Patna High Court
Ramashray Singh And Ors. vs State Of Bihar on 18 January, 2000
Equivalent citations: 2000(2)BLJR831
Author: S.N. Pathak
Bench: S.N. Pathak
JUDGMENT S.N. Pathak, J.
1. This appeal is directed, against the order of conviction and sentence passed by Shri Tarkeshwar Narain, 9th Additional Sessions Judge, Munger, dated 19.6.1989. All the appellants above-named were convicted under Section 435 as also Section 436 of the Indian Penal Code. They were sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for three years for the offence under Section 435 and five years for the of fence under Section 436 of the Indian Penal Code. Both the sentences were directed to run concurrently.
2. The case of the prosecution, as per written report of the informant Chuho Singh @ Ram Sagar Singh was to the effect that on 30.3.1986 et about 10 p.m. he was sleeping in his barn (Khalihan). Suddenly, 7 persons belonging to the same village came to the khalihan and set fire to the articles kept therein. The informant was taken hostage by these persons and fire was set to the articles kept in the khalihan by four persons, namely, Mundrika Singh and rest of the appellants. Subsequently, the informant was dragged to his bungalow (Baithka) made of bricks and tile and in course of dragging, he received scratches on his body. The baithka of the informant was also set on fire. The informant sustained a loss of Rs. 40,000/- on account of damage to his property kept in the khalihan and his Baithka. The informant went to the police station next morning, but his complaint was not entertained. So again a written report was addressed to the Superintendent of Police and Superintendent of Police directed the Police Station concerned to institute a case and investigate.
3. The accused-appellants took defence that they were implicated on account of grudge.
4. The learned trial Judge on the basis of oral evidence as also on the basis of certain exhibits, which were not material, namely, the written report, etc. held the accused-appellants guilty and convicted and sentenced them as stated above.
4-A. The evidence was criticized before me, firstly, on the ground that there was delay in instituting the case which remained unexplained. Moreover, there was no plausible motive for the appellants to commit the alleged act of arson to the informant's khalihan and dalan, and the evidence of the P.Ws. was discrepant. However, I find that the written report of the informant was properly proved and brought on record as Ext. 3. Formal F.I.R. was also exhibited as Ext. 1.
5. Prosecution examined as many as 8 witnesses. P.W. 8 was I.O. of the case and he had seen burnt and damaged crops in the khalihan of the informant. He also found certain damage to the tiled dalan of the informant. So there was objective evidence with respect to arson at the P.O. The suggestion given to the P.Ws. by accused also referred to signs of arson in the khalihan and dalan of the informant. It was the case of the accused through the suggestion that fire had spread on account of bide being thrown by some one which damaged the concerned articles and villagers had gathered to extinguish the fire, so arson to the informant property was almost admitted.
6. The point for consideration is whether the accused-appellants set fire to the place of occurrence. In this connection, P.W. 1 is a formal witness. P.Ws. 2, 3, 5 and 7 were eye-witnesses to the alleged occurrence. Some of them had seen the appellants flying from the scene of occurrence and others had seen them setting fire to the concerned P.O. Of course, no independent witness has been examined to vouch safe to the Act of arson by the accused-appellants. But, the point is whether evidence of interested witnesses can be discarded simply on the ground of their interestedness. This is not the principle of law unless plausible cause is shown for false implication. It has come in evidence that the informant's brother was facing trial in a sessions case in which the accused-appellants were also accused. The accused-appellants were laying pressure upon the informant's brother to meet the cost of litigation jointly, but the informant's brother was independently fighting the case and so the accused-appellants had a grievance. The accused-appellants had also a grievance against the informant who used to oppose their anti-social activities. So the accused-appellants had a grievance against the informant on this score also. So the accused-appellants had some grievance to nurse against the informant and his family, but the informant's family had no grievance to implicate them in false case. I find that other persons were also facing trial in the case along with the appellants, but they were acquitted and the charge under Sections 147 and 149, I.P.C. was not proved and hence the accused-appellants were acquitted thereof along with some other persons who were facing trial. The charge under Section 323, I.P.C. also failed because the informant could not substantiate any injury upon his person on account of his dragging, as alleged. So the only charge under Section 436, I.P.C. for setting fire to the dalan of the informant was substantiated and the charge under Section 435, I.P.C for setting fire to the khalihan was also substantiated by evidence on the record and hence the accused-appellants were convicted therefor.
7. So far as evidence on the paint of arson is concerned, I find that the same remained consistent and unshaken. The evidence could not be discarded only on the ground that P.Ws. were interested one. Hence, I think, the conviction of the appellants does not deserve reversal.
8. In the result, this appeal is dismissed and the appellants are directed to surrender in the lower Court to serve the remaining part of imprisonment awarded to them.