Madhya Pradesh High Court
Ramkankan Dohre vs State Of M.P. on 8 March, 2022
Author: G.S. Ahluwalia
Bench: G.S. Ahluwalia
1
Ramkankan Dohre Vs. State of M.P. (Cr.A. No. 857 of 2010)
HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
GWALIOR BENCH
DIVISION BENCH
G.S. AHLUWALIA
&
DEEPAK KUMAR AGARWAL J.J.
Cr.A. No. 857 of 2010
Ramkankan Dohre
Vs.
State of M.P.
_______________________________________
Shri S.S. Kushwaha Counsel for the Appellant
Shri Rajeev Upadhyay, Counsel for the State
Date of Hearing : 23-02-2022
Date of Judgment : 8th-03-022
Approved for Reporting :
Judgment
8th- March -2022
Per G.S. Ahluwalia J.
1.This Criminal Appeal under Section 374 of Cr.P.C. has been filed against the judgment and sentence dated 17-9-2010 passed by Sessions Judge, Datia in S.T. No. 91/2010, by which the appellant has been convicted under Section 302 of IPC and has been sentenced to 2 Ramkankan Dohre Vs. State of M.P. (Cr.A. No. 857 of 2010) undergo the Life Imprisonment.
2. According to the prosecution case, the complainant Rajaku, mother of the deceased Keshkali, lodged a report that the marriage of daughter of her daughter Keshkali was solemnized on 20-5-2010 in village Novai and accordingly, She was staying in the house of her daughter Keshkali. At about 9:00 P.M., Keshkali was preparing food and the appellant Ramkankan was lying on the cot. The mother-in- law of deceased Keshkali, another son-in-law of the complainant namely Sardar and daughter of Keshkali namely Sangeeta were in the house. At that time, Ramkankan Dohre, instructed his wife Keshkali to fan. When the deceased Keshkali replied that She is preparing meals, then the appellant stood up in anger and started assaulting Keshkali by fists and blows. When the witnesses tried to stop him, then he also charged towards the witnesses, as a result the mother-in- law of the deceased and Sardar ran away. The appellant challenged by saying that now he would kill his wife and started assaulting her by lathi and also dragged her inside the house. The deceased Keshkali has died on the spot. The complainant has also sustained injuries while She was trying to save her. The incident has been witnessed by Raheesh, Buddhe Ahirwar and other villagers. Accordingly, FIR was lodged on 27-5-2010 at 7:00 A.M.
3. The Lash Panchnama was prepared. Dead body was sent for post-mortem. Spot map was prepared. The injured complainant was also sent for medical examination. The blood stained and plain earth 3 Ramkankan Dohre Vs. State of M.P. (Cr.A. No. 857 of 2010) were seized. The appellant was arrested and lathi was seized on his memorandum. The seized articles were sent for FSL. The police after completing the investigation, filed the charge sheet for offence under Section 302 of IPC.
4. The Trial Court by order dated 16-8-2010, framed charge under Section 302 of IPC and no charge was framed for causing injuries to the complainant.
5. The Appellant abjured his guilt and pleaded not guilty.
6. The prosecution examined Buddhe Ahirwar (P.W.1), Raheesh Ahirwar (P.W.2), Ku. Sangeeta (P.W.3), Smt. Rajaku (P.W.4), Naval Kishore (P.W.5), Smt. Bissu (P.W.6), Dr. M.M. Shakya (P.W.7), Dr. P.K. Sharma (P.W.8), Angad Singh (P.W.9), Dayaram (P.W.10), Taseer Khan (P.W.11), K.B. Upadhyay (P.W.12), and Jaj Singh Yadav (P.W.
13).
7. The Appellant examined Sardar (D.W.1) in his defence.
8. The Trial Court by the impugned judgment, convicted and sentenced the appellant for the offence mentioned above.
9. Challenging the judgment of conviction, it is submitted by the Counsel for the Appellant that some unknown persons had assaulted the deceased and in fact the appellant had tried to catch hold the miscreants but could not do so. In the alternative it is submitted that since, the incident took place all of a sudden on a very trivial issue, therefore, the act of the appellant would come within the purview of Section 304 Part I of IPC and he is in jail from 28-5-2010 i.e., more 4 Ramkankan Dohre Vs. State of M.P. (Cr.A. No. 857 of 2010) than 11 years and therefore, the period of sentence already undergone by the appellant, is sufficient to meet the ends of justice.
