Delhi District Court
Brijesh Singla vs Manindra Samanta on 30 June, 2025
IN THE COURT OF SH. ABHISHEK GOYAL, ADDITIONAL
SESSIONS JUDGE-03, CENTRAL DISTRICT, TIS HAZARI
COURTS, DELHI
CNR No.: DLCT01-005371-2024
CRIMINAL REVISION No.: 133/2024
BRIJESH SINGLA,
S/o. Late Shri. B.K. Singla,
R/o. 17A, Pocket-A, SFS Flats,
Mayur Vihar, Phase-III,
Delhi-110096,
Email id. [email protected]. ... REVISIONIST/
PETITIONER
VERSUS
MANINDRA SAMANTA,
S/o. Shri. Atul Samanta,
R/o. 59/25, Ground Floor,
New Rohtak Road, Karol Bagh,
New Delhi-110005,
Email id. [email protected]. ... RESPONDENT
Date of e-filing : 04.04.2024
Date of institution : 12.04.2024
Date when judgment was reserved : 30.06.2025
Date when judgment is pronounced : 30.06.2025
JUDGMENT
1. The present revision petition has been preferred in terms of the provisions under Section 397 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as 'Cr.P.C./Code') against the order dated 05.01.2024 (hereinafter referred to as the 'impugned order'), passed by learned Metropolitan Magistrate-05/Ld. MM-05, Central, Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi (hereafter referred to as the 'Ld. Trial Court/Ld. MM'), in case bearing; 'Manindra Samantha & Anr. v. Brijesh Singla & Anr., CC No. 1795/2022', arising out of a complaint under Sections 138/142 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 ( hereinafter referred to as 'NI Act'). Pertinently, by virtue of the impugned CR No. 133/2024 Brijesh Singla v. Manindra Samanta. Page No. 1 of 35 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date:
2025.06.30 15:12:00 +0530 order, Ld. Trial Court allowed the application filed by/on behalf of the respondent in terms of the provisions under Section 143A of NI Act and the revisionist/petitioner was directed to pay/deposit, 20% (twenty percent) of the amount of the cheque in question/dishonoured cheque to the respondent as interim compensation, within a period of 60 (sixty) days of the said order.
2. Succinctly, the facts leading to the filing of the instant petition are that in the year, 2021, the respondent/complainant along with his wife, namely, Subhra Samanta (respondent in the connected revision petition), were persuaded and lured into giving financial assistance to the revisionist by way of short-term loan to a tune of Rs. 1,87,00,000/- (Rupees One Crore Eighty Seven Lakhs only) and Rs. 33,00,000/- (Rupees Thirty Three Lakhs only), respectively [cumulatively amounting to Rs. 2,20,00,000/- (Rupees Two Cores Twenty Lakhs only)]. It is further the case of the respondent and Ms. Subhra Samanta that the aforesaid amount was agreed to be repaid by the revisionist within a period of 4-6 (four-six) months thereof, with interest, in the month of October 2021. Consequently, on the representation of the revisionist that the financial assistance was required for his/revisionist's company, bearing, M/s. Singla Assets Reconstruction Pvt. Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the 'company') and on the assurance that he/the revisionist would stand as guarantee(or) for the money lent, the aforesaid amount of Rs. 2,20,00,000/- (Rupees Two Cores Twenty Lakhs only) was transferred by the respondent and Ms. Subhra Samanta to the company (M/s. Singla Assets Reconstruction Pvt. Ltd.), in the following manner;
Date From Mode of Amount
Payment (Rs.)
15.04.2021 Manindra IMPS 1,000/-
Samanta
CR No. 133/2024 Brijesh Singla v. Manindra Samanta. Page No. 2 of 35
Digitally signed
by ABHISHEK
ABHISHEK GOYAL
GOYAL Date:
2025.06.30
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15.04.2021 Manindra RTGS 51,00,000/-
Samanta
16.04.2021 Manindra RTGS 48,99,000/-
Samanta
11.06.2021 Manindra RTGS 1,000/-
Samanta
11.06.2021 Manindra RTGS 1,99,000/-
Samanta
11.06.2021 Manindra RTGS 85,00,000/-
Samanta
11.06.2021 Subhra RTGS 33,00,000/-
Samanta
TOTAL 2,20,00,000/-
(Emphasis supplied)
2.1. Relevantly, in order to secure the repayment of the loan advanced by the respondent and Ms. Subhra Samanta, pursuant to the aforesaid undertaking/transaction, the revisionist is asserted to have issued the following cheques, of the account maintained by him with his banker, in favour of the respondent and Ms. Subhra Samanta;
Cheque No. Date Amount (Rs.) Drawn on 491850, 15.10.2021 1,67,00,000/- Induslnd favouring Bank, Rajouri Manindra Garden, New Samanta Delhi.
491849, 14.10.2021 33,00,000/- Induslnd
favouring Bank, Rajouri
Subhra Garden, New
Samanta Delhi.
(Emphasis supplied)
2.2. As aforenoted, as per the respondent, the revisionist issued a cheque bearing; 491850, dated 15.10.2021, for a sum of Rs. 1,67,00,000/- (Rupees One Crore Sixty Seven Lakhs only), drawn on his banker, Induslnd Bank, Rajouri Garden, New Delhi (hereinafter referred to as the 'dishonoured cheque/cheque in question'), in favour of the respondent against part discharge of his debt/liability to the respondent. However, when the said cheque was presented for encashment by the respondent, same was CR No. 133/2024 Brijesh Singla v. Manindra Samanta. Page No. 3 of 35 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL Date: GOYAL 2025.06.30 15:12:09 +0530 returned unpaid/dishonoured on 18.10.2021 vide cheque return memo of the same date, under the remarks, 'Insufficient Funds'. Thereafter, persistent efforts of the respondent to recover the loan amount along with interest, culminated in a meeting on 11.11.2021 between the revisionist and the respondent, where the revisionist assured that the amount due to the respondent as well as Ms. Subhra Samanta would be repaid with interest. Concomitantly, in order to lend credence/credibility to his said declaration, the revisionist also executed a promissory note dated 11.11.2021 (hereinafter referred to as the 'promissory note'), with an undertaking to pay a sum of Rs. 3,00,00,000/- (Rupees Three Crores only) along with interest @ 24% (twenty four percent) per annum. Further, as per the respondent, during the meeting, it was assured by the revisionist that the cheques in question/aforenoted cheques would be cleared and honored on their presentation, in a week's time therefrom. Ergo, the said cheques are asserted to have again been presented for encashment. However, the same were returned unpaid/dishonoured with the remarks, 'Insufficient Funds' vide cheque return memo(s) dated 25.11.2021. Consequently, within a period of 30 (thirty) days of the receipt of information of such dishonour, the respondent along with Ms. Subhra Samata, issued a legal demand notice dated 21.12.2021 (hereinafter referred to as the 'legal demand notice/legal notice') to the revisionist, seeking payment of the amount of aforesaid cheques. However, since the revisionist neither replied to the said notice nor made payment of the aforesaid amount against the cheques in question/dishonoured cheques, the respondent and Ms. Subhra Samanta filed complaints, in terms of the provisions under Sections 138/142 NI Act before the Ld. Trial Court. 2.3. Relevantly, upon such complaints being filed and on CR No. 133/2024 Brijesh Singla v. Manindra Samanta. Page No. 4 of 35 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date:
2025.06.30 15:12:12 +0530 respondent's as well as Ms. Samanta's tendering pre-summoning evidence, Ld. Trial Court vide its order dated 31.03.2022, took cognizance of the offence under Section 138 NI Act and issued summons against the revisionist. Subsequently, on 22.02.2023, the revisionist entered appearance before the Ld. Trial Court, followed by framing of notice in terms of the provisions under Section 251 Cr.P.C. for the offence under Section 138 NI Act against the revisionist, to which the revisionist pleaded not guilty and claimed trial. Correspondingly, statement of the revisionist in terms of the provisions under Section 294 Cr.P.C. was recorded, admitting certain documents. Markedly, during the course of proceedings before the Ld. Trial Court, the respondent moved an application under Section 143A NI Act, upon which, notice was issued and reply, filed by/on behalf of the revisionist, denying any liability towards the respondent. Relevantly, upon arguments on the said application of the respondent being addressed by/on behalf of the revisionist as well as the respondent, Ld. Trial Court vide its order dated 05.01.2024/impugned order, allowed the respondent's application under Section 143A of NI Act, inter alia under the following observations;
"...Arguments on this application were heard on the previously and order is being pronounced today.
