Uttarakhand High Court
Union Of India & Another ...Petitioners vs Associations Of Class I (Group 'A') ... on 8 January, 2020
Author: Alok Kumar Verma
Bench: Ramesh Ranganathan, Alok Kumar Verma
Reserved Judgment
IN THE HIGH COURT OF UTTARAKHAND AT NAINITAL
Writ Petition (S/B) No. 445 of 2016
Union of India & another ...Petitioners
Versus
Associations of Class I (Group 'A') Officer & others ...Respondents
Mr. Rakesh Thapliyal, learned Assistant Solicitor General assisted by Mr. V.K. Kaparuwan, learned
Standing Counsel for the Union of India-petitioners.
Mr. Ram Prasad, learned counsel for the respondents.
JUDGMENT
Coram: Hon'ble Ramesh Ranganathan, C.J.
Hon'ble Alok Kumar Verma, J.
Judgment Reserved : 17.12.2019 Judgment Delivered : 08.01.2020 Chronological list of cases referred :
1. AIR 1958 SC 86
2. (1993) 4 SCC 10
3. Order of the Madras High Court in Writ Petition No. 18164 of 2013 dated 30.09.2013
4. (1991) 4 SCC 54
5. (1976) 1 SCC 671
6. AIR 1952 SC 12
7. AIR 1962 SC 1044
8. (1967) 1 SCA 413
9. AIR 1966 SC 828
10. (1973) 3 SCC 739
11. (1973) 2 SCC 696
12. (1970) 1 SCC 575
13. (1979) 4 SCC 458
14. (1978) 1 SCC 215
15. (2013) 4 SCC 465
16. AIR 1974 SC 1719
17. AIR 1977 SC 1361
18. (2012) 4 SCC 407
19. AIR 1954 SC 728
20. AIR 1996 SC 2736
21. (2009) 2 SCC 784
22. (2000) 2 SCC 465
23. (2000) 7 SCC 552
24. (1997) 10 SCC 549
25. (1985) 3 SCC 169
26. (1993) 4 SCC 119
27. (2013) 5 SCC 1
28. (2006) 11 SCC 731
29. (1961) 1 QBD 278
30. (1976) 2 SCC 291
31. AIR 2011 SC 3031
32. (2010) 5 SCC 600
33. (1880) 14 Ch.D., 458 James, L.J.
34. AIR 2008 SC 1289 2 RAMESH RANGANATHAN, C.J. (Per) The jurisdiction of this Court, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, has been invoked by the Union of India against the order passed by the Central Administrative Tribunal, Allahabad Bench at Nainital in O.A. No.1367 of 2011 dated 07.04.2016.
2. The jurisdiction of the Tribunal was invoked by the Association of Class I, Group-A Officers, Survey of India through its Secretary, besides several officials in the civilian stream working in different posts such as Director and Superintending Surveyor. The relief they sought in the O.A. was to quash the order dated 19.07.2011 issued by the first respondent i.e. the Secretary, Ministry of Science and Technology to the third respondent i.e. the Surveyor General of India approving the permanent secondment of Army officers to the Survey of India; (b) to quash the orders dated 27.07.2011 and 13.10.2011 issued by the third respondent; (c) to direct the respondents to refrain from inducting Army officers, in the Survey of India, in contravention of the existing recruitment Rules; and (d) to direct the respondents to dispose of the representation dated 09.09.2011 by passing a speaking order within a period of three months from the date of the order of the Tribunal.
3. In its order, impugned in this Writ Petition, the Tribunal noted the contentions urged on behalf of the applicants that, though the department has a separate seniority and posts for civilian officers vis-à-vis Army Officers, the functions of the department was such that, irrespective of the stream, an officer holding higher posts ranked senior to the person holding junior post; to illustrate, Applicants 21 and 22 had joined the Survey of India as Deputy Superintending Surveyor in the month of July, 2009; respondents 4 to 7 and 9, holding the rank of 'Major', (analogous to the post of Superintending Surveyor), had joined the Survey of India on 15.11.2011; Applicant No. 22, though having more length of service in the department, was junior to respondents 4 to 7 and 9, and had to work under them, as he was promoted to the post of Superintending Surveyor in the month of January, 2019; respondents 4 to 7 and 9 holding the rank of 'Major', analogous to the post of Superintending Surveyor, were senior to Applicants 21 and 22 right from the date of their induction; respondents 4 to 7 and 9, even though they had less length of service, would be initialing the ACRs and Character Rolls of those 3 civilians who had more length of service, as they held the rank of a 'Major' analogous to the post of Superintending Surveyor; similarly respondents 4 to 7 and 9 who were Army Officers in the rank of 'Major', and having commissioned service more than that laid down in the RR, would be entitled to be promoted/granted as NFSG just after putting six years' service in the Survey of India, whereas the applicants, who were all Civilian officers, would have to wait for 14 years for grant of NFSG, despite having more length of service in the department; the post of NFSG is that of a Director in the Survey of India; Civilian Officers, having more length of service in the department, had to work under respondents 4 to 7 and 9 (Army Officers) holding the rank of Major; these officers, having more commissioned service, were eligible to enjoy higher status in various boards and committees; and the Civilians, who had more length of service in the department, had to assist them being their juniors.
