Punjab-Haryana High Court
The Haryana State Federation Of ... vs Presiding Officer, Industrial ... on 7 April, 1994
Equivalent citations: (1995)IILLJ1054P&H, (1994)108PLR612
JUDGMENT Jawahar Lal Gupta, J.
1. Did the petitioner retrench the workman in violation of the provisions contained in Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947? The petitioner says that the respondents had been appointed on purely ad hoc basis and their services stood terminated on account of non-renewal of the contracts of employment. The Labour Court having rejected the plea of the Management, it has approached this Court through Civil Writ Petition Nos. 3952 and 14046 of 1991. Issues in both the petition being similar, these can be disposed of by a common order. A few facts emanating from the record of Civil Writ Petition No. 3952 of 1991 may be briefly noticed.
2. On February 9, 1984 the petitioner appointed the second respondent as a Salesman for a period of 89 days on ad hoc basis. The appointment was extended from time to time. Finally, in pursuance to the request made by the respondent vide his letter dated July 10, 1986, his appointment was extended for the period w.e.f. August 4, 1986 to January 30, 1987 for six months on the fixed salary of Rs. 500/- per month. Thereafter, his services stood terminated. However, the workman raised an industrial dispute. The appropriate Government made a reference to the Labour Court. It accepted the workman's claim vide award dated April 26, 1990. A copy of this award has been produced as Annexure P-3. The Labour Court ordered the reinstatement of the workman with continuity of service and full backwages. The petitioner approached this Court through Civil Writ Petition No. 8300 of 1990. Vide order dated June 4, 1990, the Motion Bench disposed of the writ petition with the following order:-
"Present. Mr. Hemant Kumar, Advocate. The sole argument is that the petitioners (respondents) going out of service could not be taken as retrenchment in view of the fixed term of the appointment vide Annexure P.I.No such point has been taken or argued before the Labour Court. The petitioner, if so advised may approach the Labour Court for the rectification of the mistake. The petition stands disposed of as indicated above. June 4, 1990 Sd/-I.S.Tiwana, J.
Sd/-G.R.Majithia,J."
3. The petitioner, thus, approached the Labour Court. It rejected the petitioner's claim. It has consequently approached this Court through the present petition.
4. Learned counsel for the parties have been heard, Mr. Hemant Kumar has contended that the respondent having been appointed for a fixed period from August 4, 1986 to January 30, 1987 and the contract of employment having not been renewed, the Labour Court has erred in holding that he was retrenched in violation of the provisions of Section 25F. On the other hand, Mr. Surya Kant, appearing for the respondent-workman, has vehemently contended that the finding of fact recorded by the Labour Court calls for no interference. Counsel for the parties have also produced a copy of the statement of claim filed by the workman and the reply to the demand notice submitted on behalf of the petitioner- management. These documents have been taken on record collectively as "Mark-A".
5. A perusal of the reply filed on behalf of the petitioner-management before the Reconciliation Officer shows that the respondent-workman had been appointed on March 23, 1984. He worked till June 19, 1984. Thereafter, he was in service of the following periods:-
(i) From June 27, 1984 to December 26, 1984;
(ii) From January 10, 1985 to April 10, 1985
(iii) From April 10, 1985 to July 11, 1986
(iv) From July 15, 1985 to January 10, 1986
(v) From February 1, 1986 to July 31. 1986 and ;
(vi) From August 4, 1986 to January 30, 1987
6. It is, thus, clear that except for short intervals of time the respondent-workman has remained in the service of the petitioner since March 23, 1984. It is in the background of this factual position that the respective contentions of the learned counsel for the parties have to be considered.
7. Retrenchment has been defined to mean "the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action...." An exception was, however, introduced by Act No. 49 of 1984. It was inter alia provided that termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry..." would not amount to retrenchment. Thus, the normal rule is that when an employer terminates the service of an employee, for any reason whatsoever, it retrenches him. However, when a person is employed for doing a particular work or for a specified duration of time (say to work against a leave vacancy), the termination may come about automatically on the completion of the work or the expiry of the period. The law appears to have excluded such termination from the ambit of 'retrenchment'. Further more, it can also happen that a person may be employed on a specified condition that he has to achieve a particular target in a specified time and in case of failure to do so, his appointment shall stand automatically terminated. Even in such case, the termination may not amount to retrenchment. However, the scope of exception to the general rule in Section 2(oo) cannot be enlarged so as to stifle the basic provision and the real objective of law.
8. A perusal of the factual position, as noticed above, shows that the respondent workman had virtually remained in continuous employment from March 23, 1984 to January 30, 1987. He had served for more than 3-1/2 years. He had not been employed for executing a project nor were his services terminated at the expiry of the initial period of employment. In fact, he had continued in service on account of a series of extension orders. The post held by him was not even alleged to have been abolished. It was not even suggested that there was no work for him. It is no doubt correct that vide order dated July 23, 1986, a copy of which has been produced as Annexure, P.1, the Managing Director of the petitioner had ordered the reappointment of the respondent-workman from August 4, 1986 to January 30, 1987. However, this order cannot be read in isolation. The preceeding facts cannot be lost sight of. In such a case, the acceptance of the petitioner's plea would virtually amount to giving a go-bye to the various provisions of the Act. A daily wage worker would never be entitled to any benefit under the Act for his service contract ends with the day. It would enable the employer to keep an employee in service for, 30 years by giving periodic extensions after short breaks or even on daily wage and then take the plea of 'non-renewal' of the contract of employment. As at present, such a plea cannot be accepted.
9. The present state of affairs in the country when the 'workmen' are doing everything but 'work' and even staff in hospitals resorts to frequent strikes, it may be desirable or even necessary to suitably amend the law. However, as at present the law does not appear to be that action such as that taken by the petitioner would not amount to retrenchment. Such is not the position of law today. The plea of the petitioner is, consequently, rejected.
10. Taking the totality of circumstances into consideration, the view taken by the Labour Court can neither be said to be illegal nor perverse. Consequently no ground for interference is made out.
11. No other point was urged.
12. In view of the above, there is no merit in these petitions, which are dismissed, but without any order as to costs.