*** *** *** Per contra, Ld. Counsel for the accused /respondent has refuted the arguments of the complainant/applicant inter alia on the ground that the present application does not deserve to be allowed as the money was transferred to the company and not to the accused. It is argued on behalf of the respondent that the impugned cheque was given merely as security in respect of business transactions which could not materialized. Lastly, it is argued that the beneficiary company has not been arrayed as an accused by the complainant and hence the application deserves to be dismissed.
CR No. 133/2024 Brijesh Singla v. Manindra Samanta. Page No. 5 of 35 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date:
2025.06.30
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+0530
On court query, Ld. counsel for
respondent/accused stated that it is no doubt true that their exists business relations between the parties and also admitted transfer of an amount of Rs.1.67 crores in the account of company namely M/s Singla Assets Reconstruction (P) Ltd. On further court query, the respondent admitted that he is the managing director of M/s Singla Assets Reconstruction (P) Ltd. Heard the parties. Perused the record The application u/s 143A N.I. Act, 1881 is maintainable in a summary trial or a summons case, where the accused pleads not guilty to the accusation made in the complaint, and in any other case, upon framing of charge and the amount of interim compensation shall not exceed 20% of the amount of the cheque. In the present case the accused has already been served with the notice u/s 251 Cr.P.C. and the instant case is also being tried as per the procedure stipulated for a summons case. In view of the above, the present application is maintainable in the eyes of law.
*** *** *** Having taken note of the objects and reasons of the amendment, the law operative the field and the relevant decisions, it is apt to refer the factual aspects of the present case. It is an admitted position that the payment has been made through banking channel. Business relations between the parties are also admitted. Signature on the impugned cheque also stands admitted by the accused. So far as the conduct of the accused is concerned, it is noticed that the court had to resort to coercive coercive process to secure the presence of the accused. Thereafter the accused had sought exemption on a particular date which was allowed by the court. However, on 19.07.2023 it was noticed that accused remained absent and time was sought by Ld. counsel stating that he was recently engaged. The court had observed that the conduct of the accused who had sought exemption on a previous date and chose to remain absent on 19.07.2023 and also did not appear before the court even through V.C. despite being offered to be accommodated so that proceedings could be conducted, was found to be unsatisfactory. On the next date of hearing i.e. 24.08.2023 also adjournment was sought on behalf of the accused. The matter was also referred to mediation where it remained unsettled. It is also important to note that despite being given several opportunities accused had initially failed to furnish the bail bond. In view of the foregoing the court is of the opinion that the conduct of the accused persons/respondents CR No. 133/2024 Brijesh Singla v. Manindra Samanta. Page No. 6 of 35 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL Date: GOYAL 2025.06.30 15:12:19 +0530 reflects adoption of delay tactics. The trial of the case is likely to take some time.
Having considered the above factual position in light of the law discussed above, conduct of the accused, his plea of defence, documents on record, amount of the cheque and also the fact that the signature on the impugned cheque is not denied by accused and that the trial is likely to take some time, the court is of the opinion that the present application deserves to be allowed and ends of justice would be met if interim compensation to the tune of 20% of the cheque amount is directed to be paid in favour of the complainant/applicant and accordingly it is ordered so. The interim compensation be paid by the respondents/accused persons within 60 days from the date of the order.
It is clarified that nothing stated herein shall tantamount to expression of opinion on merits of the case.
Application stands disposed off in above terms"
(Emphasis supplied)
3. Ld. Counsel/Ld. Amicus Curiae1 for the revisionist 1 It is noted here that during the course of proceedings before this Court on 10.01.2025, it was brought to the notice of this Court by the Ld. Proxy Counsel for the revisionist that the main counsel was neither in a position to contact the revisionist and nor was his/revisionist's whereabouts determinable. Correspondingly, it was submitted that the main counsel desired to withdraw his vakalatnama in the present case. In particular, the order sheet dated 10.01.2025, specifically records, "...It is submitted by Ld. Proxy Counsel for the revisionist that the main counsel has not been able to contact the revisionist. Further, as per the Ld. Proxy Counsel, the counsel are not aware of the present whereabouts of the revisionist and that the main counsel desires to withdraw his vakalatnama in the present case. However, it is submitted by the Ld. Proxy Counsel that the main counsel is indisposed today *** At this stage, Ld. Counsel for the respondent has submitted that the revisionist has not entered appearance before the Ld. Trial Court and that NBWs against the revisionist were issued by the Ld. Trial Court on 08.10.2024.***In view of the aforesaid submission of Ld. Counsel for the revisionist, Court deems it prudent to appoint Mr. *** as Amicus Curiae for the revisionist...". Clearly, in light of the foregoing facts and circumstances, this Court appointed Ld. Amicus Curiae for the revisionist in view of the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Madan Lal Kapoor v. Rajiv Thapar & Ors., (2007) 7 SCC 623, wherein the Hon'ble Court, remarked, "5. Thus, in Bani Singha and Ors. v. State of U.P. MANU/SC/0615/1996: 1996CriLJ3491, a three Judge Bench of this Court held that a criminal appeal should not be dismissed in default but should be decided on merits. If despite notice neither the appellant nor his counsel present, the Court could decide the appeal on merits. If the appellant is in jail the Court can appoint a lawyer at State expense to assist it. This would equally apply to the respondent*** 8. In our opinion the same reasoning applies to criminal revisions also, and hence a criminal revision cannot also be dismissed in default..." Similarly, the Hon'ble Apex Court in Surya Baksh Singh v. State of U.P., (2014) 14 SCC 222 , observed, "...17. The criminal justice delivery system is being held to ransom by convicts who have developed the devious and dishonest practice of escaping punishment or sentence by filing appeals, obtaining bail or suspension of sentence and thereafter disappearing beyond the reach of the arms of the law. The inherent powers under Section 482 CrPC, which the Supreme Court has on several occasions expounded to have existed from time immemorial, predating the present as well as the previous CrPC, must be pressed into action lest the already fragile policing and prosecuting branches of governance are rendered redundant. Since Section 482 CrPC was not considered by either of the three-Judge Benches of this Court, we have not found it necessary to resort to recommending the matter for being laid before a larger Bench. The facts and pronouncement in Bani Singh [Bani Singh v. State of U.P., (1996) 4 SCC 720: 1996 SCC (Cri) 848: AIR 1996 SC 2439] cannot be extrapolated to the factual matrix before us. On the contrary the opinion in Ram Naresh Yadav [Ram Naresh Yadav v. State of Bihar, (2014) 14 SCC 238: AIR 1987 SC 1500: 1987 Cri LJ 1856] as well as in Kishan Singh [Kishan Singh v. State of U.P., (1996) 9 SCC 372: 1996 SCC (Cri) 1010: 1992 Supp (2) SCR 305] are available to us to ensure that preventive action is devised to combat the abuse of court process so that facilitative steps are taken to secure the ends of justice.***24. It seems to us that it is necessary for the appellate court which is confronted with the absence of the convict as well as his counsel, to immediately proceed against the persons who stood surety at the time when the convict was granted bail, as this may lead to his discovery and production in court. If even this exercise fails to locate and bring forth the convict, the appellate court is empowered to dismiss the appeal. We fully and respectfully concur with the recent elucidation of the law, profound yet perspicuous, in K.S. Panduranga v. State of Karnataka [K.S. Panduranga v. State of Karnataka, (2013) 3 SCC 721: (2013) 2 SCC (Cri) CR No. 133/2024 Brijesh Singla v. Manindra Samanta. Page No. 7 of 35 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date:
