Calcutta High Court
Merlin Projects Limited vs Joint Commissioner Of Income Tax ... on 12 June, 2025
OD-1-23
ORDER SHEET
THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
Constitutional Writ Jurisdiction
ORIGINAL SIDE
WPO/290/2025
MERLIN PROJECTS LIMITED
VS
JOINT COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX CENTRAL CIRCLE CENTRAL
RANGE 2 KOLKATA AND ORS
WPO/291/2025
MERLIN PROJECTS LIMITED
VS
JOINT COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX CENTRAL CIRCLE CENTRAL
RANGE 2 KOLKATA AND ORS
WPO/292/2025
MERLIN PROJECTS LIMITED
VS
JOINT COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX CENTRAL CIRCLE CENTRAL
RANGE 2 KOLKATA AND ORS
WPO/293/2025
MERLIN PROJECTS LIMITED
VS
JOINT COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX CENTRAL CIRCLE CENTRAL
RANGE 2 KOLKATA AND ORS
WPO/294/2025
MERLIN PROJECTS LIMITED
VS
JOINT COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX CENTRAL CIRCLE CENTRAL
RANGE 2 KOLKATA AND ORS
WPO/295/2025
MERLIN LEISURES LIMITED
VS
JOINT COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX CENTRAL CIRCLE CENTRAL
RANGE 2 KOLKATA AND ORS
WPO/297/2025
MERLIN PROJECTS LTD
VS
JOINT COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX CENTRAL CIRCLE CENTRAL
RANGE 2 KOL AND ORS
2
WPO/300/2025
MERLIN LEISURES LTD
VS
JOINT COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX CENTRAL CIRCLE CENTRAL
RANGE 2 KOL AND ORS
WPO/301/2025
MERLIN LEISURES LTD
VS
JOINT COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX CENTRAL CIRCLE CENTRAL
RANGE 2 KOL AND ORS
WPO/302/2025
MERLIN LEISURES LTD
VS
JOINT COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX CENTRAL CIRCLE CENTRAL
RANGE 2 KOL AND ORS
WPO/303/2025
MERLIN LEISURES LTD
VS
JOINT COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX CENTRAL CIRCLE CENTRAL
RANGE 2 KOL AND ORS
WPO/304/2025
MERLIN LEISURES LTD
VS
JOINT COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX CENTRAL CIRCLE CENTRAL
RANGE 2 KOL AND ORS
WPO/305/2025
MERLIN LEISURES LTD
VS
JOINT COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX CENTRAL CIRCLE CENTRAL
RANGE 2 KOL AND ORS
WPO/306/2025
MERLIN PROJECTS LTD
VS
JOINT COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX CENTRAL CIRCLE CENTRAL
RANGE 2 KOL AND ORS
WPO/307/2025
MERLIN PROJECTS LTD
VS
JOINT COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX CENTRAL CIRCLE CENTRAL
RANGE 2 KOL AND ORS
3
WPO/310/2025
MERLIN PROJECTS LTD
VS
JOINT COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX CENTRAL CIRCLE CENTRAL
RANGE 2 KOLKATA AND ORS
WPO/311/2025
MERLIN LEISURES LTD
VS
JOINT COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX CENTRAL CIRCLE CENTRAL
RANGE 2 KOL AND ORS
WPO/312/2025
MERLIN LEISURES LTD
VS
JOINT COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX CENTRAL CIRCLE CENTRAL
RANGE 2 KOL AND ORS
WPO/317/2025
MERLIN PROJECTS LTD
VS
JOINT COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX CENTRAL CIRCLE CENTRAL
RANGE 2 KOL AND ORS
WPO/318/2025
MERLIN PROJECTS LTD
VS
JOINT COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX CENTRAL CIRCLE CENTRAL
RANGE 2 KOL AND ORS
WPO/319/2025
MERLIN PROJECTS LTD
VS
JOINT COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX CENTRAL CIRCLE CENTRAL
RANGE 2 KOL AND ORS
WPO/321/2025
MERLIN PROJECTS LTD
VS
JOINT COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX CENTRAL CIRCLE CENTRAL
RANGE 2 KOL AND ORS
WPO/322/2025
MERLIN PROJECTS LTD
VS
JOINT COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX CENTRAL CIRCLE CENTRAL
RANGE 2 KOL AND ORS
4
BEFORE:
The Hon'ble JUSTICE RAJA BASU CHOWDHURY
Date : 12th June 2025
Appearance:
Mr. Pratyush Jhunjhunwala, Adv.
