Delhi District Court
Santosh Kumar vs Sh. Sunil Kumar (Deceased) on 19 January, 2021
IN THE COURT OF MR. DHARMESH SHARMA
PRINCIPAL DISTRICT & SESSIONS JUDGE/RCT: WEST DISTRICT
TIS HAZARI COURTS: DELHI
RCT No. 26/2019
CNR No. DLWT01-003316-2019
In re:
Santosh Kumar
S/o Sh. Kalu Ram
R/o T-577/1, Baljit Nagar,
New Delhi-110008 . . . . . . Appellant
Versus
Sh. Sunil Kumar (deceased)
Through his LRs
1. Manish @ Sonu (Son)
2. Priyanka @ Jyoti (Daughter)
Both R/o T-417/2, Ground Floor,
Baljit Nagar, New Delhi-110008 . . . . . . Respondents
Date of filing appeal : 26.04.2019
Date of hearing arguments : 05.01.2021
Date of Judgment : 19.01.2021
CROSS-OBJECTIONS/MISC. APPLICATION NO. 311/2019
CNR No. DLWT01-004378-2019
Date of filing : 30.05.2019
Date of hearing arguments : 05.01.2021
Date of Judgment : 19.01.2021
RCT-26/2019 & M-311/19 Page 1 of 19
Appearances:
Mr. Rama Shanker, Advocate for the appellant.
Mr. Gurpreet Singh Sethi, Advocate for the respondent.
JUDGMENT
1. This common judgment shall decide the above-noted appeals preferred by the appellant under Section 38 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, as amended up to date (hereinafter referred to as the 'DRC Act'), as also the Miscellaneous case, which is cross- objections/appeal filed by the Legal representatives of the deceased respondent, whereby the appellant, claiming himself to be the landlord, has assailed the impugned Judgment dated 27.10.2018, passed by the Court of Sh. Rajinder Singh, the then Ld. Senior Civil Judge-cum-Rent Controller, (West), THC, Delhi (hereinafter referred to as the Ld. Trial Court) in petition bearing E.No. 26236/16, whereby the eviction petition under Section 14 (1) (a) of the DRC Act was dismissed. The appeal as also the cross-appeal filed by the parties raise common question of law and facts and for that reason comes this common judgment.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
2. Briefly stated, the appellant in the present appeal, initially filed a petition seeking eviction of the respondent on the ground under Section 14(1)(e) read with Section 25-B of the DRC Act and under section 14(1)(a) of the DRC Act. The petition under Section 14 (1) (e) of the DRC Act was, however, dismissed vide judgment dated 08.04.2011 and an order under Section 15(1) of the DRC Act was passed. On the death of the respondent in May-2011, his LRs were impleaded in his RCT-26/2019 & M-311/19 Page 2 of 19 place vide order dated 03.10.2011. As the order under Section 15(1) of the DRC Act was not complied with, an eviction order was passed against the LRs of the deceased respondent vide order dated 25.11.2011. However, an application under Order IX Rule 13 CPC preferred on behalf of LRs of the deceased respondent, the same was allowed vide order dated 20.08.2004.
3. It is in the said contextual background that we come to the present case, where the petitioner claimed that deceased respondent has been a tenant under him in respect of a room, kitchen, latrine and bathroom at the ground floor without roof rights in premises bearing No. T-417, Ground Floor, Baljit Nagar, New Delhi-110008, as shown red in the site plan Ex.PW-1/5 at monthly rent of Rs. 2500/- in terms of Rent Agreement dated 14.08.2008 Ex.PW-1/4 and later marked 'A' for identification. His grievance was that the respondent was a habitual defaulter in payment of rent and was not paying the rent, and therefore, legal notice dated 12.03.2009 Ex.PW-1/6 was duly served upon him to pay the arrears of rent w.e.f. 14.08.2008 onwards at the aforesaid rate but the same went in vain.
