Meghalaya High Court
Mr Bernard N. Marak vs State Of Meghalaya on 7 November, 2017
Equivalent citations: AIR 2018 (NOC) 143 (MEG.)
Author: Dinesh Maheshwari
Bench: Dinesh Maheshwari
1
PIL No.7 of 2017
Shri Bernard N. Marak v. State of Meghalaya
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MEGHALAYA AT
SHILLONG
: ORDER :
PIL No. 7 of 2017 Shri Bernard N. Marak ..... Petitioner
-Versus-
State of Meghalaya and others ..... Respondents
Date of Order :: 7th November 2017
PRESENT
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE DINESH MAHESHWARI, CHIEF JUSTICE HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE VED PRAKASH VAISH Shri N Syngkon, for the petitioner Shri S Dey, for GHADC AFR BY THE COURT: (per Hon'ble the Chief Justice) By way of this petition, framed and styled as a Public Interest Litigation [„PIL‟], the petitioner seeks to challenge the powers of Garo Hills Autonomous District Council [„GHADC‟] to enact any law on transfer of land; and to issue pattas for transfer of land while creating new plain Mauzas. The petitioner, while questioning the validity of the Garo Hills District (Transfer of Land) Act, 1955 [„the Act of 1955‟], as made by GHADC, has claimed the following reliefs:-
" In the circumstances stated herein above, your humble Petitioner prays that your Lordship may be pleased to call for the records, issue Rule calling upon the Respondents to show-cause as to why a Writ in the nature of Mandamus/Certiori or any other appropriate writ/order of direction should not be issued, declaring the Garo Hills District (Transfer of Land Act) 1955 as ultra-vires, void and illegal as a whole, specifically Section 3,4,5,6,7,8 and 9 of the said act and also be pleased to direct the respondent GHADC, not to issue patta over Aking land and again, be pleased to declare the creation/reorganisation of new plain mauza i.e. X, X-1 curving out of the areas from the Hill Mauza as illegal or be pleased 2 PIL No.7 of 2017 Shri Bernard N. Marak v. State of Meghalaya to pass any further order or orders as your Lordship may deem fit and proper."
While asserting that he is „newly appointed Nokma of Tura town area‟, the petitioner has alleged that such an appointment vests him with public duty to protect the customary laws and the system. The petitioner has averred that in Garo Hills area in the State of Meghalaya, most of the land is owned by the clan or machong, which is known as A‟khing land and the Nokma is the custodian thereof, who could part with the land to any individual or to any entity with the consent of her clan/machong members. According to the petitioner, GHADC has no role in appointment of Nokma and is only the authority to register the said appointment but many a times, GHADC exceeds its jurisdiction as if appointing Nokma and thus, interfers with the prevailing customary practice and laws in Garo Hills. The petitioner has further averred that GHADC is attempting to take away the land of the Garo tribal people through the said Act of 1955 and also by issuance of pattas while creating new Mauzas X, X-1 etc., and thereby depriving the people of their land without acquisition or without any payment to the A‟khing Nokma. The petitioner has also averred that, in his capacity as Nokma, he had made several representations/requests to the authorities for cancellation of such Mauzas but without any response.
The petitioner would maintain that GHADC is not competent to enact the law on transfer of land in terms of Sixth Schedule to the Constitution of India and as such, the Act of 1955 is ultra vires, void and illegal as a whole; and more particularly, Sections 3 to 9 thereof are beyond the competence of GHADC in terms of Sixth Schedule and are also violative of the Meghalaya Transfer of Land (Regulation) Act, 1971, 3 PIL No.7 of 2017 Shri Bernard N. Marak v. State of Meghalaya as made by the State Legislature. The petitioner has referred to the decision of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in the case of District Council of the United Khasi and Jaintia Hills, Shillong and Ors. v. Miss. Sitimon Sawian: AIR 1972 SC 787 with the submissions that the enactment of similar nature, as made by the other District Council, was disapproved by the Hon‟ble Supreme Court. The petitioner has also referred to the decision of Gauhati High Court in the case of Shri Tarani Kanta Das v. Karbi Anglong District Council, Diphu: (1989) 1 GLR 147 to assert that the land comprised in Autonomous District does not belong to the District Council.
