Jharkhand High Court
Balku Mahli vs Mahabir Prasad Tibrewal And Ors. on 22 July, 2002
Equivalent citations: 2003(51)BLJR1020
Author: Tapen Sen
Bench: Tapen Sen
ORDER
1. The accident in question occurred on 6.4.1987, at a point of time when the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 was in force. The claim application was filed on 15.11.1989, a point of time when the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 had come into force. Even though, Sub-section (3) of Section 110-A of 1939 Act provided a limitation period of six months from the date of occurrence of accident for filing a claim petition, it also simultaneously provided that the Claims Tribunal should have the jurisdiction to entertain the application even after the period of six months, if it was satisfied that the applicant was prevented by a sufficient cause from making the application in time. Sub-section (3) of Section 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 is reproduced hereunder. This reads thus :--
"110-A. Application for compensation.--(3) No application for compensation under this section shall be entertained unless it is made within six months of the occurrence of the accident :
Provided that the Claims Tribunal may entertain the application after the expiry of the said period of six months if it is satisfied that the applicant was prevent by sufficient cause from making the application in time."
2. What is noticeable therefore is that the proviso did not contain any restriction on the jurisdiction of the Tribunal in extending the period of limitation or in condoning the delay for any period. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, even though, of course also provided for and prescribed the limitation period of six months and also contained a provision for condonation of delay, but this condonation provision was materially different (in the new Act) as compared to the old 1939 Act in as much as under the new Act a restriction was imposed that if the claim petition was filed more than one year after the date of occurrence of the accident the delay could not be condoned. This was contained in Sub-section (3) of Section 166 of Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. Sub-section (3) reads thus :--
"166. Application for compensation.--(3) No application for such compensation shall be entertained unless it is made within six months of the occurrence of the accident :
Provided that the Claims Tribunal may entertain the application after the expiry of the said period of six months but not later than twelve months, if it is satisfied that the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from making the application in time."
That was the law applicable as on the date of filing of the claim application, i.e. on 15.11.1989.
3. In the case of Vinod Gurudas Raikar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. and Ors., reported in AIR 1991 SC 2156, their Lordships of the Supreme Court while considering the vital differences with respect to the applicability of Sub-section (3) of Section 110-A of the 1939 Act and Sub-section (3) of Section 166 of the 1988 Act observed as under :--
"11. In the case before us the period of limitation for lodging the claim under the old as well as the new Act was same six months which expired three weeks after coming in force of the new Act. It was open to the appellant to file his claim within this period or even later by 22.7.1989 with a prayer to condone the delay. His right to claim compensation was not affected at all by the substitution of one Act with another. Since the period of limitation remained the same there was no question of the appellant being taken by surprise. So far the question of condonation of six months delay was concerned, there was no change in the position under the new Act. In this background the appellant's further default has to be considered. If in a given case the accident had taken place more than a year before the new Act coming in force and the claimant had actually filed his petition while the old Act was in force but after a period of one year, the position could be different. Having actually initiated the proceeding when the old Act covered the field a claimant could say that his right which had accrued on filing of the petition could not be taken away. The present case is different. The right of privilege to claim benefit of a provision for condonation of delay can be governed only by the law in force at the time of delay. Even the hope or expectation of getting the benefit of an enactment presupposes applicability of the enactment when the need arises to take its benefit. In the present case the occasion to take the benefit of the provision for condonation of delay in filing the claim arose only after repeal of the old law. Obviously the ground for condonation set up as 'sufficient cause' also relates to the time after the repeal. The benefit of the repealed law could not, therefore, be available simply because the cause of action for the claim arose before repeal. 'Sufficient cause' as a ground of condonation of delay in filing the claim is distinct from 'cause of action' for the claim itself. The question of condonation of delay must, therefore, be governed by the new law. We accordingly hold that the High Court was right in its view that the case was covered by the new Act, and delay for a longer period than six months could not be condoned. The appeal is dismissed, but in the circumstances, without costs."
4. The exact legal proposition which can thus be culled from the aforesaid observations of their Lordships is that question of condonation of delay must, therefore, be governed by the law which was in force at the point of time when the claim application was filed, that is 1988 Act.