10. Per contra, the Counsel for the State has supported the findings recorded by the Trial Court.
11. Heard the learned Counsel for the parties.
12. Before adverting to the facts of the case, this Court would like to find out as to whether the deceased Keshkali died a homicidal death or not?
13. Dr. P.K. Sharma (P.W. 8) has conducted the post-mortem of the dead body of Keshkali and found following injuries :
(i) Lacerated wound present right side back of head occipital region size 7.5cm x 2.5cmxbone deep below upward direction lateral to medial vertical. Clotted blood present.
(ii) Lacerated wound present right parietal bone vertex size 7.5 cm x 2.5 cm x bone deep vertical placed clotted blood present
(iii) Lacerated wound present right forehead above right eye brow size 4.5 cm x 2.5 cm x bone deep clotted blood present
(iv) Blackish bruises present 2.5 cm below injury no. 3 transverse placed size7.5 x 2.5 cm
(v) Bruise present over right nose size 2.5 cm x 1.5 cm x blackish in colour
(vi) Bruise present on chin size 7.5 cm x 5 cm
(vii) Multiple bruises present left side of face below left ear to left neck and over mandible neck size various from 10 cm x 5 cm to 2.5 cm x 2.5 cm
(viii) Bruises present (Multiple) right shoulder scapular region upto back of various sizes 12 cm x 5 cm to 2.5 cm x 2.5 cm blueish in colour
(ix) Multiple bruises present left shoulder and scapular region lateral upto chest size varies 12 cm x 5 cm to 2.5 cm x 2.5 cm sound present left chest wall fracture of rib.
(x) Multiple bruises present back of lumbar region over back bone size varies from 7.5 cm x 2. 5 cm to 2.5 cm blueish in colour 5 Ramkankan Dohre Vs. State of M.P. (Cr.A. No. 857 of 2010)
(xi) Circular bruise present right lower chest near costal margin size 5 cm x 5 cm
(xii) Multiple bruises present both right and left upper arm present shoulder and elbow lateral to posterior size vary 15 cm x 7.5 cm to 5 cm to 25 cm blueish
(xiii) Multiple bruises present both thigh leg ankle transverse placed posterior to lateral side size vary 15 cm to 7.5 cm to 5 cm x 2.5 cm blueish in colour hematoma was present
(xiv) Lacerated wound with brownish present left middle of leg size 4 cm x 2.5 cm x bone deep All injuries were antemortem in nature and were caused by hard and blunt object. On dissection, blood clotting was found in subcutaneous tissues Fracture of right occipital parietal bone with hematoma 10 cm x 5 cm x 1 cm Fracture of left ribs 5th,6th,7th,8th, Multiple lacerations were found over lateral surface of left lung size 2.5 cm x 2 cm x 2 cm each Liver was also found lacerated.
The cause of death was shock due to internal and external hemorrhage as a result of multiple injuries over body. The nature of death is homicidal.
The post-mortem report is Ex. P.12.
14. This witness was cross-examined. In cross-examination, he stated that the dead body was brought at 11:30 A.M. and the requisition was received at 11:45 A.M. The post-mortem began at 12 P.M. He further stated that it is true that no one would die instantaneously due to injury no. 9 and 10. Fracture was found beneath injury no. 2. If some object falls from top or if a person falls on the ground or his head is dashed against hard surface, then injury no.1 could have been sustained. No injury was older than 24 hours.
15. Thus, it is clear that the deceased Keshkali died a homicidal death.
16. Now the next pivotal question for consideration is that whether 6 Ramkankan Dohre Vs. State of M.P. (Cr.A. No. 857 of 2010) the appellant is the perpetrator of the offence or not?
17. Buddhe Ahirwar (P.W.1) has turned hostile and did not support the prosecution case. He was cross-examined by the public prosecutor and in his cross-examination, this witness admitted that at about 9 P.M., he had heard that the appellant under the influence of liquor was using abusive language.
18. Raheesh Ahirwar (P.W.2) has also turned hostile and nothing could be elicited from his cross-examination, which may support the prosecution case.