2025.06.30 15:12:22 +0530 submitted that the impugned order was passed by the Ld. Trial Court on mere conjunctures, surmises and in contravention of the settled cannons of law, deserving the same to be set aside at the outset, as suffering with gross illegality. In this regard, Ld. Counsel further submitted that the impugned order was passed by the Ld. Trial Court on mere assumptions and that no sound and/or cogent reasons have been delineated under the said order. Even otherwise, as per the Ld. Counsel, the impugned order was passed by the Ld. Trial Court in a mechanical manner and utter haste, without considering the material placed on record as well as without appreciating the correct facts and circumstances brought forth on record. Ld. Counsel further vehemently contended that the Ld. Trial Court failed to prima facie evaluate the merits of the case put forth by the respondent and the revisionist's defence, under the reply to respondent's application under Section 143A NI Act. As per the Ld. Counsel, had there been any real evaluation by the Ld. Trial Court to the said effect, the findings recorded under the impugned order would have been contrastingly different. Further, as per the Ld. Counsel, the Ld. Trial Court, while recording its reasons for passing the impugned order, rightly observed that the alleged payment under loan transaction has been made through banking channel, however, in doing so, the Ld. Trial Court completely lost sight of an apparent and admitted position of fact 257: (2013) 1 SCC (L&S) 791]. After a comprehensive analysis of previous decisions our learned Brother had distilled the legal position into six propositions: (SCC p. 734, para 19)***"19.1. that the High Court cannot dismiss an appeal for non-prosecution simpliciter without examining the merits;***19.2. that the Court is not bound to adjourn the matter if both the appellant or his counsel/lawyer are absent;***19.3. that the court may, as a matter of prudence or indulgence, adjourn the matter but it is not bound to do so;***19.4. that it can dispose of the appeal after perusing the record and judgment of the trial court.***19.5. that if the accused is in jail and cannot, on his own, come to court, it would be advisable to adjourn the case and fix another date to facilitate the appearance of the appellant- accused if his lawyer is not present, and if the lawyer is absent and the court deems it appropriate to appoint a lawyer at the State expense to assist it, nothing in law would preclude the court from doing so; and***19.6. that if the case is decided on merits in the absence of the appellant, the higher court can remedy the situation ."..." (Emphasis supplied). Reference is further made to the decision in; Kabira v. State of U.P., 1981 Supp SCC 76 , wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court inter alia observed, "...The appeal could not be dismissed by the learned Judge for default of appearance. If the appellant was not present, the learned Judge should have appointed some advocate as amicus curiae and then proceeded to dispose of the appeal on merits..." (Emphasis supplied). Needless to mention neither the revisionist entered before this Court subsequent to 10.01.2025 nor was he represented by a private counsel. Ergo, arguments in the instant case were addressed by the Ld. Amicus Curiae on behalf of the revisionist.
CR No. 133/2024 Brijesh Singla v. Manindra Samanta. Page No. 8 of 35
Digitally
signed by
ABHISHEK
ABHISHEK GOYAL
GOYAL Date:
2025.06.30
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+0530
that no payment, whatsoever has been made to the revisionist, rather, to company. Ergo, it was asserted that under such circumstances, no liability could have been imputed to the revisionist in his individual capacity towards this alleged debt of the respondent/complainant. It was further strenuously contended that the respondent prima facie has failed to indicate in the said complaint proceedings any liability, much less enforceable debt qua the revisionist and this alone dispels the basic presumption of culpability under Section 139 NI Act. Ld. Counsel for the revisionist further asserted that the perversity in the impugned order is so writ large that despite there being a clear parameter and settled law that presumption under Section 139 NI Act cannot by, in itself, be a sole ground to direct the payment of interim compensation and the question of applying the presumption will arise only at the trial, yet, the Ld. Trial Court has presumed the same to be of significance, which appear to have overweighed the Ld. Trial Court, in passing the impugned order. It is further submitted that the pleadings in the complaint and the material placed on record, demonstrate no prima facie case against the revisionist, the complainant itself, being not maintainable against the revisionist herein. However, as per the Ld. Counsel, the Ld. Trial Court failed to consider the said facts under the impugned order, while allowing the respondent's application under Section 143A of the NI Act. Ergo, as per the Ld. Counsel, the impugned order is liable to set aside on this sole ground. 3.1. Ld. Counsel/Ld. Amicus Curiae for the revisionist further contended that impugned order is bad in law and liable to be set aside. In this regard, Ld. Counsel emphatically argued that not only the respondent failed to place on record, any cogent evidence in support of his assertions in the complaint, rather, also CR No. 133/2024 Brijesh Singla v. Manindra Samanta. Page No. 9 of 35 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date:
2025.06.30 15:12:30 +0530 in the light of the glaring contradictions, inconsistencies, concealment of facts and falsehood, the assertion of the respondent to bring home the point of commission of offence under Section 138 NI Act by the revisionist is far-fetched and totally inconceivable. It was further submitted that ex-facie, the material on record and the admitted position of the facts under the respondent's complaint evinces that the said complaint is not maintainable under law, as admittedly, the loan, as alleged under the subject complaint was advanced by the respondent to company, which was neither impleaded in the complaint proceedings nor any summons, issued to the company by the Ld. Trial Court. Ld. Counsel further fervently argued that the order passed by the Ld. Trial Court/impugned order is also bad in law for the very reason that the revisionist could not have been saddled with the liability under Section 143A of NI Act merely on the premise that the cheque in question bears the signature of the revisionist, and especially when it has also been explicitly pointed out by the revisionist under the notice under Section 251 Cr.P.C., in the plea of his defense that there were other business transactions with the respondent and the cheque in question was issued as security for a different transaction, which did not even materialize. It was further contended that the case of the respondent is premised on the promissory note, alleged to have been issued in settlement towards the abovementioned alleged loan transaction of Rs. 2,20,00,000/- (Rupees Two Crores Twenty Lakhs only), thus, erroneously asserting the execution of the promissory note to be a part of the very same cause of action. Even otherwise, it was submitted that the Ld. Trial Court even failed to appreciate that the promissory note, even is assumed to have been executed by the revisionist for a business transaction, the said CR No. 133/2024 Brijesh Singla v. Manindra Samanta. Page No. 10 of 35 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date:
2025.06.30 15:12:34 +0530 transaction ex-facie pertains to altogether a different business transaction executed between the revisionist and the cause of action thereunder, by any stretch of imagination, could not have been stated to be in continuity of the above alleged loan transaction between the respondent and the company. It was further submitted by the Ld. Counsel for the revisionist that the Ld. Trial Court clearly fell in error by failing to appreciate the deceptive practices of the respondent, whereby two separate and independent causes of action and transactions that too between different parties, have been conflated. Even otherwise, as per the Ld. Counsel, the promissory note, nowhere supports the theory or proposition attempted to be advanced by the respondent. 3.2. Ld. Counsel/Ld. Amicus Curiae for the revisionist further submitted that the Ld. Trial Court further failed to consider that the respondent, in its notice issued on 21.12.2021, also implicated/named another company, i.e., M/s. Singla Assets (Pvt.) Limited, which happens to an entity independent of the revisionist as well as the company. Further, as per the Ld. Counsel, the Ld. Trial Court fell in grave and patent error in failing to appreciate the contents of the complaint and other material placed on record.
