words used are capable of one construction only then it would not be open to the Courts to adopt any other hypothetical construction on the ground that such construction is more consistent with the alleged object and policy of the Act. In considering whether there is ambiguity, the Court must look at the statute as a whole and consider the appropriateness of the meaning in a particular context avoiding absurdity and inconsistencies or unreasonableness which may render the statute unconstitutional.
46. In In Nathi Devi's case, it is further held that, It is equally well-settled that in interpreting a statute, effort should be made to give effect to each and every word used by the Legislature. The Courts always presume that the Legislature inserted every part thereof for a purpose and the legislative intention is that every part of the statute should have effect. A construction which attributes redundancy to the legislature will not be accepted except for compelling reasons such as obvious drafting errors.
47. In State of Jharkhand v. Govind Singh reported in (2005) 10 SCC 437, the Supreme Court held that, 12. It is said that a statute is an edict of the legislature. The elementary principle of interpreting or construing a statute is to gather the mens or sententia legis of the legislature.
13. Interpretation postulates the search for the true meaning of the words used in the statute as a medium of expression to communicate a particular thought. The task is not easy as the language is often misunderstood even in ordinary conversation or correspondence. The tragedy is that although in the matter of correspondence or conversation the person who has spoken the words or used the language can be approached for clarification, the legislature cannot be approached as the legislature, after enacting a law or Act, becomes functus officio so far as that particular Act is concerned and it cannot itself interpret it. No doubt, the legislature retains the power to amend or repeal the law so made and can also declare its meaning, but that can be done only by making another law or statute after undertaking the whole process of law-making.
14. Statute being an edict of the legislature, it is necessary that it is expressed in clear and unambiguous language.....
15. Where, however, the words were clear, there is no obscurity, there is no ambiguity and the intention of the legislature is clearly conveyed, there is no scope for the court to innovate or take upon itself the task of amending or altering the statutory provisions. In that situation the judges should not proclaim that they are playing the role of a lawmaker merely for an exhibition of judicial valour. They have to remember that there is a line, though thin, which separates adjudication from legislation. That line should not be crossed or erased. This can be vouchsafed by an alert recognition of the necessity not to cross it and instinctive, as well as trained reluctance to do so. (See Frankfurter: Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes in Essays on Jurisprudence, Columbia Law Review, p. 51.)
16. It is true that this Court in interpreting the Constitution enjoys a freedom which is not available in interpreting a statute and, therefore, it will be useful at this stage to reproduce what Lord Diplock said in Duport Steels Ltd. v. Sirs [(1980 (1) All.ER 529] (All ER at p. 542c-d):
It endangers continued public confidence in the political impartiality of the judiciary, which is essential to the continuance of the rule of law, if judges, under the guise of interpretation, provide their own preferred amendments to statutes which experience of their operation has shown to have had consequences that members of the court before whom the matter comes consider to be injurious to the public interest.
19. In D.R. Venkatachalam v. Dy. Transport Commr. [1977 (2) SCC 273] it was observed that courts must avoid the danger of a priori determination of the meaning of a provision based on their own preconceived notions of ideological structure or scheme into which the provision to be interpreted is somewhat fitted. They are not entitled to usurp legislative function under the disguise of interpretation.
48. In Vemareddy Kumaraswamy Reddy v. State of A.P., reported in (2006) 2 SCC 670, the Supreme Court held that, 12. It is said that a statute is an edict of the legislature. The elementary principle of interpreting or construing a statute is to gather the mens or sententia legis of the legislature. It is well-settled principle in law that the court cannot read anything into a statutory provision which is plain and unambiguous.
49. In A.N.Roy Commissioner of Police v. Suresh Sham Singh reported in AIR 2006 SC 2677, the Apex Court held that, It is now well settled principle of law that, the Court cannot change the scope of legislation or intention, when the language of the statute is plain and unambiguous. Narrow and pedantic construction may not always be given effect to. Courts should avoid a construction, which would reduce the legislation to futility. It is also well settled that every statute is to be interpreted without any violence to its language. It is also trite that when an expression is capable of more than one meaning, the Court would attempt to resolve the ambiguity in a manner consistent with the purpose of the provision, having regard to the great consequences of the alternative constructions.
50. In Adamji Lookmanji & Co. v. State of Maharastra reported in AIR 2007 Bom. 56, the Bombay High Court held that, when the words of status are clear, plain or unambiguous, and reasonably susceptible to only meaning, Courts are bound to give effect to that meaning irrespective of the consequences. The intention of the legislature is primarily to be gathered from the language used. Attention should be paid to what has been said in the statute, as also to what has not been said.
51. In State of Haryana v. Suresh reported in 2007 (3) KLT 213, the Supreme Court held that, One of the basic principles of Interpretation of Statutes is to construe them according to plain, literal and grammatical meaning of the words. If that is contrary, to or inconsistent with any express intention or declared purpose of the Statute, or if it would involve any absurdity, repugnancy or inconsistency, the grammatical sense must then be modified, extended or abridged, so far as to avoid such an inconvenience, but no further. The onus of showing that the words do not mean what they say lies heavily on the party who alleges it must advance something which clearly shows that the grammatical construction would be repugnant to the intention of the Act or lead to some manifest absurdity.
52. In Sanjay Singh v. U.P. Public Service Commission reported in (2007) 3 SCC 720, the Supreme Court held that, 19. Rule 20(3) provides for the final list of selected candidates in order of their proficiency as disclosed by the aggregate of marks finally awarded to each candidate in the written examination and the interview. Note (i) to Appendix II of the Judicial Service Rules provides that the marks obtained in the interview will be added to the marks obtained in the written papers and that the candidates place will depend on the aggregate of both. Though the Judicial Service Rules refers to marks finally awarded, the said Rules do not contain a provision similar to the proviso to Rule 51 of the PSC Procedure Rules, enabling the Commission to adopt any method, device or formula to eliminate variation in the marks. It is not possible to read the proviso to Rule 51 or words to that effect into Rule 20(3) or Note (i) of Appendix II of the Judicial Service Rules. It is well settled that courts will not add words to a statute or read into the statute words not in it. Even if the courts come to the conclusion that there is any omission in the words used, it cannot make up the deficiency, where the wording as it exists is clear and unambiguous. While the courts can adopt a construction which will carry out the obvious intention of the legislative or the rule-making authority, it cannot set at naught the legislative intent clearly expressed in a statute or the rules. Therefore, Rule 20(3) and Note (i) of Appendix II have to be read as they are without the addition of the proviso to Rule 51 of the PSC Procedure Rules. If so, what can be taken into account for preparing final list of selected candidates, are marks finally awarded to a candidate in the written examination and the interview. The marks assigned by the examiner are not necessarily the marks finally awarded to a candidate. If there is any error in the marks awarded by the examiner it can always be corrected by the Commission and the corrected marks will be the final marks awarded to the candidate. Where the Commission is of the view that there is examiner variability in the marks (due to strict or liberal assessment of answer-scripts) or improper assessment on account of erratic or careless marking by an examiner, they can be corrected appropriately by moderation. The moderation is either by adding (in the case of strict examiners) or deducting (in the case of liberal examiners) a particular number of marks which has been decided with reference to principles of moderation applied. If there is erratic or careless marking, then moderation is by fresh valuation by another examiner. Therefore, the marks assigned by the examiner as moderated will be the marks finally awarded to the candidates or marks obtained by the candidates. Moderation, it has to be held, is inherent in the evaluation of answer-scripts in any large scale examination, where there are more than one examiner.
53. In T.N.State Electricity Board v. Central Electricity Regulatory Commission reported in 2007 (7) SCC 636, the Supreme Court held that, Resort can be had to the legislative intent for the purpose of interpreting a provision of law, when the language employed by the legislature is doubtful or susceptible of meanings more than one. However, when the language is plain and explicit and does not admit of any doubtful interpretation, the Supreme Court cannot, by reference to an assumed legislative intent expand the meaning of an expression employed by the legislature and therein include such category of persons as the legislature has not chosen to do.