4. The Central Administrative Tribunal, after taking note of the submissions, urged on behalf of the respondents before it (petitioners herein) regarding the circumstances in which the army officers came to be appointed in the Survey of India, observed that, in accordance with Rule 3(1) of the Survey of India (Group 'A') Posts) Service Rules, 1989, the integrated seniority of Civilian and Defence Officers had been split up into two separate streams viz 'Civilian' and 'Defence' streams; the posts included in the service, their number and pay, and their division between Civilian and Defence streams had been specified in 'Annexure-1'; according to 'Annexure-1', the distribution of the number of posts between Defence and Civilian stream were 70 and 42 respectively; it was also not disputed that 70 posts, in respect of the Defence stream, had been abolished by letter dated 21.11.2000 issued by the second respondent pursuant to the instructions contained in the Ministry of Finance Office Memorandum dated 03.05.1993; subsequently the respondents had downgraded 25 posts of Superintending Surveyors, to the level of Deputy Superintending Surveyors, for a period of 04 years from the date of filling of such posts vide DST's letter dated 10.01.2003; and further 21 posts of Superintending Surveyor were down-graded, to the level of Deputy Superintending Surveyor, vide DST's letter dated 20.08.2009.
5. From the order of the Tribunal, it is clear that the services of Group 'A' cadre employees, in the Survey of India, is governed by Rules called 'Survey 4 of India (Group-A) Service Rules, 1989' (for short the '1989 Rules'), which was notified by the President of India on 17.06.1989. These Rules were made in the exercise of powers conferred by the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution of India.
6. In terms of Rule 3 of the 1989 rules, the Group 'A' service of the Survey of India consists of two streams i.e. the Civilian stream and the Defence stream. Clause (A) of Annexure-I to the 1989 Rules relates to bifurcation of the Survey of India Group 'A' Service. Sub-clause (1) thereof stipulates that the existing combined cadre will be split up into two independent streams- one for the civilian and the other for Defence officers. The posts in the Survey of India Group 'A' cadre are to be distributed among the two streams in the manner provided in the said clause. While at the bottom of Group 'A' is the post of Deputy Superintendent Surveyor, at the top are the posts in the Senior Administrative Grade. In between, from the bottom to the top, are the posts of Superintending Surveyor, the Deputy Director, the Director/Deputy Director Selection Grade, the General Manager, and the Additional Surveyor General.
7. The particulars of these posts, in each of the grades in Group 'A' cadre, (ie the grade, the scale of pay, and the number of posts sanctioned for each stream i.e. defence and civil) are prescribed separately in Annexure-I as is evident from the table mentioned herein below:-
Grade Scale of Pay Defence Civil
Senior Administrative Grade Rs.5900-200-6700 5 3
(Additional Surveyor
General/General Manager)
Non-functional Selection Rs. 4500-150-5700 19 17
Grade Director/Deputy
Director (Selection Grade)
Junior Administrative Grade Rs.3700-125-4700-150- 23 17
(Deputy Director) 50005
Senior Time Scale Rs. 3000-100-3500-125- 70 90
(Superintending Surveyor) 4500
Junior Time Scale (Deputy Rs. 2200-75-2800-EB-100- 70 42
Superintendent Surveyor) 4000
5
8. The applicants before the Tribunal are all in the civilian stream and are not eligible to be considered for appointment to any of the posts separately earmarked for the defence stream right from the lowest post of Deputy Superintending Surveyor till the highest post in the Senior Administrative Grade. The channel of promotion is also separate i.e. a civilian officer is entitled for promotion only to the posts separately earmarked for the civilian stream, and a defence official is similarly entitled to be considered for promotion only to those posts separately earmarked for the defence stream.