Mr. Naman Choudhury, Adv.
Ms. Akshara Shukla, Adv.
Mr. Aritra Nag, Adv.
... for the petitioners in item nos.2- 5, 14-16 & 19-23
Ms. Akshara Shukla, Adv.
Mr. Aritra Nag, Adv.
... for the petitioner
Mr. Abhratosh Majumder, Sr. Advocate
Mr. Pratyush Jhunjhunwala, Adv.
Mr. Rajarshree Kajaria, Adv.
Mr. Uttam Sharma, Adv.
... for the petitioners in item nos.6-8, 13, 17 & 18
Mr. Asok Kumar Chakrabarti, ASG
Mr. Aryak Dutt, Advocate
Mr. Soumen Bhattacharjee, Adv.
Mr. Ankan Das, Adv.
Ms. Shradhya Ghosh, Adv.
...for the Income Tax Authority
Mr. Prithu Dudheria, Adv.
...For Union of India in item no.9
Mr. Amit Sharma, Adv.
...For the Union of India in item nos. 11 & 17
Mr. Sumita Sarkar, Adv.
...For the Union of India in item nos. 10 & 18
Mr. Madhu Jana, Adv.
...for the Union of India in item no.8
Mr. Amal Kumar Datta, Adv.
...For Union of India
The Court :-
1. The above writ petitions raise a common question of law and have
been filed, inter alia, challenging the show cause notices issued
under Section 274 read with Section 271D of the Income Tax Act,
5
1961 (hereinafter refer to said 'Act') and the consequential demand
cum orders issued under Section 271D of the said Act.
2. The relevant show-cause notices with particulars and the
corresponding orders are extracted and noted down in a tabulated
form hereinbelow:
WPO No. Date of show- Date of Assessment
cause order/demand Year
with relevant
section
290 of 2025 20.02.2025 28.03.2025 under 2019-20
Section 271DA
291 of 2025 06.01.2025 30.03.2025 under 2020-21
Section 271D
292 of 2025 06.01.2025 29.03.2025 under 2019-20
Section 271D
293 of 2025 07.01.2025 29.03.2025 under 2017-18
Section 271D
294 of 2025 03.01.2025 30.03.2025 under 2018-19
Section 271D
295 of 2025 19.02.2025 29.03.2025 under 2017-18
Section 271D
297 of 2025 04.01.2025 30.03.2025 under 2016-17
Section 271E
300 of 2025 19.02.2025 30.03.2025 under 2020-21
Section 271D
301 of 2025 25.02.2025 30.03.2025 under 2019-20
Section 271DA
6
302 of 2025 19.02.2025 30.03.2025 under 2021-22
Section 271D
303 of 2025 20.02.2025 30.03.2025 under 2016-17
Section 271D
304 of 2025 19.02.2025 30.03.2025 under 2019-20
Section 271D
305 of 2025 19.02.2025 30.03.2025 under 2018-19
Section 271D
306 of 2025 20.02.2025 30.03.2025 under 2021-22
Section 271DA
307 of 2025 20.02.2025 30.03.2025 under 2018-19
Section 271DA
310 of 2025 19.02.2025 29.03.2025 under 2020-21
Section 271DA
311 of 2025 21.02.2025 31.03.2025 under 2020-21
Section 271DA
312 of 2025 (i) 17.10.2024 31.02.2025 under 2021-22
(ii) 21.02.2025 Section 271DA
317 of 2025 06.01.2025 30.03.2025 under 2021-22
Section 271E
318 of 2025 06.01.2025 30.03.2025 under 2020-21
Section 271E
319 of 2025 03.01.2025 30.03.2025 under 2017-18
Section 271E
321 of 2025 06.01.2025 30.03.2025 under 2019-20
Section 271E
322 of 2025 04.01.2025 30.03.2025 under 2018-19
Section 271E
7
3. The central issue for consideration in the above writ petitions is
whether the Assessing Officer is bound to record satisfaction in the
assessment order as regards the contravention of the provisions of
Section 269SS, 269ST or 269T of the said Act as the case may be
for initiation of proceeding under Section 271D, 271DA and 271E
of the said Act as the case may be. Records would reveal that
assessment orders under Section 143(3) read with Section 153A or
153C of the said Act as the case may be all dated 31 st March,
2022, in respect of the respective assessment years as noted above,
was passed in the petitioner's case. Following the aforesaid, the
show-cause notices as aforesaid had been issued under the
provisions of Section 271D, 271DA and 271E of the said Act, on
account of contravention of the provisions of Sections 269SS,
269ST and 269T of the said Act respectively.
