Bombay High Court
Appellant : Mohammad Afzal Son Of ... vs Respondent : The State Of Maharashtra on 2 September, 2008
Author: A.P. Bhangale
Bench: K.J. Rohee, A.P. Bhangale
1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY,
NAGPUR BENCH : NAGPUR
Criminal Appeal No. 167 of 2003
Appellant : Mohammad Afzal son of Samshoddin Mus,
aged about 46 years, resident of Pusad,
District Yavatmal.
versus.
Respondent : The State of Maharashtra, through Police
Station Officer, Pusad City.
Mr Firdoz Mirza, Advocate for appellant.
Mr Yogesh Mandpe, Asst. Public Prosecutor for State.
Coram : K.J. Rohee and
A.P. Bhangale, JJ.
Dated: September 2008 ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 13:49:10 ::: 2 Judgment (Per A.P. Bhangale, J)
1. By this appeal, the appellant-accused has challenged validity and legality of the judgment and order dated 1st March 2003 in Sessions Case No. 101 of 1996 passed by the 1st Ad-hoc Additional Sessions Judge, Pusad whereby the accused has been convicted for commission of offence of murder punishable under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code and was sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for life and to pay a fine of Rs. 500/-, in default, to suffer simple imprisonment of one month.
2. The facts in brief are that deceased Kamal was married with appellant-accused Mohammad Afzal; they were living together in Shivaji Ward, Pusad and out of wedlock they were begotten with two children. The accusation is that the appellant had quarreled with deceased Kamal on 16.5.1996 at about 10.15 p.m. and consequently he had poured kerosene oil all over her body after assaulting her, lighted a match-stick and set her on fire. In the result, Kamal had suffered extensive burns upto hundred percent. She was initially ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 13:49:10 ::: 3 removed to Rural Hospital, Pusad from where she was referred to Civil Hospital, Yavatmal for further treatment. It is the case of the prosecution that during the course of investigation, three dying declarations were recorded. In her dying declaration (exhibit 76) recorded on 16.5.1995 at about 23.00 hours by PSI Rathod (PW 11) in presence of panchas, Kamal stated that she had quarrel with her husband over expenses, her husband had poured kerosene on her body, set her on fire by a lighted matchstick and ran away. The fire was extinguished by persons in the neighbourhood and her mother and then she was brought to hospital. PW 11 PSI Rathod was informed about the incident by one Raja Mahesh Tiwari (PW 1, brother of deceased). The second dying declaration was recorded by Executive Magistrate Shri Sidhu (PW 8) as per exhibit 65 on 16.5.1996 at about 23.20 hours. The third and last dying declaration was recorded by Executive Magistrate Shri V.G. Poratkar (PW 6) as per exhibit 53.
3. First Information Report (exhibit 96) was lodged as CR No. 157/96 at Pusad City Police Station on 17.5.1996 at 00.20 hours ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 13:49:10 ::: 4 under Section 307 of the Indian Penal Code. After death of Kamal, inquest was held between 17.00 hours to 17.45 hours on 17.5.1996 (exhibit 17). Spot panchanama was also drawn (exhibit 44) on 17.5.1996. The dead body was sent for post-mortem examination and post-mortem report (ex 72) was prepared. The accused was arrested on 24.6.1996. After completion of investigation he was charge-
sheeted before the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Pusad and consequently, the case was committed to the Court of Sessions for trial according to law. Sessions Case No. 101 of 1996 was tried by 1st Ad-hoc Additional Sessions Judge, Pusad. Charge (exhibit 11) was framed and explained to the accused to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. His plea was recorded at exhibit 12.
4. The prosecution had examined eleven witnesses and relied upon documentary evidence in the form of three dying declarations.
The Trial Court found them consistent with each other on material particulars and relied upon them to conclude finding of guilt against accused.
::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 13:49:10 ::: 55. In support of the appeal, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that considering the extensive burns almost upto hundred percent, the trial Court ought to have held that deceased Kamal was unable to make statement. Learned counsel for the appellant also argued that PW 1 Raju Tiwari (brother of deceased), PW 2 Rajkumari (sister of deceased), PW 3 Sarjerao, PW 4 Gautambai (mother of deceased) and PW 5 Manoj (son of deceased) were declared hostile witnesses and they did not support the prosecution case. According to learned counsel for the appellant, the alleged dying declaration recorded by PW 6 Poratkar was in printed proforma and the alleged dying declarations recorded by PW 8 Harbansing and PSI Rathod were also suspicious as deceased must have been unconscious as a result of hundred percent burns received by her as, according to admission given by PW 10 Dr Thuse who performed post-mortem examination, tongue of the deceased was totally burnt. Learned counsel for the appellant urged to set aside conviction on the ground that there were serious infirmities in evidence.
6. Learned Assistant Public Prosecutor for the State on the ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 13:49:10 ::: 6 other hand supported judgment and order of the trial Court. He submitted that all the three dying declarations are consistent with each other and circumstantial evidence corroborates the dying declarations.
