Delhi District Court
Mukesh Arora vs The State on 24 January, 2025
IN THE COURT OF SH. ABHISHEK GOYAL, ADDITIONAL
SESSIONS JUDGE-03, CENTRAL DISTRICT, TIS HAZARI
COURTS, DELHI
CNR No.: DLCT01-008142-2020
Criminal Revision No.: 283/2020
MUKESH ARORA,
S/o. Late Sh. R.C. Arora,
R/o. 3545, Jai Mata Market,
Bazar Sita Ram,
Delhi-110006. ... REVISIONIST/
PETITIONER
VERSUS
1. STATE (GNCT OF DELHI)
2. SHRI. T.S. GAMBHIR,
S/o. Shri. Satnam Singh,
R/o. R-846, New Rajender Nagar,
New Delhi-110060. ... RESPONDENT
Date of Institution : 12.11.2020
Date when judgment was reserved : 11.11.2024
Date when judgment is pronounced : 24.01.2025
JUDGMENT
1. The present revision petition has been filed under Sections 397 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter, referred to as 'Cr.P.C.'), seeking setting aside of the order dated 15.09.20201 (hereinafter referred to as the 'impugned order'), passed by Ld. ACMM-02, Central, Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi (hereinafter referred to as the 'Ld. ACMM/Ld. Trial 1 It is noted that the proceedings in the instant case pertain to the period when the restrictions due to Covid-19 restrictions were persisting and the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Re: Cognizance for Extension of Limitation, Suo Motu Writ Pet. (C) No. 3/2020, dated 10.01.2022 inter alia, directed, "*** I. The order dated 23.03.2020 is restored and in continuation of the subsequent orders dated 08.03.2021, 27.04.2021 and 23.09.2021, it is directed that the period from 15.03.2020 till 28.02.2022 shall stand excluded for the purposes of limitation as may be prescribed under any general or special laws in respect of all judicial or quasi judicial proceedings. ***III. In cases where the limitation would have expired during the period between 15.03.2020 till 28.02.2022, notwithstanding the actual balance period of limitation remaining, all persons shall have a limitation period of 90 days from 01.03.2022. In the event the actual balance period of limitation remaining, with effect from 01.03.2022 is greater than 90 days, that longer period shall apply..."
CR. No. 283/2020 Mukesh Arora v. State (NCT of Delhi) & Anr. Page No. 1 of 33
Digitally signed
ABHISHEK by ABHISHEK
GOYAL
GOYAL Date: 2025.01.24
16:54:56 +0530
Court'), in case bearing, "State v. Ram Kumar Sharma, etc., CIS No. 302036/2016", arising out of FIR No. 50/2013, PS Hauz Qazi, under Sections 419/420/467/468/471/506 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter referred to as 'IPC'). Pertinently, by virtue of the impugned order the Ld. Trial Court directed framing of charges under Sections 506(part II) IPC and Section 120B IPC read with Section 467/468/471 IPC against the revisionist/petitioner herein. Notably, the charges were subsequently framed against the revisionist on 21.10.2020.
2. Succinctly, the case of the prosecution is premised on the complaint of the complainant/respondent no. 2, namely, Sh. Tarjit Singh Gambhir/Sh. T.S. Gambhir (hereinafter referred to as the 'complainant/respondent no. 2') inter alia averring that the property bearing nos. 3375-3378, freehold plot of 79.43 sq. mts., with building standing thereon, situated in Ward No. VI, Hauz Qazi, Delhi-110006 (hereinafter referred to as the 'premise/property in question') was purchased by one Sh. Dayal Singh, S/o. Sh. Ladha Singh, vide Certificate of Sale, issued on 05.05.1962, duly registered with the office of Sub-Registrar, Delhi as Document No. 330, in Additional Book No. 1, Vol. No. 179, page 179 on 18.05.1962. As per the complainant. Sh. Dayal Singh left for heavenly abode on 19.11.1969 and post, demise of Sh. Dayal Singh, the premise/property in question devolved upon his heirs, i.e., (i) Shamsher Singh, son; (ii) Rachpal Singh, son;
(iii) Sampuran Singh, son; (iv) Avtar Singh, son; (v) Harbans Kaur, daughter; (vi) Pyar Kaur, daughter; (vii) Vidyawanti Kaur, daughter; (viii) Shanti Devi, daughter; and (ix) Beant Kaur, daughter; as well as Smt. Pritam Kaur, wife of the said deceased, left for heavenly abode on 27.03.1958. Under the complaint, it CR. No. 283/2020 Mukesh Arora v. State (NCT of Delhi) & Anr. Page No. 2 of 33 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL Date: GOYAL 2025.01.24 16:55:01 +0530 was further proclaimed that Sh. Dayal Singh never executed any will in respect of the premise/property in question and the said property was got mutated by the legal heirs in their names. Markedly, at the time of lodging of the instant complaint, respondent no. 2 while proclaiming himself as one of the co- owners of the premise/property in question, asserted that the same was under occupation of several tenants at that point in time. Further, as per the complainant/respondent no. 2, when he visited the premise/property in question in September 2012, he was informed by the tenants that one Ram Kanwar Sharma was claiming himself as the owner of the said premise. It is further the case of the prosecution/complainant/respondent no. 2 that upon enquiry it was determined that said Ram Kanwar Sharma got forged and fabricated sale deed executed in his favour by one Balbir, dated 27.07.2012, duly registered with Sub-Registrar-III vide registration no. 7090, Book No. 1, Vol. No. 14797 from pages 118 to 130 on 27.08.2012. Correspondingly, it is asserted that it was revealed upon investigation that Balbir Singh claimed himself as the owner of the premise/property in question, wrongly averring to be the only son of Seth Dayal Singh. Under his complaint, the complainant/respondent no. 2 further alleged that Balbir Singh, neither had any claim to the premise/property in question nor was he related to Seth Dayal Singh in any manner and created false documents in form of sale deed, while acting in collusion/conspiracy with Ram Kanwar Sharma. Correspondingly, as per the complainant/respondent no. 2, the revisionist while acting in collusion/conspiracy with Balbir and Ram Kanwar Sharma contacted him/the complainant for negotiation of the premise/property in question, offering to settle CR. No. 283/2020 Mukesh Arora v. State (NCT of Delhi) & Anr. Page No. 3 of 33 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date:
2025.01.24 16:55:05 +0530 dispute with him by payment of sum of Rs. 1.2 Crores. As per the complainant/respondent no. 2, the revisionist even threatened him that in case he did not settle with him/the revisionist, he/revisionist would further sell the premise/property in question to some Muslim gundas.
2.1. Markedly, on the basis of the instant complaint, the instant FIR was registered, and investigation ensued. Notably, during the course of investigation, the statements of witnesses were recorded as well as the documents of the premise/property in question, pertaining to the alleged sale thereof by Balbir Singh to Ram Kumar Sharma was carried out. Correspondingly, during the investigation, it is avowed that the police official(s) came to know that no person in the name of Balbir Singh S/o. Sh. Dayal Singh ever resides at Village Sisai Bolan, Hansi Hissar as per the voters' list of the relevant/said village. Concomitantly, it was determined that Balbir Singh S/o. Beeru Ram, got a death certificate issued on 14.06.2012 claiming that Dayal Singh died on 23.10.1995 by misrepresenting facts and filing false documents with the office of SDO, Hansi Civil Hissar, Haryana.
