Punjab-Haryana High Court
Sh. R.K. Jain (Raj Kumar Jain Huf) And ... vs Commissioner Of Income-Tax And Ors. on 15 March, 1996
Equivalent citations: [1996]221ITR136(P&H)
Author: Swatanter Kumar
Bench: Swatanter Kumar
JUDGMENT Swatanter Kumar, J.
1. The present petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, is for quashing of the complaint under Sections 276C, 277 read with Section 278B of the Income tax Act, 1961, filed by the Deputy Commissioner of Income-tax, Jalandhar, against the present petitioners.
2. The main contentions raised on behalf of the petitioners are :
(i) The complaint does not prima facie disclose contravention of any provision of the Income-tax Act thereinafter referred to as "the Act") and, as such, they are not liable to be prosecuted for the alleged offence ;
(ii) The petitioners were not responsible for the conduct of the business of the firm and, as such, the provisions of Section 278B of the Act are not attracted in the present case to render the petitioners liable for prosecution ;
(iii) The petitioners also aver that the complaint has been filed in a mechanical mariner without any application of mind.
3. Before I proceed to discuss the merits of this case, in view of the submissions made by learned senior counsel for the petitioners, it will be necessary to state the facts giving rise to the present petition.
4. In March, 1992, the Deputy Commissioner of Income-tax, Jalandhar, filed a complaint under Sections 276C, 277 read with Section 278B of the Income-tax Act involving the assessment years 1983-84 and 1984-85. It has been stated in the complaint that accused No. 1, i.e., P.S. Jain Motors, is a partnership concern of which accused Nos. 2 to 5 were the partners during the relevant period. Accused Nos. 2 to 5 were in charge and were stated to be responsible to the firm for conduct of its day-to-day business. It is alleged that during the course of assessment proceedings for the year 1984-85 books of account were examined and it was found that interest on various advances was not charged when it was being charged in the previous years, the details of which were given in the complaint. The assessment proceedings were completed on a total income of Rs. 11,11,429 vide order dated March 23, 1990, against the returned loss of Rs. 28,60,902. Penalty proceedings under Section 271(1)(c) of the Act were also initiated against the accused. The appeal was preferred by the assessees which confirmed the additions. Show-cause notice was served upon the assessees on February 20, 1992, as to why prosecution proceedings may not be started. The complainant, therefore, stated that the accused have wilfully attempted to evade the payment of income-tax. The accused are also stated to have wrongfully verified the income-tax returns which they either knew to be false or did not believe to be true. According to the complainant, there was sufficient documentary evidence with the Income-tax Department to establish commission of the offence. List of documents was filed along with the complaint.
5. The learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, vide his order dated March 31, 1992, while granting exemption to the complainant from personal appearance and without recording any evidence as the complaint was instituted by the public officer in his official capacity, summoned all the accused to face the proceedings for an offence under Sections 276C and 277 read with Section 278B of the Income-tax Act. Some time was obviously spent in service of the accused and the accused feeling aggrieved from the said order of summoning filed the present petition for quashing.
6. It will be appropriate to reproduce the relevant Sections 276C, 277 and 278 of the Income-tax Act :
"276C. (1) If a person wilfully attempts in any manner whatsoever to evade any tax, penalty or interest chargeable or imposable under this Act, he shall, without prejudice to any penalty that may be imposable on him under any other provision of this Act, be punishable, --
(i) in a case where the amount sought to be evaded exceeds one hundred thousand rupees, with rigorous imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than six months but which may extend to seven years and with fine ;
(ii) in any other case, with rigorous imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than three months but which may extend to three years and with fine.
(2) If a person wilfully attempts in any manner whatsoever to evade the payment of any tax, penalty or interest under this Act, he shall, without prejudice to any penalty that may be imposable on him under any other provision of this Act, be punishable with rigorous imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than three months but which may extend to three years and shall, in the discretion of the court, also be liable to fine.
