Central Administrative Tribunal - Bangalore
Mrs. Linimol Joseph vs Union Of India (Uoi) And Ors. on 24 March, 2003
Equivalent citations: 2004(2)SLJ159(CAT)
ORDER V. Srikantan, Member (A)
1. In this application, the applicant is seeking the quashing of the memorandum dated 10.6.2002 (Annexure A-18) and for a direction to the respondents to restore the appointment of the applicant as Senior Clerk and to continue her in the present place of posting as Junior Accounts Assistant (JAA) in the Wheel & Axle Plant, Yelahanka, Bangalore with all consequential benefits which she would have got had she continued without the order of termination being passed against her.
2. The brief facts are that South Central Railway had placed an indent on Railway Recruitment Board, Bangalore during 1995 for filling up of 90 vacancies of Junior Clerk-cum-Typist to be posted in Guntakal and Hubli Divisions. The Railway Recruitment Board supplied a panel consisting of 90 names on 17.4.96. Out of these, 37 candidates were allotted to Hubli and 53 candidates to Guntakal division respectively. The applicant was one of the candidates selected through the Railway Recruitment Board, Bangalore against this employment notice No. 4/1995 and was allotted to the office of respondent No. 4 and joined as Junior Clerk-cum-Typist and was posted to the Mechanical Department with the office of Loco Foreman on 27.6.96. Subsequently, the applicant was selected against 13-l/3rd per cent serving graduate quota and posted as an iniservice candidate as senior clerk on 28.8,98. Thereafter, the applicant had sought for inter Railway transfer to the establishment of respondent No. 5 and the same was approved and the applicant joined the office of respondents No. 5 & 6 on bottom seniority as JAA by order dated 1.5.2001. The Railway Board vide letter dated 25.2.99 cancelled the entire panel wherein the applicant was also one of the candidates and directed to terminate the services of all the candidates on consideration of CBI report and serious nature of irregularities. Accordingly, notices were issued to the candidates to show cause as to why their services should not be terminated including the applicant. Aggrieved by the action of the respondents, the candidates approached the Hyderabad Bench and Bangalore Benches of this Tribunal. The Hyderabad Bench of this Tribunal disposed of the cases at the admission stage directing the applicants to submit reply to the show cause notice. Subsequently, the respondents considered the replies received to the show cause notice and thereafter terminated the services of the candidates. The applicants had thereafter approached the Hyderabad Bench of this Tribunal by filing fresh O.As. and obtained status quo orders from the Bench. The Hyderabad Bench had taken up O.A. No. 1265/1999 filed by O. Chakradhar which was one amongst numerous O.As. on the subject and in its order passed on 15.12.99 held the termination to be not correct as the principles of natural justice had not been followed giving liberty to the respondents to issue fresh show cause notice by indicating irregularities in the selection and accordingly set aside the termination order. In similar cases, the O.As. filed by the remaining candidates before the Tribunal, the Tribunal applied the judgment passed by them in O.A. 1265/1999. The respondents had thereafter filed a writ petition against the orders passed by the Hyderabad Bench of this Tribunal in O.A. 1265/1999 before the High Court of Andhra Pradesh which was however dismissed at the admission stage itself on 18.7.2000. Thereafter, the matter was taken up by the respondents in a SLP before the Supreme Court in SLP No. 13022/2001 and the Apex Court upheld the respondent's decision to cancel the panel and accordingly set aside the orders passed by the Hyderabad Bench of this Tribunal and the High Court of Andhra Pradesh setting aside the order of termination by the respondents. On the basis of the Apex Court's decision, respondents 1 & 2 instructed respondent No. 4 to take action in terms of the said judgment of the Supreme Court and respondent No. 4 informed respondent No. 5 on 3.6.2002 to terminate the services of the applicant immediately and accordingly the applicant's services were terminated with immediate effect on 10.6.2002. Aggrieved by this order of termination, the applicant has filed this O.A.