Learned Assistant Public Prosecutor submitted that all these three dying declarations were duly proved and were consistent with each other on material facts as to how victim Kamal was set on fire by her husband-accused Mohammad Afzal. According to learned APP some of the witnesses have turned hostile, probably in order to protect shelter for children - son Manoj (PW 5) and daughter Guddi (not examined) and with a view to save accused from punishment.
However, their evidence as to the cause of death of Kamal is consistent. PW 10 Dr Vinod Thuse who performed post-mortem stated in cross-examination that tongue of the deceased was totally burnt, but post-mortem report relating to internal examination indicated that buckle cavity was intact and contended that statement in cross-
examination was wrong. The medical opinion from attending medical officer at the time of dying declaration that victim Kamal was fit to give her dying declaration along with evidence of PW 6 Vithal, PW 8 ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 13:49:10 ::: 7 Harbansing and PW 11 Shirish Rathod indicated that deceased Kamal had talked with them and clearly implicated her husband as author of crime. Burn injuries were unexplained by the accused which were noticed on his hands. He further submits that subsequent conduct of the accused of running away from spot immediately clearly proved his presence and participation in crime. Nobody else was present when the accused had set his wife on fire. Hence, dying declarations assumed greater importance than other evidence as to the cause of death of Kamal. The observation made in spot panchanama indicated falsity of defence taken by the accused. Learned Assistant Prosecutor further submitted that Executive Magistrates had no grudge or animus to implicate the accused falsely in such serious crime. He urged that the appeal is liable to be dismissed.
7. There are three dying declarations. First is recorded by PSI S.D. Rathod on 16.5.1996 between 23.00 hours and 23.10 hours.
Second dying declaration is recorded by Executive Magistrate H.G. Siddhu on 16.5.1996 between 11.30 p.m. and 11.50 p.m. (exhibit 65) ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 13:49:10 ::: 8 while third is recorded by Executive Magistrate V.J. Poratkar on 17.5.1996 between 04.05 a.m. and 04.20 a.m. The victim Kamal died on the same day at 15.15 hours (vide death report Exhibit 15).
8. We have examined evidence on record in the light of rival contentions at the bar as also legal position in respect of evidence of dying declarations admissible under Section 32 of the Evidence Act.
9. Learned counsel for the appellant placed reliance upon the ruling in Paparambaka Rosamma & ors v. State of Andhra Pradesh reported in AIR 1999 SC 3455 and submitted that the Apex Court held that in the absence of medical certification that the injured was in a fit state of mind at the time of making the declaration it would be very much risky to accept the subjective satisfaction of Magistrate who opined that the injured was in a fit state of mind at the time of making a declaration. In the case cited it appears that the Medical Officer had at the end of the dying declaration had certified patient is conscious while recording the statement. The prosecution case solely rested on ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 13:49:10 ::: 9 the dying declaration, therefore, considering the requirement of proof the Apex Court expressed opinion that certificate as above appended to the dying declaration at the end by doctor concerned did not comply with the requirement inasmuch as the doctor had failed to certify that the injured was in a fit state of mind at the time of recording the dying declaration as in medical science two stages "conscious" and "a fit state of mind" are distinct and not synonymous.
10. The next reliance is placed upon ruling in State of Punjab v. Gian Kaur and anr reported in 1998 Cri.L.J. 2061 (SC). It was a case in which the High Court had found medical evidence unreliable as there was no explanation as to how thumb impression could appear when victim had 100% burns over her body. Another doctor in the same case who had performed post mortem had categorically stated about 100% burns over body and that both thumbs of victim were burnt. Thus, benefit of doubt given to the accused was held reasonable.
11. Learned counsel for defence also relied upon Darshan ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 13:49:10 ::: 10 Singh and ors v. State of Punjab reported in AIR 1983 SC 554 to submit that that when vital organs of victim were completely smashed as per medical evidence it was held that victim could not be said to be in fit state of mind and body to make any kind of coherent or medical statement relating to circumstances which resulted into his death. Under the circumstances, dying declaration was not relied upon and had to be excluded from consideration.
12. Learned Assistant Public Prosecutor, on the other hand, made reference to Suresh v. State of MP reported in AIR 1987 SC 860 to submit that doctor concerned had found that the whole of the body of victim had sustained 100% burns of second degree. She was conscious but the condition was serious. The defence plea that victim was sinking and was unable to make any statement on account of burns and that she must be unconscious at the time her dying declaration was recorded, was not accepted. It was held that Courts below were justified in convicting the accused under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code.
::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 13:49:10 ::: 1113. We have perused all these rulings cited at the bar. We must express our view that each criminal case has to be decided on the basis of appreciation of evidence led in the case. No hard and fast rule can be laid down as each case will have to be governed by its own facts and circumstances. The legal position appears clear that dying declaration if voluntary, true and reliable it can be relied upon even without corroboration. If given by fit and conscious person and recorded correctly, it may inspire full confidence in judicial mind, once the Court is satisfied that it is not imaginary or result of prompting or tutoring. In the present case, we find plurality of dying declarations which were found reliable and trustworthy by the trial Court. The contents of all three dying declarations are consistent with each other in material particulars, victim clearly imputing that her husband had poured kerosene on her person and set her on fire with the matchstick and ran away. With extensive burns caused the victim was facing death, there was no motive which can be attributed to her to label these dying declarations as false. Great solemnity and sanctity has to be attached to her words as she was not likely to tell lies or to concoct ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 13:49:10 ::: 12 a case against her own husband particularly when they had two children left behind. Truth of these three dying declarations under the circumstances cannot be doubted.