Explanation. - For the purposes of this section, a wilful attempt to evade any tax, penalty or interest chargeable or imposable under this Act or the payment thereof shall include a case where any person-
(i) has in his possession or control any books of account or other documents (being books of account or other documents relevant to any proceeding under this Act) containing a false entry or statement ; or
(ii) makes or causes to be made any false entry or statement in such books of account or other documents ; or
(iii) wilfully omits or causes to be omitted any relevant entry or statement in such books of account or other documents ; or
(iv) causes any other circumstance to exist which will have the effect of enabling such person to evade any tax, penalty or interest chargeable or imposable under this Act or the payment thereof."
"277. If a person makes a statement in any verification under this Act or under any rule made thereunder, or delivers an account or statement which is false, and which he either knows or believes to be false, or does not believe to be true, he shall be punishable,--
(i) in a case where the amount of tax, which would have been evaded if the statement or account had been accepted as true, exceeds one hundred thousand rupees, with rigorous imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than six months but which may extend to seven years and with fine ;
(ii) in any other case, with rigorous imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than three months but which may extend to three years and with fine."
"278B.(1) Where an offence under this Act has been committed by a company, every person who, at the time the offence was committed, was in charge of, and was responsible to, the company for the conduct of the business of the company as well as the company shall be deemed to be guilty of the offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly : (emphasis* provided by the court).
Provided that nothing contained in this Sub-section shall render any such person liable to any punishment if he proves that the offence was committed without his knowledge or that he had exercised all due diligence to prevent the commission of such offence.
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in Sub-section (1), where an offence under this Act has been committed by a company and it is proved that the offence has been committed with the consent or connivance of, or is attributable to any neglect on the part of, any director, manager, secretary or other officer of the company, such director, manager, secretary or other officer shall also be deemed to be guilty of that offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly.
Explanation.--For the purposes of this section, --
(a) 'company' means a body corporate, and includes-
(i) a firm ; and
(ii) an association of persons or a body of individuals whether incorporated or not ; and
(b) 'director', in relation to -
(i) a firm, means a partner in the firm ;
(ii) any association of persons or a body of individuals, means any member controlling the affairs thereof."
7. On the basis of the aforesaid facts, the petitioners have to satisfy the court that taking the complaint as it stands, and every fact alleged in the complaint being true, does not constitute any offence in law and the petitioners are not liable to be prosecuted as the provisions of Section 278B of the Act do not cover the petitioners.
8. As already noticed by me above, the complaint makes certain specific allegations with regard to violation of Sections 276C and 277 of the Act. Specific instances have been given in the complaint for the assessment year 1984-85 where the assessees have evaded the payment of tax on the one hand and on the other hand had verified false statements. The pro-visions of Section 276C of the Act cover a wider field. Under Sub-section (1) of the said section any person who wilfully makes any attempt in any manner whatsoever to evade any tax, penalty or interest chargeable or imposable under the Act is liable to be proceeded against. While the provisions of Section 277 of the Act render the person liable for prosecution under the Act or under any rule made thereunder or delivers an account or statement which is false, and which he either knows or believes to be false, or does not believe to be true. Thus, this complaint does not lack complete particulars which would render the complaint liable to be quashed on the ground that it does not disclose any offence under the provisions of the Act. There are specific allegations based upon facts and figures given in the complaint, with specific averments, that there was evasion of payment of tax, penalty and interest imposable under the provisions of the Act. According to allegations contained in the complaint, the accused have made false statements, wrongly verified the statements also on the basis of false facts which were not true to the knowledge of the assessees. In addition to these averments reference has been made to penalty proceedings which had been initiated against the assessees and also the fact that in appeal against the assessment year, the addition of Rs. 11,75,590 and Rs. 18,67,020 has even been upheld by the appellate authority. Thus it cannot be said that the allegations made in the complaint are baseless or not supported by any evidence. In paragraph No. 13 of the complaint, it is specifically submitted that there is sufficient documentary evidence with the Income-tax Department, to establish the commission of offence. The list of documents even including the documents submitted by the accused to the Department earlier, has been filed along with the complaint. The argument of Mr. N.N. Goswami, learned senior counsel for the petitioners, is without any merit that the complaint does not disclose commission of any offence. I find that there are specific violations of those provisions as alleged in the complaint and the court is not concerned with the correctness or evidence supporting such allegations at this stage. The complainant who approaches the court by filing a complaint has the right to prove his case during trial in accordance with law. Denial of such opportunity would amount to shutting the door to the complainant at this early stage. Where the complaint, prima facie, discloses an offence then it will not only be unfair to deny the opportunity to prove the case to the complainant but would also be an infringement of the basic minimum protection available to the complainant in accordance with law. Reference can be made in this regard to the case of Pratibha Rani v. Suraj Kumar [19851 155 ITR 190 (SC).