54. In Mohan v. State of Maharashtra reported in (2007) 9 SCC 431, the Supreme Court held that, 9. In our opinion under Section 11-A what has to be seen is the date of last publication of the declaration under Section 6, and not any subsequent corrigendum to the said declaration. The only circumstance under which the period between the declaration under Section 6 and the award can be extended is mentioned in the Explanation to Section 11-A which states:
In computing the period of two years referred to in this section, the period during which any action or proceeding to be taken in pursuance of the said declaration is stayed by an order of a court shall be excluded. There is no mention in Section 11-A that the period after the publication of the declaration under Section 6 and the publication of any corrigendum to the said declaration has also to be excluded. We will be adding words to the statute if we put such interpretation to Section 11-A, and it is well settled that the court should not add or delete words in a statute.
55. In Visitor Amu v. K.S.Misra reported in 2007 (8) SCC 594, the Supreme Court held that, It is well settled principle of interpretation of the statute that it is incumbent upon the Court to avoid a construction, if reasonably permissible on the language, which will render a part of the statute devoid of any meaning or application. The Courts always presume that the legislature inserted every part thereof for a purpose and the legislative intent is that every of the statute should have effect. The legislature is deemed not to waste its words or to say anything in vain and a construction which attributes redundancy to the legislature will not be accepted except for compelling reasons. It is not a sound principle of construction to brush aside words in a statute as being in apposite surplusage, if they can have appropriate application in circumstances conceivably within the contemplation of the statute.
56. In Suresh Khullar v. Vijay Khullar reported in AIR 2008 Del. 1, the Court held that, Where alternative constructions are possible the Court must give effect to that which will be responsible for the smooth working of the system for which the statute has been enacted rather than the one which would put hindrances in its way. If the choice is between two interpretations, the narrower of which would fail to achieve the manifest purpose of the legislation the Court should avoid a construction which would reduce the legislation to futility and should rather accept the bolder construction based on the view that Parliament would legislate only for the purpose of bringing about an effective result.
57. In Gujarat Urja Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Essar Power Ltd., reported in (2008) 4 SCC 755, the Supreme Court, at Paragraphs 52, 54, 55 and 56, held as follows:
52. No doubt ordinarily the literal rule of interpretation should be followed, and hence the court should neither add nor delete words in a statute. However, in exceptional cases this can be done where not doing so would deprive certain existing words in a statute of all meaning, or some part of the statute may become absurd.
54. Thus, in Surjit Singh Kalra v. Union of India, this Court has observed that sometimes courts can supply words which have been accidentally omitted.
55. In G.P. Singhs Principles of Statutory Interpretation, 9th Edn., 2004 at pp. 71-74 several decisions of this Court and foreign courts have been referred to where the court has added words to a statute (though cautioning that normally this should not be done).
56. Hence we have to add the aforementioned words at the end of Section 175 otherwise there will be an irreconcilable conflict between Section 174 and Section 175.
58. In Ansal Properties & Industries Ltd. v. State of Haryana, reported in (2009) 3 SCC 553, the Supreme Court held that, 39. If the legislature had intended that the licensee is required to transfer the land and also to construct the buildings on it or to make payment for such construction, the legislature would have made specific provisions laying down such conditions explicitly and in clear words in which event the provisions would have been worded in altogether different words and terms. It is a well-settled principle in law that the court cannot read anything into a statutory provision which is plain and unambiguous. The language employed in a statute is determinative factor of legislative intent. If the language of the enactment is clear and unambiguous, it would not be proper for the courts to add any words thereto and evolve some legislative intent, not found in the statute.
40. In Ganga Prasad Verma (Dr.) v. State of Bihar [1995 Supp (1) SCC 192], it has been held that: (SCC p. 195, para 5) 5. Where the language of the Act is clear and explicit, the court must give effect to it, whatever may be the consequences, for in that case the words of the statute speak the intention of the legislature.
59. In Phool Patti v. Ram Singh reported in (2009) 13 SCC 22, the Supreme Court held that, 9. It is a well-settled principle of interpretation that the court cannot add words to the statute or change its language, particularly when on a plain reading the meaning seems to be clear. Since there is no mention of any pre-existing right in the exception in clause (vi), we have found it difficult to accept the views in Bhoop Singh case [1995 (5) SCC 709]. It seems that there is inconsistency in the decisions of this Court in Bhoop Singh case and K.Raghunandan case [2008 (13) SCC 102], and since we are finding it difficult to agree with the decision of this Court in Bhoop Singh case, the matter should be considered by a larger Bench of this Court.
60. In Mohd. Shahabuddin v. State of Bihar, reported in (2010) 4 SCC 653, the Supreme Court held that, 179. Even otherwise, it is a well-settled principle in law that the court cannot read anything into a statutory provision which is plain and unambiguous. The language employed in a statute is a determinative factor of the legislative intent. If the language of the enactment is clear and unambiguous, it would not be proper for the courts to add any words thereto and evolve some legislative intent, not found in the statute. Reference in this regard may be made to a recent decision of this Court in Ansal Properties & Industries Ltd. v. State of Haryana [2009 (3) SCC 553]
180. Further, it is a well-established principle of statutory interpretation that the legislature is specially precise and careful in its choice of language. Thus, if a statutory provision is enacted by the legislature, which prescribes a condition at one place but not at some other place in the same provision, the only reasonable interpretation which can be resorted to by the courts is that such was the intention of the legislature and that the provision was consciously enacted in that manner. In such cases, it will be wrong to presume that such omission was inadvertent or that by incorporating the condition at one place in the provision the legislature also intended the condition to be applied at some other place in that provision.
61. In Satheedevi v. Prasanna reported in (2010) 5 SCC 622, the Supreme Court held as follows:
12. Before proceeding further, we may notice two well-recognised rules of interpretation of statutes. The first and primary rule of construction is that the intention of the legislature must be found in the words used by the legislature itself. If the words used are capable of one construction, only then it would not be open to the courts to adopt any other hypothetical construction on the ground that such hypothetical construction is more consistent with the alleged object and policy of the Act. The words used in the material provisions of the statute must be interpreted in their plain grammatical meaning and it is only when such words are capable of two constructions that the question of giving effect to the policy or object of the Act can legitimately ariseKanai Lal Sur v. Paramnidhi Sadhukhan [AIR 1957 SC 907]
13. The other important rule of interpretation is that the court cannot rewrite, recast or reframe the legislation because it has no power to do so. The court cannot add words to a statute or read words which are not there in it. Even if there is a defect or an omission in the statute, the court cannot correct the defect or supply the omissionUnion of India v. Deoki Nandan Aggarwal [1992 Supp (1) SCC 323] and Shyam Kishori Devi v. Patna Municipal Corpn. [AIR 1966 SC 1678]
62. In Sri Jeyaram Educational Trust & Ors., v. A.G.Syed Mohideen & Ors. reported in 2010 CIJ 273 SC (1), it is held that, "6. It is now well settled that a provision of a statute should have to be read as it is, in a natural manner, plain and straight, without adding, substituting or omitting any words. While doing so, the words used in the provision should be assigned and ascribed their natural, ordinary or popular meaning. Only when such plain and straight reading, or ascribing the natural and normal meaning to the words on such reading, leads to ambiguity, vagueness, uncertainty, or absurdity which were not obviously intended by the Legislature or the Lawmaker, a court should open its interpretation tool kit containing the settled rules of construction and interpretation, to arrive at the true meaning of the provision. While using the tools of interpretation, the court should remember that it is not the author of the Statute who is empowered to amend, substitute or delete, so as to change the structure and contents. A court as an interpreter cannot alter or amend the law. It can only interpret the provision, to make it meaningful and workable so as to achieve the legislative object, when there is vagueness, ambiguity or absurdity. The purpose of interpretation is not to make a provision what the Judge thinks it should be, but to make it what the legislature intended it to be."