Notably, the said death certificate is stated to have been used by Balbir Singh with the office of Sub-Registrar-III for the registration of the sale deed. Remarkably, on conclusion of the investigation, chargesheet was filed by the concerned police officials before the Ld. Trial Court, whereupon cognizance of offence was taken by the Ld. Trial Court on 05.07.2014. Subsequently, on the compliance of the provisions under Section 207 Cr.P.C. and upon the Ld. Counsel for the accused's as well as Ld. Addl. PP for the State's addressing their respective arguments on charge, as aforementioned, charges were directed CR. No. 283/2020 Mukesh Arora v. State (NCT of Delhi) & Anr. Page No. 4 of 33 Digitally signed ABHISHEK by ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date: 2025.01.24 16:55:09 +0530 to be framed by the Ld. Trial Court inter alia against the revisionist vide order dated 15.09.2020, the impugned order herein. Apposite at this stage, to reproduce the relevant extract(s) from the order dated 15.09.2020 of the Ld. Trial Court/impugned order, as under;
"...7. Heard. Record perused.
8. It is to be noted that voter list of the Village Sisai Bolan is on record as per which name of father of accused Balbir Singh is Biru Ram who is resident of H.No. 232. The said Balbir Singh is having wife Smt. Dhanno and sons namely Sh. Dinesh, Mahender etc. Thus, as per voter list it is clear that name of father of accused Balbir Singh whose photo was also available on voter list is "Biru Ram" despite that in the year, 2012 accused Balbir Singh, S/o Sh. Biru Ram applied and got issued a death certificate of his father showing name of his father as Dayal Singh. An affidavit for preparing all these documents was executed by him on 26.07.2012 which shows that immediately prior to execution of sale deed in question he got death certificate of his father by changing his name from "Biru Ram" to "Dayal Singh". He also got a Ration Card issued in his name showing name of his father as Dayal Singh. Apparently, accused Balbir Singh, S/o Sh. Biru Ram, or Dayal Singh, R/o H.No. 232, Village Sisai Bola, Tehsil Hansi, District Hissar, Haryana, executed a document i.e. sale deed in question claiming himself to be Balbir Singh, S/o Sh. Dayal Singh, S/o Ladha Singh, as owner of property in question i.e. 3375- 3378, Ward No. VI, Hauz Qazi, Delhi-110006. This document would squarely fall within ambit of false documents as though father's name of accused Balbir Singh was shown as Dayal Singh, however he was not son of Dayal Singh, S/o Ladha Singh. Thus, it is proved that sale deed in question is forged document, as he signed the sale deed not in his own capacity. but as Balbir Singh, S/o Sh. Dayal Singh, S/o Sh. Ladha Singh.
9. Accused Ram Kumar purchased the property in question in cash. No payment was made through cheques, thus there is no proof that any money transfer has taken place between accused Balbir Singh and accused Ram Kumar Sharma which shows that accused Ram Kumar Sharma was involved in criminal conspiracy to forge document qua property CR. No. 283/2020 Mukesh Arora v. State (NCT of Delhi) & Anr. Page No. 5 of 33 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL Date: GOYAL 2025.01.24 16:55:21 +0530 in question and on the basis of such forge document he claimed to be owner of the property and has applied for mutation of property in his name.
10. Accused Mukesh Arora started construction in the property in question. He also contacted the complainant and gave offer to him and also threatened him that he would further sell the property to Muslim gundas. All these acts on the part of accused Mukesh Arora clearly shows that he was also involved in criminal conspiracy. Consequent to which forged sale deed was executed and efforts were made to take possession of the property in question.
*** *** ***
12. It is further to be noted that no offence of fraud has been committed in the present matter as there was no inducement of any one, however there are sufficient material on record to frame charges for commission of offence of criminal conspiracy for forging sale deed of property bearing no.3375-3378, Ward No. VI, Hauz Qazi, Delhi-110006 against accused persons namely Ram Kumar Sharma, Balbir Singh and Mukesh Arora.
*** *** ***
15. Charge for commission of offence U/s 506 (Part-II) IPC be also framed against accused Mukesh Arora as he threatened the complainant that he would sell the property in question to muslim gundas. There are sufficient material on record to frame charges against accused Mukesh Arora for commission of offence punishable U/s 120-B IPC r/w Section 467/468/471 IPC as well, as his threat to the complainant shows his involvement with the other accused persons..."
(Emphasis supplied)
3. Learned Counsel for the revisionist submitted that the impugned order was passed by the Ld. Trial Court on mere conjunctures, surmises and in contravention of the settled cannons of law, deserving to be set aside at the outset, as suffering with gross illegality. In this regard, Ld. Counsel further submitted that the impugned order was passed by the Ld. Trial Court on mere assumptions and that no sound and/or cogent reasons have been delineated under the said order. Ld. Counsel CR. No. 283/2020 Mukesh Arora v. State (NCT of Delhi) & Anr. Page No. 6 of 33 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date:
2025.01.24 16:55:27 +0530 further submitted that while passing the impugned order, the Ld. Trial Court further failed to appreciate that the entire story of the complainant is concocted, false and nor reliable. As per the ld. Counsel, the Ld. Trial Court passed the impugned order by totally misinterpreting the law and material on record, as well as wrongly framed the charges against the revisionist. Ld. Counsel further submitted that while passing the impugned order, the Ld. Trial Court further failed to appreciate that from the material placed on record, even the basic ingredients of the provisions/offences under Sections 506 (part-II) IPC and Section 120B IPC read with Sections 467/468/471 IPC are not even prima facie established against the revisionist. In this regard, Ld. Counsel further submitted that the Ld. Trial Court totally ignored the fact that the revisionist was not involved in any criminal conspiracy and that there was no material on the record of the Ld. Trial Court, demonstrating/making out even a prima facie case of criminal conspiracy and forgery against the revisionist. It was further submitted that the Ld. Trial Court failed to consider that the revisionist started his repair work at the instance of Ram Kumar Sharma, who alleged himself to be the owner of the premise/property in question and that the revisionist stopped the construction work, when the same was objected by respondent no. 2, becoming aware that there was title dispute between the said parties. In this regard, it was further submitted that the Ld. Trial Court also did not consider that the revisionist was doing construction and repair work of the property in the area and was not aware of the fact that respondent no. 2 or any other person were the owners of the premise/property in question. Even otherwise, as per the Ld. Counsel, there are no allegations of CR. No. 283/2020 Mukesh Arora v. State (NCT of Delhi) & Anr. Page No. 7 of 33 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date: 2025.01.24 16:55:31 +0530 conspiracy against the revisionist even under the documents/chargesheet filed by the concerned police official(s). As per the Ld. Counsel, the impugned order was not totally against the material on record, rather, also a misinterpretation of the facts and material placed before the Ld. Counsel. Ergo, it was submitted that the impugned order is non-speaking order, passed without going through the investigation record. 3.1. Learned Counsel for the revisionist further asserted that the Ld. Trial Court acted mechanically and passed the impugned order, although, it was clearly mentioned under the chargesheet that the investigation was still in progress and additional evidence was to be collected. As per Ld. Counsel, the impugned order was passed without completion of investigation and therefore, liable to be set aside as being illegal. It was further submitted that while passing the impugned order, Ld. Trial Court did not consider that Balbir Singh and Subhash Garg were related/based in same village, i.e., Village Sisai Bolan, PS Hansi Hissar, Haryana. As such, as per the Ld. Counsel, Balbir Singh was the resident of the said village and Subhash Garg's in-laws' house was also based in same village, revealing that both the said accused persons were acquainted with each other. Ld. Counsel further submitted that the Ld. Trial Court did not even appreciate that the revisionist never threatened the complainant/respondent no. 2 in any manner, whatsoever and stopped the construction work, at the very first instance when objection was raised by respondent no. 2, making the impugned order liable to be set aside on this sole ground. Correspondingly, as per the Ld. Counsel, the revisionist neither signed any alleged forged document nor was a witness thereto, therefore, no charges under CR. No. 283/2020 Mukesh Arora v. State (NCT of Delhi) & Anr. Page No. 8 of 33 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date:
2025.01.24 16:55:35 +0530 Section 120B IPC read with Sections 467/468/471 IPC ought to be framed against the revisionist in the instant case. 3.2. Learned Counsel further vehemently argued that the Ld. Trial Court grossly erred in not appreciating that there is no grave suspicion against the revisionist and the material on record, clearly demonstrates that the revisionist is innocent and has been wrongly/falsely implicated in the present case by the complainant/respondent no. 2 to only counter the case registered against him for his illegal acts and deeds. It was further submitted that the Ld. Trial Court also failed to give any sound, cogent or justified reasons for passing the impugned order, which adversely affects the rights of the revisionist. Consequently, the Ld. Counsel prayed that the impugned order, being passed in gross violation of law and settled judicial precedents, deserves to be set aside, outrightly.
