Uttarakhand High Court
Dinesh Pratap Singh vs Directorate Of Enforcement on 4 May, 2023
Author: Ravindra Maithani
Bench: Ravindra Maithani
RESERVED
HIGH COURT OF UTTARAKHAND AT NAINITAL
Criminal Misc. Application No. 9 of 2023
Dinesh Pratap Singh ....Petitioner
Versus
Directorate of Enforcement,
Government of India ....Respondent
Present:-
Mr. Vikshit Arora, Advocate with Mr. Shiv Pandey and
Mr. Kailash Chandra, Advocates for the petitioner.
Mr. Rakesh Thapliyal, Assistant Solicitor General of
India assisted by Mr. V.K. Kapruwan, Central
Government Standing Counsel for the respondent.
With
Criminal Misc. Application No. 91 of 2023
Arpan Kumar ....Petitioner
Versus
Directorate of Enforcement,
Government of India ....Respondent
Present:-
Mr. Sanjay Kumar, Advocate for the petitioner.
Mr. Rakesh Thapliyal, Assistant Solicitor General of
India assisted by Mr. V.K. Kapruwan, Central
Government Standing Counsel for the respondent.
With
Criminal Misc. Application No. 102 of 2023
Sanjay Kumar Chauhan ....Petitioner
Versus
2
Directorate of Enforcement,
Government of India ....Respondent
Present:-
Mr. Sanjay Kumar, Advocate for the petitioner.
Mr. Rakesh Thapliyal, Assistant Solicitor General of
India assisted by Mr. V.K. Kapruwan, Central
Government Standing Counsel for the respondent.
With
Criminal Misc. Application No. 103 of 2023
Vikas Kumar ....Petitioner
Versus
Directorate of Enforcement,
Government of India ....Respondent
Present:-
Mr. Sanjay Kumar, Advocate for the petitioner.
Mr. Rakesh Thapliyal, Assistant Solicitor General of
India assisted by Mr. V.K. Kapruwan, Central
Government Standing Counsel for the respondent.
With
Criminal Misc. Application No. 105 of 2023
Bhole Lal ....Petitioner
Versus
Directorate of Enforcement,
Government of India ....Respondent
Present:-
Mr. Shri Singh, Advocate with Mr. Shiv Pandey and Mr.
Kailash Chandra, Advocates for the petitioner.
Mr. Rakesh Thapliyal, Assistant Solicitor General of
India assisted by Mr. V.K. Kapruwan, Central
Government Standing Counsel for the respondent.
With
Criminal Misc. Application No. 106 of 2023
Bhagat Singh Fonia ....Petitioner
3
Versus
Directorate of Enforcement,
Government of India ....Respondent
Present:-
Mr. Shri Singh, Advocate with Mr. Shiv Pandey and Mr.
Kailash Chandra, Advocates for the petitioner.
Mr. Rakesh Thapliyal, Assistant Solicitor General of
India assisted by Mr. V.K. Kapruwan, Central
Government Standing Counsel for the respondent.
With
Criminal Misc. Application No. 109 of 2023
Madan Mohan Padaliya ....Petitioner
Versus
Directorate of Enforcement,
Government of India ....Respondent
Present:-
Mr. Shri Singh, Advocate with Mr. Shiv Pandey and Mr.
Kailash Chandra, Advocates for the petitioner.
Mr. Rakesh Thapliyal, Assistant Solicitor General of
India assisted by Mr. V.K. Kapruwan, Central
Government Standing Counsel for the respondent.
With
Criminal Misc. Application No. 110 of 2023
Barinder Singh ....Petitioner
Versus
Directorate of Enforcement,
Government of India ....Respondent
Present:-
Mr. Harshit Sanwal, Advocate for the petitioner.
Mr. Rakesh Thapliyal, Assistant Solicitor General of
India assisted by Mr. V.K. Kapruwan, Central
Government Standing Counsel for the respondent.
With
Criminal Misc. Application No. 111 of 2023
4
Balwant Singh ....Petitioner
Versus
Directorate of Enforcement,
Government of India ....Respondent
Present:-
Mr. Harshit Sanwal, Advocate for the petitioner.
Mr. Rakesh Thapliyal, Assistant Solicitor General of
India assisted by Mr. V.K. Kapruwan, Central
Government Standing Counsel for the respondent.
With
Criminal Misc. Application No. 188 of 2023
Ramesh Kumar ....Petitioner
Versus
Directorate of Enforcement,
Government of India ....Respondent
Present:-
Mr. Manish Mishra, Advocate for the petitioner is
present through video conferencing.
Mr. Rakesh Thapliyal, Assistant Solicitor General of
India assisted by Mr. V.K. Kapruwan, Central
Government Standing Counsel for the respondent.
With
Criminal Misc. Application No. 189 of 2023
Om Prakash ....Petitioner
Versus
Directorate of Enforcement,
Government of India ....Respondent
Present:-
Mr. Manish Mishra, Advocate for the petitioner is
present through video conferencing.
Mr. Rakesh Thapliyal, Assistant Solicitor General of
India assisted by Mr. V.K. Kapruwan, Central
Government Standing Counsel for the respondent.
And
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Criminal Misc. Application No. 321 of 2023
Jagdish Arora ....Petitioner
Versus
Directorate of Enforcement,
Government of India ....Respondent
Present:-
Mr. Sanjay Kumar, Advocate for the petitioner.
Mr. Rakesh Thapliyal, Assistant Solicitor General of
India assisted by Mr. Karan Anand, Advocate for the
respondent.
JUDGMENT
Hon'ble Ravindra Maithani, J. (Oral) Since a common question of law is involved in all these petitions, they are being decided by this common judgment.
2. The Directorate of Enforcement, Government of India ("the complainant") filed a complaint against all the petitioners and some other persons in the court of Special Judge (PMLA)/Sessions Judge, Dehradun, based on which, the Criminal Miscellaneous Case No. 454 of 2021, Directorate of Enforcement Vs. Dinesh Pratap Singh and others ("the case") was instituted. On 28.04.2022, the court observed that all the accused named in the complaint did not commit the offence of money laundering in the course of same transaction because different 'Proceeds of Crime' was generated in different transactions and all accused persons were not involved in money laundering of each and every 'Proceeds of Crime'. The court observed that the complaint 6 was liable to be returned for filing fresh and separate complaints, in accordance with the provisions of Section 223 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 ("the Code"). Accordingly, by the impugned order dated 28.04.2022, the complaint was returned. This order is impugned in all the petitions. Thereafter, the complainant filed seven separate complaints as follows:-
SL Case No. Name of the accused No.
1. Special Sessions Trial No. Jagdish Arora, 14 of 2022 Barinder Singh, Arpan Kumar, Dinesh Pratap Singh, Bhole Lal, Anil Kumar and Vikas Kumar
2. Special Sessions Trial No. Balwant Singh, 15 of 2022 Barinder Singh, Arpan Kumar, Jasdeep Singh Goraya, M/s Fibremarx Papers Private Ltd., Dinesh Pratap Singh, Bhagat Singh Phonia, Sanjay Kumar Chauhan and Madan Mohan Padaliya
3. Special Sessions Trial No. Charan Singh, 16 of 2022 7 Ravinder Singh, Navneet Singh, Dinesh Pratap Singh, Bhole Lal, Anil Kumar and Vikas Kumar
4. Special Sessions Trial No. Ramesh Kumar, 17 of 2022 Om Prakash, Arpan Kumar, Dinesh Pratap Singh, Bhole Lal, Anil Kumar and Vikas Kumar.
5. Special Sessions Trial No. Vikram Jeet Singh, 18 of 2022 Mandeep Singh, M/s Tera Tera Seeds and Dinesh Pratap Singh
6. Special Sessions Trial No. Harjinder Singh, 19 of 2022 Jasdeep Singh Goraya, M/s Fibremarx Papers Private Ltd., Dinesh Pratap Singh, Bhagat Singh Fonia, Sanjay Kumar Chauhan and Madan Mohan Padaliya.
7. Special Sessions Trial No. Dinesh Pratap Singh, 20 of 2022 Jishan@ Jishan Ahmed and Sudhir Chawla.
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3. In some of the above seven complaints, the processes have already been issued. In these petitions, challenge has been made to order dated 28.04.2022, passed in the case, by which a joint complaint against the petitioners and others has been returned for filing fresh and separate complaints as well as all the seven complaints and processes issued in them (the petitioner Dinesh Pratap Singh has challenged cognizance and summoning order passed in all the seven complaints as well as their proceedings); in other petitions the challenge is made as follows:-
(i) The petitioner Arpan Kumar has challenged the order dated 28.04.2022 passed in the case as well as the cognizance and summoning order passed in Special Sessions Trial Nos. 14 of 2022, 15 of 2022 and 17 of 2022 as well as their proceedings;
(ii) The petitioner Sanjay Kumar Chauhan has challenged the order dated 28.04.2022 passed in the case as well as cognizance and summoning order passed in the Special Sessions Trial No. 15 of 2022 and the entire proceedings of Miscellaneous Case No. 370 of 2022;
(iii) The petitioners Vikas Kumar and Bhole Lal have challenged the order dated 28.04.2022 passed in the case as well as the cognizance 9 and summoning order passed in Special Sessions Trial Nos. 14 of 2022, 16 of 2022 and 17 of 2022 as well as their proceedings;
(iv) The petitioner Bhagat Singh Fonia has challenged the order dated 28.04.2022 passed in the case as well as cognizance and summoning order passed in Special Sessions Trial No. 15 of 2022 as well as its entire proceedings;
(v) The petitioner Madan Mohan Padaliya has challenged the order dated 28.04.2022 passed in the case as well as the cognizance and summoning order passed in Special Sessions Trial No. 15 of 2022 as well as its entire proceedings;
(vi) The petitioner Barinder Singh has challenged the order dated 28.04.2022 passed in the case as well as the cognizance and summoning order passed in Special Sessions Trial Nos. 14 of 2022 and 15 of 2022 as well as their entire proceedings;
(vii) The petitioner Balwant Singh has challenged the order dated 28.04.2022 passed in the case as well as the cognizance and summoning order passed in Special Sessions Trial No. 15 of 2022 as well as its entire proceedings;10
(viii) The petitioner Ramesh Kumar has challenged the order dated 28.04.2022 passed in the case as well as the cognizance and summoning order passed in Special Sessions Trial No. 17 of 2022 as well as its entire proceedings;
(ix) The petitioner Om Prakash has challenged the order dated 28.04.2022 passed in the case as well as the cognizance and summoning order passed in Special Sessions Trial No. 17 of 2022 as well as its entire proceedings;
(x) The petitioner Jagdish Arora has challenged the order dated 28.04.2022 passed in the case as well as the cognizance and summoning order passed in Special Sessions Trial No. 14 of 2022 and its entire proceedings.
FACTS
4. The National Highways Authority of India ("NHAI") had acquired land for widening of NH-74. A notification under Section 3 D of National Highways Act, 1956 ("the NH Act") was issued. Different rates were fixed for 'Agricultural' and 'Non Agricultural' land proposed to be acquired. It is a case of causing huge loss to the tune of Rs.500 crores (approximately) to the Government Treasury by the 11 petitioners and others by forgery, manipulation of Government records, preparing back dated orders so that compensation may be granted at a much higher rate.
5. Initially, an FIR No. 32 of 2017 was lodged at Police Station Pantnagar, District Udham Singh Nagar under Sections 34, 120B, 167, 218, 219, 409, 420, 465, 466, 467, 468, 471, 474 IPC against un-named concerned Revenue Officers/Officials, land owners, farmers, officers/ officials of NHAI and others. The FIR was lodged by Pratap Singh Shah, Additional District Magistrate, Finance and Revenue, Udham Singh Nagar. According to it, the compensation for the land had been determined 8-10 times higher by way of showing the land, that was acquired for widening of NH-74 and notified as 'Agricultural' in Gazette Notification issued under Section 3D of the NH Act, as 'Non Agricultural'. For this purpose, the land owners, farmers in a conspiracy with Revenue Officers/Officials got the land use changed from 'Agricultural' to 'Non Agricultural' by procuring back dated orders. They had also got back dated entries of the same made in the revenue records. The forged and back dated orders in the land revenue records were used for determining higher rate of compensation showing the land as 'Non Agricultural'.