4. The petition for eviction was contested by the respondent, who inter alia denied the relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties and it was stated by him in his defence that the premises in question was sold to him for a total consideration of Rs. 2,50,000/- and a sum of Rs. One Lakh was paid to the petitioner, who executed 'Agreement to Sell' dated 02.06.2006 Ex.RW-1/1 in his favour RCT-26/2019 & M-311/19 Page 3 of 19 simultaneously handing over the possession to him; and that thereafter a sum of Rs. 70,000/- was paid by the respondent to the petitioner on 14.07.2006 vide receipt Ex.RW-1/3 and the remaining amount of Rs. 30,000/- was agreed to be paid to the petitioner on fulfilling his promise to get the seepage of the premises repaired and on clearance of the outstanding water and electricity bills. It was the case of the respondent that there arose some dispute with regard to the aforesaid repairs but finally the dispute was amicably resolved and the petitioner then executed an agreement to sell, GPA, receipt of payment, possession letter, affidavit and Will, all dated 24.11.2010, which are Ex.PW-1/D-1 to D-9 (also marked RW-1/8 to RW-1/12) and it was denied that any rent agreement dated 15.07.2008 was executed between the parties and the same was claimed to be forged and fabricated.
EVIDENCE LED BY THE PARTIES
5. During the course of trial, the petitioner came in the witness box and he tendered his affidavit in evidence dated 21.02.2015 Ex.PW-1/A. He also examined one Ram Jas Chaurasia as PW-2, who filed his affidavit in evidence Ex.PW-2/A, who deposed that the petitioner was the owner of the property in question and required the same for his bona fide residence since he was living under the tenancy of his deceased wife Smt. Prem Lata in FK-39, Block FK, Shastri Nagar, Delhi. Both the witnesses were duly cross-examined by the learned Counsel for the respondent.
RCT-26/2019 & M-311/19 Page 4 of 196. On behalf of the LRs of deceased respondent, Ms. Priyanka @ Jyoti i.e. daughter of deceased respondent filed her affidavit in evidence dated 09.03.2018 Ex.RW-1/1 and she was also cross-examined by the learned Counsel for the petitioner. The parties examined no other witnesses. I shall delve upon the evidence of the parties later on in this judgment.
IMPUGNED JUDGMENT
7. Ld. Trial Court vide impugned judgment found that the petitioner failed to produce the original rent deed nor moved any application for leading secondary evidence with regard to Mark 'A'; and that the petitioner did not cross-examine RW-1 with regard to documents viz. agreement to sell, possession letter and affidavit dated 02.06.2006 Ex.RW-1/1 to Ex.RW-1/3 respectively nor RW-1 was cross- examined with regard to documents of sale that are Ex.RW-1/8 to Ex.RW-1/8 to RW-1/12 except for simply denying his signatures on the aforesaid documents. Ld. Trial Court observed that title of the petitioner to the tenancy premises was not in dispute since the respondent was admitting that he had purchased the same from him but at the same time, the documents Ex.RW-1/1 to Ex.RW-1/12 did not transfer any right, title or interest in the immovable property from one living person to another. Ld. Trial Court further suo motu embarked on exercise to compare the signatures of the petitioner on the documents Ex.RW-1/1 to Ex.RW-1/3 with the documents that are Ex.RW-1/8 to Ex.RW-1/2 and found that the signatures were prima facie dissimilar on such comparison; and that the documents Ex.RW-1/8 to Ex.RW-
RCT-26/2019 & M-311/19 Page 5 of 191/12 were executed without any attesting witness and hence, it was observed that the documents relied upon by the respondent became doubtful.
8. All said and done, the Ld. Trial Court found that the legal notice dated 12.03.2009 Ex.PW-1/6 bore the address 'T- 417/2, Ground Floor, Baljit Nagar', whereas the registered AD Card Ex.PW-1/9 and postal receipt Ex.PW-1/10 bore the address '417/2, Ground Floor, Baljit Nagar'. It was found that the GPA, agreement to sell and receipt Ex.PW-1/1 to Ex.PW-1/3 relied upon by the petitioner clearly mentioned that address '417/2' was prefixed with the alphabet 'T' and thus it was not possible to invoke presumption under Section 27 of the General Clauses Act. Therefore, finding that the legal demand notice had not duly been served upon the respondent, the petition under Section 14 (1) (a) of the DRC Act was dismissed.