3. The case of the applicant is that the applicant and other similarly situated employees had filed O.A. 1299/1999 and others before the Hyderabad Bench of this Tribunal which had been allowed by an order dated 14.2.2000 in the positive direction that the decision should be taken only after receiving representations from the applicant and others. In other words, the services of the applicant were not to be terminated without giving an opportunity to make a representation against the alleged irregularity in the selection. Accordingly, according to the applicant, the respondents ought to have followed the principles of natural justice before terminating the services of the applicant; The applicant was not issued with initial show cause notice when the applicant's services have been terminated on the basis of the Supreme Court order dated 19.2.2002 in the case of Union of India v. Chakradhar, 2002(3) SCC 146, wherein the applicant was not a party to the said decision of the Apex Court. It is the further contention of the applicant that the Apex Court set aside the decision only in the case of Chakradhar. Another contention of the applicant is that there was no irregularity in the selection and appointment of the applicant to the post of Junior Clerk-cum-Typist which was legal, valid and strictly in accordance with the relevant rules and this being so, the applicant should have been informed of the alleged irregularities in the selection and appointment which has not been done and hence the order of termination is liable to be quashed. It is also the contention of the applicant that she is a permanent employee, a holder of a civil post and she has been working for more than six years and in the circumstances, her services cannot be terminated by issuing a simple notice of termination and the respondents are required to comply with the mandatory requirements of Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India which have not been complied with in the instant case. Yet another contention of the applicant is that the applicant is now holding the post of Senior Clerk which is a different post under which she has been posted on the basis of a fresh selection and accordingly it is not permissible' to terminate her services without following the rules of natural justice and Article 311(2) of the Constitution. It has also been pointed out by the applicant that since the CBI has filed a closure report in the criminal case against the Railway Recruitment Board and under these circumstances, the order of termination passed against the applicant cannot be sustained and moreover, the order of termination cannot be sustained as no reasons have been issued in the order of termination. It is finally contended by the applicant that the order of termination has been passed by Incompetent Authority as power to make appointment to Group 'C' post has only been delegated to an officer at the level of Divisional Railway Manager.
4. The respondents have filed their reply contesting the claim of the applicant. They have pointed out that the Supreme Court in the judgment in the case of Union of India v. Chakradhar had held that the decision of the Railway Board to cancel the selection cannot be faulted with while upholding the termination of respondent therein. It has been pointed out by the respondents that the judgment of the Apex Court applies not only to Chakradhar but also to all the candidates selected in the panel against the employment notice No. 4/1995 and accordingly, the judgment of the Supreme Court is judgment in rem. The respondents have also contended that as Supreme Court has allowed the SLP setting aside the orders of the Hyderabad Bench of this Tribunal as also the High Court of Andhra Pradesh, the Supreme Court have laid down the law which is of a binding nature and it was not material that the order passed by the Hyderabad Bench of this Tribunal in respect of the applicant had not been taken up in SLP before the Supreme Court. It is also the further contention that in this view of the matter, there has been no violation of Article 311 (2) of the Constitution. They have also denied that the termination order has been passed by an Incompetent Authority.