Correspondingly, it was argued that the Ld. Trial Court erred in not properly appreciating the settled judicial precedents as well as the legal provisions. Further, as per the Ld. Counsel, the Ld. Trial Court while passing the impugned order has unduly given importance to the conduct of the revisionist and also committed a patent error in observing that the conduct of the revisionist reflected adoption of delay tactics. On the contrary, as per the Ld. Counsel, a bare perusal of the sequence/date wise events of proceedings conducted before the Ld. Trial Court reveal the truth of the said proceedings, wherein in a short span of time, the matter CR No. 133/2024 Brijesh Singla v. Manindra Samanta. Page No. 11 of 35 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL Date: GOYAL 2025.06.30 15:12:38 +0530 has already reached that stage of conclusion of complainant's cross-examination. As per the Ld. Counsel, the Ld. Trial Court further blatantly failed to lay its hands over the facts and merits of the case before passing the impugned order and merely considered the conduct of the revisionist while passing an order/impugned order to the detriment of the revisionist. In this regard, Ld. Counsel for the revisionist further asserted that the Ld. Trial Court in reaching the conclusion of granting interim compensation to the respondent, ought not to have taken into consideration only one or two incidents of adjournment sought by the revisionist, in isolation without holistically examining the conduct of the revisionist. Correspondingly, it was argued that even in the case, where courts are inclined to allow an application under Section 143A NI Act, the court will have to apply its mind to the quantum of interim compensation to be granted, which reasons the Ld. Trial Court failed to provide for. Further, it was argued that the Ld. Trial Court, while passing the impugned order also failed to appreciate that for an order to be a 'speaking/speaking order', same has to be in consonance with the principles of natural justice and natural justice in any given case must take into account both sides of the picture/case as a rule of fair play. Further, it was asserted that the Ld. Trial Court even failed to appreciate that directing the revisionist to pay 20% (twenty percent) of the compensation that too within a short period of time, is not only harsh, rather, same would put the revisionist into acute financial hardship. Consequently, it was entreated that the impugned order be set aside as erroneous and passed in violation of facts and circumstances of case, law as well as judicial precedents. In support of the said contentions, reliance was placed upon the decision(s) in; Rakesh Ranjan Shrivastava v. State of Jharkhand & CR No. 133/2024 Brijesh Singla v. Manindra Samanta. Page No. 12 of 35 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL Date: GOYAL 2025.06.30 15:12:42 +0530 Anr., Crl. Appeal No. 741/2024, dated 15.03.2024 (SC).
4. Per contra, Ld. Counsel for the respondent submitted that the impugned order was passed by the Ld. Trial Court after due appreciation of the facts and circumstances of the present case and, as such, deserves no interference by this Court. It was further submitted that all the relevant facts and circumstances were duly considered by the Ld. Trial Court, besides the impugned order was passed by the Ld. Trial Court, wary of the settled judicial precedents and the material brought forth. Ld. Counsel for the respondent further submitted that no illegality/infirmity can be attributed to the impugned order, so as to subject the same to any interference by this Court under this Court's exercise of its revisional jurisdiction. In this regard, Ld. Counsel for the respondent further submitted that the entire case of the revisionist is premised on uncorroborated and far-reaching callous statements, which have no factual basis whatsoever. Correspondingly, as per the Ld. Counsel, there is not an iota of evidence produced by the revisionist to substantiate its case/version put forth before this Court. Further, as per the Ld. Counsel, the intention of the revisionist is manifestly clear, in as much as the revisionist, while deliberately and intentionally failing to pay the interim compensation within a period of 60 (sixty) days, as specified under the impugned order, belatedly moved before this Court solely to delay in respondent's realization of its rightful dues. In fact, it was submitted that the revisionist did not even seek any extension for depositing the aforesaid amount and in fact, moved the present revision tardily, only after the expiry of the statutory period, provided under Section 143A (3) of the NI Act. Even otherwise, as per the Ld. Counsel, the revisionist is a habitual offender and has been convicted in several other cases of similar CR No. 133/2024 Brijesh Singla v. Manindra Samanta. Page No. 13 of 35 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date:
2025.06.30 15:12:45 +0530 nature, wherein he had also been declared a proclaimed offender in some cases.
4.1. Ld. Counsel further submitted that from the material placed on record prima facie case stands established against the revisionist, which fact was also recorded by the Ld. Trial Court while taking cognizance of the offence vide its order dated 31.03.2022. As per the Ld. Counsel, the explicit provisions under law/Section 138 NI Act demonstrate that it is only the 'drawer' of the cheque, who can be made liable for the penal action under the provisions of the Act. Ld. Counsel further submitted that the impugned order is further in consonance with the parameters set forth in Rakesh Ranjan Shrivastava case (Supra.) as the Ld. Trial Court duly considered the nature of the transaction, the relationship between the revisionist and the respondent, conduct of revisionist, revisionist's plea of defence, and material on record to come to a conclusion of the respondent established a prima facie case, necessitating interim relief in favour of the respondent. Ergo, Ld. Counsel reiterated that no interference is called for under the impugned order, which was passed by the Ld. Trial Court being cognizant of the facts of the present case, legal provisions and judicial precedents. In support of the said contentions, reliance was placed upon the decisions in; Mainuddin Abdul Sattar Shaikh v.
Vijay D. Salvi, (2015) 9 SCC 622: AIR 2015 SC 2579; Rajneesh Aggarwal v. Amit J. Bhalla, (2001) 1 SCC 631; Gimpex (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Manoj Goel, (2022) 11 SCC 705; M/s. Womb Laboratory Pvt. Ltd. v. Vijay Ahuja & Anr., Criminal Appeal No. 1382-1383 of 2019, dated 11.09.2019 (SC); Bir Singh v. Mukesh Kumar, (2019) 4 SCC 197; Anil Hada v. Indian Acrylic Ltd., (2000) 1 SCC 1; Prem Rattan Sood v. Arora Agro Chemicals, 2021 SCC OnLine P&H 4195; Ajay Tyagi v. B9 Beverages, MANU/DE/5274/2022; CR No. 133/2024 Brijesh Singla v. Manindra Samanta. Page No. 14 of 35 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date:
2025.06.30 15:12:48 +0530 and Krishnamurthy v. Dairy Classic Ice Creams (Pvt.) Ltd., MANU/KA/2673/2022.
5. The arguments of Ld. Counsel for the revisionist and that of Ld. Counsel for the respondent have been heard as well as the records, including the Ld. Trial Court record, written submissions filed by the parties and the case laws, relied, thoroughly perused.
6. Before proceeding with the determination of the merits of the case/issues posed before this Court, it would be apposite to outrightly make a reference to the relevant provisions under law, as under;
"3972. Calling for records to exercise of powers of revision - (1) The High Court or any Sessions Judge may call for and examine the record of any proceeding before any inferior Criminal Court situate within its or his local jurisdiction for the purpose of satisfying itself or himself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order, recorded or passed, and as to the regularity of any proceedings of such inferior Court, and may, when calling for such record, direct that the execution of any sentence or order be suspended, and if the accused is in confinement, that he be released on bail or on his own bond pending the examination of the record. Explanation - All Magistrates, whether Executive or Judicial, and whether exercising original or appellate jurisdiction, shall be deemed to be inferior to the Sessions Judge for the purposes of this sub-section and of Section 398.
(2) The powers of revision conferred by sub-
section (1) shall not be exercised in relation to any interlocutory order passed in any appeal, inquiry, trial or other proceeding..."
(Emphasis supplied) 2 Pari materia to Section 438 BNSS, which provides; "438. Calling for records to exercise powers of revision-(1) The High Court or any Sessions Judge may call for and examine the record of any proceeding before any inferior Criminal Court situate within its or his local jurisdiction for the purpose of satisfying itself or himself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order, recorded or passed, and as to the regularity of any proceedings of such inferior Court, and may, when calling, for such record, direct that the execution of any sentence or order be suspended, and if the accused is in confinement that he be released on his own bond or bail bond pending the examination of the record.***Explanation--All Magistrates, whether Executive or Judicial, and whether exercising original or appellate jurisdiction, shall be deemed to be inferior to the Sessions Judge for the purposes of this sub-section and of Section 439.***(2) The powers of revision conferred by sub-section (1) shall not be exercised in relation to any interlocutory order passed in any appeal, inquiry, trial or other proceeding...." (Emphasis supplied). CR No. 133/2024 Brijesh Singla v. Manindra Samanta. Page No. 15 of 35 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL Date:
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7. Pertinently, from a perusal of the above, it is quite manifest that the revisional jurisdiction of this Court can be invoked either suo motu or an application of parties, that too in a case(s) where there is a palpable error, non-compliance of the provision of law, decision of Trial Court being completely erroneous or where the judicial decision is exercised arbitrarily. In this regard, reliance is placed upon the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Amit Kumar v. Ramesh Chander, (2012) 9 SCC 460, wherein the Hon'ble Court while explicating the various contours of the provision under Section 397 Cr.P.C. observed as under:
"12. Section 397 of the Code vests the court with the power to call for and examine the records of an inferior court for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality and regularity of any proceedings or order made in a case. The object of this provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law. There has to be a well-founded error and it may not be appropriate for the court to scrutinise the orders, which upon the face of it bears a token of careful consideration and appear to be in accordance with law. If one looks into the various judgments of this Court, it emerges that the revisional jurisdiction can be invoked where the decisions under challenge are grossly erroneous, there is no compliance with the provisions of law, the finding recorded is based on no evidence, material evidence is ignored or judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or perversely. These are not exhaustive classes, but are merely indicative. Each case would have to be determined on its own merits.