As required by the High Court of Meghalaya (Public Interest Litigation) Rules, 2013, the petitioner has taken the averments that the present one is a Public Interest Litigation in which, he has no personal interest; that the petition is not guided by self-gain or for gain of any other person/institution/body; and that there is no motive other than of public interest in filing this petition. The petitioner has also averred that this petition is filed in the interest of the people of Garo Hills and for protection of the customary laws of the Garos; and that he has the means to pay costs, if any, imposed by this Court. In the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the petitioner has also stated that he has not concealed any data/material/information, which may enable this Court to form an opinion whether to entertain this petition or not and whether to grant any relief or not. With this petition, the petitioner has filed a copy of the so-called „Letter of approval‟ dated 02.01.2015 (Annexure-1), said to have been issued by the Nokma of Danakgre A‟khing Smti. Enilla Ch. Marak wife of late Shri Nether M. Sangma, purportedly „appointing‟ him as Nokma/Headman of the Tura Town Area under her A‟khing land. 4 PIL No.7 of 2017
Shri Bernard N. Marak v. State of Meghalaya After having preliminarily heard the learned counsel for the petitioner Shri N Syngkon, essentially on the issue relating to the validity of the Act of 1955, we were tentatively inclined to entertain this petition, but the learned counsel Shri S Dey appearing for GHADC submitted that the present one is a personal interest litigation of the petitioner, whose capacity to act in relation to the A‟khing in question is a matter of serious dispute; and the members of the concerned clan/machong have represented against the petitioner‟s claim of Nokmaship while asserting that he does not belong to a Nokma family of any existing A‟khing; and further, even First Information Reports [„FIRs‟] have been lodged against the petitioner and are pending investigation. Besides, Shri S Dey also pointed out that the petitioner, who was the Chairperson of a banned outfit called A‟chik National Voluntary Council (B), has been attempting to assert his parallel authority, rather over and above the District Council and the State, and had been issuing notices/circulars, proclaiming himself as „Nokma‟/„Chief of Nokma Committee‟ and inviting people to attend the office of the so-called Tura Nokma Committee along with pattas for fresh registration. Learned counsel for GHADC further pointed out that the said Smti. Enilla Ch. Marak, Nokma of the A‟khing in question, earlier preferred a writ petition in this Court in relation to the dispute concerning the land in question but upon the Court directing the parties to seek their remedy before the appropriate forum, she has filed a title suit bearing number 7 of 2017 in the Court of Assistant to the Deputy Commissioner (Judicial), Tura, seeking declaration that village Rongka Chiring is part of Danakgre A‟khing while also questioning patta No. 458 for Dag No. 679 under Mauza X-1, as issued by GHADC in favour of the State. The learned counsel for GHADC vehemently argued that in view of such disputes, the 5 PIL No.7 of 2017 Shri Bernard N. Marak v. State of Meghalaya present petition in the name of PIL is nothing but an oblique attempt in furtherance of the personal interests of the petitioner.
Learned counsel for GHADC has placed on record, inter alia, the copies of: (i) the plaint relating to the said title suit No. 7 of 2017; (ii) the interim relief application in the said suit; (iii) the notice/circular issued by the petitioner to the residents of Tura Town to attend the Tura Nokma Office on 18.08.2017; (iv) the complaint dated 24.08.2017, as filed by Shri Cary Chambugong Marak, the chara of Chambugong clan1; (v) the prohibitory order dated 27.08.2017, as passed by the Deputy Commissioner, West Garo Hills District against the petitioner; (vi) the representation dated 04.09.2017 against the petitioner‟s claim of Nokmaship; (vii) the letter dated 27.08.2017 by the Deputy Commissioner to the Superintendent of Police, West Garo Hills for action as per law against the petitioner; and (viii) the FIR dated 29.08.2017, as lodged by Shri Cary Chambugong Marak against the petitioner alleging offences under Sections 417/419/506/188 IPC.