4. Per contra, Ld. Addl. PP for the State submitted that the impugned order was passed by the Ld. Trial Court after due appreciation of the facts and circumstances of the present case and, as such, deserves no interference by this Court. It was further submitted that no irregularity, impropriety, or incorrectness can be attributed to the impugned order, as well as the framing of charges against the revisionist, which was/were passed by the Ld. Trial Court, cognizant of the principles of law, as well as wary of the facts and circumstances brought forth. As per the Ld. Addl. PP for the State, the arguments contended by/on behalf of the revisionist are in the nature of revisionist's defence, which cannot be considered by the Court at the stage of framing of charge. Even otherwise, sufficiency of the material/evidence placed on record, is not a fact which can be CR. No. 283/2020 Mukesh Arora v. State (NCT of Delhi) & Anr. Page No. 9 of 33 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date: 2025.01.24 16:55:40 +0530 considered at the stage of framing of charges.
5. The arguments of Ld. Counsel for the revisionist as well as that of Ld. Addl. PP for the State, heard as well as the records, including the Ld. Trial Court records as well as the written submissions and case laws, placed on record have been thoroughly perused.
6. Before proceeding with the determination of the merits of the case/issues posed before this Court, it would be apposite to outrightly make a reference to the relevant provisions under law, in particular that under Section 397 Cr.P.C., as under;
"397. Calling for records to exercise of powers of revision - (1) The High Court or any Sessions Judge may call for and examine the record of any proceeding before any inferior Criminal Court situate within its or his local jurisdiction for the purpose of satisfying itself or himself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order, recorded or passed, and as to the regularity of any proceedings of such inferior Court, and may, when calling for such record, direct that the execution of any sentence or order be suspended, and if the accused is in confinement, that he be released on bail or on his own bond pending the examination of the record.
Explanation - All Magistrates, whether Executive or Judicial, and whether exercising original or appellate jurisdiction, shall be deemed to be inferior to the Sessions Judge for the purposes of this sub- section and of Section 398.
(2) The powers of revision conferred by sub- section (1) shall not be exercised in relation to any interlocutory order passed in any appeal, inquiry, trial or other proceeding..."
(Emphasis supplied)
7. Pertinently, from a perusal of the aforesaid, it is quite evident that the revisional jurisdiction of this Court can be agitated either suo motu or an application of parties, that too in a case(s) where there is a palpable error, non-compliance of the CR. No. 283/2020 Mukesh Arora v. State (NCT of Delhi) & Anr. Page No. 10 of 33 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK GOYAL ABHISHEK Date: GOYAL 2025.01.24 16:55:44 +0530 provision of law, decision of Trial Court being completely erroneous or where the judicial decision is exercised arbitrarily. In this regard, reliance is placed upon the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Amit Kumar v. Ramesh Chander, (2012) 9 SCC 460, wherein the Hon'ble Court while explicating the various contours of the provision under Section 397 Cr.P.C. observed as under:
"12. Section 397 of the Code vests the court with the power to call for and examine the records of an inferior court for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality and regularity of any proceedings or order made in a case. The object of this provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law. There has to be a well-founded error and it may not be appropriate for the court to scrutinise the orders, which upon the face of it bears a token of careful consideration and appear to be in accordance with law. If one looks into the various judgments of this Court, it emerges that the revisional jurisdiction can be invoked where the decisions under challenge are grossly erroneous, there is no compliance with the provisions of law, the finding recorded is based on no evidence, material evidence is ignored or judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or perversely. These are not exhaustive classes, but are merely indicative. Each case would have to be determined on its own merits.
13. Another well-accepted norm is that the revisional jurisdiction of the higher court is a very limited one and cannot be exercised in a routine manner. One of the inbuilt restrictions is that it should not be against an interim or interlocutory order. The Court has to keep in mind that the exercise of revisional jurisdiction itself should not lead to injustice ex facie. Where the Court is dealing with the question as to whether the charge has been framed properly and in accordance with law in a given case, it may be reluctant to interfere in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction unless the case substantially falls within the categories aforestated. Even framing of charge is a much advanced stage in the proceedings under the CrPC."
(Emphasis supplied)
8. Similarly, the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in V.K. CR. No. 283/2020 Mukesh Arora v. State (NCT of Delhi) & Anr. Page No. 11 of 33 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date:
2025.01.24 16:55:48 +0530 Verma v. CBI, 2022 SCC OnLine Del 1192, in a similar context noted as under;
"67. The revisional jurisdiction is not meant to test the waters of what might happen in the trial. The Revisional Court has to consider the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding inter se an order and as to the regularity of the proceedings of the court below. While doing so, the Revisional Court does not dwell at length upon the facts and evidence of the case, rather it considers the material only to satisfy itself about the legality and propriety of the findings, sentence and order and refrains from substituting its own conclusion on an elaborate consideration of evidence. In the instant case, the Petitioner has failed to make out a case for exercise of the revisional jurisdiction since there is no patent error in the impugned order on the face of record."
(Emphasis supplied)
9. Quite evidently, it may be noted from above that the revisional jurisdiction of the higher court is quite limited and cannot be exercised in a routine manner. In fact, as aforenoted, the revisional Court can interfere only in the instances where an order of trial court was passed, unjustly and unfairly. Further, it is a settled law2 that trite law that in a case where the order of subordinate Court does not suffer from any illegality , "merely because of equitable considerations, the revisional Court has no jurisdiction to re-consider the matter and pass a different order in a routine manner." Reference in this regard is made to the decision in Taron Mohan v. State, 2021 SCC OnLine Del 312, wherein the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi expounded as under;
"9. The scope of interference in a revision petition is extremely narrow. It is well settled that Section 397 CrPC gives the High Courts or the Sessions Courts jurisdiction to consider the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding inter se an order and as to the regularity of the proceedings 2 Juned v. State of M.P., 2023 SCC OnLine MP 4458; and Dilip Damor v. State of M.P., 2024 SCC OnLine MP 958.
