Gujarat High Court
Jal Sampatti Parivar Cooperative ... vs State Of Gujarat And 3 Ors. on 27 December, 2006
Equivalent citations: (2007)2GLR2310(GJ), AIR 2007 (NOC) 1685 (GUJ.)
Author: Jayant Patel
Bench: Jayant Patel
JUDGMENT Jayant Patel, J.
1. The short facts of the case are that the petitioner is a Cooperative Society of the employees of Gujarat State Narmada Water Resources Department. Its members are the employees working in the office of the Water Resources Department of the State Government. As per the petitioner, it had applied for allotment of the land for its members, to the District Collector and the State Government, bearing Final Plot No. 42, 51 and 142 of T.P. Scheme No. 12 of Village Adajan. However, the application of the petitioner was not granted. In the meantime, the order has been passed by the District Collector for allotment of the land admeasuring 3739 sq. mtrs., to respondent No. 3 Society bearing Final Plot No. 42 of T.P. Scheme No. 12 and, therefore, under these circumstances, the petitioners have preferred the present petition for the relief, inter alia, to declare the decision of the respondent authority of not to allot the land of Final Plot No. 42, 51 and 142 of T.P. Scheme No. 12 of village Adajan (hereinafter referred to as 'the lands in question') and for appropriate direction to the respondents to grant the lands in question to the petitioner society. The petitioners have also prayed to declare that the allotment of the land of Final Plot No. 42 of T.P. Scheme No. 12 admeasuring 3739 sq. mtrs. (hereinafter referred to as the 'land bearing T.P. No. 42') as illegal and ultra vires.
2. Special Civil Application No. 10390 of 1999 is preferred by the original holders of the land, which was acquired by the State Government under the Land Acquisition Act for irrigation department of the State Government. As per the said petitioners, after the acquisition, the land is not used for the purpose for which it was acquired and, therefore, the said petitioners moved the application to the authority for allotment of the land/return of the land in the year 1998, however, pending the said process the land bearing T.P. No. 42 was already allotted to Respondent No. 3 Society and, therefore, under these circumstances, the said petitioners have approached this Court for challenging the Government Resolution dated 14.12.1998 for allotment of the land of F P No. 42 to respondent No. 3 Society as per the order Annexure 'D' to the said Special Civil Application read with the order Annexure 'E' passed by the District Collector based on the order of the State Government for allotment of the land of F.P. No. 42. It is also prayed by the petitioners that the land bearing F.P. No. 42 be regranted to the petitioners being the original owners of the land, whose lands were acquired.
3. I have heard Ms. K.T.A. Mehta, learned Counsel for the petitioners of SCA No. 3193 of 1999 and Mr. A.J.Patel, learned Counsel for the petitioners of SCA No. 10390 of 1999. I have also heard Mr. Toliya, learned Counsel for some of the petitioners of SCA No. 10390 of 1999. I have also heard Mr. Desai, learned AGP for the State Authorities, Mr.S.B.Vakil, learned Counsel with Mr. K.K. Trivedi, learned Counsel and Mr. N.K. Majmudar, learned Counsel for the concerned Societies, who has been allotted the lands.
