Bombay High Court
Kailash S/O Baliram Pawar And Ors. vs State Of Maharashtra on 13 February, 2003
Equivalent citations: 2003(2)MHLJ929
Author: R.S. Mohite
Bench: R.S. Mohite
JUDGMENT R.S. Mohite, J.
1. This is an appeal which seeks to quash and set aside the judgment and order passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Pusad on 24-10-2001 in Sessions Trial No. 84/93, by which the present appellants (hereinafter referred to as the accused Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 4) have been convicted for an offence punishable under Sections 498-A and 304-B read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code. For the offence under Section 498-B of the Indian Penal Code, they have been sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for three years and to pay fine of Rs. 2000/- each and in default to suffer further rigorous imprisonment for six months. For the conviction under Section 304-B of the Indian Penal Code, they have been sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for a period of seven years and to pay a fine of Rs. 5,000/- each and in default to suffer further rigorous imprisonment for the period of one year.
2. The brief facts of the prosecution case are as under:
(A) The deceased Sangita was a daughter of one Laxman Kisan Solanke (P.W. 1). She was married with accused No. 1 Kailash in or about the year 1990.
After her marriage, Sangita went to reside in the house of accused No. 1 at village Bori. Accused Nos. 2, 3 and 4 were residing in the same house. Accused No. 2 Baliram was the father-in-law of Sangita, accused No. 3 was her mother-
in-law and accused No. 4 Kondba Baliram Pawar was younger brother of accused No . 1. Sangita resided happily in the house of the accused persons for the period of two years.
(B) It is a case of the prosecution that after a period of two years, her husband i.e. the accused No. 1 Kailash started asking Sangita to obtain a welding machine for him. Sangita disclosed this to her father (P.W.1) when she visited her house on the occasion of Diwali. Her father purchased the welding machine and gave the same to accused No. 1. He had purchased the said machine for Rs. 2,800/-. After this incident for a period of about 1 month to 11/4 months Sangita again resided happily in her marital home.
(C) After about l1/2 months of the aforesaid incident, it is the prosecution case that accused No. 1 Sangita came to the house of P.W. 1 Laxman and asked him to pay Rs. 2,000/-. P.W.1 Laxman Kisan refused to fulfil this demand and send accused No. 1 and Sangita back. It is contended that because of this, accused No. 1 and Sangita were unhappy with P.W.1 Laxman.
(D) It is the prosecution case that during the festival of Shivratri, Sangita again visited her father's house at Ambhora. That, during this visit, Sangita asked her father as to whether he had arranged for the money to which P.W.1 informed his daughter that he had not been able to arrange the money so far. It is his case that because of this Sangita became upset and returned to her matrimonial house.
(E) It is a case of the prosecution that Sangita was being harassed by her family members on account of non-payment of money and she used to be abused in filthy language.
(F) It is the prosecution case that some time thereafter P.W. 1 Laxman went to fetch his daughter back from her marital home. There accused Nos. 1 and 2 are said to have asked him as to whether he has brought the money. On his replying in the negative, accused Nos. 1 and 2 did not send Sangita with her father.
(G) Eight days after this incident, accused No. 2 and one Vitthal Pawar came to the house of P.W.1 Laxman. P.W.1 Laxman told to accused No. 2 and Vitthal that he was trying to raise money from his mother-in-law Rukhma (P.W.2) and that after he raised the money, payment would be made to accused No. 2 and Vitthal.
(H) P.W.1 Laxman then went to his mother-in-law and demanded money from her. The prosecution case is that when he went to his mother-in-law, accused No. 1 and Vitthal accompanied him. His mother-in-law told them that she was about to receive money from the sale of land and after receipt of such money, she would effect the payment to Laxman. That, however thereafter the mother-in-law of P.W. 1 Laxman did not make the payment due to which accused No. 2 and Vitthal went away in a state of anger. P.W.1 Laxman stayed at the house of her mother-in-law and at about 11 p.m. Vitthal Rathod came with a jeep at the house of his mother-in-law and told P.W.1 Laxman that Sangita was burnt.
(I) P.W.1 Laxman then went to see his daughter at the Government Hospital. Sangita was then alive but she did not say anything. She had suffered 80% burn injury and on the next day morning she died. The accused took away the dead body of Sangita and performed the funeral at village Bori.