63. In Delhi Airtech Services (P) Ltd. v. State of U.P., reported in (2011) 9 SCC 354, the Supreme Court held that, 51. This Court is of the view that Section 17(3-A) is not an isolated provision. Section 17(3-A) figures very prominently as part of the statutory mechanism in Section 17 of the Act which confers special powers in cases of urgency. Section 17 has four sub-sections and all these sub-sections comprise a composite mechanism and are closely intertwined. Power under one sub-section cannot be exercised without complying with the conditions imposed by the other sub-sections.
54. It is thus clear that sub-section (3-A) of Section 17 read with sub-section (2) of Section 31 of the Act form a composite statutory scheme. The said scheme has been legislatively framed to balance the promotion of public purpose in acquisition with rights of the individual whose land is acquired. This is clear from the Statement of Objects and Reasons which was kept in view for bringing about the amendment of the said Act by Amendment Act 68 of 1984. By the said amendment Section 17(3-A) was brought on the statute. Therefore, the provision of Section 17(3-A) cannot be viewed in isolation as it is an intrinsic and mandatory step in exercising special powers in cases of emergency. Sections 17(1) and 17(2) and 17(3-A) must be read together. Sections 17(1) and 17(2) cannot be worked out in isolation.
55. It is well settled as a canon of construction that a statute has to be read as a whole and in its context. In Attorney General v. Prince Ernest Augustus of Hanover [1957 AC 436], Lord Viscount Simonds very elegantly stated the principle that it is the duty of court to examine every word of a statute in its context. The learned Law Lord further said that in understanding the meaning of the provision, the Court must take into consideration not only other enacting provisions of the same statute, but its preamble, the existing state of the law, other statutes in pari materia, and the mischief which I can, by those and other legitimate means, discern that the statute was intended to remedy. (All ER p. 53 I)
57. These principles have been followed by this Court in its Constitution Bench decision in Union of India v. Sankalchand Himatlal Sheth [1977 (4) SCC 193]. At SCC p. 240, Bhagwati, J. as His Lordship then was, in a concurring opinion held that words in a statute cannot be read in isolation, their colour and content are derived from their context and every word in a statute is to be examined in its context. His Lordship explained that the word context has to be taken in its widest sense and expressly quoted the formulations of Lord Viscount Simonds, set out above (see para 54, p. 241 of the Report).
64. Rule 36 falls in Section V of the said Rules, under the Heading, general restrictions in respect of quarrying operations. To what extent, an Heading can be considered by the Courts in interpreting a provision in the Statute or the Rules framed thereunder, is considered by the Apex Court in the following decisions,
65. In Raichurmatham Prabhakar v. Rawatmal Dugar reported in AIR 2004 SC 3625, the Supreme Court held that, The view is now settled that the Headings or Titles pre-fixed to sections or group of sections can be referred to in construing an Act of the Legislature. But conflicting opinions have been expressed on the question as to what weight should be attached to the Headings or Titles. According to one view, the Headings might be treated as preambles to the provisions following them so as to be regard as giving the key to opening the mind of the draftsman of the clauses arranged thereunder. According to the other view, resort to Heading can only be taken when the enacting words are ambiguous. They cannot control the meaning of plain words but they may explain ambibuities. (Principles of Statutory Interpretation by Justice G.P. Singh, Ninth Edition, v. 2004, pp. 152, 155). It is permissible to assign the heading or Title of a section a limited role to play in the construction of statutes. They may be taken as very broad and general indicators of the nature of the subject-matter dealt with thereunder. The Heading or Title may also be taken as a condensed name assigned to indicate collectively the characteristics of the subject-matter dealt with by the enactment underneath; though the name would always be brief having its own limitations. In case of conflict between the plain language of the provision and the meaning of the Heading or Title, the Heading or Title would not control the meaning which is clearly and plainly discernible from the language of the provision thereunder.
66. In Refugee Co-operative Housing Society Ltd., New Delhi v. Harbans Singh Bhasin reported in AIR 1982 Del. 335, the Court that, Headings prefixed to a section may be read along with the enacting provisions of the section to resolve any doubt-heading cannot prevail when intention of the Legislature can be gathered by reference to other sections.
67. In Mahesh Housing Co-operative Society Ltd., v. State of West Bengal reported in 2004 (1) CHN 10, the Court held that, That the headings constitute an important part of the Act and may be read not only as explaining the sections, which immediately follow them, but the headings may be read as preamble to a statute and may be looked for that purpose to explain the enactment. The same can be considered as key to the construction of section, which follow them.
68. Sometimes, words used in the statute may not be explanatory, but precise. Yet they may convey the literal and purposeful meaning reflecting the legislative intent. More often, they are explained in the rules framed. The word stone used in the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957, is morefully explained, in Rule 36(1-A)(c)Expl.(ii-a). In that context, let me consider some of the judgments of the Apex Court, as to how, explanations given in the statute or the rules, have to be read and understood.
69. In S.Sundaram v. V.R.Pattabhiraman reported in AIR 1985 SC 582, the Apex Court held that, It is well settled that an explanation added to a statutory provision is not a substantive proviso,o in any sense of the term but as the plain meaning of the word itself shows, it is merely meant to explain or qualify certain ambiguities which may have crept in the statutory provision. From a conspectus of the authorities, it is manifest that the object of an Explanation to a statutory provision is-
(a) to explain the meaning and intendment of the Act itself;
(b) where there is any obscurity or vagueness in the main enactment, to clarify the same so as to make it consistent with the dominant object which it seems to subserve,
(c) to provide an additional support to the dominant object of the Act in order to make it meaningful and purposeful;
(d) an Explanation cannot in any way interfere with or change the enactment or any part thereof but where gap is left which is relevant for the purpose of the Explanation, in order to suppress the mischief and advance the object of the Act it can help or assist the court in interpreting the true purport and intendment of the enactment; and
(e) it cannot, however, take away a statutory right with which any person , under a statute has been clothed or set at naught the working of an Act by becoming an hindrance in the interpretation of the same."
70. In Sulochana Amma v. Narayanan Nair reported in AIR 1994 SC 152 = 1994 (2) SCC 14, the Supreme Court, held that, "8. It is settled law that explanation to a section is not a substantive provision by itself. It is entitled to explain the meaning of the words contained in the section or clarify certain ambiguities or clear them up. It becomes a part and parcel of the enactment. Its meaning must depend upon its terms. Sometimes it would be added to include something within it or to exclude from the ambit of the main provision or some condition or words occurring in it. Therefore, the explanation normally should be so read as to harmonise with and to clear up any ambiguity in the same section."
71. When this Court takes the task of ascertaining the intention of the legislation, the contentions of the petitioner does not satisfy the test of "rule of legislative intent". The word, "stone", as explained in Rule 36(1-A)(c)(ii-a), conveys the legislative policy that stone in whatever form and size or crushed, it is still a stone.
72. If the contentions of the petitioner are to be accepted, then it would not bring harmony in the rule and it would be subjected to misuse. Contextual and purposive interpretation of the word, stone as explained, reflects the legislative intent and object. Any other interpretation would result in absurdity. While discerning the intention behind the legislature, this Court is of the view that stone, crushed or crusher dust, will fall within the definition of mineral.
73. The word, stone is not succeptable of any limitation in its plain meaning, with which, it is used. It is well settled that regard must be had, not only to the words employed to describe the word, but also to the intention with which it is used. The word, minerals, according to its etymology means those products which are derived from a mine.