9. Clause A(iii) of Annexure-I to the 1989 Rules provides a safeguard for existing incumbents in the combined seniority list and, in terms thereof, the present incumbents (Defence/Civil), who are adversely affected on account of bifurcation, will be protected by the following provisions:- (a) all those officers (Defence/Civil), who would have got promotion on the basis of the integrated seniority, but who got left out on account of separate seniority, would be covered by creating supernumerary posts (and in addition by granting equivalent acting/substantive army ranks in case of defence officers); (b) there is no wide disparity between the existing officers in the two streams for promotion to a particular level i.e. the difference in the year of allotment, seniority of the junior- most officers or comparison at each level is not more than one year. However, if there is any case of wide disparity, the affected officers would be covered by creating supernumerary posts (and in addition by granting equivalent acting/substantive army ranks in the case of defence officers); and, (c) other affected Defence officers who get superseded by junior civilian officers in the combined list but are otherwise fit for promotion- not covered under (a) & (b) above-will be granted local rank equivalent to the post occupied by a junior civilian officer. This would not entitle them to any rank, pay or other allowances of supernumerary local rank.
10. In the O.A. filed before the Tribunal, the applicants have not even contended that the safeguards provided for existing incumbents, in the combined seniority list, has been violated. They have also not questioned the constitutional validity of the 1989 Rules. Their whole case is that persons, who are ineligible to be appointed, have been appointed in the post of Deputy Superintending Surveyor in the defence stream; and have, because of their being given periodic promotion 6 (albeit in the separate defence stream), risen far above them in the organization ie the Survey of India.
11. In the counter affidavit, filed before the Tribunal, it was submitted by the petitioners herein that Writ Petition No. 1269 of 1974 was filed by the Civilian Officers before the Andhra Pradesh High Court questioning the validity of the 1950 Rules on the ground that the seniority prescription therein was based on irrelevant criteria; the Andhra Pradesh High Court had struck down some of the Rules, of the 1950 Rules, as violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution holding that there was no ground to justify the classification made, under the 1950 Rules, between Army Officers and Civilian Officers; recruits from the Army could not be said to be better qualified than the Civilian direct recruits; and there was no justification in discriminating in favour of the Army officers; the impugned Rules were struck down on the ground that there was no reasonable nexus with the object sought to be achieved; the order of the Andhra Pradesh High Court was subjected to challenge in Civil Appeal Nos. 1754-1755 of 1975; the Supreme Court, while allowing the Civil Appeal by its order dated 05.09.1975 and in upholding the 1950 Rules, had observed that flexible provisions for promotion to higher positions, which would not make the department lop-sided or a vertical division of the civilian and military wings, without injury to integrity and efficiency, may meet the needs of equality; keeping in view the observations of the Supreme Court, and in the light of the continued discontent of the Civilian Officers, the Central Government decided to bifurcate the civilian and the defence cadres of the Survey of India, and thus the Survey of India (Group 'A') Service Rules, 1989 came to be notified; in terms of the said Rules, posts meant for the civilian and defence officers in various grades were clearly laid down in Annexure I to the Rules; Rule 9(C) of the said Rules clearly provides that there will be no inter-se seniority between officers coming from the civilian and defence stream; and, as per the present Rules, induction of Army officers on permanent secondment does not affect the seniority and promotional prospects of the civilian officers as they do not have inter-se seniority. In effect, the petitioners herein had contended that the applicants before the Tribunal could not be said to be aggrieved by the induction of Army officers in the Survey of India, as there were different channels of promotion and seniority in two distinct and separate streams for civilian and defence personnel.
712. The learned Assistant Solicitor General, appearing for the Union of India, would submit before us that the respondents-applicants lack locus standi to question appointments of Class-I Group-A officers in the defence stream; and they cannot be said to be aggrieved by such appointments, as their channel of promotion is only in the civilian stream and not in the defence stream. On the other hand Mr. Ram Prasad, learned counsel for the respondents-applicants, would contend that, notwithstanding the fact that officers are entitled for seniority and promotion in two different streams, they are, nonetheless, working in the same organization and fall within a common domain; and, as has been noted by the Tribunal in the order impugned in the Writ Petition, persons, who were appointed in the defence stream in an equivalent post long after the applicants were appointed in such posts in the civilian stream, have now risen in rank and are, in fact, examining the ACRs' and are supervising the functions of the applicants who were seniors to them in the civilian stream when these Army Officers were inducted in the services of the Survey of India.