(J) On 31-3-1993, after the death of Sangita, an F.LR. of accidental death No. 7/93 was registered at Police Station, Pusad under Section 174 of Criminal Procedure Code. In the said F.I.R. it was mentioned that the accused persons provoked Sangita to commit suicide and subjected her to cruelty by harassing her to bring an amount of Rs. 2,000/- from the house of her parents and thereby committed an offence punishable under Sections 306 and 498-A read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code.
(K) On 2-4-1993, on the basis of certain investigation made in the accidental death case, an F.I.R. came to be lodged by P.W.3 Abdul Gani Sheikh, P.S.I., Police Station, Pusad against all the four accused.
(L) After the completion of investigation, charge sheet came to be filed and the matter was committed to the Sessions Court for the trial.
(M) At the trial, the prosecution examined three witnesses; i.e. P.W.1 Laxman (father of the deceased), P.W.2 Rukhma (maternal grand mother of the deceased) and P.W.3 P.S.I. Abdul Gani Sheikh. The postmortem report was admitted in the evidence by consent under Section 294 of the Criminal Procedure Code. Based upon the ocular and documentary evidence produced by the prosecution, the Sessions Court passed the impugned judgment and order which has been challenged in the present appeal.
3. The contention on behalf of the learned advocate for the accused could be summarised as follows :
(a) That, there was no evidence whatsoever against the accused Nos. 3 and 4 save and accept the vague and general statement made by P.W.1 to the effect that accused Nos. 1 to 4 were harassing Sangita. It was contended that admittedly no demand has been made by accused Nos. 3 and 4. It was contended that a single line appearing in the examination-in-chief of P.W.1 to the effect that accused Nos. 1 to 4 were harassing Sangita was devoid of any particulars about the manner, date or time of the harassment.
(b) It was contended that as far as accused No. 2 was concerned, the evidence was that he had accompanied Vitthal Rathod to the house of P.W.1 Laxman to ask for money and that accused No. 2, Vitthal and Laxman had then gone to Kali-Tembhi to the house of mother in law i.e. P.W.2 Rukhma. That at Kali-Tembhi, the mother-in-law was supposed to have promised to pay money after selling her land after which the accused No. 2 and Vitthal were said to have returned home in an angry mood. The contention based upon suggestion made to P.W.1 Laxman and also to P.W.2 Rukhma was that there was an independent transaction relating to sale of property of accused No. 2 to Rukhma. That though Rukhma had denied that she had purchased the field of accused No. 2 in her cross examination her own son-in-law P.W.1 Laxman had admitted that he had signed a "Soudachitthi" between accused No. 2 and Rukhma, as a witness. It was contended that, therefore it could not be said that the demand of money was related to dowry, but could have been a demand of money due to accused No. 2 by virtue of sale of his land to Rukhma.
(c) To hold that the death of Sangita was a suicidal death, it was contended that unless the death was unnatural i.e. either homicidal or by way of suicide, the provisions of Section 304-B of the Indian Penal Code would not be attracted. It was contended that in the present case, the accidental nature of death of Sangita could not be ruled out. It was contended that it was the express defence of the accused that Sangita had accidentally caught fire when she was preparing tea, during which there was a flare up of the stove. It was contended that to prove this fact, the defence had adduced the evidence of one Govinda Rama Shinde (D.W.1). The learned advocate for the accused states that the police had recorded statement of Govinda as a person who had extinguished the fire on the body of Sangita. It was brought to my notice that D.W.1 had stated that he and one Istekhar had extinguished the fire on the body of Sangita and upon being asked by these witnesses as to how she got burnt, Sangita is said to have told him that she was preparing tea and because of flaring up of the stove, she caught fire. It was brought to my attention that though this witness was not examined as prosecution witness and though in his cross examination by the State, D.W.1 reaffirmed that he had stated to the police in his statement that Sangita had disclosed to him that she caught fire because of flaring up of the stove while preparing tea and had stated that he cannot assign any reason as to why the aforesaid facts were not recorded by the police in his statement, in fact, there was no omission because P.W.3 P.S.I. Abdul Gani Sheikh had admitted in his evidence that he had recorded the statement of D.W.1 Govinda as well as of one Vitthal Mithu Rathod and both these witnesses had stated in their statement that when they were extinguishing fire on the body of Sangita, Sangita had told them that she had caught fire because of the flaring up of the stove. From the spot panchanama dated 31-3-1993 it was evident that at the place of offence, a stove appearing black and burnt rags of shreds of petticoat were found. Similarly one cup and german container in which there was water for tea was found near the stove. It was contended that finding of these articles corroborated the defence version that Sangita caught fire by way of an accident. The argument was that the burden of proving that the death of Sangita was unnatural, was on the prosecution and to discharge this, the prosecution would also have to prove that the death of Sangita was not by way of an accident. In the alternative it was contended that even if the burden was on the accused, the accused had discharged that burden by bringing on record the material evidence which indicated that the death of Sangita was in fact an accident.