74. When the statute and the rules framed are read together, it conveys the aim, object and scope of the Legislation. It serves the purpose, for which, the Legislation has been made. Once it is found that a mineral is transported without a valid permit, then the carrier is liable for seizure and the person, who contravened the provisions, is liable for appropriate action. Rule 36(1-A)(c)Expl.(ii-a), is not unambiguous. It does not contain a word or phrase, in the context, in which, it is used exempts crushed dust and that the same is incapable of having more than one meaning, except to the extent that stones in different sizes or crushed, is still a "stone". The words reduced to sizes or crushed, are plain and clear. It has reference to the nature of the mineral and carved with a specific purpose.
75. Once a statutory rule is made, without any exceptions to stone crushed or crushed dust, then it is the humble view of this Court that it is not possible to carve out any exceptions. An exception from the rule should be clear and unambiguous. In my humble view, if crushed stone or crusher dust is excluded from the definition of mineral, as explained in Rule 36(1-A)(c)(ii-a) of the Rules, 1959, then it would amount to granting an exemption, which the legislative did not intend to do so. In Union of India v. Braj Nandan Singh reported in AIR 2005 SC 4403, the Apex Court held that the language employed in a statute is a determinable factor of legislative intent. In construing a provision, plain meaning has to be taken.
76. An Explanation to a Section or Rule, throws light in interpreting the word or expression used in the statute or the rule, as the case may be. Section 3(e) of the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957 and Rule 36(1-A)(c)Expl.(ii-a) of the Tamil Nadu Minor Mineral (Concession) Rules, 1959, must be read, as an integral part of the statute and the rules, while construing the meaning of the word mineral and if conjointly read, then there is no ambiguity, in understanding the intention of the legislature that, stones reduced to different sizes or crushed, would fall within the definition of a mineral.
77. If the contentions of the petitioner that crushed dust or in other words stones crushed as used in the explanation to Rule 36(1-A)(c)Expl.(ii-a), has to be accepted, as not falling within the ambit of the Act and the Rules framed thereunder, then it would not only affect the smooth working of the system, but it would defeat the manifest purpose, for which, the legislation has been made and on the contra, it would lead to legislative futility.
78. It is well settled that the process of construction combines both literal and purposive approach. The true or the legal meaning of the words used in the enactment in the light of any enactment, has to be discovered from the intention of the Legislature and object of the Act and the Rules framed thereunder. There is no ambiguity or vagueness in understanding the meaning of the word, stone, as explained in the statutory rules. It is well known that the natural meaning of the words used in the provision, has to be given. When this Court takes the position of interpreting the meaning of the word, stone, as explained in Rule 36(1-A)(c)(ii-a) of the Tamil Nadu Minor Mineral Concession Rules and explore the intention of the Legislature, from the language used in the statute and the rules, it is of the view that there is no ambiguity that crushed stone is a mineral. Expounding the words in the natural, plain and ordinary sense, with the object of the statute and the Rules framed thereunder, particularly, the Tamil Nadu Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 1959 and the Prevention Rules, 2011, this Court is not able to come to any other conclusion, except to hold that stone in the form, crushed or reduced size, unambiguously mean, that it is only a mineral.
79. Though Mr.I.Abrar Md. Abdullah, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the crusher dust is a waste product, when the stone is broken or crushed and that it would not fall under the definition, "stone", this Court is not inclined to accept the said contention for the simple reason that "stone" is defined in Rule 36(1-A)(c)(ii-a) of the abovesaid Rules, as rough stones including khandas, boulders, size reduced (broken or crushed) materials including metal jelly, ballasts, mill stones, hand chakais and building and road construction stones other than black, red, pink, grey, green, white or other coloured or multi coloured granites or any other rocks suitable for use as ornamental and decorative stones.
80. When Section 3(e) of the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act and Rule 36(1-A)(c)Expl.(ii-a)of the Tamil Nadu Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 1959, convey the meaning of the word stone, as size reduced (broken and crushed) materials, and having regard to the purpose and object, for which, the Act has been enacted, followed by the Rules, this Court is not in agreement with the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner that crushed dust is not a stone or a minor mineral, falling within the definition of Section 3(e) of the Act and Rule 36(1-A)(c)Expl.(ii-a) of the Rules.
81. A big boulder or khandas, stones reduced in different sizes or crushed, does not lose its form and substance and that is why, the Legislature has defined and carved an explanation for the word, "stone", in the Rules. Therefore, it cannot be contended that the stone, if it is transported in the form of boulders or khandas or reduced in sizes, alone require permission for transportation, and crushed dust or crushed stone, if transported, does not require transportation permits. At this juncture, it is pertinent to reiterate that as per Section 4(1-A), no person shall transport or store or cause to be transported or stored any mineral otherwise than in accordance with the provisions of this Act and the rules made thereunder.
82. If the contention of the petitioner that only in the case of boulders or big stones, etc., transport permits are required and not in the case of crusher stones, then it would amount to cutting down the plain meaning of the words, in the provision. If the contentions of the petitioner that crushed dust or in other words, stones crushed, will not fall within the meaning of the word, stone has to be accepted, then, it amounts to deletion of the word, crushed, from the Rules. Courts cannot add or alter or delete, any word from the statute or the Rules framed.
83. Though the learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that Rules 3 and 36(1-A)(c)Expl.(iii-a), of the Tamil Nadu Minor Minerals Concession Rules, 1959, are not applicable, as the petitioner is not engaged in quarry operations, this Court is not in agreement with him. While giving effect to the statute, Tamil Nadu Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 1959 and Prevention Rules, 2011, the definition of mineral as contained in Section 3(e) of the Act and explained in Rule 36(1-A)(c)(iii-a) would squarely apply to crushed dust, also. It should be brone in mind that action against the petitioner is taken under the statute and the rules framed, not for any mining operations, but for transportation of minerals, for which, permission is required.
84. Reverting back to the definition of "minor minerals" in Section 3(e), as "building stones", the legislature has made it clear that the stones, whatever size and form, which can be used for building purpose, have been included in the definition "minor minerals".
85. In the definition of "minor minerals", building stone is followed by gravel, ordinary clay, ordinary sand other than sand used for prescribed purposes, and any other mineral, which the Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, declare to be a minor mineral. From the definition, "minor minerals", even ordinary clay and gravel are included. Therefore, an inference can be drawn that minerals, which are used for construction of buildings and other incidental activities, though broadly brought, within the definition of the words, minor minerals, the Legislature has precisely explained stone, as Khandas or stone reduced in size or crushed and gravel, ordinary clay, etc., have been grouped. Therefore, if building stone is reduced into different sizes or crushed, it would still retain its character of stone.
86. In the light of the above discussion, this Court is not inclined to accept the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that crusher dust is a waste product and hence, not falling within the words, "minor minerals". "crusher dust" could be the main product or a bi-product, when stone is crushed into different sizes. It depends upon the business activity of the quarry operator.
87. The Tamilnadu Prevention of illegal mining, Transportation and Storage of Minerals and Mineral Dealers Rules, 2011 have been framed under Section 23C (1) of Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957, in exercise of the powers conferred by sub-Sections (1) and (1-A) of Section 15 of the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957 (Central Act 67 of 1957). The abovesaid Rules came into force with effect from 25.01.2011, vide G.O.Ms.No.19, Industries (MMD.1), dated 25.01.2011. Some of the relevant rules are extracted hereunder:
2. Definitions: In these Rules, unless the context otherwise requires:-
(ii) Authorised Officer means the District Collector of the district concerned or such other officer as may be authorised by the Government;
(iii) carrier means any mode of transport by which the mineral is transported from one place to another which includes automotive, person, animal or cart;
(iv) Competent Authority means the person as authorised under section 22 of the Act;
(v) Deputy Director means Deputy Director of Geology and Mining which shall include Assistant Director of Geology and Mining of the district concerned;
(vi) despatch slip means a slip issued by the permit issuing officer empowered to issue such transport permit for transportation of specific quantity of mineral in each carrier;
(viii)Form means form set out in the Schedule to these rules;
(xiii) minerals means all minerals and minor minerals except sand;
(xv) mineral dealer means any person who carries on the business of buying, selling, storing, supplying, transporting distributing or delivering for sale of mineral or its products and includes.