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of any inferior court. It is also well settled that while considering the legality, propriety or correctness of a finding or a conclusion, normally the revising court does not dwell at length upon the facts and evidence of the case. A court in revision considers the material only to satisfy itself about the legality and propriety of the findings, sentence and order and refrains from substituting its own conclusion on an elaborate consideration of evidence."
(Emphasis supplied)
10. Notably in the context of the foregoing, it is further apposite to observe here that it is no longer res integra that the orders framing charges or refusing discharge are neither interlocutory nor final in nature, rather, intermediate in nature 3, and are, therefore, not affected by the bar of Section 397(2) Cr.P.C. However, the scope of interference under Section 397 Cr.P.C. at a stage, when charge had been framed, is also equally settled4. In this regard, it is pertinent to make a reference to the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Manendra Prasad Tiwari v. Amit Kumar Tiwari, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1057, wherein the Hon'ble Court enunciated the law in regard the foregoing as under;
"22. The scope of interference and exercise of jurisdiction under Section 397 of CrPC has been time and again explained by this Court. Further, the scope of interference under Section 397 CrPC at a stage, when charge had been framed, is also well settled. At the stage of framing of a charge, the court is concerned not with the proof of the allegation rather it has to focus on the material and form an opinion whether there is strong suspicion that the accused has committed an offence, which if put to trial, could prove his guilt. The framing of charge is not a stage, at which stage the final test of guilt is to be applied. Thus, to hold that at the stage of framing the charge, the court should form an opinion that the accused is certainly guilty of committing an offence, is to hold something which is neither permissible nor is in 3 Sanjay Kumar Rai v. State of U.P., (2022) 15 SCC 720.4
State of Rajasthan v. Fatehkaran Mehdu, (2017) 3 SCC 198.
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consonance with the scheme of Code of Criminal Procedure.
23. Section 397 CrPC vests the court with the power to call for and examine the records of an inferior court for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality and regularity of any proceedings or order made in a case. The object of this provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law or the perversity which has crept in the proceeding."
(Emphasis supplied)
11. Germane for the purpose(s) of present discourse to now consider the principles governing framing of charges. In this regard, it is relevant to outrightly note the settled law 5 that at the stage of framing of charges, neither can the truth, veracity and effect of the prosecution case be meticulously 6 judged, nor can any weight to be attached to the probable defence of the accused. On the contrary, at such a stage, only the sufficiency of ground for proceeding against the accused, on a general consideration of materials placed before the Court by the investigating police officer is relevant. Further, though, sifting of evidence is permissible7, however, scanning of evidence in detail is not. Quite understandably, the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in Reena v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2020 SCC OnLine Del 630 , iterated the said principles in unequivocal terms as under;
"12. Thus it is settled position of law that at the time of framing of charge, the Court is not supposed to look into the evidence of the case in detail and is only to consider whether there is a strong suspicion against the accused on the basis of the material that comes before it. The court has the power to sift the evidence for the limited purpose of finding out, whether or not a prima facie case is made out against the accused. However, the Court is not supposed to delve deeply into the merits of the matter and start a 5 State of Bihar v. Ramesh Singh, AIR 1977 SC 2018 6 Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander, (2012) 9 SCC 460.
7State of Maharashta v. Priya Sharan Maharaj & Ors., (1997) 4 SCC 393.
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roving expedition into the evidence that is brought forth it, as if conducting a trial. Further there is no one fixed definition that may be ascribed to the term prima facie' nor can the term strong suspicion have a singular meaning. While coming to the conclusion of a strong prima facie case or strong suspicion, the Court shall have to decide each case on the basis of its own independent facts and circumstances."
(Emphasis supplied)
12. Concomitantly, it is settled law 8 that the inconsistency in the material produced by the prosecution or the defect in investigation9, cannot be looked into for discharge of an accused, in the absence of full-fledged trial. In fact, the probative value10 of the material on record cannot be gone into, and the material placed on record by the prosecution has to be accepted as true at that stage. Reference in this regard is made to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State through Deputy Superintendent of Police v. R. Soundirarasu and Ors., MANU/SC/1103/2022, wherein the Hon'ble Court remarked as under;
"58. Reiterating a similar view in Sheoraj Singh Ahlawat and Ors. v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Anr., MANU/SC/1011/2012: (2013) 11 SCC 476, it was observed by this Court that while framing charges the court is required to evaluate the materials and documents on record to decide whether the facts emerging therefrom taken at their face value would disclose existence of ingredients constituting the alleged offence. At this stage, the court is not required to go deep into the probative value of the materials on record. It needs to evaluate whether there is a ground for presuming that the Accused had committed the offence and it is not required to evaluate sufficiency of evidence to convict the Accused. It was held that the Court at this stage cannot speculate into the truthfulness or falsity of the allegations and contradictions & inconsistencies in 8 Sheoraj Singh Ahlawat v. State of U.P., (2013) 11 SCC 476.9
State of Tamil Nadu by Inspector of Police v. N. Suresh Ranjan & Ors., (2014) 11 SCC 709.10
Soma Chakravarty v. State, (2007) 5 SCC 403.
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the statement of witnesses cannot be looked into at the stage of discharge."
(Emphasis supplied)
13. Relevant to further note that it is trite law 11, at the stage of framing of charge, only the police report is required to be considered and the defence of the accused12 cannot be looked into. Needless to mention that the superior courts 13 have persistently deprecated the practice of holding a mini trial at the time of framing of charge. Relevantly, in this regard, reference is made to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Bharat Parikh v. CBI, (2008) 10 SCC 109, wherein the Hon'ble Court enunciated the judicial principle(s), as under;
"19. As observed in Debendra Nath Padhi case [(2005) 1 SCC 568: 2005 SCC (Cri) 415] at the stage of framing charge roving and fishing inquiry is impermissible and a mini trial cannot be conducted at such stage. At the stage of framing of charge the submissions on behalf of the accused have to be confined to the material produced by the investigating agency. The accused will get an opportunity to prove the documents subsequently produced by the prosecution on the order of the Court, but the same cannot be relied upon to reopen the proceedings once charge has been framed or for invocation of the High Court's powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure."
(Emphasis supplied)
14. Apposite to further emphasize14 that at the stage of charge, court(s) is/are not even required to record detailed reasons for framing charge, rather15, a very strong suspicion founded upon materials placed before it, which leads the court to 11 State Anti-Corruption Bureau, Hyderabad & Anr. v. P. Suryaprakasam, (1999) SCC (Crl.) 373 and State of Orissa v. Debendra Nath Padhi, 2005 (1) SCC 568.
12State of Gujarat v. Dilipsinh Kishorsinh Rao, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1294.
13Indu Jain v. State of M.P., (2008) 15 SCC 341.