19. Ku. Sangeeta (P.W.3) is the daughter of the appellant and the deceased. She is aged about 9 years. Her evidence was recorded after verifying her competence. She stated that She has come along with her grand mother. She stated that at about 9 P.M., the appellant had gone to bed after having his meal. At that time, this witness, her maternal grand mother Rajaku, her Mousa Sardar and Mousi Santoshi and grand mother Bissu were in the house. The appellant called the deceased to fan him and it was replied by her mother that She is preparing meals, but denied that the appellant started assaulting her mother on this issue. All the persons tried to intervene. When the appellant was beating her mother, he was under the influence of alcohol. Her maternal grand mother had also challenged her father that if he is the son of his real father, then he can dare to beat her and on this issue, the appellant got annoyed and brought Lohangi and started assaulting her mother. Her Mousa and Mousi left the house 7 Ramkankan Dohre Vs. State of M.P. (Cr.A. No. 857 of 2010) and did not return back. She denied that She has been tutored by her maternal grand mother. This witness was cross-examined and in cross-examination She stated that She was sleeping when the fight had started and got up after the fight was over.
20. Smt. Rajaku (P.W.3) is the injured witness. She has also narrated the same story. She stated that the appellant after having his meals, went to bed outside the house. He asked his wife to fan him. When Keshkali replied that She is preparing meals, then he started assaulting her. This witness also sustained injuries while making an attempt to save Keshkali. The FIR is Ex. P.3. Sangeeta, Raheesh Ahirwar and Buddhe Ahirwar were also present at the time of incident. The spot map Ex. P.4 was prepared. Safina form is Ex. P.5 and Lash Panchnama is Ex. P.6. This witness was cross-examined. In cross-examination, She stated that She is the resident of village Samthar but had come to the house of the appellant on the date of marriage. The persons who had come along with her had returned back after marriage. She doesnot use watch but as per her assessment, it was 9 P.M. She had not consumed food by that time. Her daughter was preparing meals. She denied that the appellant had never harassed the deceased from the date of her marriage till death. The appellant was in habit of assaulting her under the influence of liquor. She denied that She has any dispute with Bissu, the mother- in-law of her daughter. She could not count the number of assaults. She did not go to the police station in the night itself and went in the 8 Ramkankan Dohre Vs. State of M.P. (Cr.A. No. 857 of 2010) morning. The report was lodged on her narration. She had seen the dead body of her daughter Keshkali.
21. Naval Kishore (P.W.5) has stated that at about 12-12:30 A.M. in the night, Rajaku (P.W.4) had come to him and informed that the appellant has killed Keshkali, therefore, they have to go to Police Station for lodging report. As it was night, therefore, he did not go to police station and went in the morning where Rajaku lodged the FIR. The appellant himself had appeared before the police after the post- mortem was over. His memorandum was recorded and lathi was seized. The memorandum is Ex. P.7.
22. Smt. Bissu (P.W.6), the mother of the appellant has turned hostile and did not support the prosecution case. However, in cross- examination, She stated that this witness had attended the marriage of daughter of the appellant. Rajaku, Sardar and Santoshi were also in the house.
23. Dr. M.M. Shakya (P.W. 7) had medically examined the appellant. The requisition for medical examination is Ex. P.9 and did not find any injury on his body. The MLC is Ex. P.10.
24. Angad Singh (P.W.8) is a witness of seizure. The memorandum of appellant is Ex. P.7 and Lohangi and cloths were seized vide seizure memo Ex. P.15 which were stained with blood.
25. Dayaram (P.W.9) is a witness of Lash Panchnama.
26. Taseer Khan (P.W. 10) had seized the cloths of the deceased vide seizure memo Ex. P.17.
9
Ramkankan Dohre Vs. State of M.P. (Cr.A. No. 857 of 2010)
27. K.B. Upadhyay (P.W.11) is the investigating officer.
28. Jaj Singh Yadav (P.W. 12) is the scriber of the FIR.
29. Sardar (D.W.1) has stated that he and the appellant were sleeping at some distance. At about 9 -10 P.M. he heard the screams and therefore, rushed towards the house and saw that 2-3 persons with covered faces were running away. This witness and the appellant chased them but could not apprehend them. The deceased was lying in an injured condition.