(d) As regards the accused No. 1, it was secondly contended that the demand of welding machine and of Rs. 2,000/- could not be said to be dowry because there was nothing on record to show that the said demand was made in connection with the marriage of the parties.
4. On behalf of the prosecution it was contended that on a reading of Section 304-B of the Indian Penal Code read with Section 113-B of the Indian Evidence Act it cannot be said that there was any burden on the prosecution to prove that the death of Sangita was not an accidental death. It was contended that under Section 304-B of the Indian Penal Code, the prosecution was only required to prove that the death was due to burns. Once this was done, the prosecution must be said to have discharged its burden. It was contended that once a demand was 'made after the marriage, the said demand must be said to be made in connection with the marriage because the said demand was based upon the factum of the marriage. It was contended that it was not necessary to prove any agreement of giving dowry,
5. As regards the accused Nos. 3 and 4, it appears that there is absolutely no evidence to show that they had made any dowry demand. There is a single line of general nature appearing in the evidence of P.W.1 Laxman to the effect that the accused Nos. 1 to 4 were harassing Sangita. In his entire evidence, he has not spelt out as to how or when accused Nos. 3 and 4 were harassing Sangita. In fact, he talks about visits of Sangita to his place on festivals like Diwali and Shivratri and it is not his case that during each or at any time, any complaint was made by Sangita about accused Nos. 3 and 4. Accused Nos. 3 and 4 were not connected in any way with the demand of welding machine which said to have been made by accused No. 1 or with the demand of money said to have been subsequently made by accused No. 2. Merely on the basis of this single statement to the effect that accused Nos. 1 to 4 were harassing Sangita, a conviction cannot be sustained because there was no details as to the manner or date of harassment.
6. It is well settled that under Section 304-B of the Indian Penal Code mere harassment cannot be the basis of conviction and it has to be dowry related harassment. It is also well settled that even if there is dowry relating harassment, the same has to be "soon before her death". These ingredients, according to me are not proved. In absence of nature or details of the alleged cruelty, I am inclined to hold that even the offence under Section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code can be said to have proved against them, in my opinion, the appeal has to be allowed against accused Nos. 3 and 4 on this ground alone.
7. Coming to accused No. 2,1 am inclined to give him benefit of doubt for the reasons that the defence has managed to prove on record the fact that there was an independent property transaction whereby accused No. 2 had sold his field to P.W.2 Rukhma. No doubt, Rukhma has feigned ignorance of such transaction, but her son-in-law P.W.1 Laxman admitted that he was witness on a "Soudachitthi" relating to the property transaction between accused No. 2 and P.W.2 Rukhma. If indeed, accused No. 2 had sold his field to P.W.2 Rukhma, then he would definitely be entitled to receive the consideration for sale of his field. The evidence of P.W. 1 Laxman is totally vague on the question as to how much money was demanded by the accused No. 2 from him or for what purpose the said money was being demanded. In my opinion, in view of the vagueness of the evidence of P.W. 1 Laxman, the benefit of doubt must go to accused No. 2 and the appeal will also be liable to succeed against accused No. 2 on this count.
8. It was contended that if the death of a person is accidental then a conviction under Section 304-B cannot be sustained because an accidental death can have no nexus with a demand for dowry. It was contended that, therefore the burden of proving that the death was not an accidental death, it would lie upon the prosecution. It was contended that it is well settled that in Criminal Law the burden from the prosecution never shifts and the prosecution must prove all the ingredients of the crime. As stated hereinabove, the prosecution contended that on a plain reading of section, all that was required to be proved by the prosecution was that the death was caused due to burns and that once death was shown to be by burns, then subject to proving other ingredients of Section 304-B, even if the burns were caused by accident, yet the provisions of Section 304-B would be attracted. Since this is an important point, I have given anxious consideration to the contentions made by both the sides. In order to appreciate the contentions, it would be necessary to reproduce both the relevant sections i.e. 304-B of the Indian Penal Code as well as 113-B of the Indian Evidence Act and for the sake of convenience, they are reproduced hereinunder :
304-B. Dowry death.--(1) Where the death of a women is caused by any burns or bodily injury or occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances within seven years of her marriage and it is shown that soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband for, or in connection with any demand for dowry, such death shall be called "dowry death", and such husband or relative shall be deemed to have caused her death."