14Bhawna Bai v. Dhanshyam & Ors., (2020) 2 SCC 217 15 Supdt. and Remembrance of Legal Affairs, West Bengal v. Anil Kumar Bhunja, AIR 1980 SC 52 and Sajjan Kumar v. CBI, (2010) 9 SCC 368 CR. No. 283/2020 Mukesh Arora v. State (NCT of Delhi) & Anr. Page No. 16 of 33 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL Date: GOYAL 2025.01.24 16:56:12 +0530 form a presumptive opinion as to the existence of factual ingredients constituting the offence alleged, may justify the framing of charges. In fact16, it is only when no case is made out even after presuming entire prosecution evidence, can an accused be discharged. Needless to accentuate17, "at the stage of framing of charge, the sufficiency of materials for the purpose of conviction is not the requirement and a prayer for discharge can be allowed only if the court finds that the materials are wholly insufficient for the purpose of trial." Notably, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Stree Atyachar Virodhi Parishad v. Dilip Nathumal Chordia, (1989) 1 SCC 715, while inter alia illuminating the principles as well as the scope of enquiry for the purpose of charge/discharging an accused, observed as under;
"14. ...In fact, Section 227 itself contains enough guidelines as to the scope of enquiry for the purpose of discharging an accused. It provides that "the Judge shall discharge when he considers that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused". The "ground" in the context is not a ground for conviction, but a ground for putting the accused on trial. It is in the trial, the guilt or the innocence of the accused will be determined and not at the time of framing of charge. The court, therefore, need not undertake an elaborate enquiry in sifting and weighing the material. Nor is it necessary to delve deep into various aspects. All that the court has to consider is whether the evidentiary material on record if generally accepted, would reasonably connect the accused with the crime. No more need be enquired into."
(Emphasis supplied)
15. Germane for the purpose of the present discourse to further observe at this stage, that the superior courts18 have 16 Manjit Singh Virdi v. Hussain Mohammed Shattaf, (2023) 7 SCC 633 17 Sonu Gupta Vs. Deepak Gupta & Ors., (2015) 3 SCC 424 18 Baldev Kumar v. State, 1987 SCC OnLine Del 571; N.M. Veeraiyan v. State, 2022 SCC OnLine Mad 103; and Kamta Prasad @ K.P. Jaiswal v. State of Madhya Pradesh, Criminal Revision No. 1803 of 2022, dated 26.09.2022 (Hon'ble High Court of Madhya Pradesh). CR. No. 283/2020 Mukesh Arora v. State (NCT of Delhi) & Anr. Page No. 17 of 33 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date:
2025.01.24 16:56:18 +0530 persistently avowed that no charge can be framed against an accused merely on the basis of the confessional statements of the accused or co-accused(s). Relevantly, the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in Santokh Singh v. State of NCT of Delhi, Crl. Rev. P. 691/2009, dated 05.08.2011, in regard the aforesaid inter alia noted as under;
"5. Indubitably no charge can be framed against an accused merely on the basis of the confessional statements of the accused or co-accuseds. However, in the present case the telephone call details shows that accused Santokh Singh and Satpal Singh were in constant touch with each other and Amarjit Singh. Accused Sampat Singh and Pyare Lal have been discharged for the reason that no role was assigned to them and there was no evidence against them. Though Petitioner has not been named in the FIR however his name has surfaced during the disclosure of the co-accused pursuant to which the call details were verified which shows that the two were together."
(Emphasis supplied)
16. Ominously, in order to comprehensively deal with the issue/questions raised in the instant case, it is also pertinent to make reference to the provisions under Sections 25 and 26 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Evidence Act'), which make even (any) voluntary statement/confessions made to the police officer or by any person, whilst in custody of a police officer, unless it be made in the immediate presence of a Magistrate, as inadmissible against such person. In this regard, reference is made to the decision in Dipakbhai Jagdishchandra Patel v. State of Gujarat, (2019) 16 SCC 547, wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court, held as under;
"27. Section 25 of the Evidence Act, 1872 (hereinafter referred to as "the Evidence Act", for short) renders inadmissible a confession made to a police officer. It declares in fact that no confession CR. No. 283/2020 Mukesh Arora v. State (NCT of Delhi) & Anr. Page No. 18 of 33 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date:
2025.01.24 16:56:24 +0530 made to a police officer shall be proved as against a person accused of any offence.
*** *** ***
44. Such a person viz. person who is named in the FIR, and therefore, the accused in the eye of the law, can indeed be questioned and the statement is taken by the police officer. A confession, which is made to a police officer, would be inadmissible having regard to Section 25 of the Evidence Act. A confession, which is vitiated under Section 24 of the Evidence Act would also be inadmissible. A confession unless it fulfils the test laid down in Pakala Narayana Swami [Pakala Narayana Swami v. King Emperor, 1939 SCC OnLine PC 1: (1938-39) 66 IA 66: AIR 1939 PC 47] and as accepted by this Court, may still be used as an admission under Section 21 of the Evidence Act. This, however, is subject to the bar of admissibility of a statement under Section 161 CrPC. Therefore, even if a statement contains admission, the statement being one under Section 161, it would immediately attract the bar under Section 162 CrPC."
(Emphasis supplied)
17. Reference, at this stage is further made to the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Commr. of Police v. Narender Singh, (2006) 4 SCC 265, wherein the Hon'ble Court, while distinguishing the provisions under Sections 25 and 26 of the Evidence as well as clarifying the meaning of word, 'confession', remarked as under;
"29. ...Section 25 raises an embargo as regards proof of confession before a police officer. The same need not be in police custody; whereas Section 26 raises a bar as regards admissibility of such confession, if made by an accused in the custody of a police officer although such a confession might have been made before a person who is not a police officer.
30. The policy underlying Sections 25 and 26 is to make it a substantive rule of law that confessions whenever and wherever made to the police, or while in the custody of the police to any person whomsoever unless made in the immediate presence of a Magistrate, shall be presumed to have been obtained under the circumstances mentioned in CR. No. 283/2020 Mukesh Arora v. State (NCT of Delhi) & Anr. Page No. 19 of 33 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date:
2025.01.24 16:56:35 +0530 Section 24 and, therefore, inadmissible, except so far as is provided by Section 27 of the Act.
31. A confession would mean incriminating statement made to the police suggesting inference of the commission of the crime and it, therefore, is confined to the evidences to be adduced in a court of law..."
(Emphasis supplied)
18. Ergo, being mindful of the principles hereinunder noted, this Court would now proceed with the determination of the arguments raised by Ld. Counsel for the revisionist as well as by Ld. Addl. PP for the State. Markedly, one of the primary contentions of the Ld. Counsel for the revisionist is that even from the material placed on record prima facie ingredients of offence under the allegations levelled/charges framed against the revisionist are not made out. However, in order to appreciate the said contention, this Court deems it pertinent to reproduce the relevant provisions under law/IPC as under;
"120A. Definition of criminal conspiracy-When two or more persons agree to do, or cause to be done-
(1) an illegal act, or (2) an act which is not illegal by illegal means, such an agreement is designated a criminal conspiracy:
Provided that no agreement except an agreement to commit an offence shall amount to a criminal conspiracy unless some act besides the agreement is done by one or more parties to such agreement in pursuance thereof.