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6. After an investigation in this FIR, Charge Sheet No. 2 of 2018 was initially submitted under Sections 167, 218, 219, 409, 420, 465, 466, 467, 468, 471, 474, 120B and 34 IPC and under Section 13 (1) (b), 8 and 9 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 against the petitioners Dinesh Pratap Singh, Arpan Kumar, Sanjay Kumar Chauhan, Vikas Kumar, Bhole Lal, Bhagat Singh Fonia, Madan Mohan Padaliya, Om Prakash and others.
7. The investigation in the matter was undertaken in different phases. After completion of the 5th phase of investigation, Charge Sheet No. 2D of 2019 was submitted against the petitioner Barinder Singh and Jagdish Arora. After investigation of the 6th phase, Charge Sheet No. 2E of 2019 was submitted against the petitioner Ramesh Kumar. After completion of investigation, Charge Sheet No. 2H of 2020 was submitted against the petitioner Balwant Singh and others.
8. During the course of argument, in the instant case, it has been informed that the trial in the aforementioned charge sheets is pending.
9. The Directorate of Enforcement also investigated the role of the petitioners and others in connection with 13 money laundering under the provisions of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 ("the PML Act") and a complaint dated 08.12.2021 was filed in the court, which is basis of the case. The court heard on cognizance and by its order dated 28.04.2022 returned the complaint for filing fresh and separate complaints in accordance with law. Subsequent to it, seven separate complaints have been filed. The challenge to order dated 28.04.2022 has been made on the ground that a court cannot return the complaint with a direction to the complainant to file complaint in a particular manner.
ARGUMENTS ON IMPUGNED ORDER DATED 28.04.2022
10. Learned counsel for the petitioner, Dinesh Pratap Singh would submit that a complaint cannot be returned for filing in a particular manner. In support of his arguments, learned counsel has placed reliance on the principles of law, as laid down in the case of A. Vinayagam and 3 others Vs. Dr. Subhash Chandran and another, 2000 SCC OnLine Mad 25.
11. In the case of A. Vinayagam (supra), a complaint that was filed was returned by the Magistrate as there were some defects in the complaint. The complaint was represented. Thereafter, an argument was raised that 14 representation of the complainant was time barred. Under those facts and circumstances, in para 15 of the judgment, the Court observed as hereunder:-
"15. Law does not know or provide any other mode of dealing with the complaint, much less returning the complaint. It is not possible for a Magistrate to return the complaint for the so called defects and if the defects are there in the complaint, the complainant has to suffer. There is no warrant in the Criminal Procedure Code or the Criminal Rules of Practice, empowering the Magistrate to return then complaint just because he thinks that there are any defects. In this behalf, the observation by both the learned Judges that the Magistrate has a power to return the complaint because he has a power to accept is clearly incorrect. In the first place, the Magistrate does not have a "Power" to accept the complaint. That is not the power of the court. That is the "duty" on the part of the court in contradistinction to its "Powers". Again unless there is a specific provision in the Code or the Rules, the Magistrate cannot find out his own procedure by returning the complaint as it is. In fact, when the complainant presents the case to the Magistrate that is not the stage of examining the defects and it is not for the Magistrate to examine the so called defects in the complaint. All that the Magistrate has to do is to consider the same by ordering the examination of complainant and/or as the case may be, his witnesses. It was strenuously suggested that if there are some formal defects like the age is not stated or the name of the father of the accused is not stated, the complainant should get a fair chance to correct the defects. We only observe that it is for the complainant to produce a defectless complaint, if because of such defects, such as non-mentioning of the age and names of father, etc., the identity of the accused person becomes suspicious or is not established properly then, the complainant must suffer for his defective 15 complaint, but, under no circumstances, could the Magistrate return the complaint particularly after the court-seal had been put on that complaint and the court- fee stamps have been cancelled then, as rightly found by Janarthanam, J., the complaint becomes the court property."
12. It has been argued that since the order returning the complaint dated 28.04.2022, passed in the case is non est in the eyes of law and is completely without jurisdiction, the subsequent complaints that have been filed pursuant to the order dated 28.04.2022 would also not survive. In this context, learned counsel has placed reliance on the principles of law, as laid down in the case of State of Punjab Vs. Davinder Pal Singh Bhullar and others, (2011) 14 SCC 770. In para 107 of the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed as hereunder:-
"107. It is a settled legal proposition that if initial action is not in consonance with law, all subsequent and consequential proceedings would fall through for the reason that illegality strikes at the root of the order. In such a fact situation, the legal maxim sublato fundamento cadit opusmeaning thereby that foundation being removed, structure/work falls, comes into play and applies on all scores in the present case."
13. Learned counsel would also submit that the seven complaints, that have been filed pursuant to the order dated 28.04.2022 are unmerited and undeserved 16 complaints. If they are allowed to continue, it would be an infringement to the right to life of the petitioners. In this reference, learned counsel has placed reliance on the principles of law, as laid down in the case of Sanjaysinh Ramarao Chavan Vs. Dattatray Gulabrao Phalke and others, (2015) 3 SCC 123. In the case of Sanjaysinh Ramarao Chavan (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that "unmerited and undeserved prosecution is an infringement of the guarantee under Article 21 of the Constitution of India."
14. Learned counsel also raised the following points in his submission:-
(i) The court exceeded its jurisdiction in directing the complainant to file separate complaints.
(ii) It is for the complainant to choose how to file a complaint. On this aspect, the learned counsel has placed reliance on the principles of law, as reiterated in the case of M.C. Mehta (Taj Corridor Scam) Vs., Union of India and others, (2007) 1 SCC 110. In the case of M.C. Mehta (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that "even a 17 competent Magistrate cannot compel the police officer concerned to form a particular opinion. The formation of the opinion of the police on the material collected during the investigation as to whether judicial scrutiny is warranted or not is entirely left to the officer in charge of the police station. There is no provision in the Code empowering a Magistrate to compel the police to form a particular opinion." In fact, in the case of M.C. Mehta (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has taken a note of the principles of law, as laid down in the case of Abhinandan Jha and others Vs. Dinesh Mishra, AIR 1968 SC 117. In the case of Abhinandan Jha (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court interpreted and discussed the options available with the magistrate to whom a police report is submitted by the Investigating Officer.
(iii) The impugned order dated 28.04.2022
passed in the case is based on the
interpretation of the provisions of Sections 18 218, 219 and 223 of the Code. According to the scheme of the Code, a trial does not commence until charge is framed. It is a post cognizance stage. Therefore, it is argued that the observations made in the impugned order dated 28.04.2022, deprived the petitioners an opportunity of a fair trial/proceedings in accordance with law.
(iv) Even on subsequent complaints, no prima facie case is made out against the petitioner Dinesh Pratap Singh, therefore, they deserve to be quashed. In support of his contention, the learned counsel has placed reliance upon the principles of law, as laid down in the case of State of Haryana and Others Vs. Bhajan Lal and others, 1992 Supp (1) SCC
335.
"102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be 19 exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised.
(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted
allegations made in the FIR or
complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused.
(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-
cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.
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(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge."
15. During the course of argument, when the observations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, as made in the case of CREF Finance Ltd. Vs. Shree Shanthi Homes (P) Ltd. and another, (2005) 7 SCC 467 were brought to the notice, learned counsel for the petitioner Dinesh Pratap Singh would submit that the observations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, as made in the case of CREF Finance Ltd. (supra), are commensurate with declining/refusal of taking 21 cognizance thereupon i.e. dismissal of a complaint. It is submitted that firstly, the course open to a court of competent jurisdiction upon presentation of a complaint is to take cognizance; or secondly, refuse to take cognizance and just dismiss/reject/ return the complaint; and thirdly, ordering a further investigation. It is argued that there is no procedure in law to return a complaint with an observation to direct the complainant to file the same in a manner other than the way preferred by the complainant, whether in form or in substance.
16. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioners Jagdish Arora, Arpan Kumar, Sanjay Kumar Chauhan and Vikas Kumar adopts the arguments as made on behalf of the petitioner Dinesh Pratap Singh.
17. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioners Bhole Lal, Bhagat Singh Fonia and Mohan Singh Padaliya would also adopt the arguments as advanced on behalf of the petitioner Dinesh Pratap Singh and also raised the following points:-
(i) For the scheduled offences, the petitioners are facing a joint trial.22
(ii) The scheme of the PML Act also envisages that the trial of scheduled offences and offences under the provisions of the PML Act may be tried by the Special Court, if an application is made on this behalf. Reference has been made to the provisions of Section 44(1)(c) of the PML Act, which reads as hereunder:-
"44. (1) Offences triable by Special Courts. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), -
(a) .....
(b) .....
(c) If the court which has taken cognizance of the scheduled offence is other than the Special Court which has taken cognizance of the complaint of the offence of money-
laundering under sub-clause (b), it shall, on an application by the authority authorized to file a complaint under this At, commit the case relating to the scheduled offence to the Special Court and the Special Court shall, on receipt of such case proceed to deal with it from the stage at which it is committed."
(iii) It is in the interest of justice that a joint trial of the petitioners may be conducted.
(iv) The impugned order dated 28.04.2022 passed in the case is bad in the eyes of law. 23
The court cannot pass directions to file separate complaints.
(v) It is the case of the complainant that it was a case of joint conspiracy, therefore, one complaint was filed. There was no occasion for the Special Judge to disagree with the complainant at that stage.
18. Learned counsel for the petitioners Barinder Singh and Balwant Singh would submit that after taking cognizance, the court straightaway proceeded to examine the provisions of Section 223 of the Code, holding that a joint trial cannot be held. It is argued that it is bad in the eyes of law. It is argued that while passing the order dated 28.04.2022, the court did not take into consideration certain principles of a joint trial. Learned counsel placed reliance on the principles of law, as laid down in the case of Nasib Singh Vs. State of Punjab and another, (2021) SCC OnLine SC 924. In the case of Nasib Singh (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court summed up the principles of joint trial and in para 51 observed as hereunder:-
"51. From the decisions of this Court on joint trial and separate trials, the following principles can be formulated:24
51.1. Section 218 provides that separate trials shall be conducted for distinct offences alleged to be committed by a person. Sections 219-221 provide exceptions to this general rule. If a person falls under these exceptions, then a joint trial for the offences which a person is charged with may be conducted. Similarly, under Section 223, a joint trial may be held for persons charged with different offences if any of the clauses in the provision are separately or on a combination satisfied.
51.2. While applying the principles enunciated in Sections 218-223 on conducting joint and separate trials, the trial court should apply a two-pronged test, namely, (i) whether conducting a joint/separate trial will prejudice the defence of the accused; and/or (ii) whether conducting a joint/separate trial would cause judicial delay.
51.3. The possibility of conducting a joint trial will have to be determined at the beginning of the trial and not after the trial based on the result of the trial. The appellate court may determine the validity of the argument that there ought to have been a separate/joint trial only based on whether the trial had prejudiced the right of accused or the prosecutrix.
51.4. Since the provisions which engraft an exception use the phrase "may" with reference to conducting a joint trial, a separate trial is usually not contrary to law even if a joint trial could be conducted, unless proven to cause a miscarriage of justice.
51.5. A conviction or acquittal of the accused cannot be set aside on the mere ground that there was a possibility of a joint or a separate trial. To set aside the order of conviction or acquittal, it must be proved that the rights of the parties were prejudiced because of the joint or separate trial, as the case may be."
19. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioners Ramesh Kumar and Om Prakash adopts the arguments, as 25 advanced on behalf of the petitioner Dinesh Pratap Singh. In addition to it, it is argued that according to the complainant, it is a case of joint criminal activities, therefore, the complainant had filed a single complaint and the court had no occasion to direct separate trials.
20. On the other hand, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondent would submit that the provisions of Section 201 of the Code, deals with the procedure before magistrate, which does not apply in cases of trial under the PML Act, which is held before a sessions court. Learned Senior Counsel raised the following points in his submission:-
(i) The principles of law, as laid down in the case of A. Vinayagam (supra) does not help the petitioners. Learned Senior Counsel would refer to the observations made in the case of A. Vinayagam (supra), wherein the Hon'ble Court observed that "therefore, those order cannot be described simply as judicial orders and consequently, the complainants cannot be held guilty for not challenging them in a proper forum by way of a revision or appeal as the case 26 may be." It is argued that in the instant case also, the complainant may not be held guilty for return of a complaint.
(ii) The respondent has filed separate complainants in some of which, cognizance has already been taken. It, in no manner, prejudices the interest of the petitioners.
(iii) Before taking cognizance, no law permits that the accused should be heard.