113-B. Presumption as to dowry death.--When the question is whether a person has committed the dowry death of a woman and it is shown that soon before her death such woman has been subjected by such person to cruelty or harassment for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, the court shall presume that such person had caused the dowry death.
9. On first blush, on reading of Section 304-B it appears that if the death of a women is caused by any burns or bodily injury or occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances, and is within seven years of the marriage and it is shown that it is because of dowry related harassment soon before her death, it can be said to be a dowry death. However to my mind, the interpretation that even accidental death caused by burns without there being nexus with any dowry and which is completely unrelated and having no nexus with dowry related harassment can lead to absurdity. If such an interpretation is accepted then a woman who may have been subjected to dowry related harassment but who died due to burn injuries accidentally caused say during a vacation could entail a conviction under Section 304-B of the Indian Penal Code upon her husband and relatives. In my opinion this was never the intention of the Legislature while introducing Section 304-B of the Indian Penal Code. Apart from the fact that Section 304-B is titled "dowry death" suggesting that there must be a clear nexus between the demand for dowry and the death, the very wording of this Section suggest that in order to attract the provisions of Section 304-B, the death must be as a consequence of dowry related cruelty or harassment soon before the death of a woman. This can be gathered from the use of conjugative word "and" between the clauses describing the manner of death and the clauses describing the manner and requirement of dowry related harassment. Unless such a nexus between dowry related cruelty, harassment and the consequent death exists then in my opinions/no person may be convicted under Section 304-B of the Indian Penal Code, as would be the case in an accidental death.
10. That would bring us to the next question which is relating the burden of proof. In a criminal case, it would be correct to say that the burden would normally be on the prosecution and the prosecution would be required to prove all the ingredients of the crime. But, in the case of Section 304-B of the Indian Penal Code it appears that in view of Section 113-B of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, when a question is raised as to whether a woman has committed dowry death and the prosecution case is that soon before her death such woman had been subjected to cruelty or harassment for, or in connection with demand of dowry, the Court will presume that such person had caused the dowry death. In my opinion, in view of such presumption, once dowry related cruelty or harassment is alleged to exist soon before the death of a woman, all that the prosecution will be required to prove in relation to the nature of the death is that the death was due to burns or bodily injury or had occurred otherwise than in normal circumstances within seven years of the marriage of a woman. In view of the presumption under Section 113-B of the Indian Penal Code, (sic : Evidence Act,) the Court will presume that the death was a dowry death. The burden then will shift to the accused and it will be open for him to raise the defence of the death being accidental in nature. Needless to say that he may prove his defence either through defence evidence or may even rely upon the prosecution evidence if the same appears to be supportive of his defence. It will be open for him to rebut the presumption under Section 113-B by the aforesaid means as the presumption under Section 113-B is ultimately an rebuttal presumption. It is further well settled that the burden upon the accused to prove his defence will not be "beyond reasonable doubt" and it would be sufficient for him to prove the same through the preponderance of possibility".
11. Having held so, I must proceed to hold that in the present case accused No. 1 has in fact succeeded to discharge his lesser burden to prove his defence. This he has done by examining D.W.1 Govinda, who was the person who admittedly extinguished Sangita when she had caught fire and who states in his evidence that at the time of extinguishing fire, Sangita told him that she had been set on fire due to flare up of the stove while preparing tea. It appears that another person by name of Vitthal Rathod was also present, but he has not been examined by either parties. Be that as it may, P.S.L Abdul Gani Sheikh categorically admitted in his evidence that he had recorded the statement of witness Vitthal as well as D.W.1 Govinda to the effect that Sangita had disclosed to them that her burns were caused due to an accident and that both had in fact, in their police statement disclosed that the death was accidental and due to the flare up of the stove. Apart from this, the scene of the offence panchanama indicates that a blackened stove, one cup and a german container in which there was water for tea was found near the stove. In my opinion, this raises doubt as to whether the death was by suicide and makes alive a possibility that the death may have been due to an accident. In the facts of this case, in my opinion, the burden of proving the defence that the death was an accidental can be said to have been discharged by the present accused and therefore, the conviction of accused No. 1 under Section 304-B will also have to be set aside.