30. Thus, the entire prosecution story hinges around the evidence of Ku. Sangeeta (P.W. 3) and Rajaku (P.W.4). Further, by examining Sardar (D.W.1), the appellant has admitted that at the time of incident, he was in the house.
31. If the defence of the appellant is considered, then it is clear that he has admitted that he was sleeping outside the house. If the defence that 2-3 unknown persons had assaulted his wife is considered, then it is clear that no FIR was lodged by the appellant immediately after the incident. Further, as per the provisions of Section 106 of Evidence Act, the burden is on him to explain as to how, his wife died a homicidal death, but the appellant could not explain that if any unknown persons had killed his wife then why he did not rush to the police station, to inform about the incident and why he did not try to shift the injured/deceased to the hospital. Thus, the defence taken by the appellant is not acceptable.
32. Sangeeta (P.W.3) and Rajaku (P.W.4) are reliable witnesses as 10 Ramkankan Dohre Vs. State of M.P. (Cr.A. No. 857 of 2010) their presence in the house was natural. Since, the marriage of the daughter of the deceased Keshkali had taken place just few days back, therefore, Rajaku (P.W.4) had come to attend the marriage and stayed back with her daughter after the marriage, whereas Sangeeta (P.W.3) is the daughter of the deceased and her presence in the house was natural. Further, Bissu (P.W. 6) has also admitted the presence of Rajaku (P.W.4) in the house.
33. Thus, it is held that the appellant had assaulted the deceased Keshkali by Lohangi.
34. It is submitted by the Counsel for the appellant, that since, the appellant was under the influence of liquor, therefore, he is entitled for the protection of Section 85 of Penal Code.
35. Considered the submissions made by the Counsel for the appellant.
36. Section 85 of Penal Code reads as under :
85. Act of a person incapable of judgment by reason of intoxication caused against his will.--Nothing is an offence which is done by a person who, at the time of doing it, is, by reason of intoxication, incapable of knowing the nature of the act, or that he is doing what is either wrong, or contrary to law: provided that the thing which intoxicated him was administered to him without his knowledge or against his will.
37. In order to take benefit of Section 85 of Penal Code, the appellant must prove that thing which intoxicated him was administered to him without his knowledge or against his will. Getting intoxicated due to voluntary consumption of liquor would not 11 Ramkankan Dohre Vs. State of M.P. (Cr.A. No. 857 of 2010) bring the provision of Section 85 of Penal Code in play.
38. The Supreme Court in the case of Bablu Vs. State of Rajasthan reported in (2006) 13 SCC 116 has held as under :
11. Section 85 IPC deals with act of a person incapable of judgment by reason of intoxication caused against his will.
As the heading of the provision itself shows, intoxication must have been against his will and/or the thing with which he was intoxicated was administered to him without his knowledge. There is no specific plea taken in the present case about intoxicant having administered without the appellant's knowledge. The expression "without his knowledge" simply means an ignorance of the fact that what is being administered to him is or contains or is mixed with an intoxicant.
39. Section 86 of Penal Code reads as under :
86. Offence requiring a particular intent or knowledge committed by one who is intoxicated.--In cases where an act done is not an offence unless done with a particular knowledge or intent, a person who does the act in a state of intoxication shall be liable to be dealt with as if he had the same knowledge as he would have had if he had not been intoxicated, unless the thing which intoxicated him was administered to him without his knowledge or against his will."
40. The Supreme Court in the case of Shanakar Vs. Jaiswara Vs. State of W.B. reported in (2007) 9 SCC 360 has held as under :
22. This Court in Basdev v. State of Pepsu while construing Section 86 IPC observed: (AIR pp. 489-90, paras 4-6) "4. It is no doubt true that while the first part of the section speaks of intent or knowledge, the latter part deals only with knowledge and a certain element of doubt in interpretation may possibly be felt by reason of this omission. If in voluntary drunkenness knowledge is to be presumed in the same manner as if there was no drunkenness, what about those cases where mens rea is required.
Are we at liberty to place intent on the same footing, and if so, why has the section omitted intent in its latter part? This is not the first time that the question 12 Ramkankan Dohre Vs. State of M.P. (Cr.A. No. 857 of 2010) comes up for consideration. It has been discussed at length in many decisions and the result may be briefly summarised as follows:
5. So far as knowledge is concerned, we must attribute to the intoxicated man the same knowledge as if he was quite sober. But so far as intent or intention is concerned, we must gather it from the attending general circumstances of the case paying due regard to the degree of intoxication. Was the man beside his mind altogether for the time being?