(xvi)stockyard means a place where the minerals are stored or stocked out side the lease area;
(xvii) transport permit means a permit issued by the permit issuing officer;
(xviii) transit pass means a pass issued by the concerned Deputy Director for lawful transportation of any mineral by a carrier from the place of stockyard or from the lease area by the registree under these rules;
3. Prohibition. (1) No person shall transport or cause to be transported any mineral by any carrier from the place of raising or from the place of stockyard or from one place to another without having a valid transit pass.
(2) No person other than the mineral dealer shall store or cause to be stored any mineral at any place for purposes of sale or consumption.
(3) No mineral dealer shall store any mineral other than the place specified in the registration certificate granted under these Rules :
Provided that no person purchasing and transporting minerals for use or consumption by himself and such use or consumption does not involve any commercial activity and any holder of a mining lease or a quarry lease in respect of the minerals for which he holds a lease, shall not be required to register himself as a dealer.
4. Grant of Registration and its renewal:(1) Every Mineral Dealer and any person desirous of being registered as a Mineral Dealer under these rules shall apply to the District Collector concerned through the Deputy Director in triplicate, in Form A along with the application fee of Rs.5,000/- (Rupees five thousand only) drawn in favour of the District Collector of the concerned District by designation. Separate application along with the said fee shall be submitted for each stockyard.
(2) On receipt of application under sub-rule (1), the Deputy Director shall acknowledge the receipt immediately in Form B and the acknowledgment shall be sent to the applicant.
5. Processing of application by the District Collector:(1) The Deputy Director shall maintain a register in Form C wherein he will make necessary entries about the said application immediately after its receipt and its disposal in due course.
(2) The Deputy Director shall process the said application and place the proposal before District Collector for orders.
(3) (a) The District Collector may grant a registration certificate in Form D within thirty days from the date of receipt of application. In case of refusal or rejection of the application, the reason shall be recorded in writing and communicated to the applicant within thirty days from the date of receipt of the application.
(b) Every Mineral Dealer who wishes to continue his registration certificate after expiry of the period for which it is granted, shall make an application in Form A along with application fee of Rs.5,000/- (Rupees five thousands only) to the District Collector through the Deputy Director before ninety days from the date of expiry of its period.
(c) The maximum period for which the registration certificate granted or renewed shall not exceed five years.
6. Transport permit and Transit pass. (1) No person shall transport or otherwise remove or carry away any mineral from any place without obtaining a transit pass from the Deputy Director. Person desiring such passes should file an application before the Deputy Director in Form 'F' duly specifying all the particulars prescribed therein.
(2) The application shall be accompanied by a copy of the permit showing payment of royalty / seigniorage on such mineral or other adequate proof of such payment.
(3) On receipt of an application under sub-rule (1), the Deputy Director may grant transit pass in Form 'F' for such period and subject to such terms and conditions as may be imposed by him or may refuse to grant such transit pass for the reasons to be recorded in writing and communicated to the applicant.
(4) Any person who transports the minerals and who is required to carry transit shall produce pass on demand to the authorised officer or any officer or authority who has been empowered under sub-section (4), Section 21 of the Act.
7. Conditions.The registration certificate shall be granted in Form 'D' subject to the following conditions :
(i) "All traders in minerals should be registered as dealers. However in the case of Mineral Dealers who deal exclusively with imported minerals of a variety not available in Tamil Nadu, no inspection of the Units outside the State from which the minerals are secured will be done. The mineral traders however should file quarterly statement of their minerals imported into the State and produce proof of payment of any entry tax or other tax leviable by the State of Tamil Nadu whenever called upon to do so.
(ii) The grantee of registration shall maintain the details of minerals purchased and stocked and details of mineral transported from the stockyard and the balance of mineral available in the stockyard in Form 'E'. If the grantee of registration having more than one stockyard, each stockyard shall be registered separately and Form 'E' shall be maintained separately for each stock yard. The stockyards are liable for verification at any time by the authority or authorised officer.
(iii) The grantee of registration shall allow any authorised officer at any time to inspect the stockyard, factories to verify the stock of ores or minerals and take sample of the abstract from the records maintained by him.
(iv) Every grantee of registration shall allow the Competent Authority or the authorised officer to enter and inspect the stockyard including the premises of the factories where such mineral is processed and he may weigh, measure or take measurements of the stocks of the minerals at such stockyard or factory.
(v) All Officers who have been authorised under Section 24 of the Act are empowered to search any place in which there is a reason to believe that offence is being committed and to seize any stock of minerals in respect of which the offence has been or is being committed.
(vi) The District Collector is empowered to issue any orders for inspections to be caused and for proper implementation of the Act and Rules within the jurisdiction of the concerned district. If any person is found to keep the mineral in the place other than in stockyard or if any grantee of registration is found to commit any offence or contravene any of the provisions of the Act or Rules including any discrepancies noted in Form 'E' in respect of any stockyard, the District Collector shall take suitable action.
8. Seizure and confiscation. (1) Every grantee of registration permitted to stock or transport minerals shall allow the authorised officer or authority empowered by the Government under the provisions of the Act or competent authority to enter and inspect any premises where the mineral is kept or stored or transported, including the premises where imported minerals are kept or stored.
(2) Every officer seizing mineral under these Rules shall prepare the list of mineral seized and deliver a copy thereof signed by him to the person found in possession of such minerals. Thereafter the officer shall hand over such property to the concerned Tahsildar for safe custody. The Tahsildar shall fix the property with seal and send information to the District Collector for taking action.
9. Custody of the seized property . (1) The authorised officer shall keep the seized material or property under the custody of the Institution belonging to the Government or any responsible official of the Government as far as possible. Under normal circumstances, if illegal storage or transportation of mineral is noticed, the mineral may be handed over to the concerned Tahsildar with information to the officer incharge of nearby police station in writing.
(2) If the penalty is not paid within a week from the date of receipt of the copy of the proceedings, the seized property shall become the Government property and the same will be auctioned by the officer authorised by the District Collector in this regard.
10. Penalties. (1) Any person who contravenes any of the provisions of the Rules, sells or stores minerals except under and in accordance with the Registration certificate of Registrar or who transports the minerals not in accordance with transport permit issued shall be punishable with a penalty upto a maximum of Rs.25,000/- by an order of the District Collector concerned.
(2) Any person who transports / stores mineral and takes minerals to a place except to the destination specified in the Transport permit, shall be punishable with the imprisonment for one year or with fine which may be extended up toRs.25,000/- or with both, if the District Collector or Revenue Divisional Officer concerned within the respective jurisdiction files FIR and tries the case in a competent Court of Law in the District. Forms prescribed in the abovesaid Rules, are extracted hereunder:
THE SCHEDULE FORM A [See rule 4(1).] (Application for Registration/renewal) 1 Name of applicant (in full) PHOTO 2 Full address 3 Profession 4 Fathers name in full (In case of firm, give names and addresses of partners and person holding power of attorney to act on behalf of the firm).
5 Specific place of stock or storage of mineral / place of processing mineral
(i) Survey No. :
(ii) Village :
(iii) Taluk :
(iv) District :
(v) Extent :
(vi) Area of the stock or storage points:
(vii) Specific boundaries of stock or storage point on four sides:
6 Financial status with details of Person i.e., property annual payment of Income Tax and any other relevant evidence regarding financial status:
7 Specific purpose for which Registration is applied for (Processing / Storing / Selling /Trading):
8 Name of Mineral / Ore for which Registration is required:
9 Approximate quantity proposed to be stored / processed /trade /sold:
10 Evidence of payment of application fee:
Challan No. :
Date:
Amount :
Paid at :
11 Name and address of persons / firms from whom the Mineral / Ores will be purchased / Procured:
12 Period for which Registration is required:
13 In case of renewal, the number and date of original Registration:
14 Detail of Income Tax / Sales Tax Clearance Certificate :
15 Any other information:
Declaration I/We hereby declare that I/We have read and understood all the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Prevention of Illegal mining, transportation and storage of minerals and mineral dealers Rules, 2010 and the conditions of the Registration made there under and I/We agree to abide by the same.