13. This contention, regarding the applicants (officers in the Civilian stream) not having locus standi to question the appointment of Army officers in the defence stream, has not been examined by the Tribunal in the order impugned in the Writ Petition. As the very jurisdiction of the Tribunal to entertain an application, under Section 19(1) of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, is contingent on the applicants being "persons aggrieved", failure to determine this jurisdictional issue would vitiate the order passed by it. Where the error, irregularity or illegality, touching jurisdiction or procedure committed by an inferior court or tribunal of first instance, is so patent and loudly obtrusive that it leaves on its decision an indelible stamp of infirmity or vice which cannot be obliterated or cured on appeal or revision, and if an inferior court or tribunal of first instance acts wholly without jurisdiction or patently in excess of jurisdiction, the superior court may quite properly exercise its power to issue the prerogative writ of certiorari to correct the error of the court or tribunal of first instance. (State of U.P. v. Mohd. Nooh[1]; and Rattan Lal Sharma v. Managing Committee, Dr. Hari Ram (Co-Education) Higher Secondary School[2]).
14. It is only if we are satisfied that the applicants before the Tribunal, (ie officers all of whom are working in different posts in the civilian stream), can 8 claim to be "persons aggrieved" by the appointment and promotion of officers in the defence stream, and have the necessary standing to question such appointment, would it then be necessary for us to examine whether or not the contentions urged by the applicants before the Tribunal, regarding the validity of the appointment of officers in the defence stream, are devoid of merits.
15. In examining the question whether the respondents herein (applicants before the Central Administrative Tribunal) had the locus standi to invoke the jurisdiction of the Central Administrative Tribunal for grant of the reliefs sought for them in the O.A, certain provisions of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 needs to be noted. Chapter III of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 (the "1985 Act" for short) relates to the jurisdiction, powers and authority of Tribunals. Section 14 thereunder relates to the jurisdiction, powers and authority of the Central Administrative Tribunal. Chapter IV of the 1985 Act prescribes the procedure, and Section 19 thereunder relates to applications to the Tribunals. Under Section 19(1), subject to the other provisions of the 1985 Act, a person aggrieved by any order, pertaining to any matter within the jurisdiction of a Tribunal, may make an application to the Tribunal for the redressal of his grievance. It is not any person who can make an application to the Tribunal, but only a "person aggrieved by any order" who is entitled to do so, and that too only for the redressal of his grievance, and not of anyone else.
16. Under Section 19(3) of the 1985 Act, the Tribunal should satisfy itself whether such an application is fit for adjudication or trial. A person knocking the doors of the Tribunal should satisfy it that he has a statutory or a legal right. Thereafter, the Tribunal must also be satisfied that there has been a breach of such a legal right, and the said breach is capable of being enforced by it. The respondents must have the corresponding legal duty to remedy the breach of a legal right of an aggrieved person. Existence of a legal right is a condition precedent, before the Tribunal decides to invoke its jurisdiction. The applicant should first establish his legal right leading to a legal injury, and thereafter, seek a remedy. The onus is on the applicant to clear the first hurdle before requesting the Tribunal to go into merits. (D. Jagannathan v. S. Sattanathan and others[3]).
17. Locus standi to approach the Court/Tribunal relates to the maintainability of the petition/application. (Bangalore Medical Trust v. B.S. 9 Muddappa[4]). In a case of defect of jurisdiction, an aggrieved person will be entitled to relief including for a writ of certiorari as a matter of course, but if he does not fulfil that character, and is a "stranger", the Court/Tribunal will deny him this remedy, save in very special circumstances. (Jasbhai Motibhai Desai v. Roshan Kumar, Haji Bashir Ahmed[5]). To have "standing to sue", which means locus standi to ask for relief in a Court/Tribunal, the petitioner/applicant must show that he is injured, that is, he has been subjected to or threatened with a legal wrong. Courts can intervene only where legal rights are invaded. "Legal wrong" requires a judicially enforceable right and the touchstone to judiciability is injury to a legally protected right. A nominal or a highly speculative adverse affect on the interest or the right of a person is insufficient to give him the "standing to sue"
for judicial review of the administrative action. Again the "adverse affect"
requisite for "standing to sue" must be an "illegal effect". (Jasbhai Motibhai Desai[5]).