(iv) The principles of law, as laid down in the case of M.C. Mehta (supra), does not apply in the instant case, because in the case of M.C. Mehta (supra), the initial action was lodging of an FIR, which is not an issue in the instant case.
(v) All the offences have not been committed in same transaction; different farmers obtained different fake orders; they had different dealings with the Revenue Officials.
(vi) In each farmer's case, there was a separate conspiracy. That forms one set of conspiracy unconnected with another conspiracy hatched with another farmer.27
(vii) The petitioners can challenge the subsequent summoning order passed in seven separate complaints.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
21. The Code prescribes a procedure under Chapter XV for complaints to the Magistrate. According to the Scheme, when the complaint is presented to the Magistrate under Section 200 of the Code, the Magistrate shall examine upon oath the complainant and the witnesses present. Section 201 of the Code deals with the return of complaint. It is as hereunder:-
"201. Procedure by Magistrate not competent to take cognizance of the case.-If the complaint is made to a Magistrate who is not competent to take cognizance of the offence, he shall,-
(a) if the complaint is in writing, return it for presentation to the proper Court with an endorsement to that effect;
(b) if the complaint is not in writing, direct the complainant to the proper court."
22. Section 202 of the Code deals with a situation when the Magistrate may postpone the issue of process against the accused, and either inquire into the case himself or direct an investigation to be made by a police officer or by some other person.
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23. Section 203 deals with dismissal of complaints. It is as hereunder:-
"203. Dismissal of complaint.- If, after considering the statements on oath (if any) of the complainant and of the witnesses and the result of the inquiry or investigation (if any) under section 202, the Magistrate is of opinion that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding, he shall dismiss the complaint, and in every such case he shall briefly record his reasons for so doing."
24. If a complaint is not dismissed and there are grounds to proceed further, Section 204 of the Code, provides for issue of process. According to it, if in the opinion of a Magistrate taking cognizance of an offence there is sufficient ground for proceeding, he may issue process.
25. In the case of CREF Finance Ltd. (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court discussed and observed that the Magistrate while not taking cognizance at all may return the complaint. The Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that "we can conceive of many other situations in which a Magistrate may not take cognizance at all, for instance, a case where he finds that the complaint is not made by the person who in law can lodge the complaint, or that the complaint is not entertainable by that court, or that cognizance of the offence alleged to have been 29 committed cannot be taken without the sanction of the competent authority, etc. These are cases where the Magistrate will refuse to take cognizance and return the complaint to the complainant. But if he does not do so and proceeds to examine the complainant and such other evidence as the complainant may produce before him then, it should be held to have taken cognizance of the offence and proceeded with the inquiry."
26. What is cognizance? As such, the word cognizance has not been defined under the Code or anywhere. Generally, it means taking note of an offence by the Magistrate. In the case of Nimaljit Singh Hoon Vs. State of West Bengal and another, (1973) 3 SCC 753, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that "when a complaint is presented before him, he can under Section 200 can take cognizance of an offence made out therein and held them to examine the complainant as witness.
27. In the case of Devarapalli Lakshminarayana Reddy and others Vs.V. Narayana Reddy and others, (1976) 3 SCC 252 (in the case of Vinubhai Haribhai Malviya and others v. State of Gujarat and another, (2019) 17 SCC 1, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the statement of law 30 contained in para 17 of the judgment in the case of Devarpalli Lakshimanaraya Reddy (supra) cannot be relied upon. But, that was on another point), the Hon'ble Supreme Court discussed the word cognizance and in paras 13 and 14 observed as hereunder:-
"13. It is well settled that when a Magistrate receives a complaint, he is not bound to take cognizance if the facts alleged in the complaint, disclose the commission of an offence. This is clear from the use of the words "may take cognizance" which in the context in which they occur cannot be equated with "must take cognizance". The word "may" gives a discretion to the Magistrate in the matter. If on a reading of the complaint he finds that the allegations therein disclose a cognizable offence and the forwarding of the complaint to the police for investigation under Section 156(3) will be conducive to justice and save the valuable time of the Magistrate from being wasted in enquiring into a matter which was primarily the duty of the police to investigate, he will be justified in adopting that course as an alternative to taking cognizance of the offence, himself.
14. This raises the incidental question: What is meant by "taking cognizance of an offence" by a Magistrate within the contemplation of Section 190? This expression has not been defined in the Code. But from the scheme of the Code, the content and marginal heading of Section 190 and the caption of Chapter XIV under which Sections 190 to 199 occur, it is clear that a case can be said to be instituted in a court only when the court takes cognizance of the offence alleged therein. The ways in which such cognizance can be taken are set out in clauses (a), (b) and (c) of Section 190(1). Whether the Magistrate has or has not taken cognizance of the offence will depend on the circumstances of the particular case including the mode in which the case is sought to be 31 instituted, and the nature of the preliminary action, if any, taken by the Magistrate. Broadly speaking, when on receiving a complaint, the Magistrate applies his mind for the purposes of proceeding under Section 200 and the succeeding sections in Chapter XV to the Code of 1973, he is said to have taken cognizance of the offence within the meaning to Section 190(1)(a). It, instead of proceeding under Chapter XV, he has, in the judicial exercise of his discretion, taken action of some other kind, such as issuing a search warrant for the purpose of investigation, or ordering investigation by the police under Section 156(3), he cannot be said to have taken cognizance of any offence." (emphasis supplied)
28. It has further been reiterated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Narsingh Das Tapadia Vs. Goverdhan Das Partani and another, (2000) 7 SCC 183 [in the case of Yogendra Pratap Singh v. Savitri Pandey and another, (2014) 10 SCC 713, on one of the separate law points (premature complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881), this case law has been distinguished] in para 8 observed as hereunder:-
"8. "Taking cognizance of an offence" by the court has to be distinguished from the filing of the complaint by the complainant. Taking cognizance would mean the action taken by the court for initiating judicial proceedings against the offender in respect of the offence regarding which the complaint is filed. Before it can be said that any Magistrate or court has taken cognizance of an offence it must be shown that he has applied his mind to the facts for the purpose of proceeding further in the matter at the instance of the complainant. If the 32 Magistrate or the court is shown to have applied his mind not for the purpose of taking action upon the complaint but for taking some other kind of action contemplated under the Code of Criminal Procedure such as ordering investigation under Section 156(3) or issuing a search warrant, he cannot be said to have taken cognizance of the offence (Narayandas Bhagwandas Madhavdas v. State of W.B. [AIR 1959 SC 1118 : 1959 Cri LJ 1368] and Gopal Das Sindhi v. State of Assam [AIR 1961 SC 986 : (1961) 2 Cri LJ 39] )."
29. The word cognizance has been interpreted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of S.K. Sinha, Chief Enforcement Officer Vs. Videocon International Ltd. and others, (2008) 2 SCC 492, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed as hereunder:-
"19. The expression "cognizance" has not been defined in the Code. But the word (cognizance) is of indefinite import. It has no esoteric or mystic significance in criminal law. It merely means "become aware of" and when used with reference to a court or a Judge, it connotes "to take notice of judicially". It indicates the point when a court or a Magistrate takes judicial notice of an offence with a view to initiating proceedings in respect of such offence said to have been committed by someone.
20. "Taking cognizance" does not involve any formal action of any kind. It occurs as soon as a Magistrate applies his mind to the suspected commission of an offence. Cognizance is taken prior to commencement of criminal proceedings. Taking of cognizance is thus a sine qua non or condition precedent for holding a valid trial. Cognizance is taken of an offence and not of an offender. Whether or not a Magistrate has taken cognizance of an offence depends on the facts and circumstances of each 33 case and no rule of universal application can be laid down as to when a Magistrate can be said to have taken cognizance."
30. In the case of S.R. Sukumar Vs. S. Sunaad Raghuram, (2015) 9 SCC 609, the Hon'ble Supreme Court further discussed the word cognizance and in para 11, last sentence, observed that "a Magistrate takes cognizance of an offence when he decides to proceed against the person accused of having committed that offence and not at the time when the Magistrate is just informed either by the complainant by filing the complaint or by the police report about the commission of an offence."
31. The above principles, as laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court make it abundantly clear that in a complaint case, the Magistrate takes cognizance, when after receipt of a complaint, he proceeds to examine the complainant under Section 200 of the Code.
32. In the instant case, when the complaint was presented and registered, the court passed an order that argument shall be heard on cognizance and thereafter, returned the complaint. The court did not proceed from Section 200 onwards in Chapter XV of the Code. The order 34 dated 28.04.2022, passed in the case is not an order after taking cognizance of the case. It is an order which was passed before taking cognizance of the case.
33. An argument has been raised on behalf of the petitioners that while returning the complaint, merits cannot be seen. This argument has less force, in view of the observations made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, in the case of CREF Finance Ltd.(supra). The Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that the complaint may be returned, if it is filed without 'sanction' of the competent authority. The question of 'sanction' also involves merits of the case. While appreciating the arguments on the question of sanction, merits are always required to be examined, as to whether the act complained of was done by the accused in discharge of his official duties or not? Therefore, definitely, before taking cognizance, a complaint may be returned by the Magistrate even on merits.
34. The another question which falls for scrutiny is, as to whether the order dated 28.04.2022, passed in the case is bad, because it is a case, in which the petitioners should be put to a joint trial?
35
35. At this stage, this Court would like to make a few things clear. At the very outset, when the arguments began, this Court wanted to know from the petitioners, as to how are they aggrieved by separate complaints?
36. On behalf of the petitioner Dinesh Pratap Singh, it was argued that if the petitioners are faced to separate complaints, they may have to obtain separate bail orders, separate sureties, and if any order is to be challenged, it has to be separately challenged in the higher Court. The Court, at that stage had suggested that if by an intervention of the court in this proceeding, by one bail order and same sureties, the petitioners may appear in all the seven cases and they move an application for joint trial, this grievance may be addressed to. But, learned counsel for the petitioner Dinesh Pratap Singh would insist that this matter should find disposal on the grounds taken by the petitioner Dinesh Pratap Singh.
37. The reasons for return of the complaint have been recorded in paras 7, 8 and 9 of the impugned order dated 28.04.2022. It is as hereunder:-
"7. From the aforementioned averments of the complainant it is quite clear that during the land acquisition for the widening and construction of NH 74, 36 land of different accused persons named in this complaint as accused was acquired which was actually agricultural land and with the connivance of some government officials various conspiracies were hatched by different land owners to declare their land as non agricultural land to get 10 to 12 times more compensation. Each and every such conspiracy constituted a different offence and these all offences generated different Proceeds of Crime (POC). The main offence which generated this Proceed of Crime (POC) falls within the category of scheduled offence, therefore, Directorate of Enforcement initiated investigation with regard to laundering of this money which was actually the Proceeds of Crime (POC) generated by these different offences.
8. The averments in this complaint are clear that different offences were committed by different persons and these different offences generated different POC, however this complaint is filed after clubbing all these Proceeds of Crime (POC) in one investigation, whereas every money laundering of each and every Proceed of Crime (POC) is a distinct offence under Section 3 of the PMLA punishable under Section 4 of the PMLA.
9. In the present case all accused persons have not committed the offence of Money Laundering in the course of the same transaction because different POCs were generated in different crimes and all accused persons are not involved in the Money Laundering of each and every POCs."
38. It is true that the provisions of Sections 218, 219 and 223 of the Code are post cognizance. But, as stated and held by this Court, the Magistrate may return a complaint before taking cognizance.
37
39. Section 218 of the Code is a general rule for framing of charge. It speaks of a separate charge and a separate trial for every offence. The general rule is that for a distinct offence, there should be a distinct charge and a separate trial. But there are circumstances, in which the charges may be joint and different persons may be put to a joint trial. Sections 218, 219 and 223 of the Code are as hereunder:-
"218. Separate charges for distinct offences.--(1) For every distinct offence of which any person is accused there shall be a separate charge, and every such charge shall be tried separately:
Provided that where the accused person, by an application in writing, so desires and the Magistrate is of opinion that such person is not likely to be prejudiced thereby, the Magistrate may try together all or any number of the charges framed against such person.
(2) Nothing in sub-section (1) shall affect the operation of the provisions of sections 219, 220, 221 and
223.
219. Three offences of same kind within year may be charged together.--(1) When a person is accused of more offences than one of the same kind committed within the space of twelve months from the first to the last of such offences, whether in respect of the same person or not, he may be charged with, and tried at one trial for, any number of them not exceeding three.