GROUNDS OF APPEAL
9. The appellant has assailed the impugned judgment inter alia on the grounds that the ld. Trial Court failed to appreciate that he had placed on record the electricity bills in his name while the respondent failed to show any electricity bills in his name after the alleged purchase of the property; and that the Ld. Trial Court failed to appreciate that respondent had not lodged any complaint against the alleged forged rent agreement and merely because the petitioner did not lodge any complaint with the police on misplacing the rend deed cannot be a ground to disbelieve his case; and that once the Ld. Trial RCT-26/2019 & M-311/19 Page 6 of 19 Court observed that the documents relied upon by the respondent did not transfer any title in his favour, he ought to have held that the respondent was occupying the premises in the capacity of tenant; and that once the petitioner claimed that documents relied upon by the respondent were forged and fabricated, onus shifted upon the respondent to prove the genuineness of the documents Ex.RW-1/1 to Ex.RW-1/12, which onus he failed to discharge; and that the respondent did not examine any independent witness with regard to execution of alleged documents.
CROSS-APPEAL
10. In so far as the cross-appeal filed by the LRs of deceased respondent, there is challenge to the findings given by the Ld. Trial Court as to the existence of relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties and the finding recorded by the Ld. Trial Court with regard to the purchase of the property by the respondent; and it is agitated that the Ld. Trial Court failed to appreciate that the entire claim of the petitioner was false and bogus, and that he had miserably failed to show the relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties.
DECISION
11. I have given my thoughtful consideration to the submissions made by the Ld. Counsel for the parties. I have also carefully perused the Trial Court record and the record of the present appeal.
RCT-26/2019 & M-311/19 Page 7 of 1912. It would be expedient to reproduce the relevant provisions of Section 14 (1) (a) of the DRC Act for our better understanding, which goes as under:
Section 14 (1) (a) of the DRC Act provides as under:-
"Section 14 : Protection of tenant against eviction - (1) Not withstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law or contract, no order or decree for the recovery of possession of any premises shall be made by any Court or Controller in favour of the landlord against a tenant.
Provided that the Controller may, on an application made to him in the prescribed manner, make an order for the recovery of possession of the premises on one or more grounds only.
Section 14 (1) (a) : that the tenant has neither paid nor tendered the whole arrears of the rent legally recoverable from him within two months of the day on which a notice of demand for the arrears of rent has been served of him by the landlord in the manner provided in Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1881 (4 of 1882)."
13. It is well settled that in order to prove a case under Section 14 (1) (a) of the DRC Act, the Landlord has to show that;
i) There is relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties;
ii) That the tenant has failed to pay or tender the whole of the legally recoverable arrears of rent within two months of the service of demand notice upon him by the landlord.
14. The core to the applicability of Section 14 (1) (a) of the DRC Act is relationship of the landlord and tenant between the parties. The term 'Landlord' is defined by Section 2 (e) of the DRC Act to mean "a person who, for the time being is receiving, or is entitled to receive, the rent of any premises, whether on his own account or on account of or on behalf of, or for the benefit of, any or who would so receive the rent or be entitled to receive the rent, if the premises were let to a RCT-26/2019 & M-311/19 Page 8 of 19 tenant." A landlord may or may not be the owner of the premises let out to a tenant. When a landlord is the owner, he can demand and collect rent from the tenant in his own right to reap the benefit of his property. The term 'tenant' is explained by Section 2(l) of the DRC Act, which contains an exhaustive definition. It sufficiently states that a tenant "means a person by whom or on whose account or behalf rent of any premises, is, or, but for a special contract, would be, payable. It also means any person continuing in possession after the termination of his tenancy."