Place:
Date : Signature of Applicant. FORM-B [see rule 4(2).] (Acknowledgement of receipt of application for Registration)
Received .............................. copies of applications for grant of registration certificate for storing/selling/transportation of mineral.........................(Name of Mineral/Ore/Mineral .......... ........................from......Shri/Smt.................................................... Resident of ............... ..................... P.O. ................. ................P.S............ District............................... today with the following enclosures:(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Signature of the Assistant Director/ Deputy Director of Geology and Mining.
Place:
Date :
FORM-C [See rule 5(1).] (Register of Applications for Grant of Registration and its Renewal) Sl.No. Date of receipt of application Name of applicant Address of applicant Name of mineral/Ores (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) Place of Processing/Storing/Selling/Trading Date of order of grant/ refusal Brief orders on appeal if any Date of expiry of registration if granted Date of receipt of application for renewal (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) Date of grant of renewal Period of renewal Remarks (11) (12) (13) FORM-D [See rule 5(2).] Certificate of registration for transportation or Storage of Minerals under the Tamil Nadu Prevention of Illegal mining, transportation and storage of minerals and mineral dealers Rules, 2010.
In exercise of the powers conferred by rule 5(2) of the Tamil Nadu Prevention of Illegal Mining, Regulation of Transportation and Storage of Minerals Rules, 2010, District Collector of... District this registration is hereby grant to Thiru/ Tmt/ Tvl/.................................................. ...........................................................................................................................................(with address) for the purpose of storing / processing / consuming of ........................................................... (name of the mineral to be specified here) at Survey No..; .village ..... Taluk......... District.......... subject to the conditions stipulated in Tamil Nadu Prevention of Illegal Mining and Transportation, Storage and Mineral dealers Rules, 2010. This Registration is valid from ...........................to .......................(dates to be specified) Place:
Date :
Seal : District Collector. FORM-E [see rule 7(ii).]
(Account of ores/minerals to be maintained by the grantee of registration)
1. Name of the grantee of registration No. ..
2 Full Address ..3 No. and date of registration ..
4 Period of Registration ..
5 Name of Mineral & Ore ..
6 Name of the person registered ..
7 Postal Address of the Factory/person registered ..
8 Designation of the Officer of the Department of Geology and Mining ..
Month and Year Date Opening balance of Mineral Quantity of Mineral (1) (2) (3) (4) Quantity of Mineral transported and permitted to be removed Quantity of Mineral available after transport Closing balance of Mineral Remarks (5) (6) (7) (8) FORM-F [See rule 6 (1).] TRANSIT PASS Transit Pass Book No Transit Pass/Serial No................
To be filled by the Deputy Director of Geology and Mining in the District Concerned] 1 Name and address of person registered under this rule (with registration No.) Registration No.:
2 Place from which mineral is to be transported.
S.No. :
Village :
Taluk :
District :
3 Name of Mineral 4 Quantity (Cbm / Volume) (to be specified).
5 Number and details of transport permit issued by Deputy Director of Geology and Mining indicating payment of royalty / seigniorage fee on mineral being transported.
Transport permit No. :
Date :
No.of transit pass issued:
Sl.No. From.. To..
Signature and Seal of Assistant / Deputy Director.
TO BE FILLED UP AT THE TIME OF DESPATCH OF MINERALS FROM THE STOCKYARD
6. (a) Date and time of Despatch .. Date: Time:
(b) Name and address of Person who purchased the mineral from the registree:
(c) Destination to which mineral is being transported ..
(d) Approximate distance to the destination and route ..
(e) Expected time to reach the destination ..
(f) Mode of transport ..
(g) Carrier Registration No. ..
(h) Name of vehicle driver. ..
Signature of Driver Signature of registree with date. with date . Notes:- (1) No over writing should be done
(2) The original copy and the book has to be returned to the concerned authority after the book is exhausted.
(3) The vehicle driver shall carry two copies of the transit pass during transit.
88. A bare reading of the Tamil Nadu Prevention of Illegal Mining, Transportation and Storage of Minerals and Mineral Dealers Rules, 2011, makes it abundantly clear that a person, who intends to carry on the business of buying, selling, storing, supplying, transporting, distributing or delivering for sale of minerals or its products and includes, is a mineral dealer. The rule is wide enough to cover even a purchaser or a transporter. Stockyard means, a place where the minerals are stored or stocked out side the lease area. As per Rule 4 of the Prevention Rules, every Mineral Dealer and any person desirous of being registered as a Mineral Dealer under the rules shall apply to the District Collector concerned through the Deputy Director in triplicate, in FormA along with the application fee of Rs.5,000/- (Rupees five thousand only) drawn in favour of the District Collector of the concerned District by designation.
89. As per the supporting affidavit and the materials on record, the petitioner is no doubt a dealer in bricks, metal chips, river sand, dust and straw. As per the Certificate of Registration, the place of business of the petitioner is 1-3-244, Quilon Main Road, Puliyarai, Shencottah Taluk, Tirunelveli. In a given case, a mineral dealer, who carries on the business of buying, selling, storing and supplying, can engage the services of a transporter for transporting "minerals", purchased or stored from the stockyard, which means, a place where the minerals are stored or stocked, outside the lease area.
90. Reading of the Registration Certificates, issued by the Deputy Commercial Tax Officer, Shencottah, under Central Sales Tax (Registration and Turnover) Rules, 1957 and Tamil Nadu Value Added Tax Act, 2006, shows that the petitioner is engaged in re-sale of bricks, metal chips, river sand, dust and straw and therefore, the petitioner cannot be said to be a "mere transporter", engaged in transporting the above, through carriers.
91. Though the petitioner has contended that the petitioner is a dealer in bricks, metal chips, river sand, dust and straw and obtained Certificate of Registrations, under the Central Sales Tax (Registration and Turnover) Rules, 1957 and Tamil Nadu Value Added Tax Act, 2006 from the Deputy Commercial Tax Officer, Shencottah, no materials have been placed before this Court to substantiate that he has registered himself as a "mineral dealer" as per Rule 2(xv) of the Prevention Rules, 2011 from the District Collector.
92. As per Rule 3 of the Prevention Rules, 2011, a carrier, who engaged in transportation of minerals, from the place of stockyard or from one place to another, should have a valid despatch slip, which means, a slip issued by the permit issuing officer empowered to issue such transport permit, for transportation of any specific quantity of mineral in each carrier. Reading of Form-F also makes it clear that the Assistant/Deputy Director of Geology and Mining in the District concerned, is the competent authority to issue transport permits, indicating the name and address of the person registered under the Rules, with registration number; place from which mineral has to be transported; name and quantity of the mineral (Cbm/Volume) and number and details of the transport permit indicating payment of Royalty/Seigniorage fee.
93. When minerals have to be transported from the stockyard, the Registree, viz., the mineral dealer, should also affix his signature, with reference to the following details, viz., (a) Date and time of Despatch, (b) Name and address of Person who purchased the mineral from the registree, (c) Destination to which mineral is being transported, (d) Approximate distance to the destination and route, (e) Expected time to reach the destination, (f) Mode of transport, (g) Carrier Registration No., and (h) Name of vehicle driver. Form-F is a transit pass issued under Rule 6(1) of the Prevention Rules, 2011.