(2) Offences are of the same kind when they are punishable with the same amount of punishment under the same section of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) or of any special or local law:
38
Provided that, for the purposes of this section, an offence punishable under section 379 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) shall be deemed to be an offence of the same kind as an offence punishable under section 380 of the said Code, and that an offence punishable under any section of the said Code, or of any special or local law, shall be deemed to be an offence of the same kind as an attempt to commit such offence, when such an attempt is an offence.
223. What persons may be charged jointly.--The following persons may be charged and tried together, namely:--
(a) persons accused of the same offence committed in the course of the same transaction;
(b) persons accused of an offence and persons accused of abetment of, or attempt to commit, such offence;
(c) persons accused of more than one offence of the same kind, within the meaning of section 219 committed by them jointly within the period of twelve months;
(d) persons accused of different offences committed in the course of the same transaction;
(e) persons accused of an offence which includes theft, extortion, cheating, or criminal misappropriation, and persons accused of receiving or retaining, or assisting in the disposal or concealment of, property possession of which is alleged to have been transferred by any such offence committed by the first-named persons, or of abetment of or attempting to commit any such last-named offence;
39
(f) persons accused of offences under sections 411 and 414 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) or either of those sections in respect of stolen property the possession of which has been transferred by one offence;
(g) persons accused of any offence under Chapter XII of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) relating to counterfeit coin and persons accused of any other offence under the said Chapter relating to the same coin, or of abetment of or attempting to commit any such offence; and the provisions contained in the former part of this Chapter shall, so far as may be, apply to all such charges:
Provided that where a number of persons are charged with separate offences and such persons do not fall within any of the categories specified in this section, the Magistrate or Court of Session may, if such persons by an application in writing, so desire, and if he or it is satisfied that such persons would not be prejudicially affected thereby, and it is expedient so to do, try all such persons together."
40. The Scheme of the PML Act also envisages trial of schedule offence and trial of offences under the PML Act before one and the same court. Section 44(1)(c) of the PML Act deals with it. At the cost of repetition, this Court reproduces as to what is provided under Section 44(1)(c) of the PML Act. According to it "If the court which has taken cognizance of the scheduled offence is other than the Special Court which has taken cognizance of the complaint of the offence of money-laundering under 40 sub-clause (b), it shall, on an application by the authority authorized to file a complaint under this Act, commit the case relating to the scheduled offence to the Special Court and the Special Court shall, on receipt of such case proceed to deal with it from the stage at which it is committed."
41. In the instant case, according to the complaint, loss to the tune of Rs.500 Crores to the Government Treasury was done by the petitioners and others. According to the prosecution, it was a conspiracy. A land which was an 'Agricultural Land' was declared 'Non Agricultural' under a conspiracy with the Revenue Officials. By doing so, the compensation at a higher rate was obtained by the farmers.
The complaint records as to how these transactions were done. This Court refrains from making a deeper scrutiny of the available material at this stage.
42. In the case of State of Jharkhand Vs. Lalu Prasad Yadav alias Lalu Prasad, (2017) 8 SCC 1, the Hon'ble Supreme Court discussed the aspect of joint trial. In such huge cases, there may be a conspiracy, conspiracy separate and interlinked. The Hon'ble Supreme Court observed as hereunder:
41
"30. This Court in Natwarlal Sakarlal Mody v. State of Bombay [Natwarlal Sakarlal Mody v. State of Bombay, (1963) 65 Bom LR 660 : 1964 Mah LJ 1 : 1964 MP LJ 1 (SC)] considered the question of joint trial of persons and offences for conspiracy as per provisions contained in Section 239(d) of the old CrPC. This Court has laid down that separate trial is the rule and joint trial is an exception. Joint trial would be an irregular exercise of discretion if a court allows innumerable offences spread over a long period of time and committed by a large number of persons to be under the protecting wings of an all-embracing conspiracy, and if each or some of the offences can be separately tried, it would be appropriate and lawful. Joint trial prolongs the trial and causes waste of judicial time and complicates the matter which might otherwise be simple, and it would confuse the accused and cause prejudice to them. Court should not be overzealous to provide a cover of conspiracy for a number of offences unless it is satisfied that the persons who committed separate offences were parties to the conspiracy and committed the separate acts pursuant to the conspiracy. .................................................................
......................................................................................... ......................................................................................... ......................................................................................... ......................................................................................
32. In R. v. Griffiths [R. v. Griffiths, (1966) 1 QB 589 :
(1965) 3 WLR 405 : (1965) 2 All ER 448 (CA)] it has been laid down that a conspiracy should be tried separately to substantive counts. The Court of Appeal in England has laid down thus : (QB p. 594) "The practice of adding what may be called a rolled-up conspiracy charge to a number of counts of substantive offences has become common. We express the very strong hope that this practice will now cease and that the courts will never again have to struggle with this type of case, where it becomes almost impossible to explain to a jury that 42 evidence inadmissible against the accused on the substantive count may be admissible against him on the conspiracy count once he is shown to be a conspirator.
We do not believe that most juries can ever really understand the subtleties of the situation. In our judgment, except in simple cases, a conspiracy count (if one is needed at all) should be tried separately to substantive counts."
33. In State of A.P. v. Cheemalapati Ganeswara Rao [State of A.P. v. Cheemalapati Ganeswara Rao, (1964) 3 SCR 297 : AIR 1963 SC 1850 : (1963) 2 Cri LJ 671] this Court dealt with misjoinder of parties under Section 239 of the old CrPC. This Court with respect to "same transaction"
has observed thus : (AIR pp. 1860-61, para 27) "27. ... Whether a transaction can be regarded as the same would necessarily depend upon the particular facts of each case and it seems to us to be a difficult task to undertake a definition of that which the legislature has deliberately left undefined. We have not come across a single decision of any court which the legislature has embarked upon the difficult task of defining the expression. But it is generally thought that where there is proximity of time or place or unity of purpose and design or continuity of action in respect of a series of acts, it may be possible to infer that they form part of the same transaction. It is, however, not necessary that every one of these elements should co-exist for a transaction to be regarded as the same."
Further, it was held that : (AIR pp. 1861-62, para 30) "30. ... Where, however, several offences are alleged to have been committed by several accused persons it may be more reasonable to follow the normal rule of separate trials. But here, again, if those offences are alleged not to be wholly unconnected but as forming part of the same transaction the only consideration that will justify separate trials would be the embarrassment or difficulty caused to the accused persons in defending themselves."
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34. When several offences are alleged to have been committed by several accused persons this Court has laid down that normal rule is of separate trials."
43. On behalf of the respondent, it is being argued that with each farmer, the Revenue Officials had different conspiracy. It is also being argued that many farmers cannot be joined together in a trial under the PML Act.
44. It is clear from the impugned order dated 28.04.2022 that it was passed when the petitioners were not before the Court. Undoubtedly, an accused has no right to be heard before taking cognizance. The petitioners could not have been heard at that stage. The finding with regard to the separate trials, as recorded, in the order 28.04.2022 is definitely a tentative finding. It has been recorded at a pre-cognizance stage. Now, separate complaints have been filed against the petitioners. If petitioners are so advised, they may definitely move an application before the court for joinder of charges or a joint trial. In the eventuality of such application having been filed, the court would have an advantage of having views of the petitioners also and thereafter, such an application could be decided. Any conclusion recorded by this court, on this aspect, at this stage may prejudice the rights of the petitioners to move 44 such an application for joinder of charge/trial before the court concerned. Therefore, the Court refrains from recording any conclusion on it.
45. In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court is of the view that the court had acted within its jurisdiction while passing the order dated 28.04.2022, in the case. It is in accordance with law. The question as to whether all the subsequent seven complaints may be jointly tried or not is still open. In case, an application for joint trial is filed in any of the subsequent seven complaints, the court would definitely decide such application in accordance with law. Therefore, the impugned order dated 28.04.2022 does not warrant any interference.
ARGUMENTS ON SUBSEQUENT COMPLAINTS
46. After the order dated 28.04.2022, passed in the case, seven separate complaints have been filed by the respondent against the petitioners and others. The details of those complaints have already been given in para 2 of the judgment hereinbefore. Out of those seven complaints, in four complaints, namely, Special Sessions Trial Nos. 14 of 2022, 15 of 2022, 16 of 2022 and 17 of 2022 cognizance order has also been passed. It is also impugned in these 45 petitions. In other three complaints, it is submitted that cognizance has not been taken yet.
47. Learned counsel for the petitioner Dinesh Pratap Singh would submit that no prima facie case is made out against the petitioner Dinesh Pratap Singh. He has raised the following points in his submission:
(i) The petitioner has determined market rate and for that purpose sought a report of the nature of land from the Sub Divisional Magistrate ("the SDM"). The power to change the land use from 'Agricultural' to 'Non Agricultural' was not vested with the petitioner. If there is any discrepancy in the order passed by the concerned SDM, it cannot be attributed to the petitioner. It is argued that this has been stated in para 11 of the affidavit filed in support of the petition and it has not been denied by the respondents in para 9.5 of the counter affidavit, where respondent has stated that "it is a matter of record".
(ii) According to the respondent, the acts that make out an offence against the petitioner is 46 given in paras 9.6, 9.8, 9.9 and 9.10 of the counter affidavit filed by the respondent.
But, whatever is stated in those paragraphs does not make out a prima facie case against the petitioner.
(iii) In para 9.6 of its counter affidavit, the respondent has stated that despite the knowledge that the nature of land has already been notified in the notification issued under Section 3D of the NH Act, the petitioner sought an information regarding the nature of land and disbursed excess compensation. It is argued that under Section 3G of the NH Act, it was incumbent upon the petitioner, as a competent authority, to determine the market value of the land proposed to be acquired and for that purpose seeking information was mandatory or else the petitioner would have been blamed for dereliction of duties.
(iv) The petitioner simply proposed the compensation, which was submitted to the National Highways Authority of India and in the note sheet of the National Highways 47 Authority of India, this fact is mentioned that there is a change of nature of land in the notification under Section 3D of the NH Act and in the proceedings under Section 3G of the NH Act. The petitioner did not conceal anything. The Project Director has approved the offer. The note sheet of the NHAI also reveals that the NHAI has approved the offer subject to the verification of legality of Section 143 proceedings.
(v) In para 9.8 of the counter affidavit, the respondent has stated that the petitioner is to be blamed for generating 'Proceeds of Crime' on the basis of back dated orders. It is submitted that the petitioner was posted as a competent authority from 18.01.2016 to 15.03.2017. According to the prosecution itself, the back dated orders were reflected in the record on 30.09.2010 and their entries were made on 04.07.2015. It is argued that the petitioner did not commit any offence. If at all, there was any back dated order, they were in existence prior to his joining as a competent authority.
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(vi) In para 9.9 of the counter affidavit of the respondent, it is stated that the bribe was taken from Ajit Singh, Anil Singh Chauhan and Gurmail Singh, but these persons were neither witnesses nor accused in any of the complaints that have been filed against the petitioner.
(vii) In para 9.10 of the counter affidavit, the respondent has stated that once the stage of Section 3D of the NH Act is crossed, a competent authority is not supposed to make any change thereafter. It is submitted that at the stage of Section 3C of the NH Act, the nature of land cannot be examined. At that stage, the objections may be entertained pertaining to the use of land for the purpose or purposes mentioned under Section 3A (1) of the NH Act. Learned counsel would submit that at the stage of Section 3G of the NH Act, the competent authority is obligated to invite claims with regard to the determination of amount of compensation and in that process, the change of nature of land may also be 49 determined by him. Learned counsel would also submit that even Section 3G (7) of the NH Act gives parallel powers to the competent authority for determining the amount of compensation. Not only this, it is argued that at the stage of proceeding under Section 3C of the NH Act, an order was passed on 04.04.2014 by the then competent authority and in that order, it has categorically been stated that with regard to the nature of land, the objections could be considered while determining the compensation at the stage of Section 3G of the NH Act.
