Delhi High Court
Chhote And Ors., Ramphal And Anr. vs Union Of India And Ors. on 28 May, 1992
Equivalent citations: 48(1992)DLT98, 1992(24)DRJ574
Author: D.P. Wadhwa
Bench: D.P. Wadhwa
JUDGMENT D.P. Wadhwa, J.
(1) These two writ petitions can he disposed of by a common judgment as similar questions arise in both the petitions.
(2) C.W.P. 279/91 was filed on 21 January 1991. There are three petitioners and five respondents. Petitioners claim to be the owners of khasra No. 448 in Village Gazipur, Delhi. Relying on an earlier decision of this Court in Smt. Gabbe Vs. Union of India, 1991 R.L.R. 306, the petitioners seek an appropriate writ or direction declaring notification issued under sections 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short 'the Act') relating to their land as hull and void and of no legal consequence and they also seek a further declaration that the entire acquisition proceedings in relation to their land is illegal and, therefore, the respondents not entitled to take possession of that land. consequential reliefs are also prayed. On tiling of this petition show cause notice was issued to the respondents as to why rule nisi be not issued and at the same time it was directed that the petitioners will not be dispossessed from the land in question.
(3) Writ petition 1551/91 was filed on 7 May 1991 and since the notifications issued under the Act and sought to be challenged were the same as in the case of the first writ petition, there also notice to show cause was issued and similar interim order made. There are two petitioners. Both are brothers and again five respondents. Petitioner claim to be the owners of land bearing khasra No. 366/2 in village Gazipur, Delhi.
(4) A notification under section 4 of the Act was issued on 13 November 1959, declaration under section 6 was issued on 20 June 1966 and the award was made on 23 march 1977, Contention of the respondents is that possession under the Act was taken on 18 April 1977 and under section 22 of the Delhi Development Act the land in question has been placed at the disposal of the respondent Delhi Development Authority for purposes of development. The award, and acquisition proceedings are now being challenged in the year 1991. Respondents say that these petitions should be thrown out on the ground of delay.
(5) GABBE'S case which has been the main stand of the petitioners was decided in February 1981 and the writ petition challenging the notification and the acquisition proceedings were filed in the year 1973. In Gabbe's case a learned Single Judge of this Court held that no evidence was forthcoming from the records of the respondents that any public notice of the notification under section 4 of the Act was given in the locality as required by this section, though it was published in the Official Gazette, which deprived the petitioner of her valuable right to object to acquisition under section 5A of the Act and, therefore, the notification under section 4 stood vitiated. The notification in Gabbe's case was also the same and pertain to the village Gazipur as in the present two petitions. The award in Gabbe's case was made in 1970 and in the present two cases there is supplementary award of the year 1977. However, in Gabbe's case the court specifically observed that "the notification in the present case In so far as it relates to the petitioner, therefore, is bad in law and the entire land acquisition proceedings arc vitiated and rendered illegal." Contention of the petitioners had been that in view of the quashing of the notification under section 4 of the Act in Gabbe's case the proceedings in these two petitions also stood vitiated. We do not think the petitioners arc right in their submissions for (1) the learned Single Judge in Gabb's case confined the notification only to that case, and (2) because of the decision of the supreme Court in Ashwani Kumar Dhingra Vs. Stale of Punjab, . In this case, father and brother of the appellant Dhingra tiled a writ petition challenging notifications under sections 4 and 6 of the Act. These were quashed "in so far as they relate to the land of the respondents therein". Respondents mean the brother and the lather of the appellant. When the appellant sought to have the notifications quashed on that very ground, writ petition was dismissed and his appeal in the Supreme Court also failed. The court held that "one co-owner may challenge the acquisition whereas the other co-owner may be satisfied with the acquisition and ask for compensation and even for enhancement of compensation other brother may challenge the acquisition proceeding in his own rights; merely because one brother accepts compensation, other brother is not estopped from challenging acquisition. Similarly, where one co-owner challenges acquisition, his rights will "not be affected merely because other co-owner had accepted acquisition and the compensation". The Supreme Court in Dhingra's case also observed that notification under sections 4 and 6 of the Act were issued in August 1973 and the appellant challenged the same after five years of those notifications. He was, therefore, held not to be entitled to any relief. Gabbe's case. therefore, does not help the petitioners before us at all.