4. In the matter of allotment of the land, which can be said as State largesse, by the Government or the awarding of the contract by the Governmental authority, the law by now is well settled. The normal principle applicable to all such administrative action of the State Government is that the opportunity should be given to all eligible persons and the decision may be taken by the competent authority thereafter to allot the land or to grant contract. However, such is not an invariable rule in every case, but can be said as the normal rule, where the departure is permissible in exceptional or extraordinary cases. At this stage the reference may be made to the decision of this Court in case of Mahendra B. Shah v. State of Gujarat and Anr. reported in 1992(2) GLH, 93 and the observations made by this Court at para 11(a), after taking into consideration by the decision of the Apex Court, are as under:
11(a) From the aforesaid observations of the Supreme Court in the aforesaid case it becomes clear that in the filed of entrustment of contract or distribution of largesse the Government cannot act arbitrarily, unreasonably or contrary to public interest. Ordinarily, therefore, issuance of the public advertisement or invitation to the public at large to participate in the tender enquiry or to offer their competitive bids is the ideal methods which would exclude the charge of picking and choosing or discrimination and which would be consistent with public interest. However, the aforesaid method of selecting the recipients of largesse or parties for entrustment of contract is not the only method or is not the invariable rule. There may be other considerations, which render it reasonable and in public interest to adopt other methods of distribution of largesse or entrustment of contract. Firstly, there might be considerations of implementation of some directive principles of State policy, where the object of the Government is not to earn revenue, but is to carry out the welfare scheme for the benefit of a group or section of people deserving it. Secondly, the distribution of largesse or entrustment of the contract was urgently required to be done and the process of issuing public advertisement and inviting offers and processing such offers would not be consistent with the emergency of the project. Thirdly, special expertise, technical or scientific know-how and experience spread over a period of time are the need of the project, which can be had by referring to or inviting parties having reputation for such technical or scientific know-how and inviting offers from public at large, therefore, becomes redundant or meaningless. Fourthly the policy decision is taken to have the recipient of a largesse from amongst a particular class inasmuch as the project or contract or services to be offered are maintained for that class alone and the person well-versed in the said filed can be had from that class alone. Fifthly, there may be compelling reasons necessitating departure from the rule of public auction or public advertisement and when such reasons for the departure are rational and/or suggestive of no discrimination. A variety of considerations may operate in the minds of the authorities taking the decision and if considerations, which have weighed with the authority are reasonable and in public interest it would be open to the Govt. to formulate its policies based on an infinite variety of considerations and there might be number of contingencies that the usual and normal method of issuing public advertisement and inviting offers from the public at large may be dispensed with. An exhaustive enumeration of such considerations is well-nigh impossible but it can be said that it is ultimate policy decision of the Govt. which is required to be weighed in the Golden Scale and if such policy decision is found to be reasonable, rational and not opposed to public policy and not suggestive of any discrimination, transaction shall have to be upheld.
5. Therefore, in the ordinary circumstances, unless the departure is found to be satisfactory to the Court in view of the particular circumstances, all similarly situated persons must be allowed to compete with in the matter of getting of tender or government contract and such will be the position for distribution of the government largesse, which would include the allotment of the land to the citizen or a class of the citizens or the institution as the case may be. Therefore, it can be said that the normal mode by the Government for allotment of the government land would be by giving opportunity to all similarly situated and eligible persons. Though such rule is applicable in normal circumstances, it is not a sine qua non, but the departure therefrom is permissible in a given case, if the fact situation so warrants and is found reasonable by the Court also while undertaking the judicial scrutiny to such an action.
6. There are various tests while undertaking the judicial scrutiny to an administrative action of the State Authorities, more particularly in the matter of grant of contract or distribution of public largesse. It would be profitable to make reference to the decision of the Apex Court in case of Tata Cellular v. Union of India , where in a matter of grant of contract or acceptance of tender, after considering the various aspects, at para 113 the Apex Court has deduced the principle as under:
(a) The modern trend points to the judicial restraint in administrative action.
(b) The Court does not sit as a Court of Appeal but merely reviews the manner in which the decision was made.
(c) The Court does not have the expertise to correct the administrative decision. If a review of the administrative decision is permitted it will be substituting its own decision, without the necessary expertise which itself may be fallible.
(d) The terms of the invitation to tender cannot be open to judicial scrutiny because the invitation to tender is in the realm of contract. Normally speaking, the decision to accept the tender or award the contract is reached by process of negotiations through several tiers. More often than not, such decisions are made qualitatively by experts.
(e) The Government must have freedom of contract. In other words, a fairplay in the joints is a necessary concomitant for an administrative body functioning in an administrative sphere or quasi-administrative sphere. However, the decision must not only be tested by the application of Wednesbury principle of reasonableness (including its other facts pointed out above) but must be free from arbitrariness not affected by bias or actuated by mala fides.
(f) Quashing decisions may impose heavy administrative burden on the administration and lead to increased and unbudgeted expenditure.
7. In view of the aforesaid decision of this Court as well as of the Apex Court, the legal position, which can be deduced is that in normal circumstances, when the Government largesse is to be distributed, the opportunity is required to be given to all interested eligible persons, but such principle is not a sine qua non in every case and the departure therefrom is permissible, considering the special policy for a special benefit or for a particular class. However, the aforesaid aspect is coupled with the additional circumstances that if the procedure is expressly provided for a particular action of distribution of government largesse the same is normally to be followed, unless an extraordinary case permitting departure therefrom in a particular facts and circumstances are demonstrated to the satisfaction of the Court. At this stage, the reference to Rule 42 of the Gujarat Land Revenue Rules is appropriate and the same reads as under:
Grant of Land for non-Agricultural Purpose 42: Disposal of the land for building and other purposes:- Unoccupied land requirement or suitable for building sites or other non-agricultural purpose shall ordinarily be sold after being laid out in suitable plots by action to the highest bidder whenever the Collector is of opinion that there is a demand for land for any such purpose; but the Collector may in his discretion, dispose of such land by private arrangement, either upon payment of a price fixed by him, or without charge, as he deems fit.