48. In support of his contentions, learned counsel for the petitioner Dinesh Pratap Singh has placed reliance on the principles of law, as laid down in the case of Anurag Srivastava and others Vs. National Highway Authority of India, through its Chairman and others, 2019 SCC OnLine All 5900, National Highway Authority of India Vs. Durgappa Bharamappa Sannagudi, 2014 SCC OnLine Kar 8312 and National Highway Authority of India Vs. P. Nagaraju alias Cheluvaiah and Another, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 864. 50
49. In the case of Anurag Srivastava (supra), notices under Section 3G of the NH Act were not issued. The matter was taken up to the Hon'ble Allahabad High Court. In para 25 of the judgment, the Hon'ble High Court gave liberty to the petitioner to file objections in terms Section 3G (3) of the NH Act before the competent authority also with regard to the nature of the land. The Court held as hereunder:-
"25. For all the reasons mentioned above, we find that the award dated 19th September, 2018 passed by the second respondent under Section 3G of the Act, 1956 has been passed without following the procedure prescribed under Section 3G(3) of the Act, 1956, hence it is quashed to the said extent. We grant liberty to the petitioners to file objection in terms of Section 3G(3) of the Act, 1956 before the competent authority in respect of their claim that a construction is in existence and their land is non- agricultural. The competent authority shall consider their objections and pass the award in accordance with law after furnishing opportunity to the petitioners. The said exercise be undertaken expeditiously, preferably within four months from the date of communication of this order."
50. In the case of Durgappa Bharamappa Sannagudi (supra), the NHAI had objected to the compensation on the ground that land was being used as agricultural land and it has erroneously been assessed as 'Non-Agricultural' potential. This contention was not accepted. 51
51. In the case of P. Nagaraju (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court discussed the provisions of Section 3J of the NH Act and the principles of law laid down in the earlier decisions and held that the factors given under Section 28 of The Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (RFCTLARR ACT, 2013) may also be taken into consideration by the competent authority while determining compensation under the 3G of the NH Act. The Hon'ble Supreme Court observed as hereunder:
"18. In that view of the matter, though Section 3G(7)(a) of the NH Act provides the parameters to be taken into consideration, it only provides the basic parameters to be taken note of, for determining the amount payable as compensation. While applying the said parameters for determination of compensation, since RFCTLARR Act, 2013 is also applicable as NH Act is contained in Fourth Schedule, the factors as provided under Section 26 and 28 RFCTLARR Act, 2013 including the seventh factor will also be applicable in appropriate cases for the determination of the market value as fair compensation for the acquired land. When land is acquired from a citizen, Articles 300A and 31A of the Constitution will have to be borne in mind since the deprivation of property should be with authority of law, after being duly compensated. Such law should provide for adequately compensating the land loser keeping in view the market value. Though each enactment may have a different procedure prescribed for the process of acquisition depending on the urgency, the method of determining the compensation cannot be different as the market value of the land and the hardship faced due to deprivation of the 52 property would be the same irrespective of the Act under which it is acquired or the purpose for which it is acquired. In that light, if Section 28 of RFCTLARR Act, 2013 is held not applicable in view of Section 3J of NH Act, the same will be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. In that circumstance, the observation in Tarsem Singh (supra) that Section 3J of NH Act is unconstitutional to that extent though declared so while on the aspect of solatium and interest, it is held so on all aspects relating to determination of compensation. In any event, the extracted portion of the notification dated 28.08.2015 is explicit that the benefits available to the land owners under RFCTLARR Act is to be also available to similarly placed land owners whose lands are acquired under the 13 enactments specified in the Fourth Schedule, among which NH Act is one. Hence all aspects contained in Section 26 to 28 of RFCTLARR Act for determination of compensation will be applicable notwithstanding Section 3J and 3G(7)(a) of NH Act."
52. Learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that the petitioner had discharged his duties in accordance with law. The petitioner has not gone beyond his jurisdiction. Section 3G of the NH Act requires him to determine the market value, which he did. Everything was open and informed to his seniors.
53. Learned counsel for the petitioners Arpan Kumar, Sanjay Kumar Chauhan, Vikas Kumar and Jagdish Arora would adopt the arguments as advanced on behalf of the petitioner Dinesh Pratap Singh. Learned counsel would also 53 submit that the money which the petitioner Arpan Kumar had received, it was in lieu of a family settlement; he got Rs.50 Lakhs and Rs. 50 Lakhs was received by his father and Rs. 5 Lakhs was received by his brother. It is also submitted that the petitioner Sanjay Kumar Chauhan and Vikas Kumar were employees of Revenue Department. They followed the orders of their superiors; they have not made any back dated entries.
54. Learned counsel for the petitioners Bhole Lal, Bhagat Singh Fonia and Madan Mohan Padaliya also adopts the arguments as made on behalf of the petitioner Dinesh Pratap Singh. In addition to it, learned counsel would submit that the petitioners Bhole Lal and Madan Mohan Padaliya gave their reports as per law; there is no material to suggest that the petitioner Bhagat Singh Fonia passed any back dated orders; there is no money trail; there has been no loss to public exchequer.
55. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioners Barinder Singh and Balwant Singh also adopts the arguments as advanced on behalf of the petitioner Dinesh Pratap Singh. Learned counsel would also submit that the land to be acquired was being used for 'Non-Agricultural' 54 purposes; the orders passed under Section 143 of the Uttar Pradesh Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950 ("the ZA Act, 1950") are still good; they have never been challenged.
56. Learned counsel for the petitioners Ramesh Kumar and Om Prakash also adopts the arguments as advanced on behalf of the petitioner Dinesh Pratap Singh.
57. Learned counsel for the complainant would submit that objections with regard to use of land are invited at the stage of Section 3C of the NH Act and after hearing the objections, final notification under Section 3D of the NH Act was done. It is argued that the issue with regard to the nature of land gets finality at the stage of notification under Section 3D of the NH Act; thereafter it cannot be reviewed by the competent authority.
58. Learned Senior Counsel would also raise the following points in his submission:-
(i) At the stage of determining compensation under Section 3G of the NH Act, the competent authority is not empowered to 55 re-examine the nature of land, which had already attained finality at the stage of Section 3D notification.
(ii) The principles of law as cited on behalf of the petitioners are not applicable in the instant case. In the case of Anurag Srivastava (supra), the Hon'ble Court only gave liberty to the petitioner of that case to raise his objections with regard to the land use. But, it is argued that as such no law has been laid down.
(iii) Petitioner Dinesh Pratap Singh should not have sought report from the Revenue Authorities with regard to the land use, because no farmer had raised any objection with regard to the nature of land at the stage of either Section 3C or Section 3G of the NH Act.
(iv) Petitioner Dinesh Pratap Singh sought information with a mala fide intention to pay an excess compensation to the farmers.
It is argued that the entire material that has been filed along with the complaints reveal that prima facie case is made out 56 against all the petitioners and the petitions deserve to be dismissed.
59. Learned counsel for the petitioner Dinesh Pratap Singh would submit that at the stage of Section 3C of the NH Act, objections with regard to the nature of land to be acquired cannot be entertained. At this stage, objections with regard to the object to the use of land for the purpose or purposes mentioned in Section 3A of the NH Act, may only be entertained. It is also argued that some of the farmers, in fact, assailed the order determining compensation before the Arbitrator and the compensation was further enhanced.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
60. Arguments at this stage have been advanced as if this Court is hearing an appeal against a final conviction of the petitioners for an offence under Section 3/4 of the PML Act. The Court would scrutinize the material to the extent it is necessary to examine as to whether the cognizance and summoning orders are valid or not; not beyond that.
61. The arguments, which have been advanced on behalf of the petitioner Dinesh Pratap Singh and as adopted on law points by the other petitioners have mainly revolved 57 around the counter affidavit filed by the respondent. While summoning an accused, the court had complaints before it and also the annexures and other materials that were placed before the court along with the complaints. Therefore, the Court would examine the complaints to see as to what role has been assigned to each of the petitioners and as to whether it makes out a prima facie case or not. But, the arguments as advanced also touch upon the Scheme of the NH Act, therefore, a glance at the Scheme of the NH Act would definitely be helpful in examining the issue.
62. The NH Act has been enacted to provide for declaration of certain highways to be National Highways and for matters connected therewith. Section 3A of the NH Act empowers the Central Government to acquire land, if for a public purpose such land is required. It includes National Highways. Sections 3C, 3D and 3G of the NH Act have been referred to during the course of arguments. They are as hereunder:-
"3C. Hearing of objections. - (1) Any person interested in the land may, within twenty-one days from the date of publication of the notification under sub-section (1) of section 3A, object to the use of the land for the purpose or purposes mentioned in that sub-section.58
(2) Every objection under sub-section (1) shall be made to the competent authority in writing and shall set out the grounds thereof and the competent authority shall give the objector an opportunity of being heard, either in person or by a legal practitioner, and may, as the competent authority thinks necessary, by order, either allow or disallow the objections.
Explanation. - For the purposes of this sub- section, "legal practitioner" has the same meaning as in clause (i) of sub-section (1) of section 2 of the Advocates Act, 1961 (25 of 1961).
(3) Any order made by the competent authority under sub-section (2) shall be final."
* * * 3D. Declaration of acquisition. - (1) Where no objection under sub-section (1) of section 3C has been made to the competent authority within the period specified therein or where the competent authority has disallowed the objection under sub-section (2) of that section, the competent authority shall, as soon as may be, submit a report accordingly to the Central Government and on receipt of such report, the Central Government shall declare, by notification in the Official Gazette, that the land should be acquired for the purpose or purposes mentioned in sub-section (1) of section 3A.
(2) On the publication of the declaration under sub-section (1), the land shall vest absolutely in the Central Government free from all encumbrances.
(3) Where in respect of any land, a notification has been published under sub-section (1) of section 3A for its acquisition but no declaration under sub-section (1) has been published within a period of one year from the date of publication 59 of that notification, the notification shall cease to have any effect:
Provided that in computing the said period of one year, the period or periods during which any action or proceedings to be taken in pursuance of the notification issued under sub- section (1) of section (1) of section 3A is stayed by an order of a court shall be excluded.
(4) A declaration made by the Central Government under sub-section (1) shall not be called in question in any court or by any other authority."
* * * 3G. Determination of amount payable as compensation. - (1) Where any land is acquired under this Act, there shall be paid an amount which shall be determined by an order of the competent authority.
(2) Where the right of use or any right in the nature of an easement on, any land is acquired under this Act, there shall be paid an amount to the owner and any other person whose right of enjoyment in that land has been affected in any manner whatsoever by reason of such acquisition an amount calculated at ten per cent of the amount determined under sub-section (1), for that land.
(3) Before proceeding to determine the amount under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2), the competent authority shall give a public notice published in two local newspapers, one of which will be in a vernacular language inviting claims from all persons interested in the land to be acquired.
(4) Such notice shall state the particulars of the land and shall require all persons interested in such land to appear in person or by an agent or by a legal practitioner referred to in sub-section 60 (2) of section 3C, before the competent authority, at the time and place and to state the nature of their respective interest in such land. (5) If the amount determined by the competent authority under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) is not acceptable to either of the parties, the amount shall, on an application by either of the parties, be determined by the arbitrator to be appointed by the Central Government. (6) Subject to the provisions of this Act, the provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (26 of 1996) shall apply to every arbitration under this Act.
(7) The competent authority or the arbitrator, as the case may be, shall take into consideration -
(a) the market value of the land on the date of publication of the notification under section 3A;
(b) the damage, if any, sustained by the person interested at the time of taking possession of the land, by reason of the severing of such land from other land;
(c) the damage, if any, sustained by the person interested at the time of taking possession of the land, by reason of the acquisition injuriously affecting his other immovable property in any manner, or his earnings;
(d) if, in consequences of the acquisition of the land, the person interested is compelled to change his residence or place of business, the reasonable expenses, if any, incidental to such change."
(emphasis supplied)
63. Sub-section (1) to Section 3C of the NH Act makes it abundantly clear that any person may object to the use of land for the purpose or purposes mentioned in Section 3A (1) of the NH Act. What is being argued on behalf 61 of the petitioner Dinesh Pratap Singh is that at this stage the objections with regard to compensation qua nature of land are not entertainable. At the stage of Section 3C of the NH Act, it is argued, the objections should relate to purpose or purposes mentioned in the notification issued under Section 3A(1) of the NH Act for which the land is proposed to be acquired.
64. A bare perusal of Section 3C of the NH Act, in fact, makes it clear that at this stage objections to the use of land for the purpose or purposes mentioned under Section 3A (1) of the NH Act are entertained. It means that any person can object that for the purpose or purposes as mentioned in Notification under Section 3A(1) of the NH Act, land cannot be acquired. It apparently does not relate to compensation part, which is a subsequent stage.
65. At the stage of Section 3D of the NH Act the objections raised under Section 3C are considered and final notification is made. The determination of compensation is done under Section 3G of the NH Act. At that stage, the competent authority would give a public notice in the newspapers inviting claims from all persons interested in the land to be acquired. Section 3G (7) of the NH Act is quite wide. It empowers the competent authority as well as the 62 arbitrator to determine the compensation by assessing market value, etc.