13. Another well-accepted norm is that the revisional jurisdiction of the higher court is a very limited one and cannot be exercised in a routine manner. One of the inbuilt restrictions is that it should not be against an interim or interlocutory order. The Court has to keep in mind that the exercise of revisional jurisdiction itself should not lead to injustice ex facie. Where the Court is dealing with the question as to whether the charge has been framed properly and in accordance with law in a given case, it may be reluctant to interfere in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction unless the case substantially CR No. 133/2024 Brijesh Singla v. Manindra Samanta. Page No. 16 of 35 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL Date: GOYAL 2025.06.30 15:12:57 +0530 falls within the categories aforestated. Even framing of charge is a much advanced stage in the proceedings under the CrPC."
(Emphasis supplied)
8. Analogously, the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in V.K. Verma v. CBI, 2022 SCC OnLine Del 1192 , in a similar context noted as under;
"67. The revisional jurisdiction is not meant to test the waters of what might happen in the trial. The Revisional Court has to consider the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding inter se an order and as to the regularity of the proceedings of the court below. While doing so, the Revisional Court does not dwell at length upon the facts and evidence of the case, rather it considers the material only to satisfy itself about the legality and propriety of the findings, sentence and order and refrains from substituting its own conclusion on an elaborate consideration of evidence. In the instant case, the Petitioner has failed to make out a case for exercise of the revisional jurisdiction since there is no patent error in the impugned order on the face of record."
(Emphasis supplied)
9. Quite evidently, it may be noted from above that the revisional jurisdiction of the higher court is quite limited and cannot be exercised in a routine manner. In fact, as aforenoted, the revisional Court can interfere only in the instances where an order of trial court was passed, unjustly and unfairly. Further, it is a settled law3 that in a case where the order of subordinate Court does not suffer from any illegality, "merely because of equitable considerations, the revisional Court has no jurisdiction to re- consider the matter and pass a different order in a routine manner." Reference in this regard is made to the decision in Taron Mohan v. State, 2021 SCC OnLine Del 312, wherein the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi expounded the law, as under;
3Juned v. State of M.P., 2023 SCC OnLine MP 4458; and Dilip Damor v. State of M.P., 2024 SCC OnLine MP 958. CR No. 133/2024 Brijesh Singla v. Manindra Samanta. Page No. 17 of 35 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date:
2025.06.30 15:13:00 "9. The scope of interference in a revision petition is extremely narrow. It is well settled that Section 397 CrPC gives the High Courts or the Sessions Courts jurisdiction to consider the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding inter se an order and as to the regularity of the proceedings of any inferior court. It is also well settled that while considering the legality, propriety or correctness of a finding or a conclusion, normally the revising court does not dwell at length upon the facts and evidence of the case. A court in revision considers the material only to satisfy itself about the legality and propriety of the findings, sentence and order and refrains from substituting its own conclusion on an elaborate consideration of evidence..."
(Emphasis supplied)
10. Ergo, in light of the foregoing discussion, however, before proceeding with the assessment of the rival contentions of Ld. Counsel for the revisionist and that of Ld. Counsel for the respondent, this Court deems it apposite to reproduce the relevant provisions under law/NI Act, for the purpose(s) of the present discourse, as under;
"143A. Power to direct interim compensation-(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), the Court trying an offence under Section 138 may order the drawer of the cheque to pay interim compensation to the complainant-
(a) in a summary trial or a summons case, where he pleads not guilty to the accusation made in the complaint; and
(b) in any other case, upon framing of charge. (2) The interim compensation under sub-section (1) shall not exceed twenty percent of the amount of the cheque.
(3) The interim compensation shall be paid within sixty days from the date of the order under sub-section (1), or within such further period not exceeding thirty days as may be directed by the Court on sufficient cause being shown by the drawer of the cheque. (4) If the drawer of the cheque is acquitted, the Court shall direct the complainant to repay to the drawer the amount of interim compensation, with interest at the bank rate as published by the Reserve CR No. 133/2024 Brijesh Singla v. Manindra Samanta. Page No. 18 of 35 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date:
2025.06.30 15:13:03 +0530 Bank of India, prevalent at the beginning of the relevant financial year, within sixty days from the date of the order, or within such further period not exceeding thirty days as may be directed by the Court on sufficient cause being shown by the complainant. (5) The interim compensation payable under this section may be recovered as if it were a fine under section 421 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. (6) The amount of fine imposed under section 138 or the amount of compensation awarded under section 357 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, shall be reduced by the amount paid or recovered as interim compensation under this section.
(Emphasis supplied)
11. Apropos the present discourse, this Court outrightly notes that the provision under Section 143A was inserted under the statute book/NI Act pursuant to the Negotiable Instruments (Amendment) Act, 2018, w.e.f. 01.09.2018. Relevantly, the objective behind the introduction of the said provision, was to reduce undue delay in disposal of cheque dishonour cases as well as to provide for temporary relief in the form of interim compensation to the complainant, in the interregnum. Reference in this regard is made to the relevant extract from the Statement of Objects and Reasons, as enumerated under the Negotiable Instruments (Amendment) Bill, 2017, as under;
"...2. It is proposed to amend the said Act with a view to address the issue of undue delay in final resolution of cheque dishonour cases so as to provide relief to payees of dishonoured cheques and to discourage frivolous and unnecessary litigation which would save time and money. The proposed amendments will strengthen the credibility of cheques and help trade and commerce in general by allowing lending institutions, including banks, to continue to extend financing to the productive sectors of the economy.
3. It is, therefore, proposed to introduce the Negotiable Instruments (Amendment) Bill, 2017 to provide, inter alia, for the following, namely:-
(i) to insert a new section 143A in the said Act to provide that the Court trying an offence under section CR No. 133/2024 Brijesh Singla v. Manindra Samanta. Page No. 19 of 35 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date:
2025.06.30 15:13:06 +0530 138 may order the drawer of the cheque to pay interim compensation to the complainant, in a summary trial or a summons case, where he pleads not guilty to the accusation made in the complaint, and in any other case, upon framing of charge. The interim compensation so payable shall be such sum not exceeding twenty per cent. of the amount of the cheque; ..."
(Emphasis supplied)
12. However, at this stage, this Court deems it further pertinent to note that notwithstanding the salutary object of Section 143A NI Act, i.e., an aid to ensure speedy disposal of the proceeding pending under Section 138 NI Act, the said provision has been persistently held by the superior courts4 to be 'directory' and 'not mandatory' in nature. Reference in this regard is made to the decision of the Hon'ble High Court of Bombay in Ashwin Ashokrao Karokar v. Laxmikant Govind Joshi, WP (Crl.) No. 48/2022, dated 07.07.2022, wherein the Hon'ble Court, while expressing similar sentimentalities, remarked as under;
"...9.4. Section 143-A of the N.I. Act, though enacted with an intent to ensure speedy disposal of the proceeding pending under Section 138 of the N.I. Act, the said intent, insofar as Section143-A of the N.I. Act is concerned, does not make the provision mandatory, as what is conferred upon the Court by virtue of the said provision is a discretion to direct interim compensation and no right is created in the complainant under it, to demand the entitlement to compensation. Grant of interim compensation, would be at the discretion of the Court, based upon consideration of various factors, such as (a) whether the requirements of Section 138 of the N.I. Act, were fulfilled (b) whether the pleadings disclose the drawing of the presumption (c) whether the proceedings were within limitation and (d) whether prima facie a legal debt or liability was disclosed from the complaint or the notice of demand preceding it, and factors as such [see: B.R. Upadhya and Anant H. Ulahalkar (supra)]..."