15. Reverting back to the instant case, in so far as the issue as to whether the petitioner was the owner of the subject property - the same is beyond any dispute since there was no challenge to the GPA, agreement to sell and the receipt Ex.PW-1/1 to Ex.PW-1/3 respectively, each dated 11th day of November, 2004 executed in favour of the petitioner by the erstwhile owner, whereby he became owner and took over the possession of the subject premises. As a matter of fact, even the deceased respondent or for that matter his LRs do not deny the title of the petitioner to the subject property as it has been acknowledged that the deceased respondent had purchased the subject property from the petitioner.
16. Having established that the petitioner was indeed the owner of the subject property, elementary as it may look, the primary burden of proving that the subject property was leased out to the deceased respondent was upon the petitioner. At the outset, the RCT-26/2019 & M-311/19 Page 9 of 19 petitioner miserably fails to substantiate that the subject property was leased out to the respondent in the manner that has come out in the pleadings and in his evidence. First thing first, PW-1 in his cross- examination conceded that in response to the notice from the respondent dated 15.12.2008, he had sent a reply through his counsel Sh. Ashok Kumar, Advocate dated 12.03.2009 Ex.PW-1/D-10 (also Ex.RW-1/7). A bare reading of which would show that the petitioner acknowledged that the Agreement to sell had been executed between the parties in respect of the property bearing No. T-417/2, Ground Floor, Baljit Nagar, Delhi, for a total sale consideration of Rs. 2,50,000/-; and further conceding that Rs. One lakh had been paid out of the sale consideration up to 26.06.2006.
17. However, thereafter in the same reply dated 12.03.2009, the petitioner gave a new twist to the story alleging that the respondent did not honour his commitment to pay the balance amount despite repeated requests and demand; and thus on intervention of the respectable persons of the locality and to maintain good relations with the respondent, he returned the advance amount to him and the rent agreement dated 14.08.2008 was executed between them creating a tenancy in favour of the respondent @Rs.2,500/- per month. Ex facie, the said stand taken by the petitioner in his reply dated 12.03.2009 Ex.PW-1/D-10 (also Ex.RW-1/7) to then learned Counsel for the respondent is in patent contradiction to his stand during the course of the trial that no agreement to sell dated 02.06.2006 was ever executed and the respondent was inducted as a tenant.
RCT-26/2019 & M-311/19 Page 10 of 1918. Secondly, Ld. Trial Court rightly observed that except for a bald denial about his signatures on the sale documents marked Ex. RW1/1 to RW1/12,, the petitioner failed to make a convincing case that he never executed the customary documents for sale of the property Ex.RW-1/1 to Ex.RW-1/3 in favour of the respondent. Ld. Trial Court has also rightly observed that the petitioner did not give any challenge to the testimony of RW-1 in her cross-examination with regard to execution of latter documents of sale which are dated 24.11.2010 Ex.RW-1/8 to Ex.RW-1/12, whereas PW-1 in his cross-examination was duly confronted with each of such documents which were marked Ex.PW-1/D-1 to Ex.PW-1/D-8 and except for a bald denial, there was nothing further so as to put any cloud over the execution of the said documents.
19. In the said context, it is also pertinent to point out that although the petitioner engaged the services of Sh. Deepak Jain, B.Sc. CFSC (DU), who was claimed to be a Handwriting Expert and he had sought opinion as to whether the documents dated 24.11.2010 marked Q-1 to Q-12 bore his signatures and it was rather a favourable report in his favour. Although an affidavit of the said Handwriting Expert in evidence was filed but the said witness was not produced by the petitioner for his examination for the reasons unknown, and for which an adverse inference has to be drawn against the petitioner that had he chosen to examine the so called Handwriting Expert, things might not have gone in his favour.