Learned counsel for the petitioner, however, contended that the respondents are seeking to avoid the real issue raised in the matter that GHADC has no power to enact the law on transfer of land and the Act of 1955 is ultra vires the Constitution. With reference to the aforesaid decision of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in Sitimon Sawian's case, the learned counsel for petitioner would contend that similar nature enactment namely, United Khasi-Jaintia Hills District (Transfer of Land) Act, 1953 was held beyond the scope of law-making power of the District Council concerned insofar as the same was on the subject of transfer of land and on those principles, the GHADC‟s Act of 1955 also deserves to be 1 The male member of Chambugong clan, whose A‟khing is in question. As per Garo traditions, the abbreviation „Ch.‟ in the name of lady Nokma Smti. Enilla Ch. Marak refers to this clan. 6 PIL No.7 of 2017
Shri Bernard N. Marak v. State of Meghalaya declared ultra vires the Constitution. Learned counsel would also contend that the petitioner has only stated his status as available on record and else, the present petition has essentially been filed by him pro bono publico as an ordinary citizen and as a member of Garo tribe, for protection of the customary laws of the Garos who are not in a position to take up the matter in the Court of law for several adversities. Further, with reference to the decision of Hon‟ble Gauhati High Court in the case of Tarani Kanta Das (supra), learned counsel would argue that the land comprised in an Autonomous District does not belong to the District Council and hence, GHADC cannot issue any patta for transfer of land; and only the A‟khing Nokma, being the custodian of the land for clan/machong, is capable of issuing such a document.
Having given anxious consideration to the rival submissions and having examined the material placed on record, we have not an iota of doubt that the present petition is an oblique attempt at abusing the process of Court and deserves to be dismissed with exemplary costs as also with other necessary orders against the petitioner.
Before examining the effect of the documents placed on record by the learned counsel for the respondent, we may observe in the first place that the status as claimed by the petitioner in this writ petition namely, „newly appointed Nokma of Tura town area‟ remains seriously in doubt and the so-called Letter of Approval (Annexure-1), as said to have been issued by the said Smti. Enilla Ch. Marak, wife of late Shri Nethar M. Sangma, Nokma of Danakgre A‟king, purportedly appointing the petitioner as Nokma/Headman of Tura Town Area, appears to be seriously questionable on the very fundamentals.
7PIL No.7 of 2017
Shri Bernard N. Marak v. State of Meghalaya In his celebrated work titled "Principles of Garo Law", which is accepted as a responsible and dependable account of the Garo customary laws, the learned author Shri Jangsan Sangma has stated in the very opening expressions of Chapter IX as under:-
"A Nokma is a person who holds title to the akhing land of village community as head of the clan. He is the first man in his village and as head of the community he has the instinct to preserve the customs. The real owner of the akhing is his wife whose name also finds place in the Geneological record of the Government. The husband becomes nokma by virtue of his marriage with her."
(underlining supplied for emphasis) The learned author, while indicating the limitations on the rights of Nokma, has pointed out that the position of Nokma is like that of guardian and manager of his wife‟s property; and that a person is eligible to claim succession as Nokma of A‟khing only if his wife has a link with the house of the Nokma2 .
We need not elaborate on several other aspects of the principles of Garo customary laws in this matter. Suffice it to notice for the present purpose that the accepted legal position of the Garo customary laws is that the real owner of A‟khing is the lady and her husband becomes Nokma by virtue of his marriage with her. It is not the case of the petitioner that he stands in the capacity of the husband of the said Smti. Enilla Ch. Marak. In fact, it is not the case of anybody that the petitioner has been taken as the husband of the lady who has succeeded the 2 The learned author has, inter alia, stated that,-
"60. NOKMA DOES NOT HAVE RIGHT TO TRANSFER AKING.- The position of a nokma is also like that of a guardian and manager of his wife's property. He and his wife may pass on the akhing to his nokna and nokkrom even during their life time."
And further that,-
"61. PERSON WHEN ELIGIBLE TO CLAIM FOR NOKMASHIP.- A person is eligible to claim succession as nokma of akhing only if his wife has a link with the house of the nokma. But more (sic) link would not give a better title than nokkrom. Where a dispute as to succession is unavoidable by reason of the contestants being equally eligible, the appointment of a nokma of the akhing is done by vote of chras and chatchis (i.e., male and female members of the clan)."8 PIL No.7 of 2017
Shri Bernard N. Marak v. State of Meghalaya A‟khing in question. That being the position, prima facie it is difficult to accede any credibility to the said so-called Letter of Approval (Annexure-
1), as said to have been issued in favour of the petitioner by the said Smti. Enilla Ch. Marak on 02.01.2015.