5. In the aforesaid background, let us examine the relevant facts and salient features of the present case once again. The accident in question occurred on 6.4.1987. The claim petition was filed on 15.11.1989. As on 15.11.1989 Sub-section (3) of Section 166 of 1988 Act was in force. Therefore, the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to condone the delay and on that reckoning it can safely be said that the order dated 9.5.1990 condoning the delay was non est in the eyes of law and in any view this order was passed ex parte. It was ultimately on 24.5.1994 that the claim petition was dismissed as time barred because as per the Tribunal's judgment and the reasoning the outer limit within which a claim petition could be filed was one year from the date of the accident and since in the present case the claim petition was filed beyond the said period of one year, in view of the clear language employed in Sub-section (3) of Section 166 of 1988 Act it was bound to be dismissed. The appeal filed by the appellant before the learned single Judge against the aforesaid order dated 24.5.1994 was thus dismissed on the same ground.
6. It was after 24.5.1994, that by the amending Act of 1994, Sub-section (3) was deleted altogether from Section 166 of 1988 Act. The result of such deletion was that as from the date the amending Act of 1994 came in force, which was 14.11.1994, there was no period of limitation prescribed whatsoever for filing a claim petition by a claimant under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 be it the victim of an accident or the heirs of such a victim. In normal course we should have had no difficulty in dismissing the present appeal of the claimant because undoubtedly as on the date when the claim petition was dismissed at time barred. i.e. on 24.5.1994, Sub-section (3) of Section 166 of 1988 Act was on statutory book and thus held the field and was operative, and this sub-section admittedly was deleted only on 14.11.1994. In other words, as on 24.5.1994 rigour of limitation of one year (six months-plus-six months) was very much in operation. But when we examine this legal aspect on the touchstone of the interpretation given by the Apex Court to this complex legal inoe, we have to take a different view.
7. Our attention has been drawn to a judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Dhannalal v. D.P. Vijayvargiya, reported in AIR 1996 SC 2155, wherein their Lordships of the Supreme Court held as under :--
"7. In this background, now it has to be examined ap to what is the effect of omission of Sub-section (3) of Section 166 of the Act. From the amending Act it does not appear that the said Sub-section (3} has been deleted retrospectively but at the same time, there is nothing in the amending Act to show that benefit of deletion of Sub-section (3) of Section 166, is not be extended to pending claim petitions where a plea of limitation has been raised. The effect of deletion of sub-section (3) from Section 166 of the Act can be tested by an illustration. Suppose an accident had taken place two years before 14.11.1994, when subsection (3) was omitted from Section 166. From one reason or the other 110 claim petition has been filed by the victim or the heirs of the victim till 14.11.1994. Can a claim petition be not filed after 14.11.1994, in respect of such accident? Whether a claim petition filed after 14.11.1994, can be rejected by the Tribunal on the ground of limitation saying that the period of twelve months which had been prescribed when subsection (3) of Section 166, was in force having expired the right to prefer the claim petition had been extinguished and shall not be revived after deletion of Sub-section (2) of Section 166 w.e.f. 14.11.1994? According to us, the answer should be in negative. When Sub-section (3) of Section 166 has been omitted, then the Tribunal has to entertain a claim petition without taking note of the date on which such accident had taken place. The claim petitions can not be thrown out on the ground that such claim petitions were barred by time when Sub-section (3) of Section 166 was in force. It need not be impressed that Parliament from time to time has introduced amendments in the old Act as well as in the new Act in order to protect the interest of the victims of the accident and their heirs if the victim dies. One such amendment has been introduced in the Act by the aforesaid amendment Act 54 of 1994, by substituting Sub-section (6) of Section 158, which provides :
"As soon as any information regarding any accident involving death or bodily injury to any person is recorded or a report under this section is completed by a Police Officer, the Officer-in-Charge of the Police Station shall forward a copy of the same within thirty days from the date of recording of information or, as the case may be, on completion of such report to the Claims Tribunal having jurisdiction and a copy thereof to the concerned insurer, and where a copy is made available to the owner, of such report, forward the same to such Claims Tribunal and insurer."