If so it would not be possible to fix him with the requisite intention. But if he had not gone so deep in drinking, and from the facts it could be found that he knew what he was about, we can apply the rule that a man is presumed to intend the natural consequences of his act or acts.
6. Of course, we have to distinguish between motive, intention and knowledge. Motive is something which prompts a man to form an intention and knowledge is an awareness of the consequences of the act. In many cases intention and knowledge merge into each other and mean the same thing more or less and intention can be presumed from knowledge. The demarcating line between knowledge and intention is no doubt thin but it is not difficult to perceive that they connote different things. Even in some English decisions, the three ideas are used interchangeably and this has led to a certain amount of confusion."
23. The learned amicus curiae, however, relied upon the judgment in Mandru Gadaba, In re in support of his submissions. It is not necessary to consider the judgment to the effect of the observations inasmuch as the charge against the accused therein was under Section 304 and not under Section 302.
24. On consideration of various authorities including the decision rendered by the House of Lords in Director of Public Prosecutions v. Beard the law is neatly summarised in Russel on Crime in the following words:
"There is a distinction, however, between the defence of insanity in the true sense caused by excessive drunkenness and the defence of drunkenness which produces a condition such that the drunken man's mind becomes incapable of forming a specific intention. If actual insanity in fact supervenes as the result of alcoholic excess, it furnishes as complete answer to a criminal charge as insanity induced by any other cause.13
Ramkankan Dohre Vs. State of M.P. (Cr.A. No. 857 of 2010) But in cases falling short of insanity evidence of drunkenness which renders the accused incapable of forming the specific intent essential to constitute the crime should be taken into consideration with the other facts proved in order to determine whether or not he had this intent, but evidence of drunkenness which falls short of proving such incapacity and merely establishes that the mind of the accused was so affected by drink that he more readily gave way to some violent passion does not rebut the presumption that a man intends the natural consequences of his act."
25. In Bablu v. State of Rajasthan this Court held: (SCC p. 129, para 12) "12. The defence of drunkenness can be availed of only when intoxication produces such a condition as the accused loses the requisite intention for the offence. The onus of proof about reason of intoxication due to which the accused had become incapable of having particular knowledge in forming the particular intention is on the accused. Basically, three propositions as regards the scope and ambit of Section 85 IPC are as follows:
(i) the insanity whether produced by drunkenness or otherwise is a defence to the crime charged;
(ii) evidence of drunkenness which renders the accused incapable of forming the specific intent essential to constitute the crime should be taken into account with the other facts proved in order to determine whether or not he had this intent; and
(iii) the evidence of drunkenness falling short of a proved incapacity in the accused to form the intent necessary to constitute the crime and merely establishing that his mind is affected by drink so that he more readily gave to some violent passion, does not rebut the presumption that a man intends the natural consequences of his acts.
(emphasis supplied)
41. Now the next question for consideration is that whether the appellant had intention to kill his wife Keshkali?
42. It is submitted by the Counsel for the appellant that the incident took place all of a sudden. The appellant was lying on the 14 Ramkankan Dohre Vs. State of M.P. (Cr.A. No. 857 of 2010) cot outside the house. He had asked his wife to fan him and when She refused to do so, he got furious and out of anger, he assaulted the deceased. The incident took place all of a sudden and therefore, the act of the appellant would be covered under Section 304 Part 1 of IPC.
43. Considered the submissions made by the Counsel for the appellant.
44. In order to bring the act of an accused, it is not sufficient to prove that the incident took place all of a sudden without any premeditation, but it is also to be proved that the accused did not take undue advantage or did not act in a cruel manner. The Supreme Court in the case of Nandlal Vs. State of Maharashtra reported in (2019) 5 SCC 224 has held as under :
13. In order to bring the case within Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC, the following conditions enumerated therein must be satisfied: (i) The act must be committed without premeditation in a sudden fight in the heat of passion; (ii) upon a sudden quarrel; (iii) without the offenders having taken undue advantage; and (iv) the accused had not acted in a cruel or unusual manner.