12. An attempt was made to argue that the demand for dowry could not be said to be in connection with the marriage of the parties within the meaning of Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. It was argued that under the definition of dowry, any property or valuable security was required to be given or agreed to have been given either directly or indirectly, but in the present case the demand cannot be said to be a dowry demand as there was no agreement to give such money. This argument has to be mentioned only to be rejected. Although the point has now been rendered academic in view of my finding on the earlier issue, nevertheless, this contention made on behalf of the advocate for the appellants is no longer res integra and reference to a judgment decided by the Apex Court in the case of State of H. P. v. Nikku Ram and Ors., , will suffice. In paras 8 to 13 the Apex Court observed as follows:
"Before coming to the offence under Section 306, we have felt called upon to say a few words about the view taken by the trial court on the question that the demands of television, electric fan etc., after Roshani had been given, in marriage, could not be "dowry"; so, Section 304-B was not attracted in any case. This view was taken because as per the explanation to Sub-section (1) of Section 304-B, the word "dowry" has the same meaning as in Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. The learned trial court noted in this connection the judgment of learned Single Judge of Delhi High Court in Inder Sain v. State in which it was held that to constitute dowry the valuables demanded or given must be as "consideration for the marriage". The learned Judge then opined that only those articles are dowry which are given or agreed to be given for solemnization of marriage; and anything given after marriage is only for a happy matrimonial relationship and would not be dowry. As the demands in the present case had been made after the marriage, the trial court concluded that the same would not be dowry.
We have two observations to make. The first is that the meaning of the word "dowry" was examined as it had stood before the same was amended, first by Act 63 of 1984 and then by Act 43 of 1986. As we shall presently note, these two amendments have altered the definition of dowry in a significant way. Our second observation is that even on the basis of the definition as it stood when the decision in Inder Sain was rendered, it would not have been said that anything given after marriage could not be dowry.
We shall first take up the second facet. A perusal of the judgment shows that dowry had been defined at the relevant time as under. It "means any property or valuable security given or agreed to be given either directly or indirectly--
(a) by one party to a marriage to the other party to the marriage; or (b) by the parents of either party to the marriage or by any other
person, to either party to the marriage or to any other person, at or before or after the marriage as consideration for the marriage of the said parties, but does not include dower or Maher in the case of persons to whom the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) applies."
Despite the aforesaid definition having stated that the property or valuable security given or agreed to be given has to be as "consideration for the marriage", demands made after the marriage could also be a part of the consideration, according to us, because an implied agreement has to be read to give property or valuable securities, even if asked after the marriage, as a part of consideration for marriage. When the Dowry Prohibition Act was enacted, the Legislature was well aware of the fact that demands for dowry are made, and indeed very often, even after the marriage has been solemnized, and this demand is founded on the factum of marriage only. Such demands, therefore, would also be, in our mind, as consideration for marriage.
The definition as amended by the aforesaid two Acts does not however leave anything to doubt that demands made after the solemnization of marriage would be dowry. This is because the definition as amended reads as below :
"In this Act "dowry" means any property or valuable security given or agreed to be given either directly or indirectly--
(a) by one party to a marriage to the other party to the marriage; or (b) by the parents of either party to a marriage or by any other person, to either party to the marriage or to any other person,
at or before or any time after the marriage in connection with the marriage of the said parties, but does not include dower or Maher in the case of persons to whom the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) applies."
The aforesaid definition makes it clear that the property or the valuable security need not be as a consideration for marriage, as was required to be under the unamended definition. This apart, the addition of the words 'any time" before the expression "after the marriage" would clearly show that -even if the demand is made long after the marriage the same could constitute dowry, if other requirements of the section are satisfied."