The reference may be made to the decision of the Apex Court in case of Parashram Thakur Dass and Ors. v. Ram Chand and Ors. , wherein the Apex Court had an occasion to consider the effect of more or less similar provision for disposal of rights in Nazul Land vide Rule 26 of the Rules read with the provisions of Section 149 of M.P. Land Revenue Code. In the said case, Rule 26(1) read as under:
Leasehold rights in nazul land shall be disposed of by public auction, except when in any particular case the State Government or as the case may be the Collector considers that there is good reason for granting the land without auction.
8. Thereafter, the Apex Court further observed at para 9, inter alia, as under:
It seems indisputable that under the Rules as a general principle leasehold rights in nazul land are to be disposed of by public auction. If in any particular case the State Government or, as the case may be, the collector considers that there is good reason for grant the land without auction the reasons must be recorded in writing. The existence of good reason for departing from the general principle, and the recording of the reason in writing are essential prerequisites which must be satisfied before leasehold rights are granted without auction.
9. In my view, even for the purpose of exercise of the power under Rule 42 read with the Gujarat Land Revenue Rules read with the provisions of Bombay Land Revenue Code, the first part for disposal of the land by auction and offering the same to the highest bidder is with the same manner, but so far as the latter part of the Rule 42 is concerned, even if the Collector has to exercise the discretion to dispose of the land by private arrangement, such discretion can be exercised only in extraordinary circumstances permitting departure from the ordinary course to be adopted by disposal of the property and such extraordinary circumstances and consequent action based on the same must be rational and reasonable, keeping in view the policy of the Government for such purpose, which meets with the test of Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
10. If the matter is examined to consider the fact situation of the petitioners of SCA No. 3193 of 1999, it appears that the petitioner society did apply for allotment of the land bearing final plot Nos. 42, 51 and 142 in capacity as the society of Government employees. It appears that the requests of the petitioners were not accepted earlier on 16.8.1993 on the ground that the land is required for other Government purpose. Thereafter on 4.12.1995, it was rejected without stating the ground and subsequently on 10.2.1999 on the ground that the lands are useful for the purpose of consideration of Government building and, therefore, cannot be allotted to the petitioner society. It is true that in the earlier correspondences the demand was made by the petitioner Society for allotment of the land bearing F.P. Nos. 42, 51 and 142 and in the communication of the District Collector dated 6.8.1993, it has not been specifically provided for a particular number of final plot required for the other government purpose and such is the position even in the communication dated 4.12.1995. Whereas in the communication dated 10.2.1999, the final plots referred are 142 and 51 and there is no reference to final plot No. 42, which is the land allotted to respondent No. 3 Society. It also appears that the petitioner society applied for allotment of the land without there being any public auction in view of the policy prevailing of the State Government. Therefore, if the society of a government employees, approaches before the Court for allotment of the land without holding public auction, the Court may not issue a mandamus to the Government for such purpose since the policy cannot be read as a statutory obligation on the part of the State Government, but the ground of rejection of the application by the State Government that the land is required for public other purpose and thereafter the action of the allotment of the land to respondent No. 3 Society, that too, without holding public auction, speaks for ex-facie arbitrariness in the matter of allotment of the land to respondent No. 3 society. Therefore, such an action can be said as an arbitrary action and without proper application of mind.
11. Even if the matter is considered on the basis that any Coop. Society of the Government employees may not be entitled to seek a mandamus from this Court directing for allotment of the land to it without holding of the public auction, such society like petitioner would be entitled to participate at the public auction in the event the government has taken decision for disposal of the land to the Cooperative Societies for residential purpose. Such right in normal circumstances can be claimed by all eligible citizens, who are interested to purchase the land or who are interested for allotment of the land in their favour. Therefore, right to be considered at the allotment is a valuable right of all eligible persons, when the Government is to allot the land to a particular class of citizens or the persons for a particular purpose. In addition to the above, as per the Scheme of the Code read with the Rule 42, keeping in view of the aforesaid decision of this Court as well as of the Apex Court, it does appear that it was required for the State Government to undertake the process for disposal of the land bearing F.P. No. 42 by public auction in normal circumstances.