RCT-26/2019 & M-311/19 Page 11 of 1920. When such was the oral and documentary evidence on the record, it is not fathomable as to why the Ld. Trial Court on its own embarked upon to compare the signatures of the petitioner on the documents dated 02.06.2006 Ex.RW-1/1 to Ex.RW-1/3 and make a comparison with the latter documents dated 24.11.2010 Ex.RW-1/8 to RW-1/12 and also with other material on the record. It appears as if the Ld. Trial Court swayed by the lackluster manner in which the parties led the evidence, attempted to surgically examine the disputed signatures of the petitioner with the admitted documents, which disposition to my mind was unpalatable or uncalled for since the petitioner elected not to challenge his purported signatures on such documents. Therefore, the observation by the Ld. Trial Court that the respondent was duty bound to explain the differences with regard to the pattern of the signatures of the petitioner or any dissimilarities therein, cannot be sustained in law as RW-1 was never called upon to testify on that aspect.
21. Thirdly, the petitioner not only failed to produce the original of the Rent Agreement dated 14.08.2008 Mark 'A' but also chose not to lead any secondary evidence with regard thereto. PW-2 examined by the petitioner was a not an attesting witness to the said document and his assertion that respondent was a tenant under the petitioner is not backed by any personal knowledge as about the terms and conditions of the alleged tenancy between the two. Thus, the petitioner has miserably failed to show that the deceased respondent was initially inducted as a tenant. At the cost of repetition, his reply dated 15.12.2008 Ex.PW-1/D-10 (also Ex.RW-1/7) categorically reflects RCT-26/2019 & M-311/19 Page 12 of 19 that the respondent was inducted in the capacity of a buyer into the premises. There is no iota of evidence that rent was ever demanded by the petitioner from the deceased respondent or ever paid by him. There is no evidence that any rent receipts were ever issued. There is substance in the findings recorded by the Ld. Trial Court that the legal demand notice dated 12.03.2009 Ex.PW-1/6 was not correctly addressed. In the said scenario, it is difficult to discern that the respondent was initially induced as a tenant into the subject property or later his status was changed to that of a buyer.
22. In the view of the aforesaid discussion, the evidence brought on record clearly brings out that the deceased respondent was inducted as a buyer of the property by the petitioner and the respondent was handed over the possession of the subject property on or about 02.06.206. Indeed, the documents Ex.RW-1/8 to RW-1/12 or for that matter the earlier documents dated 02.06.2006 Ex.RW-1/1 to RW-1/3 did not per se transfer any right, title or interest in the premises in favour of the deceased respondent. However, I cannot but agree more with the submission by the learned Counsel for the LRs of the respondent to the effect that the respondent was protected by the aspect of part performance as provided under Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (herein after referred as the 'TP Act'). For our better understanding, let us examine section 53-A & 54 of the TP Act which go under:
"53A. Part performance.--Where any person contracts to transfer for consideration any immoveable property by writing signed by him or on his behalf from which the terms necessary RCT-26/2019 & M-311/19 Page 13 of 19 to constitute the transfer can be ascertained with reasonable certainty, and the transferee has, in part performance of the contract, taken possession of the property or any part thereof, or the transferee, being already in possession, continues in possession in part performance of the contract and has done some act in furtherance of the contract, and the transferee has performed or is willing to perform his part of the contract, then, notwithstanding that 2[***] where there is an instrument of transfer, that the transfer has not been completed in the manner prescribed therefor by the law for the time being in force, the transferor or any person claiming under him shall be debarred from enforcing against the transferee and persons claiming under him any right in respect of the property of which the transferee has taken or continued in possession, other than a right expressly provided by the terms of the contract: Provided that nothing in this section shall affect the rights of a transferee for consideration who has no notice of the contract or of the part performance thereof.]
54. "Sale" defined.--''Sale" is a transfer of ownership in ex- change for a price paid or promised or part-paid and part- promised. Sale how made.--3Such transfer, in the case of tan- gible immoveable property of the value of one hundred rupees and upwards, or in the case of a reversion or other intangible thing, can be made only by a registered instrument. 1In the case of tangible immoveable property of a value less than one hundred rupees, such transfer may be made either by a regis- tered instrument or by delivery of the property. Delivery of tangi- ble immoveable property takes place when the seller places the buyer, or such person as he directs, in possession of the prop- erty. Contract for sale.--A contract for the sale of immoveable property is a contract that a sale of such property shall take place on terms settled between the parties. It does not, of itself, create any interest in or charge on such property."