9. It is a settled principle of law that the plea available to an accused at this stage is at par with the plea of demurrer and the accused cannot normally be permitted to dispute the facts stated in the complaint. The complaint instituted by the Department clearly indicates violation of the provisions of the Act. Exercise of inherent powers or extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India by the High Court for quashing criminal proceedings or complaints, etc., has been circumscribed by the Supreme Court in the case of State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal, AIR 1992 SC 604 ; [1990] 4 JT 650 (SC), where the Supreme Court has categorised such cases under seven different heads. While considering a prima facie case at this stage, the court has to keep in view these categories. The court is not concerned with the ultimate result of the proceedings initiated on the basis of the complaint. It is irrelevant whether ultimately the accused would be convicted or would be entitled to ho acquitted after facing the trial. Once the complaint discloses an offence and brings out clear infringement of certain provisions of law tantamounting to a criminal offence, it renders the accused liable for prosecution. The court has no further jurisdiction to go into the merits or demerits of the complaint or conviction or otherwise at this stage.
10. In a very recent case State of West Bengal v. Mohammed Khalid, AIR 1995 SC 785 ; [1991] 7 JT 660 (SC), the Supreme Court further restricted the scope of jurisdiction exercisable by the High Court in such circumstances and held as under (page 788 of AIR 1995 SC and page 667 of [1994] 7 JT (SC)) :
"In State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal [1992] Supp 1 SCC 335, it has been categorically laid down that the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint taken on their face value and accepted in its entirety constitute an offence. The High Court is not justified in quashing the criminal proceedings. In State of Bihar v. P.P. Sharma [1992] Supp 1 SCC 222, this court had ruled that writ petition should not be entertained against charge sheet while exercising the jurisdiction. If the matter is considered on merits in the guise of prima facie evidence, it would amount to a pre-trial,"
11. A Full Bench of the Delhi High Court in the case of Neelam Mahajan Singh v. Commr. of Police [1994] 53 DLT 389, had reiterated the principle that the powers of the High Court to issue prerogative writ under Article 226 are not restricted to quash FIR, etc., but the power is required to be exercised with utmost care and caution. The Full Bench relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Janala Dal v. H.S. Chowdhary, AIR 1993 SC 892 ; [1992] 4 SCC 305.
12. In view of the settled position of law and a plain reading of the allegations in the complaint prima facie constituting violation of Sections 276C and 277 of the Act, I am unable to accept the contention raised on behalf of the petitioners in this regard.
13. Coming to the second limb of main argument of learned counsel for the petitioners that petitioners Nos. 2 to 5 could not be prosecuted for the alleged violation as they were not responsible and were not in charge of the business of the partnership concern. The complainant while making specific allegations, as aforestated, refers that these accused were partners of the partnership concern during the period in question. The accused made wrong verification of income-tax returns and delivered statement of account to the Department which were false or were believed to be untrue by them. They have wilfully attempted to evade the payment of tax, penalty and interest. In paragraph 4 of the complaint, the complainant has averred as under :
"The accused No. 1 is a registered firm for the purpose of income-tax and accused Nos. 2 to 5 were the partners of the firm during the assessment year 1984-85 relevant to the accounting period 1983-84 and were in charge and were responsible to the firm and conduct of the firm as well as the firm. The accused were dealing in purchase and sale of Tata diesel chassis and its parts and also derived income from the workshop during the relevant record."