66. In the case of P. Nagaraju (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that for the purposes of determination of compensation under the NH Act, the provisions of the RFCTLARR Act, 2013 would also apply.
67. This is the scheme of the NH Act. The question is as to what the petitioners have done and as to whether their acts make out a prima facie case against them?
68. As stated, challenge has been made to the cognizance order, passed in Special Sessions Trial Nos. 14 of 2022, 15 of 2022, 16 of 2022 and 17 of 2022. Now, this Court proceeds to examine the cognizance order in each of these complaints.
69. The complaints have been filed under the provisions of the PML Act. Cognizance has been taken under Section 3 read with 4 of the PML Act. The legal propositions, as argued may have less dispute. The scope of Sections 3C and 3G of the NH Act has already been discussed hereinbefore. The commission of the scheduled offence is one thing and resultantly, the 'Proceeds of Crime' are 63 something different which is defined under Section 2 (u) of the PML Act, as hereunder:
"2(u) "proceeds of crime" means any property derived or obtained, directly or indirectly, by any person as a result of criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence or the value of any such property or where such property is taken or held outside the country or abroad.
Explanation.- For the removal of doubts, it is hereby clarified that "proceeds of crime" including property not only derived or obtained from the scheduled offence but also any property which may directly or indirectly be derived or obtained as a result of any criminal activity relatable to the scheduled offence;"
70. The offence of "money laundering" has been defined under Section 3 of the PML Act, which is punishable under Section 4 of it. Section 3 of the PML Act reads as hereunder:-
"3. Offence of money-laundering.- Whosoever directly or indirectly attempts to indulge or knowingly assists or knowingly is a party or is actually involved in any process or activity connected proceeds of crime including its concealment, possession, acquisition or use and projecting or claiming it as untainted property shall be guilty of offence of money-laundering.
Explanation.- For the removal of doubts, it is hereby clarified that,-64
(i) a person shall be guilty of offence of money-
laundering if such person is found to have directly or indirectly attempted to indulge or knowingly assisted or knowingly is a party or is actually involved in one or more of the following processes or activities connected with proceeds of crime, namely:-
(a) concealment; or
(b) possession; or
(c) acquisition; or
(d) use; or
(e) projecting as untainted property; or
(f) claiming as untainted property, in any manner whatsoever;
(ii) the process or activity connected with proceeds of crime is a continuing activity and continues till such time a person is directly or indirectly enjoying the proceeds of crime by its concealment or possession or acquisition or use or projecting it as untainted property or claiming it as untainted property in any manner whatsoever."
71. A bare perusal of these provisions makes it abundantly clear that the 'Proceeds of Crime' are derived or obtained from the scheduled offence. It also includes a property, which may directly or indirectly be derived or obtained as a result of any criminal activity related to the scheduled offence. It is not only possession of the 'Proceeds of Crime', which alone is an offence of money laundering. Section 3 of the PML Act has a wide amplitude. It makes 65 various other activities related to it as money laundering, which includes concealment, possession, acquisition or use, etc.
72. In the case of Vijay Madanlal Chaudhary and other v. Union of India and others, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 929, the Hon'ble Supreme Court had discussed various provisions of the PML Act and the conclusions have been summarised in para 467 of the judgment. With regard to the offence of money laundering, in sub para (v)(a), (v)(b) and
(v)(d), the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as hereunder:-
"467. In light of the above analysis, we now proceed to summarise our conclusion on seminal points in issue in the following terms:--
(i).....
(ii) ....
(iii)....
(iv)....
(v)(a) Section 3 of the 2002 Act has a wider reach and captures every process and activity, direct or indirect, in dealing with the proceeds of crime and is not limited to the happening of the final act of integration of tainted property in the formal economy. The Explanation inserted to Section 3 by way of amendment of 2019 does not expand the purport of Section 3 but is only clarificatory in nature. It clarifies the word "and"
preceding the expression projecting or claiming as "or"; and being a clarificatory 66 amendment, it would make no difference even if it is introduced by way of Finance Act or otherwise.
(b) Independent of the above, we are clearly of the view that the expression "and" occurring in Section 3 has to be construed as "or", to give full play to the said provision so as to include "every" process or activity indulged into by anyone. Projecting or claiming the property as untainted property would constitute an offence of money-laundering on its own, being an independent process or activity.
(c) ......
(d) The offence under Section 3 of the 2002 Act is dependent on illegal gain of property as a result of criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence. It is concerning the process or activity connected with such property, which constitutes the offence of money-laundering. The Authorities under the 2002 Act cannot prosecute any person on notional basis or on the assumption that a scheduled offence has been committed, unless it is so registered with the jurisdictional police and/or pending enquiry/trial including by way of criminal complaint before the competent forum. If the person is finally discharged/acquitted of the scheduled offence or the criminal case against him is quashed by the Court of competent jurisdiction, there can be no offence of money-laundering against him or any one claiming such property being the property linked to stated scheduled offence through him."
67
73. The question for consideration is as to whether a prima facie case is made out in the instant matter?
74. Needless to say, summoning of a person is not a routine act. After all liberty of a person is somehow curtailed by requiring him to appear and face the trial. In the case of Pepsi Foods Ltd. and another v. Special Judicial Magistrate and others, (1998) 5 SCC 749, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed the consequence of summoning and the role of the Magistrate. In para 28, Hon'ble Court observed as hereunder:-
"28. Summoning of an accused in a criminal case is a serious matter. Criminal law cannot be set into motion as a matter of course. It is not that the complainant has to bring only two witnesses to support his allegations in the complaint to have the criminal law set into motion. The order of the Magistrate summoning the accused must reflect that he has applied his mind to the facts of the case and the law applicable thereto. He has to examine the nature of allegations made in the complaint and the evidence both oral and documentary in support thereof and would that be sufficient for the complainant to succeed in bringing charge home to the accused. It is not that the Magistrate is a silent spectator at the time of recording of preliminary evidence before summoning of the accused. The Magistrate has to carefully scrutinise the evidence 68 brought on record and may even himself put questions to the complainant and his witnesses to elicit answers to find out the truthfulness of the allegations or otherwise and then examine if any offence is prima facie committed by all or any of the accused."
75. Cognizance of an offence is taken and thereafter, summoning is done, if there is prima facie case made out against the person to be summoned. The words "prima facie case" as such have not been defined under any provision of the Code. At different stages of a criminal case, the level of satisfaction is different. At the stage of summoning "prima facie case" is to be seen. At the stage of the framing of charge, the level of satisfaction is higher than it and, finally, at the stage of judgment, the level of satisfaction is "proved beyond reasonable doubt". For "Prima facie case", it has to be shown that some offence has been committed and there is material regarding grave involvement of the person to be summoned.
76. In the case of Martin Burn Ltd. Vs. R.N. Bangerjee, AIR 1958 SC 79, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in some other context discussed the concept of a prima facie case and observed that "a prima facie case does not mean a case proved to the hilt but a case which can be said to 69 be established if the evidence which is led in support of the same were believed. While determining whether a prima facie case had been made out the relevant consideration is whether on the evidence led it was possible to arrive at the conclusion in question and not whether that was the only conclusion which could be arrived at on that evidence."
SPECIAL SESSIONS TRIAL NO.14 OF 2022
77. In this case, cognizance has been taken on 06.09.2022 against the petitioners Dinesh Pratap Singh, Arpan Kumar, Barinder Singh, Vikas Kumar, Bhole Lal, Jagdish Arora and others. It is not the case of exercise of excessive jurisdiction by the petitioner Dinesh Pratap Singh and others. But, it is the case of the complainant that in order to give an undue advantage to the farmers, under a conspiracy, back dated orders under Section 143 of the ZA Act, 1950 were prepared; back dated entries were made; they were entered into computer systems and an excessive compensation was procured in the name of farmers, which was deposited and transferred in the accounts of various individual entities in order to layer and integrate the 'Proceeds of Crime' generated through criminal activities related to the scheduled offence.
70
78. The complaint of Special Sessions Trial No. 14 of 2022, which is Annexure No. 15 to the petition, at para 8.2.2, the case has been summarised by the complainant. It is as hereunder:-
"8.2.2. That during the course of investigation under PMLA so far, it is revealed;
(a) that the land of Jagdish Arora s/o Nihal Chand was acquired by the NHAI for the four-
laning/widening of NH-74. The said land was located at Khasra No. 191 and having area of 0.6203 hectare in village Ghadi Hussain, Jaspur, Udham Singh Nagar;
(b) that the nature of the land was mentioned and notified as agriculture in the Notification No. S.O. 1218(E) dated 07.05.2014 (Annexure B-25) issued u/s 3D of NH Act, 1956;
(c) that Jagdish Arora s/o Nihal Chand neither submitted any objection u/s 3C nor any claim u/s 3G (3) of NH Act, 1956 regarding his land which was being acquired for widening/four- laning of NH-74 as per information received from the office of the Special Land Acquisition Officer, Udham Singh Nagar/Nainital vide letter dated 29.06.2021 (Annexure B-26).
(d) that the NHAI conducted Joint Measuring Survey (JMS) for the said land which were being acquired for the widening/four-laning of NH-74; that the said land was also mentioned as agriculture as per Joint Measuring Survey (JMS) Report as per information received from the office of Project Director, Nazibabad, NHAI vide letter dated 11.08.2021 (Annexure B-27). 71
(e) that Smt. Yukta Mishra, the then SDM Jaspur submitted an enquiry report dated 17.03.2017 & 20.03.2017 (Annexure B-14) to the then Kumaon Commissioner regarding the discrepancies found in the record of said land in revenue documents of SDM Court and Tehsil.
(f) that entries of the order of section 143 of U.P.Z.A. & LR Act, 1950 of the said land was not made by Shri Chandrapal Singh, the then Registrar Kanungo, Tehsil Jaspur in R-6 register of Tehsil, Jaspur but actually entered by Anil Kumar, the then Sangrah Amin (attached with Registrar Kanungo, Tehsil Jaspur). Shri Chandrapal Singh, the then Registrar Kanungo and Anil Kumar, the then Sangrah Amin inter alia stated that the said facts in their statement recorded u/s 50(3) of the PMLA, 2002.
(g) that, as per Police charge sheet mentioned above, Jagdish Kumar Singh, in connivance with Dinesh Pratap Singh (the then CALA/SLAO, Udham Singh Nagar/Nainital), Bhole Lal (the then Naib Tehsildar, Tehsil Jaspur), Vikash Chauhan (Reader/Peshkar in SDM Court Jaspur), Anil Kumar (Sangrah Amin attached with Registrar Kanungo, Tehsil Jaspur) & Middlemen and others managed to get the compensation at non-agricultural rate on the basis of back dated order.
(h) that Dinesh Pratap Singh, the then CALA/SLAO passed an award No. 10/2016 dated 17-05-2016 (Annexure-33) duly amended vide compensation order No. 21/2016 dated 15.07.2016 (Annexure B-34) for the land at Khasra No. 194 & 219 situated in Garhi Hussain, Jaspur, Udham Singh Nagar at non-agricultural rate; Jagdish Arora managed to get compensation of Rs. 8,22,46,232/- on 06.09.2016 fraudulently at 72 non-agriculture rate for his land acquired for four-laning/widening of NH-74; that the compensation amount was credited, after deducting TDS, in the bank A/c No. 31936645640 of Jagdish Arora (Annexure B-28) maintained with State Bank of India, Jaspur, Udham Singh Nagar, Uttarakhand.
(i) that the above said fact clearly proves that the said land of Jagdish Arora was clearly agriculture in nature at the time of land acquisition for widening of the National Highway.
(j) that, Jagdish Arora, in connivance with Dinesh Pratap Singh (the then CALA/SLAO, Udham Singh Nagar/Nainita), Bhole Lal (the then Naib Tehsildar, Tehsil Jaspur), Vikash Chauhan (Reader/Peshkar in SDM Court Jaspur), Anil Kumar (Sangrah Amin attached with Registrar Kanungo, Tehsil Jaspur) & middlemen and others illegally managed to get the forged back dated order u/s 143 of the U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act, 1950 passed and its subsequent entries in the revenue records and thereafter got the compensation at non-agriculture rate on the basis of the said back dated order."