14. Even if the fight is unpremeditated and sudden, if the weapon or manner of retaliation is disproportionate to the offence and if the accused had taken undue advantage of the deceased, the accused cannot be protected under Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC. Considering the scope of Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC, in Sridhar Bhuyan v. State of Orissa, this Court held as under: (SCC pp. 396-97, paras 7-8) "7. For bringing in operation of Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC, it has to be established that the act was committed without premeditation, in a sudden fight in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel without the offender having taken undue advantage and not having acted in a cruel or unusual manner.
8. The fourth exception of Section 300 IPC covers acts 15 Ramkankan Dohre Vs. State of M.P. (Cr.A. No. 857 of 2010) done in a sudden fight. The said exception deals with a case of prosecution not covered by the first exception, after which its place would have been more appropriate. ... There is no previous deliberation or determination to fight. A fight suddenly takes place, for which both parties are more or less to be blamed. It may be that one of them starts it, but if the other had not aggravated it by his own conduct it would not have taken the serious turn it did. There is then mutual provocation and aggravation, and it is difficult to apportion the share of blame which attaches to each fighter. The help of Exception 4 can be invoked if death is caused: (a) without premeditation; (b) in a sudden fight; (c) without the offenders having taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner; and (d) the fight must have been with the person killed. To bring a case within Exception 4 all the ingredients mentioned in it must be found. It is to be noted that the "fight" occurring in Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC is not defined in IPC. It takes two to make a fight. Heat of passion requires that there must be no time for the passions to cool down and in this case, the parties have worked themselves into a fury on account of the verbal altercation in the beginning.
A fight is a combat between two and more persons whether with or without weapons. It is not possible to enunciate any general rule as to what shall be deemed to be a sudden quarrel. It is a question of fact and whether a quarrel is sudden or not must necessarily depend upon the proved facts of each case. For the application of Exception 4, it is not sufficient to show that there was a sudden quarrel and there was no premeditation. It must further be shown that the offender has not taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner. The expression "undue advantage" as used in the provision means "unfair advantage"."
(emphasis supplied) The same principle was reiterated in Pappu v. State of M.P. and in Surain Singh v. State of Punjab where the conviction under Section 302 IPC was modified under Section 304 Part II IPC.
45. If the facts of the present case are considered, then it is clear that it is true that the incident took place all of a sudden because the 16 Ramkankan Dohre Vs. State of M.P. (Cr.A. No. 857 of 2010) appellant was insisting that his wife Keshkali must fan him, whereas Keshkali was busy in preparing meals, but looking to the number of external and internal injuries caused to the deceased, it is clear that the appellant had acted in a cruel manner. Although as per post- mortem report, Ex. P. 12, 14 external injuries were found but injuries no. 7,8,9,12 and 13 were multiple bruises. Most of the injuries were caused on the vital parts of the body of the deceased. Even internal organs were found lacerated. Multiple fractures of ribs and occipital bone were found. Thus, it is clear that the act of the appellant would not come under the purview of Section 304 Part I of I.P.C.
46. Although it is the case of the prosecution that Rajaku (P.W. 4) had also sustained injuries while She was trying to save her daughter, but neither the prosecution filed charge sheet for causing injuries to Rajaku (P.W.4) but even no charge was framed.
47. Considering the totality of the facts and circumstances of the case, this Court is of the considered opinion, that the prosecution has proved the guilt of the appellant for offence under Section 302 of IPC.
48. Accordingly, he is held guilty of committing offence under Section 302 of IPC.
49. So far as the question of sentence is concerned, the minimum sentence is Life Imprisonment, and accordingly, it doesnot call for any interference.
50. Ex-Consequenti, the judgment and sentence dated 17-9-2010 17 Ramkankan Dohre Vs. State of M.P. (Cr.A. No. 857 of 2010) passed by Sessions Judge, Datia in S.T. No. 91/2010 is hereby Affirmed.
51. The appellant is in jail. He shall undergo the remaining jail sentence. Let a copy of this judgment be provided to the appellant, free of cost.
52. The record of the Trial Court be sent back immediately along with copy of this judgment for necessary information and compliance.
53. The appeal fails and is hereby Dismissed.
(G.S. Ahluwalia) (Deepak Kumar Agarwal)
Judge Judge
ARUN KUMAR MISHRA
2022.03.08 14:39:13 +05'30'