4. Immediately upon receipt of such show-cause notices, the
petitioner by response in writing had called upon the department
to disclose the certified copy of the order-sheet recording the
reasons/satisfaction of the Assessing Officer, which promoted
issuance of show-cause notice. Records would reveal that the
department by a written response had, inter alia, held out that all
penalty proceedings initiated against the assessee had been carried
out through ITBA system of the department, which is also visible to
the assessee.
8
5. Records would reveal that the petitioner had contradicted the same
by a written communication enclosing therein screen shots from
the portal to demonstrate that no order or satisfaction had been
uploaded on the portal.
6. It is the petitioner's case that the department without adhering to
the petitioner's request to disclose the satisfaction note had
proceeded to pass the order under Sections 271D, 271DA and
271E of the said Act in respect of the relevant assessment years as
noted above.
7. The learned advocates appearing in support of the writ petitions
has drawn attention of this court not only to the show-cause
notices but also to the response filed by the petitioner thereto, to
highlight the fact that the recording of satisfaction contrary to the
claim made by the respondents, was not available on the portal. He
would submit that by a CBDT Circular No.09/DV/2016 dated 26 th April, 2016, a clarification has been provided not only with regard to the departmental view as regards initiation of penalty proceeding but to bring an uniformity and to remove conflict in the procedure to be followed by the Assessing Officers below the rank of Joint Commissioner of Income Tax, while making a reference to the Range Head regarding any violation of provisions of Section 269SS, 269ST and 269T of the said Act, as the case may be, in course of the assessment proceeding or any other proceeding under the said Act.
9
8. According to him, in absence of the satisfaction being recorded by the Assessing Officer regarding contravention of Section 269SS, 269ST and 269T of the said Act for initiation of penalty proceedings under the provisions of sections 271D, 271DA and 271E of the said Act, independent penalty proceeding, independent of such satisfaction could be initiated. In support of his aforesaid contention that in absence of satisfaction regarding contravention of the provisions of Section 269SS, 269ST and 269ST of the said Act, by the Assessing Officer, no penalty proceeding can be initiated under sections 271D, 271DA and 271E of the said Act and no penalty could be levied, he has placed reliance on the judgment delivered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Commissioner of Income Tax, Panchkula vs. Jai Laxmi Rice Mills Ambala City reported in (2015) 64 taxman.com 75 (SC). He has also placed reliance on the judgment delivered by the Hon'ble High Court at Andhra Pradesh in the case of Grandhi Sri Venkata Amarendra vs. Joint Commissioner of Income Tax reported in (2024) 167 taxman.com 352 (Andhra Pradesh).
9. On the question whether this Hon'ble Court is competent to entertain the writ petitions, notwithstanding there being an alternative remedy in the form of an appeal he has placed reliance on a judgment delivered in the case of Whirlpool Corporation vs. Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai reported in (1998) 8 SCC page 1 and the judgment delivered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court 10 in the case of Godrej Sara Lee Ltd. vs. Excise of Taxation Officer-cum-Assessing Authority And Others reported in (2023) 109 GSTR 402 : 2023 SCC Online SC 95. In the facts of the case noted hereinabove, he would submit that the order impugned as also the penalty proceedings cannot be sustained and the same be quashed.