12. On behalf of the State Government the affidavit in reply is filed by the Collector, Surat and in the said affidavit no statement is made or material is produced to support or to justify the departure from the normal principles of disposal of the land by public auction. The tenor of the affidavit in reply is that as the application was made by respondent No. 3 for allotment of the land, the same is processed, recommended and the State Government has approved the said proposal. Even in the impugned orders dated 14.12.1998 and 10.2.1999 passed by the State Government for allotment of land to respondent No. 3, copy whereof is produced at Annexures V and VI, there is no reference whatsoever for showing the circumstances justifying the departure from the normal procedure for allotment of the land by public auction. Therefore, in absence of any extraordinary circumstances, permitting departure from the normal principles of allotment of the land by public auction, it can be said that the action of the allotment of the land by the Government is ex-facie arbitrary and without considering the normal principles of allotment of the land and, therefore, without application of mind on the grounds, which were germane to the exercise of power under Rule 42 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code. If the case of the petitioners of SCA No. 10390 of 1999 is considered, it appears that it is not in dispute that the petitioners are the original holder of the lands whose lands are acquired for irrigation project of the State Government. As per Clause 328 of Land Acquisition Manual, upon which the reliance is placed by the learned Counsel for the petitioners, it does appear that vide second para of Clause 328(1), it has been provided that if after acquisition of the land for non-agricultural purpose, if there is no special reason, the same can be allotted to the persons, who were having interest or who were holding the lands and from whom the lands are acquired, at a price, compensation, or the prevailing market price, whichever is more. Therefore, as per the policy provided in the Land Acquisition Manual, the matter can be considered for the allotment of the lands to the original holders from whom the lands were acquired if after acquisition the lands are not used for such non-agricultural purpose or are not required for any other public purpose. However, the price for allotment of the land will be the prevailing market price.
13. It is not in dispute that the lands, which were acquired from the petitioners are not used for the public purpose. It is true that as per the communication made by the District Collector with the petitioners of SCA No. 3193 of 1999, it has been stated that the land is required for other public purpose. Therefore, if the lands are required for other public purpose, the petitioners cannot assert as of right that the lands be reallotted. The question of considering the claim for the allotment of the lands to the persons whose lands are acquired may arise only if the Government takes the decision for disposal of the lands. It may be that the lands may not be required for the existing public purpose, but the Government is not prevented from retaining the lands, keeping in view the future public purpose also. However, if the Government forms the opinion that the land is not required for the purpose for which the lands were required or for any other public purpose or for any other future public purpose, it may take decision for disposal of such land. At that stage, the question may arise for considering the claim of the eligibility by the persons whose lands are acquired. In view of the reasons recorded hereinabove in earlier paragraphs, while considering the aspects of normal procedure to be adopted by the Government for disposal of the public property, the holding of public auction is a normal procedure to be followed. At that stage, if the State Government has taken decision for allotment of the lands to a particular class of the persons or citizens for a better public purpose to be achieved indirectly, and if the original holders of the land, whose lands were acquired, are falling outside the zone of consideration even at the public auction, at that stage, they may raise the grievance for denying for consideration at the time of allotment and such decision may be subject to judicial scrutiny and if ultimately the decision of the Government found reasonable, the decision may not be interfered with. Therefore, the right as contemplated in the Land Acquisition Manual can be read only to the extent of making grievance in the event the original holders of the lands are excluded from the zone of consideration provided the Government has taken decision that the lands are to be disposed of by public auction to the public at large and the lands are not required for any public purpose for the present or in future.
14. Such right in no circumstances can be stretched to the extent of seeking a mandamus to the Government for regrant of the land to the original holder of the land. As observed earlier, even if the right is accepted for consideration at the time of disposal and if the original holder of the land is fulfilling the eligibility criteria for allotment of the land, they may apply and participate at the auction and at that stage between the same amount of the offer at the public auction in light of the policy of the Government a priority to the original holder of the land may prevail, but such right also cannot be read to cause serious loss to the public revenue or public exchequer, which ultimately and consequently would defeat the public purpose.
