Dharmeshbhai Kirtikumar Shah vs State Of Gujarat on 4 March, 2014

[Cites 16, Cited by 1]

Gujarat High Court

Dharmeshbhai Kirtikumar Shah vs State Of Gujarat on 4 March, 2014

1. The applicant who stands charged for the offence under section 307 of the Indian Penal Code ("the Code" for short) and 25(1)(B)(C) of the Arms Act has filed this application for bail under section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The learned Sessions Judge has rejected the application by observing that during the investigation, police found that the applicant has illicit relationship with the wife of the injured and to eliminate her husband (injured), the applicant hired contract killer (commonly known as giving of Sopari for killing somebody).

2. I have heard the learned advocates for the parties.

3. Learned advocate Shri Bhargav Bhatt appearing with learned advocate Shri Rajesh Deval for the applicant submitted that there is absolutely no evidence against the applicant to connect him with the alleged offence. Mr. Bhatt submitted that the applicant is involved in the offences on the basis of the statements of the co-accused which since not admissible in evidence cannot be relied against the applicant. Mr. Bhatt submitted that to connect the applicant with the alleged crime, the police has relied on the call details of mobile phones recovered from the wife of the injured and from the applicant. Mr. Bhatt submitted that the call details of the day of incident are indicating one way sending of SMS from mobile phone bearing No. 8758239076 allegedly of the applicant whereas no details of sending SMS or making of any call are found from the mobile phone recovered from the wife of the injured. Mr. Bhatt submitted that it is not possible to believe that it was physically possible for applicant to complete the chain of time as suggested in the FIR to reach near the house of the injured. Mr. Bhatt submitted that the mobile Phone No. 8758239076 is also not found registered in the name of the applicant but the same is found registered in the name of one Panalal Rabari. The police did not take any trouble to find out who was said Panalal Rabari but just to shortcut the investigation, it implicated the applicant because said mobile was recovered from the custody of the applicant. Mr. Bhatt submitted that the law does not permit either the Page 2 of 12 R/CR.MA/2548/2014 JUDGMENT police or the Court to use the statement of co-accused for arriving at conclusion of the involvement of the person in the offences. Mr. Bhatt submitted that such statements either recorded independently or in any panchanama, cannot be read in evidence and, therefore, based on any such statements, the applicant cannot be denied the bail especially when the applicant has been in jail for the last more than five months. Mr. Bhatt submitted that the injury allegedly received by the injured was simple. On the same day of incident within short time, he could lodge his complaint. Mr.Bhatt submitted that injury was on non vital part of the body and considering the fact that the co- accused rested at firing only one shot from revolver, it cannot be said that the offence under section 307 of the Code was made out against the applicant. Mr. Bhatt submitted that there is no direct evidence against the applicant for causing such bullet injury to the injured person. Mr. Bhatt submitted that the demonstration panchanama of the scene of offence allegedly shown at the instance of the applicant cannot be used against the applicant in view of section 25 of the Evidence Act. Mr. Bhatt submitted that leaving aside the panchanama drawn by the police and the call details relied on to implicate the applicant, the only thing which remains against the applicant is of alleged illicit relationship of the applicant with the wife of the injured but that by itself is no proof of the involvement of the applicant in the offences alleged in the FIR. Mr. Bhatt thus urged to exercise discretion under section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in favour of the applicant. In support of his submissions, learned advocate Mr. Bhatt has relied on the following decisions:

(1) Jayendra Saraswathi Swamigal Versus State of Tamil Nadu reported in 2005(2) SCC page 13.

(2) Rohit Babuji Thakor versus State of Gujarat reported in 2010(3) GCD 2091:2010 GLHEL HC 223929 (3) Sanjay Chandra versus CBI reported in 2012(1) GLH 93. (4) State of Gujarat versus Dhramraj Bhanushankar Dave reported in 2007 (O) GLHEL-HC 220960.

