Andhra HC (Pre-Telangana)
N. Ramu And Ors. vs Transport Commissioner, Government Of ... on 16 August, 1995
Equivalent citations: 1995(2)ALT860, 1995 A I H C 6291, (1995) 2 LS 292, (1995) 2 ANDH LT 860, (1995) 2 APLJ 425
ORDER S.R. Nayak, J.
1. In both the writ petitions the petitioners who are operators of the contract carriages have called in question the validity and the legality of the directions issued by the Transport Commissioner contained in his D.O. Letter No. 28648 / Ml/95, dated 3-8-1995. Therefore, these two writ petitions were heard together of at the stage of admission itself. Sri E. Manohar, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioners and the learned High Court Government Pleader were heard in the matter.
2. The petitioners have sought for a direction to the respondents-Motor Vehicle Authorities not to launch prosecution against the petitioners and /or their crew under Section 192-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (for short 'the Act') in pursuance of the directions contained in the D.O. letter of the Transport Commissioner dated 3-8-1995, referred to above. They have also sought consequential direction to the Motor Vehicle Inspectors concerned not to launch prosecution against the petitioners and/or their drivers or other members of the crew.
3. The D.O. letter No. 28648/Ml/95, dated 3-8-1995 is extracted here below for ready reference:
"P. Goutham Kumar, I.P.S., 6th Floor, B-Block,
Transport Commissioner, BRK Govt. Officer Bldg.,
Andhra Pradesh. Tank Bund,
Hyderabad-29.
Dated 3-8-1995.
D.O. LETTER No. 28648/M1/95.
My dear,
As you are aware there have been repeated complaints both in the press and in the public regarding illicit operations of vehicles.
It has now been decided to organise a simultaneous drive throughout the State from 7-8-95 onwards to effectively put down the operations of these vehicles. I would request you to convene a meeting of all your executive officers and chalk out a suitable action plan towards this end. You may also make it clear to all your executive officers that from the 7th onwards, any illicit operations which come to notice in their limits shall mean very severe and deterrent action against the motor vehicle inspector concerned.
Regarding vehicles which are plying with Court orders directing the checking officers not to compound etc., action should be taken to prosecute the permit holders and drivers in Court. Please also get in touch with the press before the 7th and enlist their support and through them the support of the public for passing on information about how effectively this drive is being carried on in the various parts of your district.
I shall expect you to closely minitor the progress of the drive the ensure its complete success.
Yours Sincerely,
To Sd/-
Regional transport Officer. (P. Gautam Kumar)."
4. The observations made in the first paragraph are in general. The significance of the same could be understood only in the context of information that the transport Commissioner had possessed at the time of issuing the D.O. letter. The second para in the said D.O. letter refers to the necessity to organise JO a simultaneous drive throughout the State from 7-8-1995 onwards to effectively put down the operations of the vehicles. In the context of the matter it should be understood that the vehicles to which reference is made in the said letter should be understood to be only those vehicles which are operated in violation of the law. In para 3 of the D.O. letter the Transport Commissioner, after referring to the plying of the vehicles after the Court orders, directs that the action should be taken to prosecute the permit holders and drivers in the Court. This direction definitely relates to the vehicles which are permitted to ply by virtue of interim orders granted by this Court.
5. Sri E. Manohar, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioners, submitted two-fold arguments for consideration of the Court. According to the learned Senior Counsel having regard to the interim orders granted by this Court in W.P. No. 2441 /94 and the batch and the interim order granted by this Court in W.P. No. 10601/95 and the batch, it is totally impermissible for the respondent-authorities to launch prosecution against the petitioners and the like under Section 192-A of the Act. The interim order granted by this Court in W.P. No. 2441/94 reads thus:
"The respondents and their subordinates be and hereby are directed not to seize, detain or compound the vehicles of the petitioners for the alleged misuse as stage carriages, if the vehicles of the petitioners are covered by a contract entered into with the Agents or Contractors, as the case may be, pending further orders on this writ petition."
And the interim order granted by this Court in W.P. No. 10601 /95 and the batch reads thus:
"Interim direction to the respondents not to collect compounding fee in respect of violation of Section 192-A of the Motor "Vehicles Act subject to the 35 condition of the petitioners furnishing bank, guarantee for a sum of Rs. 3,000-00 (Rupees three thousand only) each to the satisfaction of the Secretary, State Transport Authority, once in every three months commencing from 1st June, 1995. However, the vehicles can be checked and check reports can be prepared."
The interim order in W.P. No. 2441/94 and the batch directs the respondent- authorities not to seize, detain or compound the vehicles for the alleged misuse as stage carriages if the vehicles of the petitioners are covered by a contract entered into with the Agents or Contractors, as the case may be (emphasis is supplied by the Court), pending further orders on the writ petition. The interim order passed in W.P. No. 10601/95 and the batch directs the respondent-Motor Vehicle Authorities not to collect compounding fee in respect of violation of Section 192-A of the Motor Vehicles Act (emphasis is supplied by the Court) subject to the condition of the owners furnishing bank guarantee for a sum of Rs. 3,000-00 each to the satisfaction of the Secretary, State Transport Authority once in every three months commencing from.....