Further, a look at the documents placed on record by the counsel for the respondent makes out that the said Smti. Enilla Ch. Marak filed a writ petition in this Court in the year 2015, being WP(C) No.115 of 2015, claiming her right as Nokma and seeking to question the notices said to have been issued by the Deputy Commissioner, West Garo Hills to certain persons, alleged to be her lawful occupants. Some such occupants also filed a separate writ petition, being WP(C) No.98 of 2015, alleging themselves to be in possession for almost 40 years and questioning the proceedings adopted by the authorities. A learned Single Judge of this Court found that the dispute as raised in the matter was required to be adjudicated in the appropriate forum, where the petitioners ought to establish their title. It does not appear that the petitioner‟s alleged capacity as Nokma was ever suggested in the said petitions. Interestingly, the said Smti. Enilla Ch. Marak has filed the said Title Suit No.7 of 2017 in the Court of the Assistant to the Deputy Commissioner, West Garo Hills, Tura while stating that she was the Nokma of Danakgre A‟king; and was appointed as Nokma after the demise of the last recorded Nokma namely, Changre Marak Mechik and Najing Sangma Meassa and was registered as such with the District Council on 12.04.2011. There is no suggestion in the said civil suit about the petitioner‟s alleged appointment as Nokma. The material on record also shows that contrary to the claim sought to be made by the petitioner, complaints have been made against his claim as Nokma of Tura town and the Deputy 9 PIL No.7 of 2017 Shri Bernard N. Marak v. State of Meghalaya Commissioner has issued the order under Section 144 CrPC, prohibiting the activities of the office established by the petitioner, (i.e., the office of Tura Nokma Committee).
Further, by way of a representation dated 04.09.2017, Chambugong Mahari Association has questioned the notices said to have been issued by the petitioner, claiming himself as Nokma/Chief of Nokma Committee of Tura; and has alleged that the petitioner was using a fake seal of Nokmaship because the sole Nokma was the said Smti. Enilla Ch. Marak and she was the only authorized person to use the seal. Apart from the above, as noticed, FIRs have also been lodged against the petitioner while questioning his claim of Nokmaship.
We may hasten to observe that none of the disputed facts are proposed to be decided in this order. We have taken note of the facts as placed before us and the fundamentals of the principles of Garo laws to indicate: (1) that the claim of Nokmaship by the petitioner is a matter of serious doubts and disputes; (2) that the dispute regarding a part of the land of A‟khing in question between the Nokma Smti. Enilla Ch. Marak and the State and other authorities is pending adjudication in the civil Court; (3) and that the claim as sought to be made by the petitioner has given rise to serious complaints and FIRs and has led to the prohibitory order by the Deputy Commissioner.
In the sum total of the position aforesaid, and the overall circumstances of the case, it is but apparent that the relief as claimed by the petitioner against GHADC, of not issuing pattas over the A‟khing land in question and for declaring the creation of new plain Mauza X and X-1 as illegal, are not the claims of public at large, but are precisely the claims 10 PIL No.7 of 2017 Shri Bernard N. Marak v. State of Meghalaya in which the petitioner has a direct interest; and hence, this petition is not on behalf of, or for the benefit of, the Garo people at large.
For what has been noticed and observed hereinabove, the obvious deduction is that in order to allege and assert his own rights as also to sub-serve his own interests and to thwart the other legal proceedings, petitioner has chosen to invoke the PIL jurisdiction of this Court. In the given circumstances, challenge to the Act of 1955 with reference to the cited decisions also appears to be an oblique attempt to somehow invoke the PIL jurisdiction of this Court and such a challenge, at the behest of the petitioner, cannot be said to be a bona fide one.
It is but apparent that the present petition is the one in which the petitioner is not guided by any other interest but that of self-gain and the petitioner has no other motive than to assert his own rights. It is also noteworthy that all such facts, as disclosed by the counsel for the respondents, have not been indicated in the writ petition; and we are unable to accept the affidavit of the petitioner that he has not concealed any material information. The petition is, therefore, liable to be dismissed with exemplary costs and other orders against the petitioner.