14. These allegations which have been imputed by the Department against the accused are sought to be proved before the court of competent jurisdiction by leading oral as well as documentary evidence. The documents have been filed on record as per list annexed to the complaint. To attract the provisions of Section 278B of the Act, all that the Department has to discharge is the primary burden at this stage of the proceedings to show and to allege that the person is in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the business of the company. While screening the contents of the complaint, the court has to find whether the allegations made in the complaint per se justify the prosecution of the accused persons. The language of Section 278B of the Act clearly indicates the intention of the legislation in holding a person guilty of an offence, if he was responsible to the company for the conduct of the business of the company. It is provided that if the Department has discharged its primary burden under Sub-section (1) of Section 278B of the said Act, the accused has the opportunity if he so desires to rebut this onus by establishing that the offence was without his knowledge or he had exercised all due diligence to prevent the commission. It is in these circumstances alone that the accused can take the advantage of the proviso to Sub-section (1) of Section 278B of the Act. The Explanation to this section provides for inclusion of a firm in the word "company" and a "partner" in the term "director" used in this section. Thus the language of the section which requires consideration is "was responsible to the company for conduct of the business of the company". In this case the court is primarily concerned with the business of the partnership concern. Under the provisions of the Indian Partnership Act, two or more persons can constitute a partnership-firm which will be governed by a contract between the parties under Section 11 of the Indian Partnership Act. This contract between the partners is primarily subject to the provisions of that Act, i.e., to say that other statutory provisions of the Indian Partnership Act shall take precedence and will prevail over the contract between the parties which they enter into for the purpose of running the business of the partnership concern and rights and duties of the respective partner. Section 25 of the Indian Partnership Act provides that every partner is liable, jointly with all the other partners and also severally, for all acts of the firm done while he was a partner. The liability of a partner is unlimited so far as he continues to be a partner of the partnership concern. In the background of the provisions which govern the principal accused in the present case, one has to read the concerned language of Section 278B of the Act that "A person had to be responsible for the conduct of the business of the company". There are specific allegations satisfying basic ingredients, of the offence alleged to have been committed. There is also a specific allegation that the petitioners were responsible for the day-to-day business of the partnership concern and were conducting the business of the concern.
15. It is also a settled rule of law that the complaint has to be read in its entirety as one complete document. The argument of learned counsel for the petitioners that there is only reproduction of the language of Section 278B of the Act, has no force because as already noticed, there are specific and definite allegations and they are alleged to be responsible for the conduct of the business of the company/firm. It cannot be said that there is no application of mind in the present case because the order of assessment from where these offences have been attracted, has been upheld by the appellate authority and even show-cause notices had been given. Thus, it is neither a case of no pleading nor of no application of mind. Learned counsel for the petitioners has strongly relied upon the judgment of the; Delhi High Court in Parmeet Singh Sawney v. Dinesh Verma [1988] 169 ITR 5. With respect to the learned judge, the case lays down a sweeping proposition, in my humble view and for the reasons recorded in this judgment, I respectfully differ therefrom. In that case, the authority had acted casually by impleading as an accused a minor who was a six year-old boy and consequently was not liable for the acts of the partnership as postulated under the provisions of Section 278B of the Act. Thus, the case cited by learned counsel for the petitioners, on the face of it, is distinguishable from the facts of the present case.
16. The Supreme Court in the case of State of Karnataka v. Pratap Chand [1981] 128 ITR 573 made observations that a partner is liable to be convicted for an offence committed by the firm if he was in charge of and responsible to the firm for the conduct of the business of the firm. The Supreme Court further held (at page 576) : "It seems to us that in the context a person in charge must mean that 'the person should be in overall control of the day-to-day business of the firm'."
17. When it is alleged that the accused-petitioners were in overall control of the business of the partnership-firm and were also overall responsible for the conduct of the business of the partnership concern and other allegations constituting the offence are clearly stated, it will not be justifiable to quash the complaint as a case of no pleading or no offence made out. In another judgment of M.S.M. Company (Paints) v. T. Govindarajan, ITO [1995] 213 ITR 596 (Mad), it has been held as under (page 599) :
"Therefore, the ratio of these decisions is that, if there is no allegation in the complaint that the accused are in actual management or control of the business, they cannot be prosecuted."