15. In the present case it is not in dispute that the land has been allotted to Respondent No. 3 Society by the State Government without considering the application of the petitioners, who were original holders of the land. It is neither the case of the State Government that on account of the said policy of the Government for a particular class a departure from the normal principle was made. Therefore, the original allottee of the land even otherwise also would be entitled to participate at the auction in the event the land is to be disposed of by the State Government to the eligible persons or citizens. At that stage, if the offer received of the petitioners is of the same amount as being offered by the other citizens i.e. other than the persons whose lands are acquired, the matter may be required to consider for the allotment to the petitioners on priority basis since the lands belonging to the petitioners were acquired and, as observed earlier, the right can be read to that extent.
16. Under the above circumstances as, in any case, the lands have been disposed of by the District Collector with the approval of the State Government to respondent No. 3 Society without holding public auction the fact remains that the application of the petitioners for allotment is not considered or, in any case, the petitioners are kept outside the zone of consideration at the time of allotment of the land, may be by public auction or by private negotiation. Therefore, it can be said that the impugned decision of the State Government is arbitrary and without properly considering the relevant circumstances, which were germane to the exercise of the power under the Bombay Land Revenue Code read with the Rule 42 of the Gujarat Land Revenue Rules read with the policy contained in the Land Acquisition Manual.
17. The question incidentally may arise for consideration is the scope and ambit of the direction to be issued by this Court in the event it is found by this Court that the decision for the allotment of the land by the State Government to respondent No. 3 is arbitrary and without proper application of mind. It may be recorded that when the petition came to be considered by the Court for the first time it was at a stage when not only the allotment was already made to the respondent No. 3, but it further appears that the amount of Rs. 37,39,000/- on the tentative valuation of Rs. 1,000/- per sq. mtrs., was already deposited, subject to the finalization of the price by the District Valuation Committee and the possession of the land as per respondent No. 3 was handed over. However, in view of the interim order passed by this Court, no construction is made and the land has remained as it is.
18. Mr.Desai, learned AGP, by relying upon the file of the District Collector, declared before the Court that pending the petition the District Valuation Committee has finalized the valuation of the land in question at Rs. 2,500/- per sq. mtrs. and consequently the respondent No. 3 Society will be required to deposit the difference at the rate of Rs. 1,500/- per sq. mtrs., total Rs. 66,08,500/-, but as the matter is pending and the interim order was passed, the communication is deferred by the District Collector.
19. Mr.Vakil and Mr.Trivedi, learned Counsel for respondent No. 3, in response thereto, submitted that the amount may be required to be deposited since, in any case, the valuation was to be finalized and if the valuation is of Rs. 2,500/- made by the District Valuation Committee, respondent No. 3 is ready to deposit Rs. 66,08,500/- on the basis of difference of Rs. 1,500/- per sq. mtrs. It was also submitted that if the order of the State Government is maintained, respondent No. 3 has no objection in depositing such amount. Be as it may, but it appears that the valuation as prevailing even as per District Valuation Committee of the land in question was Rs. 2,500/- per sq. mtr., whereas the allotment made is at Rs. 1,000/- per sq. mtr. If both the prices are considered, the allotment came to be made and the approval came to be granted by the State Government at the lesser amount of Rs. 66,08,500/-, even as per the valuation finalized by the District Valuation Committee of the land as on 20.4.1999.
20. The learned Counsel appearing for respondent No. 3 attempted to submit that the District Valuation Committee itself had valued the land at Rs. 1,000/- per sq. mtrs. on 2.5.1998 and as per the conditions of the allotment order, since the allotment is finalized by the District Collector on 10.2.1999 and as the District Valuation Committee has made assessment on 20.4.1999 in the next meeting the difference of Rs. 1,500/- has accrued. He submitted that even otherwise also the respondent No. 3 was bound by the conditions of allotment and, therefore, the revaluation made on 20.4.1999 may not be termed as the valuation of the land in the year 1998 when the proposal came to be made by the District Collector. I am afraid such contention can be accepted as it is on the face of it. In any event, the valuation made by the District Valuation Committee on 2.5.1998, which was made as a basis for forwarding of the proposal was Rs. 1,000/- per sq. mtrs., and even prior to the expiry of one year the reassessment was made of Rs. 2,500/-. Such two circumstances go to show that there was no proper valuation on the aspects of market price when the first proposal came to be made on 2.5.1998 or, in any case, if the valuation is assessed of Rs. 2,500/- in April, 1999, the allotment on the face of the proposal in April, 1998 at the rate of Rs. 1,000/- per sq. mtrs., would be ex-facie arbitrary, without proper verification of not only the valuation, but had the allotment maintained as it was, it would have caused huge loss to the public revenue of Rs. 66,08,500/-. Therefore, it would be an additional circumstance to interfere with the order passed by the State Government for allotment of the land to Respondent No. 3 without holding public auction.