In the case of State of Uttaranchal vs. Balwant Singh Chaufal and others : (2010) 3 SCC 402, the Hon‟ble Supreme Court enunciated several principles for maintaining purity and sanctity of the PIL jurisdiction and laid down the guidelines so that the genuine and bona fide PILs may be encouraged while the PIL filed for extraneous considerations could be discouraged. The Hon‟ble Supreme Court sadly noted that such an important jurisdiction, carefully carved out and nurtured by the Courts with great care and caution, was blatantly abused by filing some petitions with 11 PIL No.7 of 2017 Shri Bernard N. Marak v. State of Meghalaya oblique motives. The Hon‟ble Supreme Court observed, inter alia, as under :
"143. Unfortunately, of late, it has been noticed that such an important jurisdiction which has been carefully carved out, created and nurtured with great care and caution by the courts, is being blatantly abused by filing some petitions with oblique motives. We think time has come when genuine and bona fide public interest litigation must be encouraged whereas frivolous public interest litigation should be discouraged. In our considered opinion, we have to protect and preserve this important jurisdiction in the larger interest of the people of this country but we must take effective steps to prevent and cure its abuse on the basis of monetary and non-monetary directions by the courts.
144. In BALCO Employees‟ Union v. Union of India, this Court recognized that there have been, in recent times, increasing instances of abuse of public interest litigation. Accordingly, the Court has devised a number of strategies to ensure that the attractive brand name of public interest litigation should not be allowed to be used for suspicious products of mischief. Firstly, the Supreme Court has limited standing in PIL to individuals "acting bona fide". Secondly, the Supreme Court has sanctioned the imposition of "exemplary costs" as a deterrent against frivolous and vexatious public interest litigations. Thirdly, the Supreme Court has instructed the High Courts to be more selective in entertaining the public interest litigations.
145. In S.P. Gupta case - this Court has found that this liberal standard makes it critical to limit standing to individuals "acting bona fide". To avoid entertaining frivolous and vexatious petitions under the guise of PIL, the Court has excluded two groups of persons from obtaining standing in PIL petitions. First, the Supreme Court has rejected awarding standing to "meddlesome interlopers". Second, the Court has denied standing to interveners bringing public interest litigation for personal gain."
(underlining supplied for emphasis) Coming down heavily on the frivolous and groundless filings, particularly by a litigant who would take liberties with the truth or with the procedures of the Court, the Hon‟ble Supreme Court has observed in the case of Dnyandeo Sabaji Naik and Anr. v. Pradnya Prakash Khadekar and Ors. : (2017) 5 SCC 496 as under :
"13. This Court must view with disfavor any attempt by a litigant to abuse the process. The sanctity of the judicial process will be seriously eroded if such attempts are not dealt with firmly. A litigant who takes liberties with the truth or with the procedures of the Court should be left in no doubt about the consequences to follow. Others should not venture along the same path in the hope or on a misplaced expectation of judicial leniency. Exemplary costs are inevitable, and even necessary, in order to ensure that in litigation, as in the law which is practised in our country, there is no premium on the truth.
14. Courts across the legal system - this Court not being an exception - are choked with litigation. Frivolous and groundless filings constitute a serious menace to the administration of justice. They consume time and 12 PIL No.7 of 2017 Shri Bernard N. Marak v. State of Meghalaya clog the infrastructure. Productive resources which should be deployed in the handling of genuine causes are dissipated in attending to cases filed only to benefit from delay, by prolonging dead issues and pursuing worthless causes. No litigant can have a vested interest in delay. Unfortunately, as the present case exemplifies, the process of dispensing justice is misused by the unscrupulous to the detriment of the legitimate. The present case is an illustration of how a simple issue has occupied the time of the courts and of how successive applications have been filed to prolong the inevitable. The person in whose favour the balance of justice lies has in the process been left in the lurch by repeated attempts to revive a stale issue. This tendency can be curbed only if courts across the system adopt an institutional approach which penalizes such behaviour. Liberal access to justice does not mean access to chaos and indiscipline. A strong message must be conveyed that courts of justice will not be allowed to be disrupted by litigative strategies designed to profit from the delays of the law. Unless remedial action is taken by all courts here and now our society will breed a legal culture based on evasion instead of abidance. It is the duty of every court to firmly deal with such situations. The imposition of exemplary costs is a necessary instrument which has to be deployed to weed out, as well as to prevent the filing of frivolous cases. It is only then that the courts can set apart time to resolve genuine causes and answer the concerns of those who are in need of justice. Imposition of real time costs is also necessary to ensure that access to courts is available to citizens with genuine grievances. Otherwise, the doors would be shut to legitimate causes simply by the weight of undeserving cases which flood the system. Such a situation cannot be allowed to come to pass. Hence it is not merely a matter of discretion but a duty and obligation cast upon all courts to ensure that the legal system is not exploited by those who use the forms of the law to defeat or delay justice. We commend all courts to deal with frivolous filings in the same manner."