23. A bare perusal of section 54 of the TP Act would show that a mere contract for sale of immovable property is in the nature of a personal obligation of the parties that a sale of such property shall take place as per the terms and conditions settled between them. It does not create any right, title or interest in the immovable property. However, RCT-26/2019 & M-311/19 Page 14 of 19 the preceding section 53-A of the TP Act protects a buyer of the immovable property who has acquired its possession by virtue of fulfilling his part of the duties or obligations contained in a contract for sale of the immovable property. In the case of Annamalai Gounden vs Venkatswami Naidu, AIR 1959 Mad 354, a legal issue was raised as to whether the plea of the tenant to invoke section 53-A of the TP Act can be entertained in eviction proceedings under the relevant rent laws. Examining the scope and ambit of section 53-A of the TP Act, it was observed as under:
"The first question for determination is whether the conditions laid down in Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act have been fulfilled to enable the petitioner to rely upon the doctrine of part performance. It is true that before Section 53-A was introduced by the Transfer of Property Amendment Act of 1929, the law in this country did not enable the defendant in an action for ejectment to resist the action merely on the ground that he had obtained a contract for sale or the property.
The decision of the Privy Council in Ariff v. Jadunath Mazumdar, 58 Ind App 91: (AIR 1931 PC 79) which laid down this, proposition, has been reaffirmed by the Privy Council in Pit Bus v. Mohamed Tahar, 67 Mad LJ 865: (AIR 1934 PC 235). But both these decisions dealt with the law as it stood before the Amendment of 1929. After the amendment of the Transfer of Property Act in 1929, which introduced Section 53-A, a defendant in a suit for ejectment is entitled to rely upon his contract for transfer, provided the conditions mentioned in that section are fulfilled. A point was raised by the learned counsel for the first respondent whether Section 53-A would apply to a case where the instrument in question relied upon by the defendant was only an agreement or contract to transfer and not an inchoate deed of transfer. "
24. Incidentally in the aforesaid cited case, a plea was taken that a mere agreement of sale or for that matter a decree for specific RCT-26/2019 & M-311/19 Page 15 of 19 performance by itself would not create any right or title in the property in view of Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, and a decision in Hakim Enayat Ullah v. Khalil Ullah Khan, AIR 1938 All 432 was cited this effect. Repelling such plea, it was observed that :
"The point for decision is not whether the agreement to sell obtained by the petitioner in this case creates an interest in the immoveable property, but whether it creates a right in him to possession of the property for resisting the claim for ejectment made by the landlord first respondent. If the conditions stipulated in Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act are fulfilled, it cannot he denied that the landlord would be helpless in a civil court if he resorted to that court for evicting the petitioners. There is no dispute that the contract for sale had been performed In part in this case and that it is supported by consideration. The other requirement whether the petitioner was allowed to continue in possession of the property, in part- performance of the contract is not also in doubt, because, at the time when the contract of sale was entered into, the term of tho lease has expired and the landlord was free to enforce his claim for possession, subject of course to the provisions of the Madras Cultivating Tenants Protection Act. It is obvious that, till the contract of sale was entered into, the petitioner only occupied the position of lessee. But, after the date of the contract and after it was performed in part by consideration being paid for the contract and the landlord allowing the tenant to remain in possession by reason of the new status created under the contract, it was no longer open to the landlord to contend that the right of possession claimed by the petitioner was referable to the contract of lease. There can be no doubt in this case that the conditions laid down in Section 53-A of the Transfer of Pro-party Act are fulfilled even though a contract to sell alone was obtained. No authority was cited for the contention that a deed of transfer should have been obtained by petitioners, before they could invoke Section 53-A. Indeed the very language of the section is against such a contention. The question whether this defence would he open in a proceeding for eviction under the Madras Cultivating Tenants Protection Act is really beside the point, because, the moment possession is taken or continued under the contract of sale, the original relationship of landlord and tenant ceases to exist and the landlord cannot take advantage of the provisions of the Madras Cultivating Tenants Protection Act to file an application for eviction."RCT-26/2019 & M-311/19 Page 16 of 19