(Emphasis supplied) 4 JSB Cargo and Freight Forwarder (P) Ltd. v. State, 2021 SCC OnLine Del 5425. CR No. 133/2024 Brijesh Singla v. Manindra Samanta. Page No. 20 of 35 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date:
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13. Clearly, it is seen from above that the discretion under Section 143A of NI Act entails a judicial exercise, which the courts have to determine, cognizant of various facts and circumstances. As a corollary, it is quite understandable that Ld. Magistrates/ Ld. MMs/Ld. JMFCs, while exercising such discretion are bound to provide reasons/record brief reasons, indicating consideration of all relevant factors while granting or denying such interim compensation. Reference in this regard is made to the decision of the Hon'ble Madras High Court in L.G.R. Enterprises v. P. Anbazhagan, AIR Online 2019 Mad 801: (2019) 3 MAD LJ(CRI) 423, wherein the Hon'ble Court accentuated the importance of a reasoned order under such cases, in the following terms;
"8. Therefore, whenever the trial Court exercises its jurisdiction under Section 143A(1) of the Act, it shall record reasons as to why it directs the accused person (drawer of the cheque) to pay the interim compensation to the complainant. The reasons may be varied. For instance, the accused person would have absconded for a longtime and thereby would have protracted the proceedings or the accused person would have intentionally evaded service for a long time and only after repeated attempts, appears before the Court, or the enforceable debt or liability in a case, is borne out by overwhelming materials which the accused person could not on the face of it deny or where the accused person accepts the debt or liability partly or where the accused person does not cross examine the witnesses and keeps on dragging with the proceedings by filing one petition after another or the accused person absconds and by virtue of a non- bailable warrant he is secured and brought before the Court after a long time or he files a recall non-bailable warrant petition after a long time and the Court while considering his petition for recalling the non-bailable warrant can invoke Section 143A(1) of the Act. This list is not exhaustive and it is more illustrative as to the various circumstances under which the trial Court will be justified in exercising its jurisdiction under Section 143A(1) of the Act, by directing the accused person to pay the interim compensation of 20% to the complainant.
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9. The other reason why the order of the trial Court under Section 143A(1) of the Act, should contain reasons, is because it will always be subjected to challenge before this Court. This Court while considering the petition will only look for the reasons given by the Court below while passing the order under Section 143A(1) of the Act. An order that is subjected to appeal or revision, should always be supported by reasons. A discretionary order without reasons is, on the face of it, illegal and it will be set aside on that ground alone..."
(Emphasis supplied)
14. Significantly, this Court deems it further germane to refer to a recent decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Rakesh Ranjan Shrivastava v. The State of Jharkhand & Anr., (Supra.), wherein the Hon'ble Court, while delving into the contours, scope and ambit of the provisions under Section 143A of NI Act, observed as under;
"19. Subject to what is held earlier, the main conclusions can be summarised as follows:
a. The exercise of power under sub-section (1) of Section 143A is discretionary. The provision is directory and not mandatory. The word "may" used in the provision cannot be construed as "shall."
b. While deciding the prayer made under Section 143A, the Court must record brief reasons indicating consideration of all relevant factors.
c. The broad parameters for exercising the discretion under Section 143A are as follows:
i. The Court will have to prima facie evaluate the merits of the case made out by the complainant and the merits of the defence pleaded by the accused in the reply to the application. The financial distress of the accused can also be a consideration.
ii. A direction to pay interim compensation can be issued, only if the complainant makes out a prima facie case.
iii. If the defence of the accused is found to be prima facie plausible, the Court may exercise discretion in refusing to grant interim compensation.
CR No. 133/2024 Brijesh Singla v. Manindra Samanta. Page No. 22 of 35 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL Date: GOYAL 2025.06.30 15:13:34 +0530
iv. If the Court concludes that a case is made out to grant interim compensation, it will also have to apply its mind to the quantum of interim compensation to be granted. While doing so, the Court will have to consider several factors such as the nature of the transaction, the relationship, if any, between the accused and the complainant, etc. v. There could be several other relevant factors in the peculiar facts of a given case, which cannot be exhaustively stated. The parameters stated above are not exhaustive..."
(Emphasis supplied)
15. Ergo, in light of the foregoing discussion, legal provisions and judicial dictates, when the facts of the present case are seen in conjunction with the arguments addressed by/on behalf of the revisionist and that of the respondent, this Court concedes with the finding of the Ld. Trial Court under the impugned order. In fact, this Court is also in concurrence with the observation of the Ld. Trial Court that once the revisionist admitted his signatures on the cheque in question/dishonoured cheque, presumption5 under Section 118/139 of the NI Act came into play. Needless to mention that it is trite law the presumption envisioned under Section 139 NI Act not only pertains to the fact that the cheque in question was drawn in discharge of debt or liability, rather, also includes6 a presumption that there exists a legally enforceable debt or liability at the time of such drawing. Indisputably7, the burden to rebut the presumption lies on an accused/revisionist herein, by establishing probable defence, which can be only done during the trial by the revisionist's either leading evidence or from the material placed on record by the complainant/respondent. Correspondingly, it is seen from a conscientious perusal of the impugned order that while 5 Rajesh Jain v. Ajay Singh, (2023) 10 SCC 148; and Rangappa v. Sri Mohan, (2010) 11 SCC 441.
6S. Natarajan v. Sama Dharman, (2021) 6 SCC 413.
7Rajaram v. Maruthachalam, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 48.
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allowing the respondent's application under Section 143A of NI Act, the Ld. Trial Court not only considered the facts and circumstances brought forth on record by the respondent and the revisionist, rather, also of the objective behind the introduction of the said provision under the statute books and awarded a compensation to a tune of 20% (twenty percent) of the cheque amount/dishonoured cheque amount. As aforenoted, the objective behind the introduction of the provisions under Section 143A NI Act under the statute books was premised/aimed to address the issue of undue delay in final resolution of cheque dishonour cases, "so as to provide relief to payees of dishonoured cheques and to discourage frivolous and unnecessary litigation which would save time and money." Ergo, in said context, in the considered opinion of this Court, Ld. Trial Court was well within its right to note the conduct of the revisionist in intentionally delaying the proceedings in the said complaint case, by his persistent absence, adjournments, etc. In fact, in this regard, even this Court records that from a conscientious perusal of the records it is noted that the summons qua the revisionist were issued by the Ld. Trial Court on 31.03.2022. However, subsequently, under the order dated 20.10.2022, Ld. Trial Court duly noted that the summons issued to the revisionist returned unserved with the remarks that the "employee of the accused refused to accept the summons", leading to the Ld. Trial Court initiating coercive steps/bailable warrants against the revisionist. Subsequently, on 22.02.2023, the revisionist entered appearance before the Ld. Trial Court and notice under Section 251 Cr.P.C. was inter alia framed against the revisionist. Thereafter on 17.05.2023, again requests for adjournment as well as for personal exemption of the revisionist was made by/on behalf of the revisionist, which was allowed by CR No. 133/2024 Brijesh Singla v. Manindra Samanta. Page No. 24 of 35 Digitally signed ABHISHEK by ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date: 2025.06.30 15:13:41 +0530 the Ld. Trial Court, adjourning the matter to 19.07.2023 for cross examination of the respondent. However, again on 19.07.2023, adjournment was sought by/on behalf of the revisionist on the ground that the Ld. Counsel had been recently engaged by the revisionist. Pertinently, on the said date, Ld. Trial Court deferred/passed over the matter for 02:30 p.m. However, again when the matter was taken up by the Ld. Trial Court, post pass- over at 03:00 p.m. on the said date, Ld. Trial Court noted the dilatory attitude of the revisionist inter alia under the following observations;
"...At 3.00 pm Proceedings conducted online through VC using Cisco Webex.
Present: Mr. Sharad Jain, Ld. counsel for the complainant along with complainant.
Mr. Subhash, Ld. counsel for the accused. Matter is listed for cross examination of complainant.
At the outset, this court questioned as to where the accused is, it is informed by Ld. Counsel for the accused that he is not available right now and it is not even possible for him to join the court proceedings through V.C. On further court query regarding his absence, it is informed that he is on his business tour. This court does not find the reason to be acceptable in as much as on the LDOH also the accused had sought adjournment and this court had allowed the same in the interest of justice. This court even offered whether it is possible for the accused to assist this court so that the cross examination can be conducted and he will not object to the cross examination which is conducted in his absence to which there is no response. In that view of the matter, this court is constrained to observe that the conduct of the accused is certainly not satisfactory and he has been delaying the matter on one pretext or the other. Ld. Counsel for the complainant has drawn attention of this court to the previous orders to highlight that even the bail bond has not been furnished by the accused till date.