(underlining supplied for emphasis) In the aforesaid case of Dnyandeo Sabaji Naik, the frivolous petition was dismissed by the Hon‟ble Supreme Court with costs quantified at Rs.5,00,000/-.
In the case of Pradip Kumar Dey v. State of Meghalaya and Ors:
PIL No.4 of 2016 decided on 13.04.2016, this Court has indicated some of the basic duties of a PIL petitioner, and the consequences of a petition wanting in bona fide intent, as under :
"We are constrained to reiterate the fundamental principles that for maintaining the genuine PIL, the petitioner is supposed to carry out basic research in the matter and ought to be forthright while disclosing all the relevant and material facts and particulars. Moreover, the petitioner owes a duty to disclose all the relevant aspects and particulars of previous litigations, whether pending or decided, relating to the subject matter of PIL. Any petition filed without the petitioner attending on these requirements and with the petitioner lacking in forthrightness, obviously, appears to be a petition wanting in bona fide intent and motive; and such 13 PIL No.7 of 2017 Shri Bernard N. Marak v. State of Meghalaya a petition, taking unnecessary toll on the time of the Court, is required to be rejected at the threshold and that too with costs."
(underlining supplied for emphasis) We do not find the present one to be a simple case of the petitioner having chosen the PIL jurisdiction under some misconception. The dealings of the petitioner as placed on record, prima facie, show that the petitioner intends to impose himself as an extra-legal entity over the authorities as also over the Garo customary laws though his proclaimed right is in dispute and he is being duly proceeded against. While applying the principles in the decisions referred hereinabove, we are clearly of the view that for such an attempt wanting in bona fide, the petitioner deserves to be saddled with exemplary costs; and in the interest of public at large, the professed rights by the petitioner deserve to be put in abeyance, while leaving it open for him to take recourse of appropriate remedies to get such rights declared by the competent Court. Such a course, in our view, is necessary not only to penalize the petitioner but also to emphatically reiterate that while a bona fide PIL for the benefit of the public at large may be entertained by the Court on being satisfied of the cause but, at the same time, a PIL filed only for the purpose of sub-serving the personal cause of the petitioner and which stands rather at conflict with public interest, is treated as the grossest abuse of the process of law and entails penal consequences.
In view of the above, we find no reason to take up for adjudication the issues relating to the validity of the Garo Hills District (Transfer of Land) Act, 1955 in this petition and at the instance of the petitioner but would keep such issues open to be taken up at the appropriate occasion in an appropriate petition.
14PIL No.7 of 2017
Shri Bernard N. Marak v. State of Meghalaya Subject to the observations foregoing, this petition is dismissed with costs quantified in the sum of Rs.1,00,000/- (Rupees One lakh only). Apart from costs against the petitioner, it is also provided that the operation and effect of the alleged Letter of Approval (Annexure-1) as also any notice issued by the petitioner shall remain in abeyance until the petitioner is able to establish his rights in a competent Court of law in regular proceedings. In the interest of justice, however, it is made clear that dismissal of this writ petition with costs and other directions shall not be of any impediment in the petitioner taking up the proceedings in accordance with law. It is also made clear that we are not pronouncing on the merits of the issues relating to the validity of the Act of 1955 and such issues shall remain open to be examined in the appropriate proceedings at the appropriate stage.
The petitioner shall deposit the amount of costs within 30 (thirty) days from today with the Deputy Commissioner of West Garo Hills, Tura. If the petitioner fails to deposit the amount of costs within 30 days from today, the Deputy Commissioner, West Garo Hills shall take all necessary steps for recovering the same. After such deposit/recovery, the said Deputy Commissioner shall forward this amount of costs to the Meghalaya State Legal Services Authority for utilizing the same for legal aid to the needy people of Garo Hills.
JUDGE CHIEF JUSTICE Sylvana