18. In order to have locus standi, an applicant should ordinarily be one who has a personal or individual right in the subject-matter of the application. In other words, as a general rule, infringement of some legal right, or prejudice to some legal interest, inhering in the petitioner is necessary to give him locus standi in the matter, (State of Orissa v. Madan Gopal Rungta[6]; Calcutta Gas Co. v. State of W.B.[7]; Ram Umeshwari Suthoo v. Member, Board of Revenue, Orissa[8]; Gadde Venkateswara Rao v. Government of A.P.[9]; State of Orissa v. Rajasaheb Chandanmall[10]; Satyanarayana Sinha Dr. v. S. Lal & Co.[11]; and Jasbhai Motibhai Desai[5]). The expression "ordinarily" indicates that this is not a cast-iron rule. It is flexible enough to take in those cases where the applicant has been prejudicially affected by an act or omission of an authority, even though he has no proprietary or even a fiduciary interest in the subject-matter. That apart, in exceptional cases, even a stranger or a person who was not a party to the proceedings before the authority, but has a substantial and genuine interest in the subject-matter of the proceedings, will be covered by this rule. (Jasbhai Motibhai Desai[5]).
19. Even assuming a wrong was committed, it alone would not create a right in favour of an applicant in the absence of a legal right followed by a legal injury. (D. Jagannathan[3]). In Nagar Rice and Flour Mills v. N.T. Gowda[12], 10 the Supreme Court held that a ricemill owner has no locus standi to challenge, the setting up of a new rice mill by another -- even if such setting up be in contravention of Section 8(3)(c) of the Rice Milling Industry (Regulation) Act, 1958 -- because no right vested in such an applicant is infringed. In Mohd. Ibrahim Khan v. State of M.P.[13], the Supreme Court held that a right to notice by reason of any rule of natural justice, which a party may establish, must depend for its existence upon proof of an interest which is bound to be injured by not hearing the party claiming to be entitled to a notice, and to be heard before an order is passed; if the duty to give notice and to hear the party is not-mandatory, the actual order passed on a matter must be shown to have injuriously affected the interest of the party which was given no notice of the matter (Cosmosteels Private Ltd. v. Jairam Das Gupta[14]).
20. The legal remedy may be invoked by 'any person aggrieved'. This is the same phrase as is used at common law to define standing for obtaining quashing and prohibiting orders. Courts have interpreted this apparently guideless phrase as expressing a requirement of standing, and have treated it as meaning 'any person affected', as Judges have felt that any question of standing must be resolved by interpreting these words restrictively. Since standing depends upon indefinable factors which vary from one case to another, the interpretations are sometimes inconsistent. There has been some confusion of two different questions: whether a person is at liberty to apply to the court; and whether, having done so, he has shown sufficient standing to be entitled to a remedy. There seems to be no reason to hold that, because he passes the first test, he necessarily passes the second. Judicial statements suggest that the words 'person aggrieved' are likely to cover any person who has a genuine grievance of whatever kind. (Administrative Law:
Tenth Edition H.W.R. Wade & C.F. Forsyth).
21. A legal right means an entitlement arising out of legal rules. It may be defined as an advantage, or a benefit conferred upon a person by the rule of law. The expression, "person aggrieved", does not include a person who suffers from a psychological or an imaginary injury. A person aggrieved must therefore, necessarily, be one whose right or interest has been adversely affected or jeopardised. (Ayaaubkhan Noorkhan Pathan v. State of Maharashtra and others[15]; Shanti Kumar R. Chanji v. Home Insurance Co. of New York[16];
11State of Rajasthan & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors.[17]; and D. Jagannathan[3]). A legal right is, in fact, a benefit conferred upon a person by the rule of law. Thus, a person who suffers from legal injury can only challenge the act or omission. There may be some harm or loss that may not be wrongful in the eye of the law because it may not result in injury to a legal right or legally protected interest of the complainant, but juridically harm of this description is called damnum sine injuria. The complainant has to establish that he has been deprived of, or has been denied, a legal right, and he has sustained injury to any legally protected interest. In case he has no legal right for a justiciable claim, he cannot be heard as a party in a lis. (Ravi Yashwant Bhoir v. District Collector, Raigad[18]; Ayaaubkhan Noorkhan Pathan[15]; and D. Jagannathan[3]).