5. Heard both Counsel and perused documents on record.
6. It was vigorously argued by the Counsel for the applicant that the orders passed by the Hyderabad Bench of this Tribunal had not been challenged by the respondents before the Supreme Court in WP filed and this being so the orders passed by the Supreme Court in Union of India v. Chakradhar's case was not applicable to the applicant. This was contested by the Counsellor the respondents who argued that the orders passed by the Supreme Court was an order in rem and had laid down the law in the matter and this being so, the action of the respondents in terminating the services of the applicant was perfectly in order. The applicant, in support of her contention has referred to the orders passed by the Supreme Court in the case of Scooters India Limited v. M. Mohammad Yaqub and Another, AIR 2001 SC 227, and H.C. Puttaswamy and Others v. Chief Justice of Karnataka High Court, Bangalore and Others, AIR 1991 SC 295. In so far as the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Scooters India Limited v. Mohammad Yaqub and Another is concerned, on going through the judgment it is seen that the facts therein are entirely different and this decision is not relevant. In the case of Puttaswamy v. Chief Justice of Karnataka High Court, it is no doubt true that the Supreme Court while holding that appointments made by the Chief Justice of High Court without consulting the Public Service Commission as not being proper, had however directed all the appointees to be treated as regularly appointed on humanitarian grounds. It is thus clear that even in this case, the Supreme Court had declared the appointments made as not proper. The Counsel for the respondents on the other hand, drew our attention to Para 12 of the orders passed by the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India v. Chakradhar and to the orders passed by the Supreme Court in the case of Director, Settlements, A.P. and Others v. M.R. Appa Rao and Another, 2002(4) SCC 638, and contended that the action taken by the respondents was perfectly in order and that the respondents were duty bound to follow the Supreme Court decision and that in the light of the Supreme Court decision, the decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court was no longer valid and the attempt of the applicant to seek a revival of a High Court decision which had been set aside by the Supreme Court was a nullity.
7. It is no doubt true that the order passed by the Hyderabad Bench of this Tribunal in respect of the applicant was in her favour and it was based on orders passed by the Hyderabad Bench of this Tribunal in similar cases and which had been upheld by the Andhra Pradesh High Court. However, one of such similar cases pertaining to O. Chakradhar had been taken up by the respondents before the Supreme Court in a writ petition and the Supreme Court had set aside the orders passed by the Hyderabad Bench of this Tribunal as upheld by the High Court of Andhra Pradesh in respect of O. Chakradhar. It is, in our opinion not necessary that each and every order passed by a Tribunal or a High Court which specifically pertains to a recruitment made with reference to a common notice of employment be taken up independently before the Supreme Court. In the circumstances, the orders passed by the Supreme Court in the case of O. Chakradhar has to be held as having laid down the law especially in the light of Para 12 of the orders of the Supreme Court which read as under:
"12. As per the report of CBI the whole selection smacks of mala fides and arbitrariness. All norms are said to have been violated with impunity at each stage viz. right from the stage of entertaining applications, with answer-sheets while in the custody of Chairman, in holding typing test, in interview and in the end while preparing the final result. In such circumstances it may not be possible to pick out or choose a few persons in respect of whom alone the selection could be cancelled and their services in pursuance thereof could be terminated. The illegality and irregularity are so intermixed with the whole process of the selection that it becomes impossible to sort out the right from the wrong or vice versa. The result of such a selection cannot be relied or acted upon. It is not a case where a question of misconduct on the part of a candidate is to be gone into but a case where those who conducted the selection have rendered it wholly unacceptable. Guilt of those who have been selected is not the question under consideration but the question is, could such selection be acted upon in the matter of public employment? We are therefore of the view that it is not one of those cases where it may have been possible to issue any individual notice of misconduct to each selectee and seek his explanation in regard to the large-scale, widespread and all-pervasive illegalities and irregularities committed by those who conducted the selection which may of course possible be for the benefit of those who have been selected but there may be a few who may have deserved selection otherwise, but it is difficult to separate the cases of some of the candidates from the rest even if there may be some. The decisions in the case of Krishan Yadav applies to the facts of the present case. The Railway Board's decision to cancel the selection cannot be faulted with. The appeal therefore deserves to be allowed."
It is also seen that in Director of Settlement, A.P. and Others v. M.R. Appa Rao (supra) the Supreme Court have held that the High Court is duty bound to follow Supreme Court decisions and a High Court decision of refusing to follow a Supreme Court decision is a nullity. In this case, it is seen that the Supreme Court has clearly laid down the law and also made it clear that it was not necessary to issue individual notices and upheld the action of the respondents in cancelling the selection.
8. For the above reasons, we do not find any merit in this application and accordingly the application is dismissed. No costs.