Heard. Perused.
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Keeping in view of the submissions and the fact that the judicial has been wasted by the accused, the court is constrained impose cost of Rs.5,000/- to be deposited with DLSA, Central.
Copy of application u/s 143A NI Act already supplied.
The accused is at liberty to file reply to the application u/s 143A NI Act, if so advise with advance copy to the complainant.
To come up for appearance of the accused/arguments on application u/s 143A NI Act on 24.08.2023..."
(Emphasis supplied)
16. Undeterred, even on 24.08.2023, new counsel entered appearance on behalf of the revisionist before the Ld. Trial Court and again request for adjournment was made by/on behalf of the revisionist on the ground of Ld. Counsel's recent engagement and need for time to peruse the case records. However, again, the Ld. Trial Court, in the interest of justice was pleased to grant one more opportunity to the revisionist to cross-examine the respondent before the Ld. Trial Court. Significantly, on the said date, the revisionist and the respondent had requested for reference of their dispute/matter to mediation, which was allowed by the Ld. Trial Court inter alia noting that in the event of failure of mediation, "... parties be present before the Court on the NDOH/furnishing of bail bond/arguments on application 143A NI Act/C.E. and further proceedings...". Markedly, when the matter was next taken up before the Ld. Trial Court on 21.09.2023, it was brought to the notice of the Ld. Trial Court that on the earlier two dates at the Mediation Centre, the revisionist did not appear. However, considering the request made by the parties, the matter was again adjourned to 02.11.2024 for the revisionist to furnish bail bonds and the outcome on mediation. Subsequently, on 02.11.2023, the Ld. Trial Court was apprised that the mediation could not fructify, CR No. 133/2024 Brijesh Singla v. Manindra Samanta. Page No. 26 of 35 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date:
2025.06.30 15:13:49 +0530 however, the revisionist again requested for adjournment for addressing arguments on application under Section 143A NI Act as well as furnishing bail bonds. Needless to mention, again on 24.11.2023, the revisionist further sought time to furnish bail bonds. Clearly, in light of the foregoing, no error/irregularity in the observation of the Ld. Trial Court can be attributed by this Court in the Ld. Trial Court's noting the conduct of the revisionist under the impugned order, which, even in the considered opinion of this Court, suggests adoption of delaying tactics on the part of the revisionist on one or the other pretext. In fact, the entire conduct of the revisionist before the Ld. Trial Court is extremely recalcitrant and remiss, as noted from the records of the Ld. Trial Court, delaying adjudication in the complaint proceedings, initiated by the respondent. Needless to mention, under such circumstances, no incongruity can be ascribed to the finding of the Ld. Trial Court under the impugned order, pertaining to the conduct of the revisionist, considering the objective behind the introduction of provisions under Section 143A NI Act it to provide temporary respite to the payees of dishonoured cheques and to discourage frivolous and unnecessary litigation.
17. Congruently, it is seen from a scrupulous analysis of the impugned order that the Ld. Trial Court, while directing the revisionist to deposit/pay the interim compensation amount, duly reflected on the defence(s) raised by the revisionist , i.e., to the effect that the dishonoured cheque was issued as a 'security' and that the amount in question was issued to the company, in variance to the revisionist herein. In this regard, this Court deems it further pertinent to outrightly make a reference to the relevant extracts of notice under Section 251 Cr.P.C. framed against the revisionist, wherein the revisionist inter alia proclaimed as under;
CR No. 133/2024 Brijesh Singla v. Manindra Samanta. Page No. 27 of 35 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL Date: GOYAL 2025.06.30 15:13:53 +0530 "...Q. Do you know the complainant? A. Yes.
Q. Have you understood the particulars of offence and substance of accusation?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you plead guilty or have any defence to make?
A. I do not plead guilty. I claim trial.
Q. Whether the cheque in question is of your bank account?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you admit your signature on the cheque in question?
A. Yes.
Q. Did you fill the other particulars on the cheque in question including date, name of payee and amount?
A. Except date all other entries were filled by me in my own hand-writing.
Q. Did you receive above mentioned legal notice from the complainant?
A. Yes.
Q. Whether the address mentioned on the said legal notice dated 21.12.2021 is correct?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you admit the bank return memo?
A. Yes. It is a matter of record.
Q. Do you have anything else to say?
A. My plea of defence is that I had entered into business transaction with complainant. The cheque in question was handed over to complainant merely as security. I owe nothing towards the complainant..."
(Emphasis supplied)
18. Clearly, it is seen from above that the revisionist, at the time of framing of notice under Section 251 Cr.P.C. duly admitted the issuance of cheque in question/dishonoured cheque from his bank account, besides, the revisionist also admitted, filling-in the particulars on the said cheque/dishonored cheque, except the date mentioned/specified therein; receipt of the legal demand notice as well as the cheque return memo(s). However, the defence raised by the revisionist was that he had entered into CR No. 133/2024 Brijesh Singla v. Manindra Samanta. Page No. 28 of 35 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL Date: GOYAL 2025.06.30 15:13:57 +0530 business transaction with the respondent and the cheque in question/dishonoured cheque was handed over to respondent merely as security. Needless to mention, the revisionist further proclaimed that he owed nothing towards the respondent/complainant. In this regard, it is apposite to note that the onus of proving the defence that the cheque was issued as security and that the respondent had not complied with his obligation was on the revisionist. Clearly, no material to the said effect/in support of the said defence has been brought on record of the Ld. Trial Court at the said stage and that the same could be determined only during the course of trial. Nonetheless, in the considered opinion of this Court, the plea/defence of the revisionist that the cheque in question was a ' security/security cheque' does not find favour with this Court at this stage, in view of the repeated avowals of the superior courts 8 affirming that the question whether a post-dated cheque is for ' discharge of debt or liability' or a mere 'security deposit', depends on the nature of the transaction. Consequently, where on the date of the cheque, liability or debt exists or the amount has become legally recoverable, the provisions under Section 138 NI Act would be attracted in an instant case, otherwise not. In fact, in this regard, reference is made to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Sripati Singh, through his Son Gaurav Singh v. State of Jharkhand & Ors., MANU/SC/1002/2021, wherein the Hon'ble Court, while revaluating the issue regarding the maintainability of the proceedings under Section 138 NI Act in the event of dishonour of security cheque(s), noted as under;
"16. A cheque issued as security pursuant to a financial transaction cannot be considered as a 8 Sampelly Satyanarayana Rao v. Indian Renewable Energy Development Agency Ltd., (2016) 10 SCC 458; and Sunil Todi v. State of Gujarat & Anr., 2021 SCC OnLine SC 1174.
CR No. 133/2024 Brijesh Singla v. Manindra Samanta. Page No. 29 of 35
Digitally
signed by
ABHISHEK
ABHISHEK GOYAL
GOYAL Date:
2025.06.30
15:14:02
+0530
worthless piece of paper under every circumstance. 'Security' in its true sense is the state of being safe and the security given for a loan is something given as a pledge of payment. It is given, deposited or pledged to make certain the fulfilment of an obligation to which the parties to the transaction are bound. If in a transaction, a loan is advanced and the borrower agrees to repay the amount in a specified timeframe and issues a cheque as security to secure such repayment; if the loan amount is not repaid in any other form before the due date or if there is no other understanding or agreement between the parties to defer the payment of amount, the cheque which is issued as security would mature for presentation and the drawee of the cheque would be entitled to present the same. On such presentation, if the same is dishonoured, the consequences contemplated Under Section 138 and the other provisions of N.I. Act would flow."