4. Learned A.P.P. Shri A.N.Shah appearing for the respondent Page 3 of 12 R/CR.MA/2548/2014 JUDGMENT State submitted that the applicant is the main accused who in fact wanted to do away with the life of the injured by hiring contract killer as he had developed illicit relationship with the wife of the injured. Mr. Shah submitted that during the investigation, the police found from the call details that the applicant has been in touch with the wife of the injured. Mr. Shah submitted that the police on interrogation of the applicant could know that the applicant decided to eliminate the injured and for that purpose, he hired the co-accused. Mr. Shah submitted that the wife of the injured named Janki in her statement dated 15.10.2013 confirmed her illicit relationship with the applicant and also stated that on the day of incident, she was with the applicant and after she came back to her house, incident took place. Learned A.P.P. Mr. Shah submitted that the panchanamas drawn by the police of the scene of offence, of recovery of the revolver and contract money given by the applicant, when proved either with the evidence of the panchas or with the evidence of the police officers, contents thereof could be read in evidence as per section 27 of the Evidence Act. Mr. Shah submitted that the co-accused who took money and executed the work of firing at the injured person are from far away place and they worked just for money without there being any motive to kill the injured. Mr. Shah submitted that in view of the recovery of contract money from the accused, it is very much clear that the applicant had clear intention to get rid of the injured person with the help of the co-accused. Mr. Shah submitted that the applicant is in fact the main accused at whose instance the bullet was fired at the injured by the co-accused. Mr. Shah submitted that simply because the injured person could survive is no ground to contend that the injury was minor in nature and would not attract the provisions of section 307 of the Code. He, thus, urged to reject the application.

5. Having heard the learned advocates for the parties and having perused the charge sheet papers including the panchanamas, the typed copies of which are placed with the application, it appears that Page 4 of 12 R/CR.MA/2548/2014 JUDGMENT from the call details from mobile phone of the wife of the injured, the police could reach to the applicant and found that the applicant has been in illicit relationship with her for long time as a result of which the applicant appears to have nurtured an idea to eliminate the injured. Mr. Bhatt however submitted that on the day of incident, only one way call details were found and therefore such call details could not be relied to involve the applicant. However, it is not the case where only call details are relied. Over and above the call details, wife of the injured in her statement clearly stated that she has been in love with the applicant and in constant touch with the applicant on mobile phones. She has also stated that she had entered into physical relationship with the applicant. She has further stated that on the day of incident, when she was taken by the applicant to the place where the construction of her new house was going on, and thereafter, when she received phone call from her husband, the applicant dropped her at her residence and shortly thereafter, her husband entered the house with injury and was found bleeding. She has further stated in the statement that she had informed the applicant about the incident and asked him not to call her by sending SMS to him.

6. During the investigation, the police drew different panchanamas. Panchanama dated 1.10.2013 is for recovery of two mobile phones from applicant out of which, one was bearing No. 8758239076 used by the applicant to keep contact with the wife of the injured. This panchanama records that in the presence of the panchas, the applicant stated about his relationship with the wife of the injured and also stated about the reason why he decided to kill the injured. There is another panchanama drawn by the police on 5.10.2013 which records that in presence of the panchas, the applicant stated that he had taken the co-accused Vijay Devabhai Parmar to show him the place of incident for the purpose of completing the act of killing the injured and he further stated that when the co-accused Vijay Devabhai Parmar fired at the injured, he Page 5 of 12 R/CR.MA/2548/2014 JUDGMENT was standing at some distance. The police on that very day drew another panchanama which records that the co-accused Vijay who fired shot voluntarily stated in presence of the panchas that he had gone with the applicant on his Activa vehicle to the place of incident and he then led the police to the place of incident and further stated that while standing at 4 ft. away from the gate of the first bungalow, he had fired at the injured and at that time the applicant was present and standing at some distance. By discovery panchanama dated 3.10.2013, the police recovered pistol used for the purpose of commission of offence and then by panchanama dated 3.10.2013, the police recovered the amount of Rs.50,000.00 from the custody of the co-accused Vijay Devabhai Parmar from his residence at Raghuvirpara, Manavadar, District Junagadh.