14. Regarding penal liability of the accused, no special knowledge was required to be proved on his part when he had poured kerosene on the person of his wife and set his wife on fire after lighting a matchstick. It was obvious that the accused had knowledge that he was running risk of causing death of Kamal (victim) - offence falling within 4thly of Section 300 of the Indian Penal Code. His conduct to run away from the scene of crime instead of taking his wife to the hospital and presence of burn injuries on his hand were further clear pointers to his criminal liability for murdering his wife by burning her.
15. Much capital cannot be made of the admission in cross-
examination by PW 10 Dr Vinod Thuse who conducted post-mortem that "the tongue was also totally burnt" as the same was contrary to ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 13:49:10 ::: 13 findings recorded in post-mortem as to condition of the burn injuries and internal examination of injuries. The said admission is also isolated and cannot be relied upon as there is sufficient medical evidence on record to believe that victim Kamal was conscious and well oriented during recording of her dying declaration. The learned trial Judge had rightly separated the chalf from the grain and relied upon witnesses who were material witnesses in respect of dying declarations who were creditworthy. Learned counsel for appellant cannot insist upon the Court to accept above opinion of PW 10 Dr Vinod Thuse, because evidence of doctor depending upon his own observation, analysis or inference cannot be accepted without legal or judicial scrutiny. The medical witness does assist the Court to arrive at the truth, but it is patently impossible for a medical witness to claim infallibility or complete knowledge with precision and exactitude.
Medical Science has its own limitations. Like any other witness, a doctor deposing long after the post-mortem examination may give a wrong answer on the spur of moment while facing cross-examination by an elite influential defence lawyer. Cumulative evaluation is ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 13:49:10 ::: 14 necessary of any such answer in juxtaposition to the other evidence on record. When other evidence is credible and trustworthy, isolated medical opinion elicited in cross-examination pointing out otherwise may have to be rejected as not acceptable. In our opinion, therefore, trial Court cannot be faulted on this count.
16. PW 9 Dr R.K. Ade deposed having examined patient Kamal Afzal and certified that she was totally conscious and well oriented, physically and mentally fit and was able to give her dying declaration. Executive Magistrate Shri Poratkar had recorded dying declaration of Kamal in his presence and Dr Ade had again certified that patient was conscious and well oriented during recording of dying declaration. Although an admission was elicited from Dr Ade that there were 100% burn injuries on the person of the patient there was no suggestion that she was unable to give her thumb impression on the dying declaration. PW 7 Dr Prakash Rathod is another Medical Officer who deposed that victim Kamal was conscious throughout the period when her dying declaration was recorded by the Executive ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 13:49:10 ::: 15 Magistrate Shri Sidhu (PW 8) who recorded exhibit 65. Dr Rathod (PW 7) also deposed that he had certified that patient (Kamal) was conscious during the period when her statement was recorded by police (vide evidence of PW 11 PSI Rathod).
17. Considering the evidence of PW 11 PSI Rathod, PW 8 Executive Magistrate Shri Sidhu, PW 6 Executive Magistrate Shri Paratkar in juxtaposition with medical evidence on record, we have no doubt in our mind about veracity of all these dying declarations (exhibits 76, 65 and 53) which had consistently imputed the accused for offence of wife-burning by pouring kerosene on her person and setting her on fire with the help of lighted matchstick.
18. Learned counsel for the appellant also contended that the dying declarations were not recorded in Hindi which was mother-
tongue of the deceased. We are not impressed by this submission.
There is no suggestion anywhere in evidence that the victim Kamal was unable to speak in Marathi - most commonly spoken language in ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 13:49:10 ::: 16 the State of Maharashtra.
19. It appears that learned trial Judge had analysed the evidence of all prosecution witnesses including PW 2 Rajkumari, PW 4 Gautambai and PW 5 Manoj who were declared hostile by the prosecution. All three dying declarations upon analysis were found consistent with each other and learned trial Judge placed reliance upon them giving ample reasons to accept the prosecution evidence in the light of rulings cited before the trial Court. Learned trial Judge is justified because no guilty man shall be allowed to go unpunished as wrong acquittal will send wrong signal to the society.
20. Learned counsel for appellant finally submitted in the alternative that the accused had no intention to commit murder and is not punishable for offence under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code. We have already observed that no special knowledge is required to be proved in such case of wife burning. Nobody can claim by pouring kerosene all over the person and setting her on fire by ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 13:49:10 ::: 17 means of lighted matchstick that he had no requisite intention to kill or knowledge about imminent risk of death of such person. No special knowledge need to be proved in such case.
21. We have no doubt whatsoever to conclude that deceased Kamal Afzal met with homicidal death and author of the crime was none other than appellant-accused Afzal. Hence, appeal has to be dismissed.
22. In the result, appeal is dismissed.
JUDGE. JUDGE.
hsj
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