(Emphasis supplied)
19. Ergo, in light of the foregoing, mere blatant assertion that the cheque in question was issued as security, in the considered opinion of this Court, would not come to the aid of the revisionist at this stage. In fact, it is for the revisionist to prove that when the cheque in question was presented for encashment, no liability existed against him, which can only be done once evidence is adduced during trial. Concurrently, this Court does not concede with the submission of the Ld. Counsel for the revisionist that no obligation could be attributed qua the revisionist as admittedly the amount in question was transferred in the account of the company, in view of the repeated avowals of superior courts unambiguously declaring that the person, who draws a cheque on an account maintained by him, for paying the payee, alone attracts liability under Section 138 NI Act. Reference in this regard is made to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Mainuddin Abdul Sattar Shaikh v. Vijay D. Salvi, (Supra.) , wherein the Hon'ble Court, noted as under;
CR No. 133/2024 Brijesh Singla v. Manindra Samanta. Page No. 30 of 35 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date: 2025.06.30 15:14:09 +0530
"...From a bare reading of Section 138 of the NI Act, the following essentials have to be met for attracting a liability under the Section. The first and foremost being that the person who is to be made liable should be the drawer of the cheque and should have drawn the cheque on an account maintained by him with a Banker for payment of any amount of money to another person from out of that account for discharge in whole or part, of any debt or other liability. We see that from the bare text of the Section it has been stated clearly that the person, who draws a cheque on an account maintained by him, for paying the payee, alone attracts liability..."
(Emphasis supplied)
20. Even otherwise, it is noted from a scrupulous analysis of the respondent's complaint and other documents that the respondent specifically asserted that the revisionist represented to the respondent that the financial assistance was required for his company, namely, M/s. Singla Assets Reconstruction Pvt. Ltd. and that he/the revisionist shall stand as guarantee(or) for the money lend by the respondent to the company. Here, it is apposite to make reference to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in ICDS Ltd. v. Beena Shabeer & Anr., Crl. Appeal No. 797/2002, dated 12.08.2002: (2002) 6 SCC 426, wherein the Hon'ble Court was confounded with the issue of, "as to the maintainability of a proceeding under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, vis-a-vis a guarantor". Relevantly, in this regard, the Hon'ble Court, remarked as under;
"...The language, however, has been rather specific as regards the intent of the legislature. The commencement of the Section stands with the words "Where any cheque". The above noted three words are of extreme significance, in particular, by reason of the user of the word "any" the first three words suggest that in fact for whatever reason if a cheque is drawn on an account maintained by him with a banker in favour of another person for the discharge of any debt or other liability, the highlighted words if read with the first three words at the commencement of Section 138, leave no manner of doubt that for whatever CR No. 133/2024 Brijesh Singla v. Manindra Samanta. Page No. 31 of 35 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date:
2025.06.30 15:14:13 +0530 reason it may be, the liability under this provision cannot be avoided in the event the same stands returned by the banker unpaid. The legislature has been careful enough to record not only discharge in whole or in part of any debt but the same includes other liability as well. This aspect of the matter has not been appreciated by the High Court, neither been dealt with or even referred to in the impugned judgment. The issue as regards the co-extensive liability of the guarantor and the principal debtor, in our view, is totally out of the purview of Section 138 of the Act, neither the same calls for any discussion therein. The language of the Statute depicts the intent of the law- makers to the effect that wherever there is a default on the part of one in favour of another and in the event a cheque is issued in discharge of any debt or other liability there cannot be any restriction or embargo in the matter of application of the provisions of Section 138 of the Act: 'Any cheque' and 'other liability' are the two key expressions which stands as clarifying the legislative intent so as to bring the factual context within the ambit of the provisions of the Statute. Any contra interpretation would defeat the intent of the legislature. The High Court, it seems, got carried away by the issue of guarantee and guarantor's liability and thus has overlooked the true intent and purport of Section 138 of the Act. The judgments recorded in the order of the High Court do not have any relevance in the contextual facts and the same thus does not lend any assistance to the contentions raised by the respondents..."
(Emphasis supplied)
21. Consequently, in conspectus of above, further being wary of the aforenoted judicial principles, in light of the arguments addressed by the Ld. Counsel for the revisionist as well as by Ld. Counsel for the respondent, this Court unambiguously reaches a conclusion that all the considerations for exercising the discretion under Section 143A of the NI Act were duly dealt with by the Ld. Trial Court, while passing the impugned order. Needless to mention that all the points and contentions of the revisionist and that of the respondent were duly dealt with by the Ld. Trial Court in the impugned order. In fact, there is nothing to show that the Ld. CR No. 133/2024 Brijesh Singla v. Manindra Samanta. Page No. 32 of 35 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL Date: GOYAL 2025.06.30 15:14:17 +0530 Trial Court committed any illegality and/or impropriety while passing the impugned order or that it/Ld. Trial Court exercised its discretion arbitrarily, capriciously and perversely. Needless to reiterate that the Ld. Trial Court, while passing the impugned order duly considered the objective behind the said provision, establishment of a prima facie case by the respondent in the instant case, besides duly considered the material placed on record by the respondent and the revisionist as well as analyzed the plausibility of the defence raised by the revisionist before the Ld. Trial Court. At the same time, upon determination of/conclusion of case in favour of the respondent for the grant of interim compensation, Ld. Trial Court also applied its mind to the quantum of interim compensation awarded, i.e., 20% (twenty percent) of the cheque amount/dishonoured cheque amount, in the instant case. Needless to further mention that this Court is also not convinced with the submission of Ld. Counsel for the revisionist that the Ld. Trial Court acted unfairly by directing such amount be paid within the period of 60 (sixty) days of impugned order. On the contrary, the order/impugned order, is in consonance with the explicit terms of Section 143A(3) of the NI Act, which inter alia provides that the amount directed to be paid as interim compensation has to be deposited/paid within a period of 60 (sixty) days from the date of the order, directing such payment, or within such further period not exceeding thirty days, "as may be directed by the Court on sufficient cause being shown by the drawer of the cheque ." Clearly, the statute itself provides for a period of deposit of the fine amount for 60 (sixty) days, extendable to a further period of 30 (thirty) days, only upon demonstration of sufficient cause by the person/accused, directed to pay and not otherwise. Lastly, this Court is further not convinced that the revisionist has made any CR No. 133/2024 Brijesh Singla v. Manindra Samanta. Page No. 33 of 35 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL Date: GOYAL 2025.06.30 15:14:21 +0530 ground against his inability to pay the said amount 20% (twenty percent) of the cheque amount/dishonoured cheque amount, except for a blatant assertion of his financial capacity. Needless in this regard to note that no documents/material in support of the said contention, except for mere assertion by the revisionist have been placed on record to demonstrate his alleged financial unsoundness/inability to permit any relaxation in his favour.
22. Accordingly, in light of the aforesaid discussion, this Court unswervingly records and reiterates that the Ld. Trial Court did not commit any illegality and/or impropriety under the impugned order, while allowing the respondent's application under Section 143A of NI Act, in light of the facts and circumstances, arguments addressed, documents and the material placed on record, as well as judicial dictates, directing the revisionist to pay/deposit 20% (twenty percent) of the amount of the cheque in question/dishonoured cheque to the respondent as interim compensation. Consequently, in the considered opinion of this Court the present revision petition deserves to be dismissed as devoid of merits and is hereby dismissed. As a corollary, the order dated 05.01.2024, passed by Ld. MM-05, Central, Tis Hazari Courts in case bearing; 'Manindra Samantha & Anr. v. Brijesh Singla & Anr., CC No. 1795/2022', arising out of a complaint under Section 138/142 of NI Act is hereby upheld/affirmed. Apposite at this stage to further note that, though, this Court holds highest regard for the decision(s) relied upon by Ld. Counsel/ Ld. Amicus Curiae for the revisionist, however, the same would not, in the considered opinion of this Court come to the aid/rescue of the case put forth by the revisionist in the manner as prayed, as the facts and circumstances of the present case are clearly, distinguishable.
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23. Trial Court Record along with a copy of this order/judgment be sent to the Ld. Trial Court, with directions to proceed as per law. Needless to mention, nothing stated herein shall tantamount to be an expression of opinion on the merits of the case.
24. Revision file be consigned to record room after due compliance. Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date:
2025.06.30 15:14:28 +0530 Announced in the open Court (Abhishek Goyal) on 30.06.2025. ASJ-03, Central District, Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi CR No. 133/2024 Brijesh Singla v. Manindra Samanta. Page No. 35 of 35