Explanation.-It is immaterial whether the illegal act is the ultimate object of such agreement, or is merely incidental to that object.
*** *** ***
463. Forgery-Whoever makes any false documents or false electronic record or part of a document or electronic record with intent to cause damage or injury, to the public or to any person, or to support any claim or title, or to cause any person to part with property, or to enter into any express or CR. No. 283/2020 Mukesh Arora v. State (NCT of Delhi) & Anr. Page No. 20 of 33 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date:
2025.01.24 16:56:39 +0530 implied contract, or with intent to commit fraud or that fraud may be committed, commits forgery.
*** *** ***
467. Forgery of valuable security, will, etc.-
Whoever forges a document which purports to be a valuable security or a will, or an authority to adopt a son, or which purports to give authority to any person to make or transfer any valuable security, or to receive the principal, interest or dividends thereon, or to receive or deliver any money, movable property, or valuable security, or any document purporting to be an acquaintance or receipt acknowledging the payment of money, or an acquaintance or receipt for the delivery of any movable property or valuable security, shall be punished with imprisonment for life, or with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine.
468. Forgery for purpose of cheating-Whoever commits forgery, intending that the document or electronic record forged shall be used for the purpose of cheating, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine.
*** *** ***
471. Using as genuine a forged document or electronic record-Whoever fraudulently or dishonestly uses as genuine any document or electronic record which he knows or has reason to believe to be a forged document or electronic record, shall be punished in the same manner as if he had forged such document or electronic record.
*** *** ***
503. Criminal intimidation-Whoever threatens another with any injury to his person, reputation or property, or to the person or reputation of any one in whom that person is interested, with intent to cause alarm to that person, or to cause that person to do any act which he is not legally bound to do, or to omit to do any act which that person is legally entitled to do, as the means of avoiding the execution of such threat, commits criminal intimidation.
*** *** ***
506. Punishment for criminal intimidation- Whoever commits, the offence of criminal intimidation shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both.
CR. No. 283/2020 Mukesh Arora v. State (NCT of Delhi) & Anr. Page No. 21 of 33 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date:
2025.01.24 16:56:44 +0530 If threat be to cause death or grievous hurt, etc.-- and if the threat be to cause death or grievous hurt, or to cause the destruction of any property by fire, or to cause an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life, or with imprisonment for a term which may extend to seven years, or to impute, unchastity to a woman, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, or with line, or with both."
(Emphasis supplied)
19. Notably, it is observed from above that in order to attract culpability under provisions under Sections 467 and 468 IPC, the prosecution is inter alia required to establish19, commission of forgery as defined under Section 463 IPC.
Notably, as per the provisions under Section 463 IPC, "Whoever makes any false documents or false electronic record or part of a document or electronic record, with intent to cause damage or injury, to the public or to any person, or to support any claim or title, or to cause any person to part with property, or to enter into any express or implied contract, or with intent to commit fraud or that fraud may be committed, commits forgery" . Needless to mention, making of false document, as per Section 464 IPC inter alia amounts to the making, signing, sealing or execution of a document or part of a document or electronic record in the manner specified under the said provision, "with the intention of causing it to be believed that such document or part of document, electronic record or electronic signature was made, signed, sealed, executed, transmitted or affixed by or by the authority of a person by whom or by whose authority he knows that it was not made, signed, sealed, executed or affixed". Reference in this regard is made to the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in 19 Dharmala Venkata Subrahmanya Sarma v. The State of A.P., Criminal Petition No. 10174 of 2018, dated 27.03.2024 (Hon'ble High Court of Andhra Pradesh).
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Mohd Ibrahim v. State of Bihar (2009) 8 SCC 751 , wherein the Hon'ble Court, while enunciating the ingredients of offence of making of false document(s)/Section 464 IPC, noted as under;
"10. An analysis of section 464 of Penal Code shows that it divides false documents into three categories:
10.1. The first is where a person dishonestly or fraudulently makes or executes a document with the intention of causing it to be believed that such document was made or executed by some other person, or by the authority of some other person, by whom or by whose authority he knows it was not made or executed.
10.2. The second is where a person dishonestly or fraudulently, by cancellation or otherwise, alters a document in any material part, without lawful authority, after it has been made or executed by either himself or any other person.
10.3. The third is where a person dishonestly or fraudulently causes any person to sign, execute or alter a document knowing that such person could not by reason of (a) unsoundness of mind; or (b) intoxication; or (c) deception practised upon him, know the contents of the document or the nature of the alteration.
11. In short, a person is said to have made a `false document', if (i) he made or executed a document claiming to be someone else or authorised by someone else; or (ii) he altered or tampered a document; or (iii) he obtained a document by practicing deception, or from a person not in control of his senses."
(Emphasis supplied)
20. Here, it is further pertinent to refer to the decision of the Hon'ble High Court of Madhya Pradesh in Karan Kohli v. The State of Madhya Pradesh, Criminal Revision No. 199/2018, dated 11.10.2018, wherein the Hon'ble High Court observed that for liability under Section 468 IPC to attract, prosecution is not required to prove that an accused actually commits the offence of cheating. On the contrary, "what is material is the intention or CR. No. 283/2020 Mukesh Arora v. State (NCT of Delhi) & Anr. Page No. 23 of 33 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date:
2025.01.24 16:56:53 +0530 purpose of the offender in committing forgery. For proving the case under Section 468 of the IPC prosecution is required to establish that the accused had committed forgery and that he did it with the intention that document forged shall be used for the purposes of cheating." Correspondingly, provisions under Section 471 IPC would be attracted 20 in a case where an accused, fraudulently or dishonestly uses as genuine, any document or electronic record, which he knows or has reasons to believe to be forged. Lastly, in so far as the provisions under Section 120B IPC is concerned, this Court deems it pertinent to make a reference to the decision in Ajay Agarwal v. Union of India, 1993 (3) SCC 609, wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court, noted with approval, as under;
"...It is not necessary that each conspirator must know all the details or the scheme nor be a participant at every stage. It is necessary that they should agree for design or object of the conspiracy. Conspiracy is conceived as having three elements: (1) agreement (2) between two or more persons by whom the agreement is effected, and (3) a criminal object, which may be either the ultimate aim of the agreement, or may constitute the means, or one of the means by which that aim is to be accomplished. It is immaterial whether this is found in the ultimate objects..."
(Emphasis supplied)
21. In so far as the provisions under Section 506 of IPC is concerned, law is settled that in order for the said provision to be applicable, the prosecution is required to prove that the; (i) accused threatened some person; (ii) such threat must extend to causing any injury to his person, reputation or property, or to the person, reputation or property of someone in whom he was interested; and (iii) the accused did so with intent to cause alarm 20 Deepak Gaba v. State of Uttar Pradesh, Criminal Appeal No. 2328 of 2022, dated 02.01.2023 (SC).
