Andhra HC (Pre-Telangana)
State Of Andhra Pradesh And Ors. vs Suramalla Ramulu And Ors. on 25 March, 1996
Equivalent citations: 1996(2)ALT504, 1996CRILJ2854
Author: M.H.S. Ansari
Bench: M.H.S. Ansari
JUDGMENT M.H.S. Ansari, J.
1. Aggrieved against the orders awarding compensation to the dependants of a convict who died in prison, the appellants have preferred this appeal.
2. Writ petitioner-respondent No. 1 is the father, respondent No. 2 is the mother and respondent No. 3 in this appeal is the wife of the deceased Shankar. They claimed compensation on account of the death of the said Shankar who died on 10-8-1992. The said Shankar was imprisoned to undergo Life sentence when his death occurred. The learned single Judge awarded compensation to the mother of the deceased Shankar in a sum of Rs. 500/- per month to be paid by the appellants to her for maintaining herself and a lump sum payment has been directed to be made to the 3rd respondent, wife of the deceased Shankar in a sum of Rs. 25,000/-. No compensation however has been awarded to writ petitioner-respondent No. 1, father of the said Shankar on the basis of the allegations made by the said Shankar against his father. The learned single Judge has noticed that different versions have been putforth by the appellants and the writ petitioner-respondents as to the cause of the death of the said Shankar. Whilst, writ petitioners-respondents claim that Shankar died on account of the torturous acts of the prison staff the appellants have stated in the detailed counter filed on their behalf, that the death of Shankar occurred on account of beating by a co-convict one Chakali Nagendrudu. It is stated that on the intervening night of 9/10-8-1992, one of the convicts by name Chakali Nagendrudu and Shankar had a scuffle when the said Chakali Nagendrudu inflicted injuries on the body of Shankar with a broken wooden piece which was kept in the latrine for cleaning purposes. On hearing the hue and cry of the other convicts who were in the same barrack, the staff of the Central Prisen came running and opened the barrack and separated Shankar from Chakali Nagendrudu and rushed Shankar to Osmania General Hospital where he was given some treatment and later was declared dead by the Doctors. The appellants have denied that they are in any way responsible for the death of Shankar and disowned any responsibility to pay compensation on that account.
3. It must be noted here that the deceased Shankar was on an earlier occasion imprisoned and was undergoing jail sentence, his wife seems to have given birth to a child which is said to be born through his (Shankar's) own father. Shankar is said to have developed grudge against his father and his wife and after his release from the prison, Shanker is said to have gone to his village and killed the child ruthlessly and on that charge, a Sessions Case No. 18 of 1988 was registered and Shankar was convicted and sentenced to undergo life imprisonment under Section 302, I.P.C. and also rigorous imprisonment for five years under Section 377 of the I.P.C., both sentences to run concurrently. It was while undergoing this imprisonment in Central Prison, Chanchalguda, Hyderabad that Shankar died on 10-8-1992. As on the date of his death, Shankar had completed nearly 4 years of jail term. He was aged about 39 years as on the date of his death and had another ten years of sentence to undergo which would conclude by 2002, in all probability.
4. The learned Addl. Advocate General has strenuously urged that in the absence of any specific finding to the effect that the person staff caused the death of Shankar by any torturous acts, the State could not be made vacariously responsible for the death of Shankar which occurred on account of the beating by another convict in prison.
5. It is not so dispute that Shankar died in prison where he was undergoing life imprisonment. What therefore, falls for consideration is whether the case is one of deprivation of life and is there any infringement of Article 21 of the Constitution of India. Article 21 of our Constitution declares "no person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law". The right to life enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution of India is the most precious human right and forms the Arc of all other rights and has been interpreted by the Supreme Court in a broad and expansive spirit.
6. Subba Rao, J. (as he then was) quoted the following passage in Kharak Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, -
"By the term "life" as here used something more is meant than mere animal existence. The inhibition against its deprivation extends to all those limbs and faculties by which life is enjoyed. The provision equally prohibits the mutilation of the body or amputation of an arm or leg or the putting out of an eye or the destruction of any other organ of the body through which the soul communicates with the outer world".
In Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration, (1979) 1 SCR 302 at p. 503 : (1978 Cri LJ 1741 at p. 1797) the Constitutional Bench of the Supreme Court considered this very passage and accepted the same as laying down the correct law. Bhagwati, J. (as he then was) in Francis Coralie v. Union Territory of Delhi, AIR 1981 SC 746 : (1981 Cri LJ 306) after referring to the passage quoted in Kharak Singh's (cited supra) case and reiterated in Sunil Batras's case (cited supra) observed as under :
"Every limb or faculty through which life is enjoyed is thus protected by Article 21 and a fortiori, this would include the faculties of thinking and feeling. Now deprivation which is inhibited by Article 21 may be total or partial, neither any limb or faculty can be totally destroyed nor can it be partially damaged. Moreover it is every kind of deprivation that is hit by Article 21, whether such deprivation be permanent or temporary .................."
7. The position now obtaining with regard to Article 21 as interpreted in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, is that, no person shall be derived of his life personal liberty except by procedures established by law and this procedure must be reasonable, fair and just and not arbitrary and it is for the Court to decide in exercise of its constitutional power and judicial review whether the deprivation of life or personal liberty in a given case is by procedure, which is reasonable, fair and just or if it is otherwise.