22. The legal right that can be enforced must ordinarily be the right of the applicant himself, who complains of infraction of such a right and approaches the Court/Tribunal for relief. (Ayaaubkhan Noorkhan Pathan[15]; Madan Gopal Rungta[6]; Saghir Ahmad & Anr. v. State of U.P.[19]; Calcutta Gas Company (Proprietary) Ltd. v. State of West Bengal & Ors.[7]; Rajendra Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh[20]; and Tamilnadu Mercantile Bank Shareholders Welfare Association (2) v. S.C. Sekar & Ors.[21]; D. Jagannathan[3]).
23. The foundation for exercising jurisdiction either under Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, or under Article 226 of the Constitution, is, ordinarily, the personal or individual legal right of the petitioner himself. However, in a Public Interest Litigation or in writs like habeas corpus and quo warranto, this rule has been relaxed and modified. (Satyanarayana Sinha[11]; Railway Board v. Chandrima Das[22]; and M.S. Jayaraj v. Commr.of Excise[23]). The restricted meaning of "aggrieved person", and the narrow outlook of specific injury, has yielded in favour of a broad and wide construction in such cases. (B.S. Muddappa[4]). In the context of public interest litigation the Supreme Court, in its various judgments, has given the widest amplitude and meaning to the concept of locus standi. In People's Union for Democratic Rights v. Union of India it was laid down that public interest litigation could be initiated not only by filing formal petitions in the High Court, but even by sending letters and telegrams so as to provide easy access to court. (Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India[24]; State of H.P. v. A Parent of a Student of Medical College[25] on the right to 12 approach the court in the realm of public interest litigation). In B.S. Muddappa[4], the Supreme Court held that the restricted meaning of "aggrieved person" and the narrow outlook of a "specific injury" has yielded in favour of a broad and wide construction in the wake of public interest litigation; public-spirited citizens, having faith in the rule of law, are rendering great social and legal service by espousing causes of a public nature; they cannot be ignored or overlooked on a technical or conservative yardstick of the rule of locus standi or the absence of personal loss or injury; and the concept of locus standi in public interest litigation is much wider, and takes in its stride anyone who is not a mere "busybody". (Railway Board v. Chandrima Das[22]). In service jurisprudence, however, it is for the aggrieved person to assail the legality of the offending action. A third party has no locus standi to canvass the legality or correctness of the action. (R.K. Jain v. Union of India[26]; State of Punjab v. Salil Sabhlok[27]; and B. Srinivasa Reddy v. Karnataka Urban Water Supply & Drainage Board Employees Association & Ors.[28]).
24. In the context of locus standi, an applicant may ordinarily fall in any of these categories: (i) "person aggrieved"; (ii) "stranger"; (iii) busybody or meddlesome interloper. Persons in the last category are easily distinguishable from those coming under the first two categories. Such persons interfere in things which do not concern them. They masquerade as crusaders for justice. They pretend to act in the name of pro bono publico, though they have no interest of the public or even of their own to protect. They indulge in the pastime of meddling with the judicial process either by force of habit or from improper motives. Often, they are actuated by a desire to win notoriety or cheap popularity; and the ulterior intent, of some applicants in this category, may be no more than spoking the wheels of administration. The applications of such busy-bodies should be rejected at the threshold. (Jasbhai Motibhai Desai[5]).
25. The distinction between the first and second categories of applicants, though real, is not always well-demarcated. The first category has, as it were, two concentric zones; a solid central zone of certainty, and a grey outer circle of lessening certainty in a sliding centrifugal scale, with an outermost nebulous fringe of uncertainty. Applicants falling within the central zone are those whose legal rights have been infringed. Such applicants undoubtedly stand in the category of 13 "persons aggrieved". In the grey outer circle, the bounds which separate the first category from the second intermix, interfuse and overlap increasingly in a centrifugal direction. All persons in this outer zone may not be "persons aggrieved". To distinguish such applicants from "strangers", among them, some broad tests are applied. (Jasbhai Motibhai Desai[5]).