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to that person, or to cause that person to do any act which he was not legally bound to do or omit to do an act which he is legally entitled to do as a means of avoiding the execution of such threat. Pertinently, the Hon'ble High Court of Orissa in Amulya Kumar Behera v. Nabaghana Behera, 1995 SCC Online Ori 317, while explicating the meaning of the word, 'alarm' used under Section 503/506 IPC, noted as under;
"...The threat must be intended to cause alarm from which it follows that, ordinarily, it would be sufficient for that purpose. The degree of such alarm may very in different cases, but the essential matter is that it is of a nature and extent to unsettle the mind of the person on whom it operates and take away from his acts that element of free voluntary action which alone constitutes consent. The case where the threat produces an alarm is comparatively a simple one, for all that has then to be proved is that threat was given and that the alarm was due to the threat: but where the threat has not that effect, it involves a question whether it was sufficient to overcome a man of ordinary nerves. The Court may hold it to be an empty boast, too insignificant to call for penal visitation of Section 506. "Intimidate" according to Webstar's Dictionary means" (1) to make timid, make afraid, overawe; (2) force or deter with threats or violence, cow". Threat referred to in the Section must be a threat communicated or uttered with intention of its being communicated to the person threatened for the purpose of influencing his mind. Question whether threat amounts to a criminal intimidation or not does not depend on norms of individual threatened if it is such a threat as may overcome ordinary free will of a man of common firmness. "Threat" is derived from Anglo-sexam word "threotou to life", (harass). It is the dicleration of an intention to inflict punishment, loss or pain on another. "Injury" is defined in Section 44. It involves doing of an illegal act. If it is made with intention mentioned in the section, it is an offence. Whether threat was given with intention to cause alarm to the person threatened has to be established by evidence to be brought on record..."
(Emphasis supplied) CR. No. 283/2020 Mukesh Arora v. State (NCT of Delhi) & Anr. Page No. 25 of 33 Digitally signed ABHISHEK by ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date: 2025.01.24 16:57:03 +0530
22. Significantly, in the aforenoted dictate, the Hon'ble Court explicitly observed that the mens rea/ intention envisaged under Section 503/506 IPC must be to cause alarm to the victim and whether or not such a victim is alarmed, is not of any consequence. Here, it is further apposite to make reference to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Manik Taneja v. State of Karnataka, (2015) 7 SCC 423, wherein the Hon'ble Court, while dealing with the ingredients of offence under Section(s) 503/506 IPC, inter alia, observed as under;
"11. ...A reading of the definition of "criminal intimidation" would indicate that there must be an act of threatening to another person, of causing an injury to the person, reputation, or property of the person threatened, or to the person in whom the threatened person is interested and the threat must be with the intent to cause alarm to the person threatened or it must be to do any act which he is not legally bound to do or omit to do an act which he is legally entitled to do."
(Emphasis supplied)
23. Consequently, being mindful of the above, when facts of the present case are conscientiously evaluated, in light of aforenoted judicial precedents as well as the arguments addressed, it is outrightly observed that the complainant/respondent no. 2 has made/levelled specific allegations against the revisionist and the co-accused persons, Balbir Singh and Ram Kanwar Sharma. In particular, it is asserted against the revisionist, under the complaint of respondent no. 2, as under;
"10. Mr. Mukesh Arora a known builder is associates with Sh. Balvir and Sh. Ram Kanwar Sharma has contacted myself for negotiations of the said property even knowing wrongful execution of the sale deed and even offering to settle with Sh. Balvir, as per the enquires made it has come to my knowledge that Mr. Balvir and Mr. Ram Kanwar CR. No. 283/2020 Mukesh Arora v. State (NCT of Delhi) & Anr. Page No. 26 of 33 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL Date: GOYAL 2025.01.24 16:57:07 +0530 Sharma are just hand to mouth status and cannot dream of such big deals. As such, Mr. Mukesh Arora fully involved in the conspiracy. Mr. Mukesh Arora now is contacting me directly and offered me Rs. 1.2 Crore even knowing the of fraudulent execution of the sale deed of above referred property. Mr. Mukesh has threatened myself if I don't settle with him, he will further sell it to some notoriest Muslim goondas. I hereby pray that such action be stopped..."
(Emphasis supplied)
24. Markedly, it is observed from the documents/material placed on record of the Ld. Trial Court, in particular from the sale deed dated 27.07.2012, alleged to be executed between co-accused Balbir/Balvir and Sh. Ram Kanwar Sharma, co-accused Balbir/Balvir declared himself as the son/sole surviving legal heir of Sh. Dayal Singh S/o. Late Sh. Ladha Singh @ Lakha Ram. In particular, the said agreement, while declaring Sh. Dayal Singh as the absolute and rightful owner of built up property bearing nos. 3375-3378, with roof/terrace rights, built on freehold plot of land admeasuring, 79.43 sq. mts., situated at Ward No. VI, Hauz Qazi, Delhi-110006 (premise/property in question), further declared that Sh. Dayal Singh left for heavenly above on 23.10.1995 and his wife, passed away in the year, 1987, leaving behind Balvir as his sole legal heir, as aforenoted. However, when the particulars of said, Balvir, asserted to be resident of H. No. 232, Village Sisai Bola, Tehsil Hansi, Distt. Hissar, Haryana (as specified under the said sale deed/sale agreement dated 27.07.2012) are stated to be verified from the voters' list of the said village and the residential address particulars, particulars are determined to be of that of one Balbir Singh S/o. Biru Ram. Correspondingly, whilst, the complainant annexed the death certificate of Sh. Dayal Singh, wherein the date of Sh. Singh's demise is noted as CR. No. 283/2020 Mukesh Arora v. State (NCT of Delhi) & Anr. Page No. 27 of 33 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL Date: GOYAL 2025.01.24 16:57:12 +0530 19.11.1969, on the basis of which, mutation of the premise/property in question is proclaimed to be carried out by MCD in favour of the legal heirs of Sh. Dayal Singh vide letter No. Tax/CS/MR/28, dated 12.04.1999, however, it is noted from the records of the Ld. Trial Court that co-accused Balbir Singh got a false death certificate prepared of Sh. Dayal Singh by wrongfully representing Sh. Dayal Singh as his father. Markedly, under the said certificate the date of demise of Sh. Dayal Singh was got recorded as 23.10.1995, whilst, under the death certificate of Sh. Dayal Singh, annexed with the complaint, date of demise of Sh. Dayal Singh was noted as 19.11.1969. Needless to reiterate that not only did co-accused Balbir/Balvir Singh wrongly asserted Sh. Dayal Singh as his father, rather, also wrongly got the said death certificate issued basis ration card issued in name of Balbir Singh, depicting his father's name as Sh. Dayal Singh as well as on a false affidavit. Further, as aforementioned that on the basis of said documents it is prima facie observed that the co-accused Balvir/Balbir Singh and Ram Kanwar Sharma executed the sale deed dated 27.07.2012 for the premise/property in question. Consequently, in light of the foregoing this Court is in concurrence with the finding of the Ld. Trial Court that the said documents, i.e., death certificate of Sh. Dayal Singh as well as the sale deed dated 27.07.2012 are false documents in so far as the said documents were made, signed, sealed, executed, transmitted or affixed by or by the authority of a person by whom or by whose authority he knows that it was not made, signed, sealed, executed or affixed. Clearly, sale deed dated 27.07.2012 is asserted to be executed by co-accused Balvir/Balbir as S/o. Dayal Singh, which prima facie stands CR. No. 283/2020 Mukesh Arora v. State (NCT of Delhi) & Anr. Page No. 28 of 33 Digitally signed ABHISHEK by ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date: 2025.01.24 16:57:17 +0530 belied from the records/documents placed on record, in particular, voters list of the village where the said co-accused is avowed to be a resident of. Correspondingly, the death certificate of Sh. Dayal Singh prima facie appears to be forged/false document, basis the manipulated records produced by co-accused Balvir/Balbir Singh, as aforenoted.