13. Further in the case of Pawan Kumar v. State of Harayana, , the Apex Court made the following observations:
"The offence alleged against the appellants is under Section 304-B, Indian Penal Code which makes "demand of dowry" itself punishable. Demand neither conceives nor would conceive of any agreement. If for convicting any offender, agreement for dowry is to be proved, hardly any offenders would come under the clutches of law. When Section 304-B refers to "demand of dowry", it refers to the demand of property or valuable security as referred to in the definition of "dowry" under the 1961 Act. It was argued on behalf of the appellants that mere demand of scooter or fridge would not be a demand for dowry. We find from the evidence on record that within a few days after the marriage, the deceased was tortured, maltreated and harassed for not bringing the aforesaid articles in marriage. Hence the demand is in connection with marriage. The argument that there is no demand of dowry, in the present case, has no force. In cases of dowry deaths and suicides, circumstantial evidence plays an important role and inferences can be drawn on the basis of such evidence. That could be either direct or indirect. It is significant that Section 4 of the 1961 Act, was also amended by means of Act 63 of 1984, under which it is an offence to demand dowry directly or indirectly from the parents or other relatives or guardian of a bride. The word "agreement" referred to in Section 2 has to be inferred on the facts and circumstances of each case. The interpretation that the appellant seeks, that conviction can only be if there is agreement for dowry, is misconceived. This would be contrary to the mandate and object of the Act. "Dowry" definition is to be interpreted with the other provisions of the Act including Section 3, which refers to giving or taking dowry and Section 4 which deals with penalty for demanding dowry, under the 1961 Act and the Indian Penal Code. This makes it clear that even demand of dowry on other ingredients being satisfied is punishable, This leads to the inference, when persistent demands for TV and scooter are made from the bride after marriage or from her parents, it would constitute to be in connection with the marriage and it would be a case of demand of dowry within the meaning of Section 304-B, Indian Penal Code. It is not always necessary that there be any agreement for dowry.
Reverting to the present case, the evidences of the aforesaid PWs are very clear. After a few days of the marriage, there was demand of scooter and fridge, which when not being met led to repetitive "taunts and maltreatment. Such demands cannot be said to be not in connection with the marriage. Hence the evidence qualifies to be demand for dowry in connection with the marriage and in the circumstances of the case constitutes to be a case falling within the definition of "dowry" under Section 2 of 1961 Act and Section 304-B, Indian Penal Code."
14. From the aforesaid observations of the Apex Court, it is clear that it is sufficient for the prosecution to prove that there was dowry related harassment or cruelty soon before the death of the woman. It will not be necessary for the prosecution to show that the demand was as a part of any agreement. As observed by the Apex Court, such an agreement is implied and that once the factum of marriage is proved, a demand made upon the wife would in fact be a demand based upon the factum of marriage and would, therefore be "in connection with the marriage" within the meaning of Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961.
15. Having said this, I must also place on record that I am alive to the observations of the Apex Court in the case of Satvir Singh v. State of Punjab, in which the Apex Court has held that; certain customary payments in connection with the events after the marriage; such as birth of child or other ceremonies are not enveloped within the ambit of 'dowry'. If it is the prosecution case that demands made after the marriage related to such customary payments are dowry demands, then obviously the prosecution case under Section 304-B must fail. It would be a possible defence for the accused to show that the payments made were in the nature of such customary payments.
16. As regards the conviction of accused No. 1 for the offence punishable under Section 498-A, Indian Penal Code I am in agreement with the findings of the trial Court. There is sufficient material on record to show that accused No. 1 was making unlawful demands relating to property and that would amount to a cruelty within the meaning of Section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code. I see no reason to disagree with the findings of the trial court or with the sentence awarded for an offence punishable under Section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code. However, in the light of my findings above, I find that there is no material for conviction under Section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code in respect of accused Nos. 2, 3 and 4.
17. In the net result, the appeal is partly allowed. The conviction of all the accused for the offence punishable under Section 304-B read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code is quashed and set aside. The conviction of accused Nos. 2, 3 and 4 for the offence punishable under Section 498-A, of the Indian Penal Code is also quashed and set aside. The conviction of accused No. 1 Kailash s/o Baliram Pawar for an offence punishable under Section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code and sentence imposed upon him is confirmed. Fine if any, paid in respect of the sentence imposed upon all the accused under Section 304-B read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code to be refunded. Similarly, fine if any, paid by the accused Nos. 2, 3 and 4 for conviction under Section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code to be refunded. The bail bonds of accused Nos. 3 and 4 shall stand cancelled.