18. Still in another case Shital N. Shah v. ITO [1991] 188 ITR 376 (Mad), the court held as under (headnote) :
"Under Section 278B, the basic requirement is that the prosecution must prove that the persons concerned were in charge of, and were responsible to, the firm for the conduct of the business of the firm. It is only then that they can be vicariously prosecuted along with the firm. The proviso to Section 278B(1) of the Act will come into operation only after the initial onus cast on the prosecution under the main section gets discharged."
19. The stage for providing the allegations has still not arrived in the present case. Specific allegations have been made in the complaint by the Department which the Department has to establish by leading cogent and proper evidence at the appropriate stage. The present case cannot certainly be termed as one of "no allegations in the complaint". Thus any adjudication or determination in this regard at this stage will be predetermining or pre-judging the issue which the court below has to adjudge after affording the parties concerned opportunity to lead appropriate evidence. The single Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in the case of Smt. Sudarsh Ahluwalia and Smt. Anjiv Ahluwalia v. Z.S. Klar, m [1988] 169 ITR 610 expressed the view that if it was not alleged that any other partner was in charge of or responsible to the firm for the conduct of its business at the time of commission of the offence, in that event, the complaint against the partner could not be sustained which necessarily implies that if such allegation was made in the complaint in that event, the complaint cannot be quashed even with regard to the partner and Section 278B of the Act would come to aid the complainant. In the case of R.N. Bajaj v. K. Govindan, ITO [1992] 198 ITR 447, the Madras High Court after considering the various decisions, relied upon the case of Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Ram Kishan Rohtagi, AIR 1983 SC 67, 70, where the Supreme Court had held as under (page 456) ;
"It is, therefore, manifestly clear that proceedings against an accused in the initial stages can be quashed only if on the face of the complaint or the papers accompanying the same, no offence is constituted. In other words, the test is that taking the allegations and the complaint as they are, without adding or subtracting anything if no offence is made out then the High Court will be justified in quashing the proceedings in exercise of its powers under Section 482 of the present Code."
20. There are certain wrongful acts committed by the partners for which the partnership concern is liable to be proceeded against. The partnership is nothing but a nomenclature given to the association of two or four persons and of course, it holds its entity for the purpose of this Act. The court at this stage is not concerned with appreciation of evidence which may be adduced by either of the parties before the court concerned. There is no denial of the fact in the petition, that all the petitioners were partners during different times of the assessment for the period in question. Whether one partner was at Delhi and therefore, was not responsible for the conduct of the business in Punjab, is a matter of evidence because this fact has not been admitted by the Department before this court. On the contrary specific allegations based on proof of documents and records have been made in the complaint alleging these petitioners to be responsible for the conduct of the business of the firm and consequently liable to be prosecuted under Sections 276C, 277 read with Section 278B of the Act. The wrongful acts attributed by law to the legal persons in fact are the acts of the agent. The partnership is bound to act through its partners and even under the provisions of the Income-tax Act, it is not necessary that all the partners must sign the returns, but it is equally true that every partner not only draws benefit from such accounts of the partnership concern but also fully acts upon them. In the light of these settled principles of law and the practice and specific allegations in the complaint, it is neither practicable nor permissible to uphold the contentions raised on behalf of the petitioners.
21. At this stage it may be relevant to refer to the view expressed by Mrs. H.K. Sandhu, Judge of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Amrit Lal and Co. v. ITO [1994] 210 ITR 427. The court while dealing with the prayer for quashing of the complaint under Sections 269SS, 278B, 276DD held as under (page 431) :
"This authority is not applicable to the facts of the present case as in paragraph No. 6 of the complaint it is specifically mentioned that all the partners of the firm were directly connected and were in charge of and were responsible to the firm for the conduct of its business. So, it cannot be said that there are no averments to that effect. The question whether they were sleeping partners and they had nothing to do with the conduct of business of the firm is to be determined only after evidence is led to that effect. The allegations made in the complaint prima facie make out a case against the petitioners. No ground for quashing the complaint is made out and I find that the petition is without any merit. The same is hereby dismissed."