79. It may be noted that the petitioner Dinesh Pratap Singh was the competent authority under the provisions of the NH Act at the relevant time. The petitioner Arpan Kumar was a Data Entry Operator; the petitioner Jagdish Arora was the farmer involved; the petitioner Barinder Singh was the person who layered and integrated the 'Proceeds of Crime'; the petitioner Bhole Lal was a Naib Tehsildar and 73 the petitioner Vikas Kumar was the Reader of the SDM court. The individual role of each of these petitioners has been delineated at para 9 of the complaint.
80. In nutshell, it is the case against the petitioner Jagdish Arora that his land was to be acquired and in the notification under Section 3D of the NH Act, the land was declared 'Agricultural Land'. He did not file any objection at the stage of Section 3C or 3G of the NH Act, but under a conspiracy with the other petitioners and other accused, he got forged back dated orders and got declared his land as 'Non-Agricultural' under Section 143 of the ZA Act, 1950. Thereafter, he transferred the compensation amount so received from NHAI by creating fixed deposits in his name, in the name of other family members and other individuals/entities in order to layer and integrate the 'Proceeds of Crime' generated through criminal activities related to scheduled offence. (para 9.1 of complaint)
81. It is the case against the petitioner Barinder Singh that he resorted to transfer/round tripping the amount received in his account from the petitioner Jagdish Arora in order to layer and integrate the 'Proceeds of Crime'. (para 9.2 of the complaint) 74
82. According to the complainant, Arpan Kumar played an important role in facilitating the farmers in getting compensation fraudulently on a higher rate. He and his family members received huge amount. By layering and integrating the amount by way of withdrawing in cash to hide criminal intention, according to the complaint, the petitioner Arpan Kumar projected the tainted money generated out of criminal activities as untainted by way of projecting the amount received as a help given by the petitioner Jagdish Arora. (para 9.3 of the complaint)
83. It is the case against the petitioner Dinesh Pratap Singh that he was actively involved in the process of activities connected with generation of 'Proceeds of Crime' generated through criminal activities related to a scheduled offence. (para 9.4 of the complaint)
84. The petitioner Bhole Lal was working as a Naib Tehsildar at the relevant time. According to the complaint, he had prepared and submitted back dated reports of Section 143 ZA Act, 1950. He was involved in the process of activities connected with generation of 'Proceeds of Crime' generated through criminal activities related to a scheduled offence. (Para 9.5 of the complaint) 75
85. It is the case against the petitioner Vikas Kumar, who was working as a Reader in the SDM Court, Jaspur that he made back dated entries of the back dated orders under Section 143 of the ZA Act, 1950. He was actively involved in the process of activities connected with generation of 'Proceeds of Crime' generated through criminal activities related to scheduled offence. (Para 9.7 of the complaint)
86. The averments as made in the complaint definitely make out a prima facie case against all these petitioners. The cognizance and summoning order passed on 06.09.2022 is quite in detail. The court below has taken into consideration the material placed before it. Having considered the material, cognizance has been taken and the petitioners and others have been summoned. This Court does not see any illegality in the summoning order. Therefore, there is no reason to interfere in the cognizance and summoning order dated 06.09.2022 passed in SST No. 14 of 2022.
SPECIAL SESSIONS TRIAL No. 15 of 2022
87. In this case, cognizance and summoning order was passed on 06.09.2022. The complaint is a part of Annexure 15 of the petition. In para 8.2.3, the case has been summarised by the complainant. It is as hereunder:-. 76
"8.2.3. That during the course of investigation under PMLA, 2002 so far, it is revealed:
(a) That the lands of Balwant Singh s/o Maharaj Singh were acquired by the NHAI for the four-
laning/widening of NH-74 (Haridwar to Kashipur section). The said lands were located at Khasra No.163, 164 & 198 in village Banskheda Kala, Kashipur, Udham Singh Nagar and having area of 1.1027 hectare, 1.1922 Hectare & 0.6174 Hectare respectively.
(b) That the nature of the land was mentioned and notified as agriculture in the Notification No. S.O. 1218 € dated 07.05.2014 (Annexure B-27) issued u/s 3D of NH Act, 1956.
(c) That Balwant Singh S/o Maharaj Singh did not submit any objection u/s 3C of NH Act, 1956 but Balwant Singh and other interested persons submitted their claim u/s 3G (3) of NH Act, 1956 vide application dated 13.06.2014 inter alia stating that the applicant used their land for agriculture for the livelihood of their family. The said information has been received from the office of the Special Land Acquisition Officer, Udham Singh Nagar/Nainital vide letter dated 29.06.2021 (Annexure B-28).
(d) That the NHAI conducted Joint Measuring Survey (JMS) for the said lands which were being acquired for the widening/four laning of NH-74; that the said lands were also mentioned as agriculture as per Joint Measuring Survey (JMS) Report as per information received from the office of Project Director, Nazibabad, NHAI vide letter dated 11.08.2021 (Annexure B-29).
(e) That Shri Dayanand Saraswati, the then SDM Kashipur submitted an enquiry report dated 17.03.2017 (Annexure B-14) to the then Kumaon Commissioner regarding the discrepancies found in the 77 record of the said lands in revenue documents of SDM Court and Tehsil.
(f) That in the statement of Sh. Rakesh Pradhan dated 27.07.2021, he inter alia stated that when he was posted as Rajaswa Ahlmad at S.D.M. Court, Kashipur during that time cases only upto No. 22/516 were registered in Misilband Panjika of revenue year 2009- 10; that Case No. 22/517 (2009-10) Balwant Singh, Village Banskhera Kala,Case No. 22/518 (2009-10) Pyara Singh Village Dabhora Musthakam, Case No. 22/519 (2009-10) Kashmir Kaur and Amarjeet Kaur village Dabhora Mustakam were not entered by him and also their case files were not available in his chargelist handed over by him upon his transfer, that the entries of above mentioned cases were entered back dated after his transfer from S.D.M. Court, Kashipur.
(g) The above said facts clearly prove that the said land of Balwant Singh was clearly agricultural in nature at the time of land acquisition for widening of National Highway.
(h) That, as per police chargesheet, Barinder Singh along with his grandfather Balwant Singh managed to get back dated order of section 143 of UPZA & LR Act, 1950 passed on 30.09.2010 in case no. 22/517 in connivance with Bhagat Singh Fonia (the then Assistant Collector First Cass/SDM, Kashipur, Udham Singh Nagar); that subsequently they, under a conspiracy with Dinesh Pratap Singh (CALA)/SLAO) and Sanjay Kumar Chauhan (Reader/Peshkar in SDM Court, Kashipur) and others, illegally managed to get the forged back dated orders u/s 143 of U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act 1950 passed and its subsequent entries in the revenue records and thereafter got the excess compensation fraudulently at non agriculture rate on the basis of the said back dated order for the land 78 which were being acquired for four-laning/widening of NH-74 and notified as agriculture in 3D Notification issued by NHAI. During investigation under PMLA, 2002, Bhagat Singh Fonia interalia stated that he had passed the order of section 143 of U.P.ZA & LR Act, 1950 of the said land in Case No. 22/517 (2009)-10) Balwant Singh, Village Banskera Kala on 30.09.2010 on the basis of report submitted by Madan Mohan Padlia, the then Naib Tehsildar, Kashipur. Further Madan Mohan Padlia, the then Naib Tehsildar, Kashipur. Further, Madan Mohan Padlia also inter alia stated that he had also submitted section 143 report to Bhagat Singh Fonia, the then SDM Kashipur. Further, netiher Bhagat Singh Fonia nor Madan Mohan Padlia produced any documents which showed that the said order was passed on 30.09.2010.
(i) That Dinesh Pratap Singh, the then CALA/SLAO despite having clear information that the said land of Balwant Singh has been mentioned as agriculture in the Notification No. S.O. 1218 (E) dated 07.05.2014 (AnnexureB-27) issued u/s 3D of NH Act, 1956, passed an award No. 6/2016 dated 11-05-2016 (Annexure B-58) duly amended vide compensation order No. 20/2016 dated 15.07.2016 (Annexure B-59) for the land at Khasra No. 163, 164, & 198 situated in village Banskheda Kala, Kashipur, Udham Singh Nagar at non-agriculture rate.
(j) that Balwant Singh received total compensation of Rs. 34,05,61,008/- (Rs. 13,94,14,495/- on 24.08.2016, Rs. 7,21,98,045/- & Rs. 12,89,48,468/- on 14.06.2016) fraudulently at non-agriculture rate for his lands acquired for four-laning/widening of NH-74 by NHAI; that the compensation amount was credited, after deducting TDS, in the joint Account No. 913010041809666 (Annexure B-30) maintained at Axis Bank, Kashipur, Udham Singh Nagar, 79 Uttarakhand held in the name of Balwant Singh & Barinder Singh.
(k) The above said facts clearly proves the malafide intentions of Balwant Singh, Barinder Singh, Dinesh Pratap Singh (the then CALA/SLAO, Udham Singh Nagar/Nainital), Bhagat Singh Fonia (the then SDM, Kashipur/Jaspur), Sanjay Kumar Chauhan (the then Reader at SDM Court, Kashipur), Madan Mohan Palia (the then Naib Tehsildar Kashipur) attached with Registrar Kanungo, Tehsil, Jaspur) of causing huge financial losses to the Govt. treasury and corresponding financial gains to themselves."
88. The role of individual petitioners summoned in this case has been given at para 9 of the complaint. In para 9.1, the role of the petitioner Balwant Singh is stated. He is a farmer. His land was notified as 'Agriculture Land' under Section 3D of the NH Act. Under a conspiracy with the other petitioners and co-accused, he had obtained forged back dated orders under Section 143 of the ZA Act, 1950. He had received excessive compensation, which was utilized for buying movable and immovable properties in his name and in the name of his family members, which was withdrawn in cash in order to layer and integrate the 'Proceeds of Crime' generated through criminal activities related to the scheduled offence.
89. The petitioner Barinder Singh had received an excessive compensation, transferred the amount in his 80 account also, which was utilized for buying movable and immovable properties in his name and withdrawing a huge cash amount in order to layer and integrate the 'Proceeds of Crime'. (Para 9.2 of the complaint)
90. It is the case against the petitioner Arpan Kumar that he had played an important role in facilitating the farmers in getting compensation at 'Non-Agricultural' rate fraudulently. He had received Rs. 10,00,000/- from the petitioner Barinder Singh, which is nothing but 'Proceeds of Crime' generated through criminal activities related to scheduled offence. (Para 9.3 of the complaint)
91. There are similar kind of allegations against the petitioner Dinesh Pratap Singh in all the complaints, which need not be reproduced. It is the case against him that he was actively involved in the process of activities connected with generation of 'Proceeds of Crime' generated through criminal activities related to scheduled offence. (Para 9.6 of the complaint)
92. Petitioner Bhagat Singh Fonia was the SDM at the relevant time. It is the allegation against him that he had passed forged back dated orders. He was actively involved in the process of activities connected with generation of 'Proceeds of Crime' generated through criminal 81 activities related to scheduled offence. (Para 9.7 of the complaint)
93. The petitioner Sanjay Kumar Chauhan was the Reader in the court of SDM, Kashipur at the relevant time. It is alleged that he had entered forged back dated orders under Section 143 of the ZA Act, 1950. He was actively involved in the process of activities connected with generation of 'Proceeds of Crime' generated through criminal activities related to scheduled offence. (Para 9.8 of the compliant)
94. The petitioner Madan Mohan Padaliya was working as a Naib Tehsildar at the relevant time. He had prepared and submitted back dated reports of Section 143 of the ZA Act, 1950. He was actively involved in the process of activities connected with generation of 'Proceeds of Crime' generated through criminal activities related to scheduled offence. (Para 9.9 of the complaint)
95. The averments as made in the complaint definitely make out a prima facie case against all these petitioners. The cognizance and summoning order passed on 06.09.2022 is quite in detail. The court below has taken into consideration the material placed before it. Having 82 considered the material, cognizance was taken and the petitioners and others have been summoned. This Court does not see any illegality in the summoning order. Therefore, there is no reason to interfere in the cognizance and summoning order dated 06.09.2022 passed in SST No. 15 of 2022.