26. Some general tests have been devised to ascertain whether an applicant is eligible for the first category so as to have the necessary locus standi or "standing". (Jasbhai Motibhai Desai[5]). The expression "aggrieved person"
denotes an elastic, and to an extent, an elusive concept. It cannot be confined within the bounds of a rigid, exact and comprehensive definition. At best, its features can be described in a broad tentative manner. Its scope and meaning depends on diverse, variable factors such as the content and intent of the statute of which contravention is alleged, the specific circumstances of the case, the nature and extent of the petitioner's interest, and the nature and extent of the prejudice or injury suffered by him. (Jasbhai Motibhai Desai[5]). The expression "person aggrieved " means a person who had suffered a legal grievance. But if the applicant had no right under the statute, and no legal right of his had been infringed, he is not entitled to challenge the decision. (Burton v. Minister of Housing and Local Government[29]; and Jasbhai Motibhai Desai[5]).
27. Among the meanings, of the words 'a person aggrieved', is that a person will be held to be aggrieved by a decision if that decision is materially adverse to him. Normally, one is required to establish that one has been denied or deprived of something to which one is legally entitled, in order to make one 'a person aggrieved'. Again a person is aggrieved if a legal burden is imposed on him. The meaning of the words 'a person aggrieved' is given a restricted meaning in statutes which provide remedies for the protection of private legal rights. The restricted meaning requires denial or deprivation of legal rights. (Bar Council of Maharashtra v. M.V. Dabholkar[30]; and Jasbhai Motibhai Desai[5]).
28. The scope and meaning of the expression "aggrieved person" depends on diverse, variable factors such as the content and intent of the statute of which contravention is alleged, the specific circumstances of the case, the nature and extent of the complainant's interest and the nature and the extent of the prejudice or 14 injury suffered by the complainant. (A. Subhash Babu v. State of A.P.[31]; and Ayaaubkhan Noorkhan Pathan[15]). The expression "person aggrieved" means a person who is wrongfully deprived of his entitlement which he is legally entitled to receive, and it does not include any kind of disappointment or personal inconvenience. 'Person aggrieved' means a person who is injured or one who is adversely affected in a legal sense. (M.S. Jayaraj[23]; and S. Khushboo v. Kanniammal[32]).
29. The words 'person aggrieved' do not really mean a man who is disappointed of a benefit which he might have received if some other order had been made. A 'person aggrieved' must be a man who has suffered a legal grievance, a man against whom a decision has been pronounced which has wrongfully deprived him of something or wrongfully refused him something, or wrongfully affected his title to something. (In Re Sidebothem[33]; Burton[29]; and Jasbhai Motibhai Desai[5]). If a person claiming relief is not eligible as per requirement, then he cannot be said to be a person aggrieved. (Anand Sharadchandra Oka v. University of Mumbai[34]; Ayaaubkhan Noorkhan Pathan[15]).
30. The tests, to distinguish "persons aggrieved" from strangers, are not absolute and ultimate. Their efficacy varies according to the circumstances of the case, including the statutory context in which the matter falls to be considered. These are: Whether the applicant is a person whose legal right has been infringed? Has he suffered a legal wrong or injury, in the sense, that his interest, recognised by law, has been prejudicially and directly affected by the act or omission of the authority, complained of; is he a person who has suffered a legal grievance, a person "against whom a decision has been pronounced which has wrongfully deprived him of something or wrongfully refused him something, or wrongfully affected his title to something?"Has he a special and substantial grievance of his own beyond some grievance or inconvenience suffered by him in common with the rest of the public? Was he entitled to object and be heard by the authority before it took the impugned action? If so, was he prejudicially affected in the exercise of that right by the act of usurpation of jurisdiction on the part of the authority? Is the statute, in the context of which the scope of the words "person aggrieved" is 15 being considered, dealing with private rights of particular individuals? (Jasbhai Motibhai Desai[5]).
31. A person, who raises a grievance, must show how he has suffered legal injury. Generally, a stranger having no right whatsoever to any post or property, cannot be permitted to intervene in the affairs of others. (Ayaaubkhan Noorkhan Pathan[15]; D. Jagannathan[3]). Only a person who has suffered, or suffers from, a legal injury can challenge the act/action/order etc. in a court of law. (Ayaaubkhan Noorkhan Pathan[15]; D. Jagannathan[3]).