25. In so far as the role of the revisionist in the instant case, alleged to be involved in conspiracy with the aforenoted co-accused persons is concerned, reference is made to statements of various witnesses recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C. as well as that of the complainant/respondent no. 2. In particular, it is noted from the statements of Sh. K.K. Gupta and Sh. Raja Ahuja, both asserted that in May, 2012, the revisionist started demolition work on the first and second floors of the premise/property in question. In fact, Sh. K.K. Gupta further proclaimed of receipt of notice of Ram Kumar Sharma in relation to the said property. However, it is noted that in quite vicinity of time, sale deed of the premise/property is proclaimed to have been executed between Sh. Balbir Singh and said Ram Kanwar Sharma vide sale deed dated 27.07.2012. Further, as aforenoted, the complainant/respondent no. 2 in his complaint inter alia asserted that the revisionist approached him/the complainant, proposing/offering a sum of Rs. 1.2 Crores for settlement in relation to the premise in question, besides threatening the complainant that he would sell the property/premise in question to some gundas in the event the complainant/respondent no. 2 failed to succumb to his/revisionist's demands. Here, it is further pertinent to mention that the complainant asserted in his complaint that Ram Kanwar Sharma, on the basis of the said CR. No. 283/2020 Mukesh Arora v. State (NCT of Delhi) & Anr. Page No. 29 of 33 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date:
2025.01.24 16:57:22 +0530 forged sale deed endeavoured to claim entitlement to the property in question. Consequently, when the entire factual scenario of the instant case, including the previous and past conduct of the revisionist, factum of preparation of false documents, i.e., the death certificate of Sh. Dayal Singh and sale deed dated 27.07.2012, wherein co-accused Balbir Singh proclaimed himself to be the sole surviving heir of Sh. Dayal Singh and the co-
accused Ram Kanwar Sharma claimed ownership of the premise/property in question basis such false document, further accentuated by the statements of Sh. K.K. Gupta and Sh. Raja Ahuja, as well as the assertions of the complaint, this Court is of the considered opinion that there is sufficient material/ground(s) to proceed against the revisionist for the allegations levelled against him is so far as they pertain to offences against Section 120B IPC read with Sections 467/468/471 IPC. Needless to mention that there is prima facie case grounds and strong suspicion, as well as material and witnesses who can depose against the revisionist for the framing of charges. Apposite to further mention at this stage that in so far as the offence of conspiracy is concerned even otherwise, law is settled that direct evidence is difficult to find for generally 21, "a conspiracy is hatched in secrecy and it may be difficult to adduce direct evidence of the same. The prosecution will often rely on evidence of acts of various parties to infer that they were done in reference to their common intention. The prosecution will also more often rely upon circumstantial evidence. The conspiracy can be undoubtedly proved by such evidence direct or circumstantial."
21Mukesh and Ors. v. State for NCT of Delhi & Ors., MANU/SC/0575/2017.
CR. No. 283/2020 Mukesh Arora v. State (NCT of Delhi) & Anr. Page No. 30 of 33 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK GOYAL ABHISHEK Date: GOYAL 2025.01.24 16:57:26 +0530 26. However, in so far as the complainant's/respondent no. 2's own assertion/averment
complaint pertaining to allegation of criminal intimidation are concerned, it is alleged under the complaint that the revisionist threatened the complainant/respondent no. 2 that in the event of the complainant's not succumbing to his/revisionist's demands, he would further sell the premise/property in question to some notorious goondas. Undoubtedly, there are allegations of injury 22 to the premise/property in question, however, there are no threat to cause destruction of premise/property by fire, clearing bringing the conduct of the revisionist under the ambit of provisions under Section 506 (part-I), instead of Section 506 (part-II) as specified under the impugned order.
27. Consequently, in conspectus of above, further being wary of the aforenoted judicial principles, in light of the arguments addressed by the Ld. Counsel for the revisionist, Ld. Counsel for the complainant as well as by Ld. Addl. PP for the State, this Court observes that from the facts and circumstances of the case, material and the documents placed on record of the Ld. Trial Court, including inter alia the contents of the chargesheet, statements of witnesses, including that of the complainant and other witnesses, as aforenoted as well as other material, including the FSL report dated 14.09.2015 placed on record of the Ld. Trial Court, prima facie case under Section 120B IPC read with Sections 467/468/471 IPC and Section 506 (part-I) stands established against revisionist in as much as the revisionist, while acting in criminal conspiracy with co-accused 22 Reference is made to Section 44 IPC which provides the meaning of injury as, "The word "injury" denotes any harm whatever illegally caused to any person, in body, mind, reputation or property."
(Emphasis supplied) CR. No. 283/2020 Mukesh Arora v. State (NCT of Delhi) & Anr. Page No. 31 of 33 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL Date: GOYAL 2025.01.24 16:57:31 +0530
persons, Balbir/Balvir Singh and Ram Kanwar/Kumar Sharma prepared false/forged sale deed dated 27.07.2012, registered on 27.08.2012, whereby co-accused Balbir Singh impersonated as Balbir Singh S/o. Dayal Singh as well as in furtherance of conspiracy, co-accused Balbir Singh got prepared false document/foreged death certificate of Dayal Singh by changing his father's name from Biru Singh, said sale deed being used by Ram Kumar Sharma for claiming right of premise/property in question as well as to get mutated the property in his favour. Correspondingly, the revisionist prima facie appears to have threatened the complainant/respondent no. 2 to cause injury to the property/premise in question.
28. Accordingly, in light of the aforesaid discussion, this Court unwaveringly records and reiterates that the impugned order/order dated 15.09.2020, passed by Ld. ACMM-02, Central, Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi, in case bearing, "State v. Ram Kumar Sharma, etc., CIS No. 302036/2016", arising out of FIR No. 50/2013, PS Hauz Qazi, under Sections 419/420/467/468/471/506 of IPC is upheld in respect of charges under Section 120B IPC read with Sections 467/468/471 IPC and in the considered opinion of this Court, the facts of the case demonstrate a prima facie case under Section 506 (part-I) IPC, instead of Section 506 (part-II) IPC. Ergo, the instant petition/revision petition stands disposed off in the terms specified herein.
29. Trial Court Record along with a copy of this order/judgment be sent to the Ld. Trial Court concerned for information and compliance and with directions to proceed, as per law.
CR. No. 283/2020 Mukesh Arora v. State (NCT of Delhi) & Anr. Page No. 32 of 33
Digitally signed
ABHISHEK by ABHISHEK
GOYAL
GOYAL Date: 2025.01.24
16:57:35 +0530
30. Revision file be consigned to record room after due compliance.
Digitally
signed by
ABHISHEK
ABHISHEK GOYAL
GOYAL Date:
2025.01.24
16:57:40
+0530
Announced in the open Court (Abhishek Goyal)
on 24.01.2025 ASJ-03, Central District,
Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi
CR. No. 283/2020 Mukesh Arora v. State (NCT of Delhi) & Anr. Page No. 33 of 33