22. In the case of M.R. Punj v. The State [1993] 199 ITR 87 (Delhi), the only question raised in the petition was that summons to the accused could not be issued because they were not responsible for the affairs of the company and some of them were not even partners of the partnership concern at the relevant time. Further prayer was that the complaint should be quashed. In that situation, the Delhi High Court held as under (page 91) :
"In view of this pronouncement of the Supreme Court, the petitioners cannot take advantage of the fact that since Mr. V.P. Punj, accused No. 8, signed the return, he alone is liable. Now, in view of the new Section 278B, every partner of accused No. 1 would be equally liable. Whether these petitioners stood retired from the partnership-firm is a matter of fact which has to be gone into after recording evidence."
23. In the case of Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Purshotam Dass Jhunjunwala, AIR 1983 SC 158 ; [1983] 1 SCC 9, the Supreme Court reproduced paragraph 5 of the complaint as under (page 159 of AIR 1983 SC) :
"That accused Ram Kishan Bajaj is the chairman, accused R.P. Neyatia, is the managing director and accused Nos. 7 to 12 are the directors of the Hindustan Sugar Mills Ltd. and were in charge of and responsible to it for the conduct of its business at the time of commission of offence."
24. In that complaint sufficient averments entitling the accused for discharge and quashing of the complaint were not disclosed, as it did not hold them responsible for the conduct of the business of the company as contemplated in Section 7/16/17 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. The Supreme Court held as under (page 159 of AIR 1983 SC) :
"In the instant case, a clear averment has been made regarding the active role played by the respondents and the extent of their liability. In this view of the matter, it cannot be said that paragraph 5 of the complaint is vague and does not implicate respondents Nos. 1 to 11. As to what would be the evidence against the respondents is not a matter to be considered at this stage and would have to be proved at the trial. We have already held that for the purpose of quashing the proceedings only the allegations set forth in the complaint have to be seen and nothing further."
25. The Supreme Court set aside the order of the High Court while sustaining the order of the magistrate summoning the accused to face the trial. In this judgment, the Supreme Court followed its view expressed in the case of Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Ram Kishan Rohtagi, AIR 1983 SC 67 ; [1983] 1 SCC 1.
26. The Supreme Court while cautioning the High Court from exercising extraordinary jurisdiction for quashing of an FIR or complaint, has restricted such exercise to rarest of rare cases which necessarily implies that normally the court would permit the law to take its own course before the trial court except in some rare cases where injustice is manifest and would amount to abuse of process of law. In a very recent judgment in the case of Mustaq Ahmad v. Mohd. Habibur Rehman Faizi [1996] 1 JT 656 (SC), the Supreme Court held as under (page 657) :
"Having perused the impugned judgment in the light of the complaint and its accompaniments we are constrained to say, that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code in passing the impugned judgment and order. It is rather unfortunate that though the High Court referred to the decision in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal [1990] 4 JT 650 (SC) ; [1992] Supp 1 SCC 335, wherein this court has enumerated by way of illustration the categories of cases in which power to quash complaint or FIR can be exercised, it did not keep in mind-much less adhered to--the following note of caution given therein :
'We also give a note of caution to the effect that the power of quashing a criminal proceeding should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases ; that the court will not he justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or in the complaint and that the extraordinary or inherent powers do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the court to act according to its whim or caprice'."
27. Thus, the consistent view which have been expressed by different High Courts of the country and even indicated by the Supreme Court in no uncertain terms are that where specific and definite averments are made in the complaint to attract the penal provisions and satisfy the basic ingredients postulated in such offence, it may not be open to the court to enter into an enquiry into the correctness or otherwise of the allegations at this initial stage while exercising inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure or extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. This court cannot, therefore, consider the case of the petitioners at this stage and go ahead to determine whether the petitioners are entitled to the benefit of the proviso to Section 278B of the Act. The situation may be entirely different where there are no allegations in the complaint to satisfy the basic ingredients constituting an offence under Sections 276C and 277 of the Act. In the present case, the complainant has prima facie shown the involvement of the petitioners with the aid of the provisions of Section 278B of the Act.
28. In the result, this petition is dismissed without any order as to costs. The contention of learned counsel for the petitioners needs to be noted that the complaint was filed in March, 1992, and no effective proceedings have been taken so far in the trial court. In the facts and circumstances of the case, the trial court shall deal with this case expeditiously and endeavour its best to dispose of the matter as early as possible.