32. A fanciful or sentimental grievance may not be sufficient to confer locus standi to sue upon the individual. There must be injuria or a legal grievance which can be appreciated and not a stat pro ratione voluntas reasons i.e. a claim devoid of reasons. (Ravi Yashwant Bhoir[18]; Ayaaubkhan Noorkhan Pathan[15]; and D. Jagannathan[3]). When it is found that a person is not a person aggrieved, then, resultantly, he would lack locus standi to maintain the application. An imaginary injury cannot give a right to sue. (D. Jagannathan[3]).
33. The respondents-applicants herein claim to have locus standi to file the OA, seeking the reliefs sought for by them therein, contending that officers, in both the streams ie the Civilian and the Defence stream, are working in the same organization, and fall within a common domain; officers in the defence stream, appointed long after the respondents-applicants were appointed in a similar post in the Civilian stream, have now risen in rank; and are, in fact, examining the ACRs and supervising the functions of the respondents-applicants, though the applicants were far senior to the Army officers at the time of their induction in the Survey of India.
34. As noted hereinabove, the table in Annexure-I to the 1989 Rules prescribes the number of sanctioned posts in different groups, in the Group-A cadre, separately for defence and civilian officials. The channel of promotion of civilian officers to higher posts is only with respect to the sanctioned posts under the Civilian stream. Likewise, promotion of Army Officer from a lower post to a higher post can be effected only within the number of sanctioned higher posts in the defence stream. In effect, officials in the defence stream are not entitled for promotion to higher posts, if any available, in the civilian stream and vice-versa. It 16 does not appear to be in dispute that, even though the streams are different, both civilian and defence officials work in the same organization and discharge duties which are sometimes inter-changeable.
35. The fortuitous circumstance, of availability of a larger number of vacancies in the defence stream, appears to have resulted in a faster upward movement of officers in the defence stream. As a result of vacancies being available, officers in the defence stream, who have risen faster in the hierarchy, are possible examining the ACRs and supervising the functions of civilian officers occupying lower posts who, though senior to these Army Officials at the time of their induction, were not promoted to higher posts because of non-availability of vacancies in the sanctioned higher posts in the civilian stream. This fortuitous circumstance does not result in any legal injury to the respondents-applicants since their seniority and their avenues for promotion is only in the civilian stream, and officers in the defence stream cannot claim any right to be promoted to higher posts in the civilian stream. It may possibly happen in future that Officers in the Civilian stream rise faster in the hierarchy on account of larger vacancies being available in the civilian stream, and thereby supervising the functions of erstwhile Army Officers working in lower posts in the defence stream. The fanciful/sentimental grievance, of the respondents-applicants, would not suffice to confer on them the locus standi to sue for the reliefs sought for in the OA. An imaginary injury cannot give a right to sue, and the respondents-applicants, who are strangers having no right whatsoever to posts in the defence stream, cannot be permitted to question appointment of officers in the defence stream on the basis of their fanciful grievance that officers in the defence stream have risen faster in the organisation, albeit on their being promoted to the sanctioned higher posts separately made available to officers in the defence stream.
36. While a Procrustean approach should be avoided, as a rule, the Court should not interfere at the instance of a "stranger" unless there are exceptional circumstances involving a grave miscarriage of justice having an adverse impact on public interest. Assuming that the respondent-applicants are "strangers", and not busy-bodies, even then there are no exceptional circumstances in the present case which justified the Central Administrative Tribunal entertaining the application under Section 19 of the Act. (Jasbhai Motibhai Desai[5]).
1737. We are satisfied, therefore, that the respondents-applicants lacked locus standi to invoke the jurisdiction of the Central Administrative Tribunal questioning the appointment of defence officers to sanctioned posts in the defence stream. As the OA was liable to be dismissed in limini on the ground that the applicants were not "persons aggrieved", and lacked locus standi to question the appointment/promotion of officers in the defence stream, the question, of examining the validity of the appointment of such offices on merits, did not arise. The Tribunal has exceeded its jurisdiction in examining the applicants' claim on merits without, in the first instance, considering whether or not they had the locus standi to invoke its jurisdiction claiming the reliefs sought for in the OA.
38. On the short ground that the respondents-applicants lacked locus standi to invoke the jurisdiction of the Central Administrative Tribunal, the order of the Tribunal, in OA No.1367 of 2011 dated 07.04.2016, is set-aside. The Writ Petition is allowed. However, in the circumstances, without costs.
(Alok Kumar Verma, J.) (Ramesh Ranganathan, C. J.)
08.01.2020 08.01.2020
Rahul