In view of Sub-section (6) of Section 158 of the Act the Officer-in-Charge of the Police Station is enjoyed to forward a copy of information/report regarding the accident to the Tribunal having jurisdiction. A copy thereof has also to be forwarded to the concerned insurer. It also requires that where a copy is made available to the owner of the vehicle, he shall within thirty days or receipt of such copy forward the same to the Claims Tribunal and insurer. In this background, the deletion of subsection (3) from Section 166 should be given full effect so that the object of deletion of said section by the Parliament is not defeated. If a victim of the accident or heirs of the deceased victim can prefer claim for compensation although not being preferred earlier because of the expiry of the period of limitation prescribed, how the victim of heirs of the deceased shall be in a worse position if the question of condonation of delay in filing the claim petition is pending either before the Tribunal, High Court or the Supreme Court. The present appeal is one such case. The appellant has been pursuing from Tribunal to this Court. His right to get compensation in connection with the accident in question is being resisted by the respondents on the ground of delay in filing the same. If he had not filed any petition for claim till 14.11.1994, in respect of the accident which took place on 4.12.1990, in view of the amending Act he became entitled to file such claim petition, the period of limitation having been deleted, the claim petition, has been filed and is being pursued up to this Court cannot be thrown out on the ground of limitation."
8. Based on the aforesaid observations, therefore, it can safely be said that even though the effect of omission of Sub-section (3) of Section 166 of the 1988 Act could not be held to be retrospective in operation, yet there is nothing in the amending Act to show that the benefit of such deletion of Sub-section (3) was not to be extended to pending claim petitions where a plea of limitation has been raised. The effect of deletion of Sub-section (3), therefore, was to be available to all pending claim petitions as well, absolutely irrespective of the date of accident. Actually the aforesaid observations would show how their Lordships have illustrated with reference to the date of accident and the filing of the claim petition, the true position which frees the claim petitions from any rigour or constraint of any limitation period.
9. As observed by us earlier, the date of dismissal of the claim petition, i.e. 24.5.1994 should have clinched the issue against the appellant in the present appeal but looking to the aforesaid observations of their Lordships on Dhannalal's case (supra), we have no doubt that the benefit of deletion of Sub-section (3) has to be extended to the appellant also in the present case because of the pendency of the proceedings in view of the observations made here-in-above as also more explicit and specific observation on this question as made in the same judgment elsewhere, which we quote as under :--
"8. The matter will be different if any claimant having filed a period for claim beyond time which has been rejected by the Tribunal or the High Court, the claimant does not challenged the same and allows the said judicial order to become final. The aforesaid amending Act shall be of no help to such claimant. The reason being that a judicial order saying that such petition of claim was barred by limitation as attained finality. But that principle will not govern cases where the dispute as to whether petition for claim having been filed beyond the period of twelve months from the date of the accident is pending consideration either before the Tribunal, High Court or this Court. In such cases, the benefit of amendment of Sub- section (3) of Section 166 should be extended."
10. The appellant had been pursing his remedy in the Tribunal where he lost. He challenged the Tribunal's dismissal order before the learned single Judge. He lost there too. He has challenged the judgment of the learned single Judge before us in this Letters Patent Appeal.
11. The principle of the judicial order attaining finality, therefore, in view of the aforesaid observations of their Lordships would not bind the appellant in the present case because the order in question has not been allowed to attain finality in as such as the same is still under challenge before us in this appeal.
12. Based on the aforesaid reasoning therefore, and the law laid down by the Apex Court in Dhannalal's case (supra) we have no doubt in our mind that the benefit of deletion of Sub-section (3) of Section 166 of 1998 Act being available to the appellant, the appellant's claim petition cannot be dismissed by us to be barred by limitation. The same accordingly, being held to be maintainable is allowed to be restored and revived.
13. The appeal accordingly, is allowed. The judgment of the learned single Judge as also the impugned order of the Tribunal are both set aside. The claim petition is restored to the file of the Claims Tribunal. The Tribunal is directed to treat the claim petition as being within limitation and proceed to dispose it of in accordance with law. No order as to costs.
14. At this stage, Mr. Alok Lal, learned counsel appearing for the Insurance Company-respondent in this appeal submits that the claim petition in question was admittedly filed beyond the peried of limitation, almost more than one & half years from the date of accident and has been pending ever since. More than twelve years actually have since elapsed since date of the filing of the claim petition and, therefore, if and when the Tribunal passes any award in this case, if at all, the Insurance Company, if saddled with any liability to pay the awarded amount should not be burdened to pay any interest on the awarded amount. We note this submission, also the fact that the pendency of the claim petition for twelve long years cannot be attributed on account of any act of omission or commission as far as the Insurance Company is concerned, and hence direct that the Tribunal shall consider the said submission on its merits and keep it in mind while deciding the question of payment of interest, if at all it decides to pass any award in favour of the claimants.
15. Appeal allowed. No order as to costs.