8. The fundamental rights guaranteed under our Constitution including that of right to life in Article 21 of our Constitution whether the same are available also to a person who is convicted of a crime and is in prison ? This aspect was considered in D. Bhuvan Mohan Patnaik v. State of A.P., wherein it was observed (Para 6) :
"Convicts are not, by mere reason of the conviction, denuded of all the fundamental rights which they otherwise possess. A compulsion under the authority of law following upon a conviction, to live in a prison-house entails by its own force the deprivation of fundamental freedoms like the right to move freely throughout the territory of India or the right to 'practice' a profession ...... But the Constitution guarantees other freedoms like the right to acquire, hold and dispose of property ....... Likewise even a convict is entitled to the precious right guaranteed by Article 21 of the Constitution that he shall not be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law."
and in Sunil Batra's case (1978 Cri LJ 1741) (SC) (cited supra), it was categorically held that the Convicts are not denuded of their fundamental rights in the following words (at p. 1793 of Cri LJ) :
"It is no more open to debate that convicts are not wholly denuded of their fundamental rights. No iron curtain can be drawn between the prisoner and the Constitution. Prisoners are entitled to all constitutional rights unless their liberty has been constitutionally curtailed. ............ However, a prisoner's liberty is in the very nature of things circumscribed by the very fact of his confinement. His interest in the liberty left to him is then all the more substantial".
There is therefore no room for doubt that even a prisoner convicted of a crime undergoing sentence is very much entitled to the fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution including that of right to life guaranteed by Article 21 of the Constitution that he shall not be deprived of his life except by procedures established by law.
9. Apart from the Constitutional safeguards, the jail manuals and the rules framed enjoin the officials administering the jails to ensure safety of prisoners. The prisoner being entrusted to their care is entitled to protection and it is the responsibility of the prison officials to ensure the life and safety of every inmate of the jail including those who may have been convicted and serving sentence. These authorities are not absolved of this responsibility merely because the prisoners had been convicted by a Court of law and were serving sentence. A prisoner, as noticed above, is not denuded of his fundamental rights and is not deprived of his constitutional right guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India except to the extent he has been deprived of it in accordance with law. Shankar, in the instant case died in prison. He was killed even according to the version as putforth by the appellants-respondents by a co-prisoner which took place in jail. It resulted in deprivation of his life contrary to law. The death of Shankar resulted, on account of the acts of omission in taking due care to protect the lives of prisoners and on account of negligence on the part of prison officials in doing their duty properly in ensuring safety of prisoners as they are enjoined to do.
10. Once it is held, as in the instant case, that the death of Shankar occurred on account of the negligence of the prison officials, negligence in discharge of their duties, the State has to be held vicariously liable for the loss resulting from such negligence. We are fortified in this view by a direct decision of a Division Bench Judgment of this Court in Challa Ramkonda Reddy v. State of A.P. by District Collector, Kurnool, and the more recent pronouncement of the Supreme Court in Kewal Pati (Smt.) v. State of U.P., .
11. In Smt. Nilabati Behera alias Lalita Behera v. State of Orissa, , the oft quoted judgments of the Apex Court in Rudul Sah v. State of Bihar, ; Sebastian M. Homgray v. Union of India, and ; Bhim Singh v. State of J. & K., 1984 (Supp) SCC 504 and ; Saheli, A Women's Resources Centre v. Commissioner of Police, Delhi Police Headquarters, and State of Maharashtra v. Ravikant S. Patil, where referred to with regard to the liability of the State for compensation and the principle on which the liability of the State arises in such cases for payment of compensation and the distinction between the said liabilities and the liability in private law for payment of compensation in an action on tort and it was held as under :
"It may be mentioned straightaway that award of compensation in a proceeding under Article 32 by this Court or by the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is a remedy available in public law, based on strict liability for contravention of fundamental rights to whom the principle of sovereign immunity does not apply, even though it may be available as a defence in private law in an action based on tort. This is a distinction between the two remedies to be borne in mind which also indicates the basis on which the compensation is awarded in such proceedings".
12. In the light of the legal conspectus and the principles laid down as to the power of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution to award monetary compensation for contravention of a fundamental right and respectfully following the ratio laid down therein, it has to be held that compensation be awarded instead of directing the claimant to resort to ordinary process of recovery of damages by recourse to an action in tort. We are therefore of the opinion that the State is liable to pay compensation on account of the death of Shankar which resulted due to failure of authorities to protect him.
13. What then is the quantum of compensation to be paid and to whom has next to be considered. The learned single Judge, as already noticed, declined to award any compensation to the 1st petitioner, father, on the ground that deceased Shankar suspected the fidelity of his wife having illicit contact with his own father and giving birth to a child. We find no reason to differ with the discretion exercised by the learned single Judge on this count, however, we are forced for the same reasons to interfere with the award of compensation directed to be made to the wife-writ petitioner-respondent No. 3 on the very same grounds on which compensation has been declined to the father-petitioner No. 1 accordingly hold that the writ petitioner-3rd respondent, the wife Shankaramma shall not be entitled to any compensation. The learned single Judge has on the facts and circumstances of the case directed compensation of a monthly sum of Rs. 500/- to the mother of the deceased for the rest of her life. Instead, we enhance the same to Rupees 750/- per month which in our opinion would be a reasonable sum to enable the mother-writ petitioner-respondent No. 2 to maintain herself in her old age with dignity.
14. To the extent indicated above, the orders passed in the writ petition awarding compensation are modified and the writ appeal is accordingly disposed of in the terms as above. There shall be no order as costs.
15. Order accordingly.