SPECIAL SESSIONS TRIAL No. 16 of 2022
96. In this case, cognizance and summoning order dated 06.09.2022 has been passed against the petitioners Dinesh Pratap Singh, Vikas Kumar, Bhole Lal and other co- accused. In fact, the role of revenue officers/officials is almost identical in the case of each farmer. The complaint in S.S.T. No. 16 of 2022 is a part of Annexure 15. In para 8.2.2, the summary of the case is given, which is as hereunder:
"8.2.2. That during the course of investigation under PMLA, 2002 so far, it is revealed:
(a) That the lands of Charan Singh s/o Khan Chand was acquired by the NHAI fr the four-
laning/widening of NH-74 (Haridwar to Kashipur Section). The said land was located at Khasra No.194 & 219 in village Garhi Hussain, Jaspur, Udham Singh Nagar and having area of 0.3000 hectare & 0.6062 Hectare respectively.
(b) That the nature of the land was mentioned as agriculture in the Notification No. S.O. 1218 (E) dated 07.05.2014 (Annexure B-19) issued u/s 3D of NH Act, 1956.
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(c) That Charan Singh s/o Khan Chand neither submitted any objection u/s 3 C nor any claim u/s 3G (3) of NH Act, 1956 regarding his land which was being acquired for widening-four-laning of NH-74 as per information received from the office of the Special Land Acquisition Officer, Udham Snigh Nagar/Nainital vide letter dated 29.06.2021 (Annexure B-20).
(d) That the NHAI conducted Joint Measuring Survey (JMS) for the said land which were being acquired for the widening/four-laning of NH-74; that the said land was also mentioned as agriculture as per Joint Measuring Survey (JMS) Report as per information received from the office of Project Director, Nazibabad, NHAI vide letter dated 11.08.2021 (Annexure B-21).
(e) That Smt. Yukta Mishra, the then SDM Jaspur submitted an enquiry report dated 17.03.2017 & 20.03.2017 (Annexure B-10) to the then Kumaon Commissioner regarding the discrepancies found in the record of said land in revenue documents of SDM Court and Tehsil.
(f) That entries of the order of section 143 of UP ZA & LR Act, 1950 of the said land was not made by Shri Chandrapal Singh, the then Registrar Kanungo, Tehsil Jaspur in R-6 register of Tehsil, Jaspur but actually entered by Anil Kumar, the then Sangrah Amin (attached with Registrar Kanungo, Tehsil Jaspur). Shri Chandrapal Singh, the then Registrar Kanungo and Anil Kumar, the then Sangrah Amin inter-alia stated the said facts in their statement recorded u/s 50(3) of the PMLA, 2002. Further as there was no space available for making back dated entry in the R-6 register of village Garhi Hussain, Anil Kumar entered the same in the R-6 register of village Amka of Jaspur Tehsil.
(g) The above said fact clearly proves that the said land of Charan Singh was clearly agriculture in nature at the time of land acquisition for widening of the National Highway.
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(h) That, Charan Singh, in connivance with Dinesh Pratap Singh (the then Naib Tehsildar, Tehsil Jaspur), Vikas Chauhan (Reader/Peshkar in SDM Court Jaspur), Anil Kumar (Sangrah Amin attached with Registrar Kanungo, Tehsil Jaspur) & middlemen and others illegally managed to get the forged back dated order u/s 143 of the UP ZA & LR Act, 1950 passed and its subsequent entries in the revenue records and thereafter got the compensation at non-agriculture rate on the basis of the said back dated order.
(i) That Dinesh Pratap Singh, the then CALA/SLAO, despite having clear information that the said land of Charan Singh has been mentioned as agriculture in the Notification No. S.O. 1218 (E) dated 07.05.2014 (Annexure B-19) issued u/s 3D of the NH Act, 1956, passed an award No. 10/2016 dated 17.05.2016 (Annexure B-33) duly amended vide compensation order No. 21/2016 dated 15.07.2016 (Annexure B-34) for the land at Khasra No.194 of 219 situated in Garhi Hussain, Jaspur, Udham Singh Nagar, at non-agriculture rate;
(j) That Charan Singh received compensation of Rs. 8,03,76,699/- on 24.08.2016 and Rs. 3,97,77,317/- on 07.09.2016 fraudulently at non-agriculture rate for his lands acquired for four-laning-widening of NH-74; that the compensation amount was credited, in his account no. 976010019749913 (Annexure B-22) maintained with Axis Bank, Bhaisia, Gadarpur, Udham Singh Nagar, Uttarakhand, after deducting TDS.
(k) The above said facts clearly proves the malafide intentions of Charan Singh, Dinesh Pratap Singh (the then CALA/SLAO, Udham Singh Nagar/Nainital), Bhole Lal (the then Naib Tehsildar, Tehsil Jaspur), Vikas Chauhan (Reader/Peshkar in SDM Court Jaspur), Anil Kumar (Sangrah Amin attached with Registrar Kanungo, Tehsil Jaspur), of causing huge financial losses to the Govt. Treasury and corresponding financial gains to themselves."
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97. Individual role of the petitioners is given in para 9 of the complaint. The role of the petitioner Dinesh Pratap Singh is given in para 9.4, the role of the petitioner Bhole Lal is given in para 9.5 and the role of the petitioner Vikas Kumar is given in para 9.7. Their role is almost identical as assigned in other complaints, which have been narrated hereinbefore. This Court refrains from repeating their role. The petitioner Dinesh Pratap Singh has been assigned activities involved in the process or activity connected with generation of 'Proceeds of Crime'. The petitioner Bhole Lal, who was a Naib Tehsildar at the relevant time, has been assigned the role of preparing and submitting back dated report of 143 ZA Act, 1950 and the petitioner Vikas Kumar, who was a Reader in the court, had been assigned the role of making back dated entries of back dated orders under Section 143 ZA Act, 1950.
98. The averments as made in the complaint definitely make out a prima facie case against all these petitioners. The cognizance and summoning order passed on 06.09.2022 is quite in detail. The court below has taken into consideration the material placed before it. Having considered the material, cognizance was taken and the petitioners and others have been summoned. This Court does not see any illegality in the summoning order. 86 Therefore, there is no reason to interfere in the cognizance and summoning order dated 06.09.2022 passed in SST No. 16 of 2022.
SPECIAL SESSIONS TRIAL No. 17 of 2022
99. In this case, cognizance and summoning order has been passed on 14.10.2022 against the petitioners Dinesh Pratap Singh, Arpan Kumar, Vikas Kumar, Bhole Lal, Ramesh Kumar (farmer) and Om Prakash (farmer). The complaint is a part of Annexure 15. In para 8.2.3 of it, the case against the petitioners in nutshell has been stated as follows:
"8.2.3. That during the course of investigation under PMLA so far, it is revealed.
(a) that the lands of Om Prakash and Pamesh Kumar s/o Chaudhary Ram were acquired by the NHAI for the four-laning/widening of NH-74 (Haridwar to Kashipur Section). The said lands were located at Khasra No.188 and 190 in village Garhi Hussain, Jaspur, Udham Singh Nagar and having area of 0.4462 hectare & 0.1942 Hectare respectively;
(b) that the nature of the lands were mentioned and notified as agriculture in the Notification No. S.O. 1218 (E) dated 07.05.2014 (Annexure B-25) issued u/s 3D of NH Act, 1956;
(c) that Om Prakash and Ramesh Kumar s/o Chaudhary Ram did not submit any objection u/s 3C of NH Act, 1956 but Om Prakash and Ramesh Kumar s/o Chaudhary Ram and other interested persons submitted their claim u/s 3G (3) 87 of the NH Act, 1956 vide application dated 13.06.2014 inter alia stating that the applicant used their land for agriculture for the livelihood of their family. The said information has been received from the office of the Special Land Acquisition Officer, Udham Singh Nagar/Nainital vide letter dated 29.06.2021 (Annexure B-26).
(d) that the NHAI conducted Joint Measuring Survey (JMS) for the said land which were being acquired for the widening/four-laning of NH-74; that the said land was also mentioned as agriculture as per Joint Measuring Survey (JMS) Report as per information received from the office of Project Director, Nazibabad, NHAI vide letter dated 11.08.2021 (Annexure B-27).
(e) that Smt. Yukta Mishra, the then SDM, Jaspur submitted an enquiry report dated 17.03.2017 & 20.03.2017 (Annexure B-23) to the then Kumaon Commissioner regard the discrepancies found in the record of said lands in revenue documents of SDM Court and Tehsil.
(f) that Shri Satpal, Reader/peshkar in SDM Court, Jaspur lodged an FIR against Vikas Chauhan, the then reader/peshkar in SDM Court Jaspur for not handing over the case files of order of section 143 of UP ZA & LR Act, 1950 regarding the lands of Ramesh and Om Prakash, when he took the charge from Vikas Chauhan.
(g) that the entries of the order of section 143 of UP ZA and LR Act, 1950 of the said land was not made by Shri Chandrapal Singh, the then Registrar Kanungo, Tehsil Jaspur in R-6 register of Tehsl, Jaspur but at a later date by Anil Kumar, the then Sangrah Amin (attached with Registrar Kanungo, Tehsil Jaspur). Shri Chandrapal Singh, the then Registrar Kanungo and Anil Kumar, the then Sangrah Amin interalia stated that said facts 88 in their statement recorded u/s 50 (3) of the PMLA, 2002.
(h) that, as per Police charge sheet mentioned above, Ramesh Kumar and Om Prakash, in connivance with Dinesh Pratap Singh (the then CALA/SLAO, Udham Singh Nagar/Nainital), Bhole Lal (the then Naib Tehsildar, Tehsil Jaspur), Vikas Chauhan (Reader/Peshkar in SDM Court Jaspur), Anil Kumar (Sangrah Amin attached with Registrar Kanungo, Tehsil Jaspur) & middlemen and others managed to get the compensation at non- agriculture rate on the basis of forged back dated orders and entries.
(i) that Dinesh Pratap Singh, the then CALA/SLAO passed an award No.10/2016 dated 17.05.2016 (Annexure B-40) duly amended vide compensation order No.21/2016 dated 15.07.2016 (Annexure B-41) for the land at Khasra No.188 and 190 situated in Garhi Hussain, Jaspur, Udham Singh Nagar at non-agriculture rate; that Om Prakash and Ramesh Kumar managed to get compensation of Rs. 5,91,62,429/- on 01.09.2016 and Rs. 2,57,73,403/- on 07.09.2016 respectively, fraudulently at non-agriculture rate for their lands acquired for four-laning/widening of NH-74 (Haridwar to Kashipur Section); that the compensation amount was credited, after deducting the TDS, in the joint A/c No. 4485000100007348 of Ramesh Kumar & Om Prakash maintained with PNB Jaspur, Udham Singh Nagar, Uttarakhand.
(j) that the above said fact clearly proves that the said land of Ramesh Kumar and Om Prakash was clearly agriculture in nature at the time of land acquisition of widening of the National Highway.
(k) That, Ramesh Kumar and Om Prakash, in connivance with Dinesh Pratap Singh (the then CALA/SLAO, Udham Singh Nagar/Nainital), Bhole 89 Lal (the then Naib Tehsildar, Tehsil Jaspur), Vikas Chauhan (Reader/Peshkar in SDM Court Jaspur), Anil Kumar (Sangrah Amin attached with Registrar Kanungo, Tehsil Jaspur) & middlemen and others illegally managed to get the forged back dated order u/s 143 of the U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act, 1950 passed and its subsequent entries in the revenue records and thereafter got the compensation at non- agriculture rate on the basis of the said back dated order."
100. The role of individual petitioner is given in para 9 of the complaint. In the instant case, the petitioners Ramesh Kumar and Om Prakash are farmers. Their land was notified as 'Agricultural Land' under Section 3D of the NH Act. They had never filed any objections either under Section 3C or 3G of the NH Act. Their role is given in paras 9.1 and 9.2 of the complaint respectively. The role of the petitioners Dinesh Pratap Singh, Arpan Kumar, Bhole Lal and Vikas Kumar is given in paras 9.4, 9.3, 9.5 and 9.7 of the complaint respectively. They all were revenue officers/official at the relevant time. Their role is identical to the acts attributed to them in other complaints, which has already been discussed hereinbefore.
101. The averments as made in the complaint definitely make out a prima facie case against all these petitioners. The cognizance and summoning order passed on14.10.2022 is quite in detail. The court below has taken 90 into consideration the material placed before it. Having considered the material, cognizance was taken and the petitioners and others have been summoned. This Court does not see any illegality in the summoning order. Therefore, there is no reason to interfere in the cognizance and summoning order dated 14.10.2022 passed in SST No. 17 of 2022.
102. In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court is of the view that there is no merit in the instant petitions. The petitions deserve to be dismissed.
103. All the petitions are dismissed.
(Ravindra Maithani, J.) 04.05.2023 Avneet/