(6) The respondents also said that the petitioners acquiesced to the acquisition proceedings in as much as they appeared before the land Acquisition Collector and also sought reference under section 18 of the Act for enhancement of the compensation. Petitioners also said there was no evidence of public notice under section 4 of the Act and they were deprived to file objections under section 5 of the Act. Such an objection at this late stage has no meaning. All official acts are presumed to have been properly performed. Respondents have also brought on record the report of their officials showing that possession of the land in questions had been taken over and then placed at the disposal of the respondent D.D.A and at no point of time earlier the petitioners ever objected that there was no public notice and they were deprived of filing objections under section 5 of the Act when all though they had been participating in the acquisition proceedings.
(7) A .Division Bench of this Court in Shri Bhagwan and another Vs. Union of India and others, 1991 (2) Delhi Lawyer 59, held that a petition was liable to be dismissed where deliberate attempt was made to mislead the court and to secure favorable interim orders. In this case there was also delay of three years after making of the award in filing the petition and the court held that petitioners were guilty of laches and could not challenge the notifications under sections 4 of 6 of the Act. In yet another case a Division Bench of this Court dismissed the petition when the petitioners had approached after more than three years. That was also a petition under the Act challenging the notifications under section 4 and 17 of the Act. That case is Smt. Shakuntala B. Moda Vs. Union of India and others, C.W. No. 342/90, decided on 28 May 1991. (DRJ 1991 Supp. 497) (8) During the Course of hearing we are told that two writ petitions were earlier filed challenging the same very notifications and pertaining to the same village. These were C.W.P. No. 2148/85 and C.W.P. No. 1890/86 both entitled Yuva Gram Sabha Samiti Vs. Union of India and others. In C.W. 2148/85 there were as many as 49 petitioners and one of them was chhote, petitioners No.1 in writ petition No. 279/91. In writ petition 1890/86 there were as many as 50 petitioners and two of the petitioners were the same as petitioners and two of the petitioners were the same as petitioners in C.W.P. No. 1551/91.
(9) Though there are three petitioners in C.W.P. 279/91, they all claim to be the joint owners of khasra No. 448 in village Gazipur. There appears to us to be no reason why the khasras now mentioned in the two writ petitions before us could not have been the subject-matter of the earlier two petitions.
(10) Mr. Chadha, learned counsel for the respondents D.D.A., also drew our attention to yet another to yet another case decided by the Supreme Court where the petitioners were non-suited for challenging notifications under sections 4 and 6 of the Act on the ground of delay and laches. This is Civil Appeal No. 1391 of 1988 entitled Vishwas Nagar Evacuees Plot Purchasers Association and another Vs. Under Secretary, Delhi Administration and others, decided on 27 February 1990. Details were also given by Mr. Chadha as to how the land in question was needed for the development purposes and how the interim order granted by this Court was hampering the development.
(11) In C.W. 1551/91 Mr. Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioners, said that the land in question had been sold away earlier by the petitioners to one Smt. Bhoo Devi and that was the reason why it was not mentioned by the petitioners in the earlier writ petitions. C.W. 1551/91 did not say if the land had been sold to any one and was filed though Mr. B.D. Sharma claiming to be the attorney of the petitioners. He is stated to be the husband of Bhoo Devi. There is no sale deed and a photo copy of the agreement-cum-will had been filed to show the sale of the land in question. Law does not recognise any such sale.
(12) We find that correct facts withheld from this Court in both the petitions. Infact, the learned counsel for the petitioners themselves were not award of the earlier petitions pending in this Court and petitioners would appear to have misled them too. We, therefore, find no merit in these petitions and would dismiss the same.