10. Per contra, learned Additional Solicitor General representing the respondents, at the very outset, would submit that the petitioner has an alternative efficacious remedy in the form of an appeal from the orders passed in the penalty proceeding under Sections 271D, 271DA and 271E of the said Act, before the appellate authority in terms of the provisions contained in 246A of the said Act. He would submit that ordinarily when an efficacious alternative remedy is available, a Court exercising writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India should not entertain the same. It is still further argued that it is not the case of the petitioner that the respondents did not have the jurisdiction to initiate the penalty proceedings. Once, the Court comes to a conclusion that the order passed by the authority is within the scope of its adjudication, ordinarily in such circumstances, in the event there is an alternative remedy available challenge, by way of invoking the extraordinary remedy is not permissible. Further according to the learned Additional Solicitor General, since, the matter would require examination of the assessment order in the 11 form of evidence, this Court should not entertain the writ petitions. In support of his aforesaid contention, he has placed reliance on the Constitutional Bench judgment delivered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Thansingh Nathmal vs. Superintendent of Taxes, Dhubri & Ors. reported in AIR 1964 SC 1419, the judgment delivered in the case of Commissioner of Income Tax vs. Chhabil Dass Agarwal reported in (2013) 36 taxman.com 36 (SC) taxman and the judgment delivered in the case of Whirlpool Corporation (supra). Independent of the aforesaid, by placing reliance on the circular issued by the CBDT (supra), he would submit that paragraph 4 of the aforesaid circular clarifies the position, that the advisory is not confined to the assessment proceeding but is also in respect of other proceeding under the said Act. According to him, the assessment proceeding under the said Act are distinct and different from the penalty proceeding and independent of the assessment proceeding a penalty proceeding cannot be initiated. As such in ordinary course there is no requirement for recording satisfaction by the Assessing Officer as regards contravention of the provisions of Sections 269SS, 269ST and 269T of the said Act for initiating proceedings under Sections 271D, 271DA and 271E of the said Act. In the facts noted hereinabove, it is submitted that no special case has been made out by the petitioner for invoking the extraordinary writ jurisdiction of this Court. In addition to the above, it is submitted that the point raised by the petitioner does not constitute a 12 jurisdictional issue for this Court to entertain the same and in any event, if the Hon'ble Court by overruling the objection raised by the respondents admits the writ petitions, the petitioner should be put to terms especially having regard to the fact that the petitioner had not cooperated with the department in the penalty proceedings and had not offered any explanation on merits. On the issue of satisfaction of the Assessing Officer as regards the contravention of Sections 269SS, 269ST and 269T of the said Act, he would submit that even if such satisfaction is not explicit on the face of the records, it is always open for the Hon'ble Court to scrutinise the records and ascertain whether there was any basis for issuing the direction since, the satisfaction can be both subjective and objective.
11. Heard the learned advocates appearing for the respective parties and considered the materials on record including the supplementary affidavits. From the argument advanced by the advocates representing the respective parties, it would transpire that the primary issue that falls for consideration in the present series of writ petitions is whether the department was competent to initiate the penalty proceedings under Sections 271D, 271DA and 271E of the said Act, without there being a satisfaction of the Assessing Officer as regards the contravention of the provision of Sections 269SS, 269ST and 269T of the said Act. However, before a proceeding to adjudicate the above issue, having regard to the 13 objection raised by the respondents with respect to the maintainability of the writ petitions, I am of the view, such issue should be considered first.
12. I find that it is the respondents' contention that having regard to the statutory remedy in the form of an appeal available to the petitioner, this Court should not exercise the jurisdiction. There is no dispute that the petitioner has an alternative remedy in the form of an appeal from the order impugned. It is equally true that the petitioner had raised the jurisdictional issue as regard the competence of the department to initiate a penalty proceeding under Sections 271D, 271DA and 271E of the said Act. I find that the learned Additional Solicitor General by placing reliance on the judgment delivered in the case of Thansingh Nathmal (supra) has tried to impress upon this Court that when an alternative remedy in the form of a statutory appeal is available ordinarily this Court should not entertain the present set of writ petitions. I am of the view, that there cannot be any doubt that an alternative remedy would stand in the way of a Writ Court exercising its jurisdiction unless the petitioner is in a position to demonstrate that either the alternative remedy is inefficacious or the petitioner comes within the exception, as enumerated in the judgment delivered in the case of Whilpool Corporation (supra). I find that the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Thansingh Nathmal (supra) had refused to entertain the writ petitions not merely on the ground that an 14 alternative remedy was available but on the ground that the question of facts which were raised before the Hon'ble Supreme Court were not canvassed before the appropriate taxing authority. In fact as highlighted in paragraph 8 of such judgment the assessee in such case had attempted to reopen the decision of the taxing authorities on the question of fact, by invoking the jurisdiction under Article 226, which jurisdiction by the statute constituting them is exclusively vested in the taxing authorities. The above judgment thus, does not assist the respondents. The learned Additional Solicitor General next relied on a judgment delivered in the case of Chhabil Dass Agarwal (supra) where in the matter dealt with a challenge to a notice issued under section 148 of the said Act under the old regime that is prior to introduction of the Finance Act, 2021 with effect from 1 st April 2021. Following the aforesaid an assessment order was passed, aggrieved the assessee without exhausting the statutory remedy had approached the writ Court. In the said case the Hon'ble Supreme Court had held that a complete machinery for the assessment/reassessment of tax, imposition of penalty had been provided in the statute and having regard thereto the Hon'ble Court has refused to entertain the writ petition. In my view, challenge to an assessment order ordinarily would require detailed enquiry on facts. Such is not the case here. The above judgment does not assist the respondents as well.