21. It may be that at the time of public auction the land may fetch higher valuation and if the appreciation from 2.5.1998 at the rate of Rs. 1,000/- is considered with the valuation on 20.4.1999 at the rate of Rs. 2,500/-, it may be very high at the prevailing market price in comparison to the price at which the land is allotted by the Government in favour of respondent No. 3. As such if ultimately the order for allotment of the land is found as illegal by this Court, the benefit pursuant that may not accrue in favour of the person, who is party to receive the benefit of such illegal order. However, the situation in the present case is slightly different inasmuch as the Court is required to consider the matter at a stage where the amount of Rs. 37,39,000/- was already deposited by respondent No. 3 and the possession was already handed over to respondent No. 3. If the valuation as on 20.4.1999 is considered as it is, then in that case, respondent No. 3. May be required to deposit Rs. 66,08,500/- and the highest amount or the net amount, which may be realised would be of Rs. 2,500/- per sq. mtrs. of the land in question. In my view, even if this Court is inclined to interfere with the arbitrary decision of the State Government for allotment of the land in absence of any sufficient material produced on record of the action taken with intention to cause loss to the public revenue and to confer such benefit to respondent No. 3 and this Court considers the matter to set aside the order for allotment, it would be just and proper to issue appropriate direction in the manner by balancing the rights of the parties, but by ensuring that no loss is caused to the public revenue on account of, inter se, dispute between the parties to the proceedings, who are interested for allotment of the land. Further, in the event the land is to realise the higher amount and respondent No. 3 is required to part with the land, no loss will be caused to the public revenue since the amount is to be realised, in any case, higher in comparison to the price to be received from respondent No. 3 pursuant to the impugned order. Therefore, under such circumstances, respondent No. 3 would be entitled to get back the amount with reasonable interest.
22. In view of the aforesaid the impugned orders passed by the State Government dated 14.12.1998 and the by District Collector dated 8-10.2.1999 for allotment of the land of F.P. No. 42 and quashed and set aside with the direction as stated hereinafter:
(a) In the event the Government decides not to dispose of the land by public auction, respondent No. 3 will be entitled to the refund of the amount of Rs. 37,39,000/- with the interest at the rate of 9% from the date of deposit until the actual refund by the Government.
(b) In the event the Government decides to dispose of the land, it would be required for the Government to hold the public auction of the land in question and at that stage the petitioner of SCA No. 3193 of 1999 as well as of SCA No. 10390 of 1999 shall be entitled to apply and participate at the auction by submitting their respective offers and even respondent No. 3 shall also be entitled to apply and participate at the auction. In view of the price assessed at Rs. 2,500/- per sq. mtrs., on 22.4.1999, it would be open to the Government to reassess the upset price prior to the public auction, but the same, in any case, will not be less than Rs. 2,500/- per sq. mtrs.
(c) While considering the offer of the petitioner together with the other eligibile person, the observations made by this Court in its judgement qua the petitioner of SCA No. 10390 of 1999 shall be considered for giving priority at equal amount of the offer and the auction may be finalized in accordance with law.
(d) At the auction if the offer of the respondent No. 3 is not accepted and the land is allotted to any other persons including the petitioners of both the petitions or other eligible person, within a period of 30 days from the finalization of the auction, the amount of Rs. 37,39,000/- with interest at the rate of 9% from the date of deposit until actual refund shall be returned to respondent No. 3 by the District Collector.
(e) In the event the offer is made by respondent No. 3 at the auction, it would be open to respondent No. 3 to claim adjustment of the amount of Rs. 37,39,000/-, in the requisite deposit as per the conditions of the auction.
23. The other reliefs prayed by the petitioners in both the petitions are not granted. Petitions are partly allowed. Rule made absolute in terms of the aforesaid order and the directions. Considering the facts and circumstances, there shall be no order as to costs.