25. Thus, the ratio decidendi that can be culled out from the decision in Annamalai v Venkatasami (supra) is that where the continued possession of the tenant was in pursuance of an agreement of sale, the tenant could claim the benefit of section 53-A of the TP Act. In another interesting case the facts of which are squarely applicable to the instant appeal, titled Duraisami Nadar v Nagamal, (1981) 1 MLJ 35, the petitioner was tenant running a hotel business from the leased premises and the respondent landlady filed an eviction petition on the composite ground non-payment of rent as also for requiring the premises for her bonafide necessity. The petitioner inter alia denied the relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties stating that he had ceased to be a tenant by virtue of agreement to sell executed in his favour for valuable consideration by the landlady. While the ld Trial Court decided in favour of the petitioner, the appellate Court found that mere execution of the agreement for sale did not result in doing away with the liability of the tenant to pay rent to the landlady,. Upholding the decision of the Ld Appellate Court, Hon'ble Judge of the Madras High Court observed that "unless the agreement of sale itself, in specific terms, stipulate to the effect that liability to pay the rent had ceased, it can not be concluded that the relationship of landlord and tenant came to an end. It was held that even assuming that the petitioner is entitled to benefit of section 53-A, his liability to pay rent does not cease unless the agreement of sale puts an end to that liability in specific terms."
26. In the light of the said authoritative pronouncements, reverting to the instant case, it can be well-appreciated with reasonable certainty that the possession of the respondent could be traced back to RCT-26/2019 & M-311/19 Page 17 of 19 the documents Ex. RW1/1 to RW1/3 in view of the reply dated 12.03.2009 Ex. PW-1/D-10 and there is nothing discernible from the bare reading of the recitals in the documents Ex.RW-1/1 to RW-1/3 and/ or for that matter the documents Ex.RW-1/8 to RW-1/12 so as to suggest that the deceased respondent had been initially inducted into the possession as a 'tenant' or that at any subsequent stage he was agreed by the parties to continue occupying the subject premises as a tenant under the landlord. There was no such stipulation with regard to the legal status of the deceased respondent in the subject premises nor it is reflected in the document Mark 'A', which rent agreement dated 14.08.2008 has not been proved as per the law.
27. In view of the foregoing discussion, it is difficult to discern that there existed any relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties. In arriving at such finding, I am not oblivious of the legal position that the present eviction petition under DRC Act cannot be converted into a title suit and the only finding that is being given by this Appellate Court is that the evidence brought on the record leads to the conclusion that there never existed any relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties.
FINAL ORDER
28. In view of the aforesaid discussion, I find no merit in the present appeal bearing RCT No. 26/2019 and the same is accordingly dismissed. However, the cross-appeal filed by the LRs of the deceased respondent vide Miscellaneous No. 311/2019 is allowed in terms of the RCT-26/2019 & M-311/19 Page 18 of 19 observations made hereinabove and this Court finds that the appellant has failed to prove the relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties. Nothing contained herein shall tantamount to have any final opinion with regard to the title of the parties to the subject property. In the facts and circumstances of the case, no costs are imposed.
29. Trial Court record along-with copy of this Judgment be sent back forthwith. A copy of this Judgment be sent to the Ld. Counsel for parties on their email IDs. A signed copy of this Judgment be also placed in both the files. The appeal file be consigned toDigitally Record Room.
signed by
DHARMESH DHARMESH
SHARMA
SHARMA Date: 2021.01.21
18:41:13 +0530
Announced in the open Court (DHARMESH SHARMA)
on 19th January, 2021 Principal District & Sessions Judge/
Rent Control Tribunal (West)
Tis Hazari Courts: Delhi
RCT-26/2019 & M-311/19 Page 19 of 19