15
13. In so far as the judgment delivered in the case of Whirlpool Corporation (supra) is concerned, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in paragraph 15 of such judgment has been inter alia pleased to observe as follows:
"15. Under Article 226 of the Constitution, the High Court, having regard to the facts of the case, has a discretion to entertain or not to entertain a writ petition. But the High Court has imposed upon itself restrictions one of which is that if an effective and efficacious remedy is available, the High Court would not normally exercise its jurisdiction. But the alternative remedy has been consistently held by this Court not to operate as a bar in at least three contingencies, namely, where the writ petition has been filed for the enforcement of any of the Fundamental Rights or where there has been a violation of the principle of natural justice or where the order or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction or the vires of an Act is challenged. There is a plethora of case -law on this point but to cut down this circle or forensic whirlpool, we would rely on some old decisions of the evolutionary era of the Constitutional law as they still hold the field"
14. From the above it will be aptly clear that in case the jurisdictional issue is raised the Court ordinarily does not refuse but accept the challenge to the same. Before proceeding further I must note that the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the recent judgment delivered in the case of Godrej Sara Lee Ltd. (Supra) in paragraph 8 has observed as follows:
16
"8. That apart, we may also usefully refer to the decisions of this Court reported in (1977) 2 SCC 724 (State of U. P. v. Indian Hume Pipe Co. Ltd.)** and (2000) 10 SCC 482 (Union of India v. State of Haryana). What appears on a plain reading of the former decision is that whether a certain item falls within an entry in a sales tax statute, raises a pure question of law and if investigation into facts is unnecessary, the High Court could entertain a writ petition in its discretion even though the alternative remedy was not availed of ; and, unless exercise of discretion is shown to be unreasonable or perverse, this Court would not interfere. In the latter decision, this court found the issue raised by the appellant to be pristinely legal requiring determination by the High Court without putting the appellant through the mill of statutory appeals in the hierarchy. What follows from the said decision is that where the controversy is a purely legal one and it does not *(2021) 93 GSTR 1 (SC) ** (1977) 39 STC 355 (SC).
involve dispute question of fact but only questions of law then it should be decided by the High Court instead of dismissing the writ petition on the ground of an alternative remedy being available."
15. From the nature of challenge presented by the petitioner in the present set of petitions it does not appear that there is any scope to embark on any enquiry on any disputed question of fact or to consider any evidence. The controversy at hand is a purely legal one. The question as to whether the satisfaction of the 17 Assessing Officer is necessary as regards contravention of Sections 269SS, 269ST and 269T of the said Act, for initiating a penalty proceeding noted above would not require any detailed enquiry since there is no dispute at least on the basis of materials on record that there is no satisfaction recorded in the assessment order with regard to the violation of the provisions of section 269SS, 269ST and 269T of the said Act. Thus, by overruling the objection as to maintainability of the above petitions, I proceed to decide on the primary question of law raised in the above petitions.
16. I find that Mr. Mookherjee by placing reliance on the judgment delivered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Jai Laxmi Rice Mills (supra) has submitted that without the satisfaction of the Assessing Officer being recorded regarding the contravention of Sections 269SS, 269ST and 269T of the said Act, no penalty proceeding can be initiated. In this context it would be relevant to extract the observation made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in paragraphs 2 to 5 of the above judgment.