94. As per Rule 6 of the Prevention Rules, 2011, Form-F has to be submitted before the Deputy Director, duly specifying all the particulars and the application should be accompanied by a copy of the permit, showing payment of royalty/seigniorage on such mineral or other adequate proof of such payment. On receipt of an application under sub-rule (1), the Deputy Director may grant transit pass in Form 'F' for such period and subject to such terms and conditions as may be imposed by him or may refuse to grant such transit pass for the reasons to be recorded in writing and communicated to the applicant. Any person, who transports the minerals and who is required to carry transit, shall produce pass on demand to the authorised officer or any officer or authority who has been empowered under sub-section (4), Section 21 of the Act.
95. Though the learned counsel for the petitioner relied on a common order made in W.P.(MD)Nos.742and 8678 of 2010, dated 10.08.2010, which has been passed, following an earlier order made in W.P.Nos.12738 to 12741 of 2009, with due respect, this Court is of the view that the decisions, relied on, are not proximate to the consideration of the Act and the Rules made thereunder. In this context, this Court deems it fit to extract few decisions, as to when, a decision can be taken as a precedent or a judgment, laying down the law, on the subject.
96. In State of Orissa vs. Sudhansu Sekar Misra, reported in AIR 1968 SC 647, the Hon'ble Supreme Court explained as to when a decision can be taken as a precedent, which as follows:-
A decision is only an authority for what it actually decides. What is of the essence of a decision is its ratio and not every observation found therein nor what logically follows from the various observations made in it. On this topic, this is what Earl of Halsbury LC said in Quinn v. Leathem, reported in 901 AC 495.
'Now before discussing the case of Allen vs. Flood, reported in 1898 AC 1 and what was decided therein, there are two observations of a general character which I wish to make, and one is to repeat what I have very often said before, that every judgment must be read as applicable to the particular facts proved, or assumed to be proved, since the generality of the expressions which may be found there are not intended to be expositions of the whole law, but governed and qualified by the particular facts of the case in which such expressions are to be found. The other is that a case is only an authority for what it actually decides. I entirely deny that it can be quoted for a proposition that may seem to follow logically from it. Such a mode of reasoning assumes that the law is necessarily a logical code, whereas every lawyer must acknowledge that the law is not always logical at all. It is not profitable task to extract a sentence here and there from a judgment and to build upon it.
97. In Union of India Vs. Dhanwanti Devi, reported in 1996 (6) SCC 44 = 1996 (7) Supreme 51, at page 51, the Supreme Court has explained, what constitutes a precedent, which as follows:-
"Before adverting to and considering whether solatium and interest would be payable under the Act, at the outset, we will dispose of the objection raised by Shri Vaidyanathan that Union of India v. Hari Krishan Khosla case reported in 1993 Supplement (2) SCC 149, is not a binding precedent nor does it operate as ratio decidendi to be followed as a precedent and is per se per incuriam. It is not everything said by a Judge while giving judgment that constitutes a precedent. The only thing in a Judge's decision binding a party is the principle upon which the case is decided and for this reason it is important to analyse a decision and isolate from it the ratio decidendi According to the well-settled theory of precedents, every decision contains three basic postulates (i) findings of material facts, direct and inferential. A inferential finding of facts is the inference which the Judge draws from the direct, or perceptible facts; (ii) statements of the principles of law applicable to the legal problems disclosed by the facts; and (iii) judgment based on the combined effect of the above. A decision is only an authority for what it actually decides. What is of the essence in a decision is its ratio and not every observation found therein nor what logically follows from the various observations made in the judgment. Every judgment must be read as applicable to the particular facts proved, or assumed to be proved, since the generality of the expressions which may be found there is not intended to be exposition of the whole law, but governed and qualified by the particular facts of the case in which such expressions are to be found. It would, therefore, be not profitable to extract a sentence here and there from the judgment and to build upon it because the essence of the decision is its ratio and not every observation found therein. The enunciation of the reason or principle on which a question before a court has been decided is alone binding as a precedent. The concrete decision alone is binding between the parties to it, but it is the abstract ratio decidendi. ascertained on a consideration of the judgment in relation to the subject-matter of the decision, which alone has the force of law and which, when it is clear what it was, is binding. It is only the principle laid down in the judgment that is binding law under Article 141 of the Constitution. A deliberate judicial decision arrived at after hearing an argument on a question which arises in the case or is put in issue may constitute a precedent, no matter for what reason, and the precedent by long recognition may mature into rule of stare decisis. It is the rule deductible from the application of law to the facts and circumstances of the case which constitutes its ratio decidendi.
Therefore, in order to understand and appreciate the binding force of a decision it is always necessary to see what were the facts in the case in which the decision was given and what was the point which had to be decided. No judgment can be read as if it is a statute. A word or a clause or a sentence in the judgment cannot be regarded as a full exposition of law. Law cannot afford to be static and therefore, Judges arc to employ an intelligent technique in the use of precedents. It would, therefore, be necessary to see whether Hari Krishnan Khosla case, reported in 1993 Supp (2) SCC 149, would form a binding precedent. Therein, admittedly the question that had arisen and was decided by the Bench of three Judges was whether solatium and interest are payable to an owner whose land was acquired under the provisions of the Central Act? On consideration of the facts, the relevant provisions in the Central Act and the previous precendents bearing on the topic, the Court had held that solatium and interest are not a part of compensation. It is a facet of the principle in the statute. The Central Act omitted to provide for payment of solatium and interest since preceding the acquisition the property was under requisition during which period compensation was paid to the owner. The position obtained and enjoyed by the Government during the period of requisition continued after acquisition. The same principle was applied without further elaboration on entitlement to payment of interest of an owner. It is true that the decisions relied on by Shri Vaidyanathan on the principle of payment of interest as part of compensation in respect of land acquired were brought to the attention of this Court for discussion. What would be its purport would be considered a little later. Suffice it to say for the present that the finding that solatium and interest are not payable for the lands acquired under the Central Act as part of compensation is a binding precedent. Obviously, therefore, this Court followed the ratio therein in Distt. Judge case reported in 1994 (4) SCC 737. The contention, therefore, that Hari Krishan Khosla case, cannot be treated as a binding precedent since therein there is no ratio but a conclusion without discussion, in not tenable and devoid of force. In that view, it is not necessary to discuss in extenso the effect of the decisions cited by Sri.Vaidyanathan. Equally, the contention of Shri.Vaidyanathan that the ratio in Hari Krishan Khosla case is in conflict with the ratio in Satinder Singh case, reported in 1961 (3) SCR 676 = AIR 1961 SC 908 which was neither distinguished nor overruled and that the decision of a coordinate Bench, cannot have the effect of overruling decision of another coordinate Bench, cannot be given countenance. The effect of the ratio in Satinder Singh case will be considered a little later; suffice it to state that there is no conflict in the ratio of these two cases, if the facts in Satinder Singh case are closely analysed and the principle laid down therein is understood in its proper perspective. Therefore, Hari Krishan Khosla case, cannot be held to be per incuriam nor has it the effect of overruling the ratio decidendi of Satinder Singh case (1961) 3 SCR 676 : AIR 1961 SC 908.
98. In Government of W.B vs. Tarun Roy and others, reported in 2004 (1) SCC 347, as regards binding precedent of a judgment, the Supreme Court at paragraph 26, has observed as follows:-
26.......... If rule of law is to be followed, judicial discipline demands that the court follows its earlier binding precedent. The Calcutta High Court itself has rejected such a plea. The matter is pending in appeal. An order passed to the contrary by another learned Single Judge in ignorance of the earlier binding precedent by itself would not constitute a binding precedent and may be held to have been rendered per incuriam.