6. Neither of these two interim orders, in my considered opinion, has impaired or diluted the operation of the provisions of Sub-section (1) of Section 192-A of the Act. It is settled position in law that when a law grants to an authority a power to do certain thing, then the exercise of such power or authority shall not be interdicted by the Court when there is no challenge to the source of authority. The provisions of sub-section (1) of Section 192-A as such are not called in question before the Court. The two interim orders granted by this Court in two sets of writ petitions do not stall or impair the power otherwise available to the Motor Vehicle authorities to launch prosecution for violation of provisions of sub section (1) of Section 66 or in contravention of any condition of permit relating to the route on which or the area in which or the purpose for which the vehicle may be used. Therefore, the petitioners are not entitled to the writ of Mandamus to direct the respondents-motor vehicle authorities not to launch prosecution against the operators and their crew under Section 192-A of the Act. However Sri Manohar, the learned Senior Counsel, would submit that the directions contained in the impugned D.O. letter dated 3-8-1995 issued by the Transport Commissioner send wrong signals to the subordinate enforcing authorities and the Transport Commissioner has commanded his subordinates to prosecute the permit holders and the drivers who had earlier approached this Court and obtained interim orders. Literally speaking, the direction issued by the Transport Commissioner as contained in para 3 of the D.O. letter are to the same effect, but the directions or observations issued or made by the Transport Commissioner should be understood in the context of the statute. It is needless to state that the Transport Commissioner is totally incompetent and has no authority to issue any direction or directions which is/are contrary to the statutory provisions. On what grounds an operator could be prosecuted under Section 192-A of the Act are statutorily specified and laid down and the law enforcing authorities are entitled to initiate prosecution only on those permissible statutory grounds, not otherwise. The direction contained in the D.O. letter of the Transport Commissioner shall not enable the law enforcing officers and the authorities to subject an operator to prosecution even in a case where no ground is made out under Section 192-A of the Act. I think that this clarification will suffice to take out the harmful effect as apprehended by Sri Manohar from the literal reading of the direction contained in para 3 of the D.O, letter.
7. Before concluding, the other argument of Sri Manohar based on the provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 200 should be noted and considered. Sub-section (2) of Section 200 provides that where an offence has been compounded under sub-section (1) the offender, if in custody, shall be discharged and no further proceeding shall be taken against him in respect of such offence. The argument of Sri Manohar, the learned Senior Counsel, is that by virtue of the interim order granted by this Court in W.P. No. 10601 /95 and the batch, it should be held that the offence or offences alleged against such operaters has /have been compounded within the meaning of sub-section (2) of Section 200 of the Act and if it is so held, initiation of prosecution against the petitioners is totally impermissible. This argument of the learned Senior Counsel is not acceptable to the Court. The interim order granted by this Court in W.P. No. 10601/95 and the batch clearly directs the respondent-Motor Vehicle authorities not to collect compounding fee in respect of violation of Section 192 of the Act. If that is so, collection of compounding fee by virtue of the interim order granted by this Court was not at all given effect to. In other words, the alleged offence against the operators has not been compounded so as to attract the provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 200 of the Act. However Sri E. Manohar does not stop there. According to the learned Counsel by the same interim order the Court directed the operators to furnish bank guarantee for a sum of Rs. 3,000-00 once in every three months and the direction contained in the first part of the interim order and the direction to deposit a sum of Rs. 3,000-00 periodically as contained in the latter part read together would only mean that the offence alleged against the petitioners is permitted to be compounded by the Court at a lesser rate of compounding fee and if it is so construed, it should be held that the offence alleged against the petitioners therein has been permitted to be compounded under sub-section (1) of Section 200 of the Act and in that event certainly the bar contained in sub-section (2) of Section 200 of the Act would attract the facts of the present case. This argument is also not acceptable to the Court. There is absolutely no ambiguity in the language employed by the Court in granting the interim order. Interim order clearly directs that the respondents shall not collect compounding fee in respect of any violation under Section 192-A of the Act. If that is so, the further direction to the petitioners-operators to deposit Rs. 3,000-00 once in every three months is only a condition attached to the main interim relief granted in favour of the petitioners. Obviously such a condition is imposed by the Court to safeguard the interest of the Department in the event of the Department succeeding at the final hearing of the writ petitions.
8. Lastly, Sri Manohar, the learned senior Counsel, took exception to the direction contained in the vehicle check report No. 958456 insofar as it directs the driver of the vehicle to go over to R.T. A., and meet Motor Vehicle Inspector for launching prosecution. The learned High Court Government Pleader submitted that the so called direction issued to the driver is only a directory and if the driver choses to go before the authority and furnish any document at his own will, he may do so and there is no legal compulsion for him to approach before the Motor Vehicle Inspector. At any rate the learned High Court Government Pleader is not in a position to trace the authority of the Motor Vehicle Inspector to direct the driver of the vehicle to appear before him for launching prosecution under any law. In that view of the matter, I hold that the driver / owner of the vehicle is not under any legal obligation to approach Motor Vehicle Inspector for the purpose of launching prosecution.
9. In the result and for the foregoing reasons, these writ petitions stand disposed of. No costs.