"2. The assessee carried out this order in appeal. The Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) allowed the appeal and set aside the assessment order with a direction to frame the assessment de novo after affording adequate opportunity ot the assessee.
3. After remand, the Assessing Officer passed fresh assessment order. In this assessment order, however, no satisfaction regarding initiation of penalty proceedings under Section 271E of the Act was 18 recorded. It so happened that on the basis of the original assessment order dated 26.02.1996, show cause notice was given to the assessee and it resulted in passing the penalty order dated 23.09.1996. Thus, this penalty order was passed before the appeal of the assessee against the original assessment order was heard and allowed thereby setting aside the assessment order itself. It is in the backdrop, a question has arisen as to whether the penalty order, which was passed on the basis of original assessment order and when that assessment order had been set aside, could still survive.
4. The Tribunal as well as the High Court has held that it could not be so for the simple reason that when the original assessment order itself was set aside, the satisfaction recorded therein for the purpose of initiation of the penalty proceeding under section 271E would also not survive. This according to us is the correct proposition of law stated by the High Court in the impugned order.
5. As pointed out above, insofar as, fresh assessment order is concerned, there was no satisfaction recorded regarding penalty proceeding under Section 271E of the Act, though in that order the Assessing Officer wanted penalty proceeding to be initiated under Section 271(1)(c) of the Act. Thus, insofar as penalty under Section 271E is concerned, it was without any satisfaction and, therefore, no such penalty could be levied. These appeals are, accordingly, dismissed."
17. I find that the aforesaid issue has also been considered by the Hon'ble High Court of Andhra Pradesh in the case of Grandhi 19 Sri Venkata Amarendra (supra) wherein the Hon'ble High Court of Andhra Pradesh has in paragraphs 8 and 9 pleased to observe as follows:-
"8. We have gone through the material placed on record. The Assessing Officer, except to base his addition on the letter of the assessee dated 02-06- 2014, did not record any finding that there has been any violation of the provisions of Sec.269SS of the Act by the assessee, nor was any satisfaction recorded to the effect that the alleged transaction of acceptance of loan would attract penal consequences. In the absence of any finding to the said effect, in our considered view, the penalty cannot be levied. A presumption can be drawn, in the absence of a finding by the Assessing Officer to the effect that the petitioner has violated the provisions of Sec.269SS of the Act, that the department has accepted the explanaction furnished by the petitioner denying allegation of loan in cash. Therefore, it can unhesistently be said that, having satisfied with the explanation of the assessee, the Assessing Officer did not record any satisfaction in the assessment order to the effect that the provisions of Section 269SS of the Act, are violated and did not contemplate levy of penalty under Sec.271D of the Act.
9. In our view, the satisfaction of the Assessing Officer is required to be recorded because the officer, who passed the assessment order would not be levying the penalty under Sec.271D of the Act, unless it is record in the assessment order, he cannot refer the file to superior officer i.e. Joint Commissioner, for initiating levy of penalty. Unless the Assessing Officer, who is the primary authority, based on the material before it, 20 during assessment proceedings, arrives at a finding that there has been a violation of the provisions, like in the present case, of Section 269SS, there will not be any occasion to the Joint Commissioner, who is not the Assessing Officer, to exercise his jurisdiction to levy Penalty under Section 271D. Following the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Jai Laxmi Rice Mills referred supra, we set aside the order passed under Sec.271D of the Act."
18. Having regard thereto, and in absence of the assessment orders recording the satisfaction of contravention of provisions of Section 269SS, 269ST and 269T of the said Act, consequential penalty proceedings may be a nonstarter and could not have been proceeded with. However, since the respondents insist on producing the records, the respondents shall be at liberty to produce the records. Alternatively, the respondents are also at liberty to file affidavit-in-opposition to the aforesaid writ petitions so to disclose any additional material regarding satisfaction of the assessing officer within a period of two weeks. Reply thereto, if any, be filed on or before the matter is taken up next. Pending hearing of these petitions, there shall be stay of the orders impugned in the above writ petitions till the end of August, 2025 or until further order whichever is earlier. List these writ petitions in the monthly list of July, 2025.
(RAJA BASU CHOWDHURY, J.) R. Bose