99. In State of Punjab v. Devans Modern Breweries Ltd., reported in (2004) 11 SCC 26, the Hon'ble Supreme Court explained the doctrine of precedents and when a judgment becomes per incuriam. Paragraphs 334 to 336, 339 and 343, of the judgment are relevant and they are as follows:-
Precedent: 334. The doctrine of precedent is a well-accepted principle. A ruling is generally considered to be binding on lower courts and courts having a smaller bench structure:
A precedent influences future decisions. Every decision is pronounced on a specific set of past facts and from the decision on those facts a rule has to be extracted and projected into the future. No one can foresee the precise situation that will arise, so the rule has to be capable of applying to a range of broadly similar situations against a background of changing conditions. It has therefore to be in general terms and malleable No word has one proper meaning, nor can anyone seek to fix the meaning of words for others, so the interpretation of the rule remains flexible and open-ended. (See Dias Jurisprudence, 5th Edn., p. 136.)
335. However, although a decision has neither been reversed nor overruled, it may cease to be law owing to changed conditions and changed law. This is reflected by the principle cessante ratione cessat ipsa lex.
It is not easy to detect when such situations occur, for as long as the traditional theory prevails that judges never make law, but only declare it, two situations need to be carefully distinguished. One is where a case is rejected as being no longer law on the ground that it is now thought never to have represented the law; the other is where a case, which is acknowledged to have been the law at the time, has ceased to have that character owing to altered circumstances. (See Dias Jurisprudence, 5th Edn., pp. 146-47.)
336. It is the latter situation which is often of relevance. With changes that are bound to occur in an evolving society, the judiciary must also keep abreast of these changes in order that the law is considered to be good law. This is extremely pertinent especially in the current era of globalisation when the entire philosophy of society, on the economic front, is undergoing vast changes.
339. Judicial discipline envisages that a coordinate Bench follow the decision of an earlier coordinate Bench. If a coordinate Bench does not agree with the principles of law enunciated by another Bench, the matter may be referred only to a larger Bench. (See Pradip Chandra Parija v. Pramod Chandra Patnaik, reported in 2003 (7) SCC 01, SCC at paras 6 and 7; followed in Union of India v. Hansoli Devi, reported in 2002 (7) SCC 01, SCC at para 2.) But no decision can be arrived at contrary to or inconsistent with the law laid down by the coordinate Bench. Kalyani Stores, reported in AIR 1966 SC 1686 and K.K. Narula, reported in AIR 1967 SC 1368, both have been rendered by the Constitution Benches. The said decisions, therefore, cannot be thrown out for any purpose whatsoever; more so when both of them if applied collectively lead to a contrary decision proposed by the majority.
343. It is also trite that the binding precedents which are authoritative in nature and are meant to be applied should not be ignored on application of the doctrine of sub silentio or per incuriam without assigning specific reasons therefor. I, for one, do not see as to how Kalyani Stores and K.K. Narula read together can be said to have been passed sub silentio or rendered per incuriam.
100. In M.Muniyandi v. Collector, Thiruvellore reported in AIR 1998 Mad. 136, this Court, after considering Section 102 Cr.P.C., vis-a-vis Section 21(4) and (5) and Section 23-A of the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957 r/w. Rule 36(5)(b) of the Taml Nadu Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 1959 and Appendices XII and XIII, held that the power, conferred under Section 21(4) to seize the vehicle that are used for transporting minerals without lawful authority is independent from that of the powers under Section 21(5) read with Rule 36-A(1) to recover the minerals raised without any lawful authority or to recover the price of minerals so raised if they have been already disposed of. Therefore, the seizure of vehicle used for transporting minerals unlawfully in view of powers under Section 21(5) and Rule 36-A(1), is not illegal.
101. In M/s. Maa Jalpa Enterprises, Appellants v. State of Madhya Pradesh reported in AIR 2012 MP 1, the Mining Officer, Panna, Madhya Pradesh by order dated 7.11.2009 imposed penalty of Rs.25,000/- on the petitioners under Rule 18 of the M.P. Mineral (Prevention of Illegal Mining, Transportation and Storage) Rules, 2006 (hereinafter referred to as Rules) on the ground that the petitioners were found transporting coal without obtaining a valid transit pass as required by the Rules. A learned single Judge by order dated 19.4.2010 has upheld the validity of the order dated 7.11.2009. The petitioners preferred an intracourt appeal, under Section 2 of the Madhya Pradesh Uchcha Nayayalaya (Khand Nyapeeth Ko Appeal) Adhiniyam, 2005, challenging the order dated 19.4.2010.
102. In the above reported case, the learned Counsel for the appellants has contended that the appellants are only traders and have valid licence for purchase and sale of coal. Therefore, he did not obtain any transit pass. It has further been submitted that no transit pass is prescribed under the provisions of the Rules which can be issued to a purchaser for transporting coal from one place to another place. Therefore, the order dated 7.11.2009 passed by the Mining Officer, Panna is arbitrary and illegal.
103. Per contra, the respondents therein have asserted that the petitioner No. 2 was found transporting coal from Katni to Bhiwandi in the State of Rajasthan, without having any valid transit pass, as required under the Rules. Accordingly, a notice to show cause was issued to him under Rule 18(5) of the Rules and the truck on which coal worth Rs.1,82,083/- was being transported was seized. Thereafter, since the petitioners-appellants could not produce a valid transit pass, as required under the Rules hence, after considering their reply to the show cause, a penalty of Rs.25,000/- has been imposed and the said order has been impugned, in the writ petition. Applying Rule 3 of the Rules prohibits transportation of any mineral/ minerals and its products by any carrier from one place to another, in the absence of a valid transit pass, the relief prayed for has been objected.
104. After considering the rules, the Madhya Pradesh High Court held that before compounding the offence an opportunity to show cause was extended to the appellants/writ petitioners and only thereafter, a penalty of Rs.25,000/- has been imposed. The Court held that the appellants were admittedly found transporting coal from one place to another place without obtaining a valid transit pass, as required under Rule 3 of the Rules and as such they are liable for prosecution and for payment of penalty for unauthorised transporting coal. On the submission of the learned counsel for the writ petitioner, the High Court has stated that the provisions contained in Rule 3 of the Rules clearly and emphatically prohibits transportation of coal without obtaining a valid transit pass and contravention of the same is made punishable and liable for payment of penalty under Rule 18 of the Rules. Lastly, the Hon'ble Division Bench has held that the Court did not find any reason to differ with the view taken by the learned single Judge. Accordingly, the Hon'ble Division Bench has dismissed the writ appeal, for want of merit, and without any order as to costs.
105. In the light of the above statutory provisions, both under the Central Act and the State Rules, the contention of the petitioner that as he is only a transporter of the crushed dust and therefore, the statute and the rules made thereunder, have no applicability to the petitioner and that the respondents have no power or authority to restrict transportation of crusher dust under the statute and the Rules framed thereunder, is untenable.
106. In the light of the above decisions and discussion, this Court is inclined to dismiss this writ petition and accordingly, dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected Miscellaneous Petition is also closed. The Secretary to Government, Department of Geology and Mining, Industries Department, is directed to issue appropriate directions to all the District Collectors and the authorities under the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1952, Tamil Nadu Minor and Mineral Concession Rules, 1959 and Tamil Nadu Prevention of Illegal Mining, Transportation and Storage of Minerals and Mineral Dealers' Rules, 2011 and the Police, for strict enforcement of the statutory provisions.
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1. The Secretary to Government, Department of Geology and Mining, Thiru.Vi.Ka.Industrial Estate, Guindy, Chennai 600 032.
2. The District Collector, Coimbatore District, Coimbatore.
3. The Deputy Director, Department of Geology and Mining, Coimbatore.
4. The Inspector General of Police, Commissioner of Police Campus, Coimbatore 641 018.
5. The Superintendent of Police, No.5, Red Field, Grd Road, Coimbatore Central, Coimbatore 641 018.
6. The Deputy Superintendent of Police, Pollachi.
7. The Secretary to Government, Department of Geology and Mining, Industries Department, Fort St. George, Chennai-9.
S. MANIKUMAR, J.
skm W.P.No.24218 of 2013 07.09.2013