7. In another panchanama dated 3.10.2013 drawn for recovery of big amount from co-accused Lilabhai alias Laljibhai resident of Raghuvirpara, Manavadar, Junagadh, it is recorded that co-accused Lilabhai alias Laljibhai stated in presence of the panchas that the amount of Rs.29,50,000.00 and other amounts recovered from him was part of the contract amount (sopari) given to him by the applicant for the purpose of killing the injured. From the said accused Laljibhai, total amount of Rs.41,00,000.00 (Rupees forty one lac) was recovered.

8. There are two other panchanamas drawn for recovery of contract money from other co-accused.

9. From the above panchanamas, it prima facie appears that it was the applicant who wanted to get the injured killed with the help of co-accused.

10. The contents of the panchanamas clearly reveal prima facie involvement of the applicant in the offences alleged. Such contents of the panchanamas when proved with the help of the police and/or panch witnesses could be read in evidence and relied against the applicant as per section 27 of the Evidence Act.

11. Therefore, even if the statement of the applicant recorded by Page 6 of 12 R/CR.MA/2548/2014 JUDGMENT the police in connection with the alleged offence and the statement of the co-accused recorded by the police are not to be considered, then also, it can be said that there is enough material collected by the police connecting the applicant with the offences alleged. Mr. Bhatt however submitted that panchanama is no evidence and contents of panchanama cannot be relied against the applicant.

12. In the case of Sunil Clifford Daniel versus State of Punjab reported in (2012) 11 SCC 205, Hon'ble the Supreme Court has observed in para 47 and 48 as under:

"47. When the appellant herein made a disclosure statement, a panchnama was prepared and recovery panchnamas were also made. The evidence on record revealed that the same were duly signed by two police officials, and one independent panch witness, namely, Randhir Singh Jat, who was admittedly, not examined. Therefore, a question arose regarding the effect of non-examination of the said panch witness, and also the sanctity of the evidence, in respect of recovery made only by two police officials.

48. The issue was considered at length by this Court in State, Govt. of NCT of Delhi v. Sunil , wherein this Court held as under:

"20.....But if no witness was present or if no person had agreed to affix his signature on the document, it is difficult to lay down, as a proposition of law, that the document so prepared by the police officer must be treated as tainted and the recovery evidence unreliable. The court has to consider the evidence of the investigating officer who deposed to the fact of recovery based on the statement elicited from the accused on its own worth.

21. We feel that it is an archaic notion that actions of the police officer should be approached with initial distrust.........At any rate, the court cannot start with the presumption that the police records are untrustworthy. As a proposition of law the presumption should be the other way around. That official acts of the police have been regularly performed is a wise principle of presumption and recognised even by the legislature. Hence when a police officer gives evidence in court that a certain article Page 7 of 12 R/CR.MA/2548/2014 JUDGMENT was recovered by him on the strength of the statement made by the accused it is open to the court to believe the version to be correct if it is not otherwise shown to be unreliable. It is for the accused, through cross-examination of witnesses or through any other materials, to show that the evidence of the police officer is either unreliable or at least unsafe to be acted upon in a particular case. If the court has any good reason to suspect the truthfulness of such records of the police the court could certainly take into account the fact that no other independent person was present at the time of recovery. But it is not a legally approvable procedure to presume the police action as unreliable to start with, nor to jettison such action merely for the reason that police did not collect signatures of independent persons in the documents made contemporaneous with such actions." "

13. In the case of Pandurang Kalu Patil and another versus State of Maharashtra reported in (2002) 2 SCC 490, Hon'ble the Supreme Court has observed in para 5 as under:

5. Even the recent decision in State of Maharashtra v. Damn, this Court followed Pulikuri Kottaya with approval. The fallacy committed by the Division Bench as per the impugned judgment is possibly on account of truncating the word "fact" in Section 27 of the Evidence Act from the adjoining word "discovered". The essence of Section 27 is that it was enacted as a proviso to the two preceding Sections (see Sec. 25 and 26) which imposed a complete ban on the admissibility of any confession made by an accused either to the police or to any one while the accused is in police custody. The object of making a provision in Section 27 was to permit a certain portion of the statement made by an accused to a police officer admissible in evidence whether or not such statement is confessional or non-confessional. Nonetheless he ban against admissibility would stand lifted if the statement distinctly related to a discovery of fact. A fact can be discovered by the police (investigating) officer) pursuant to an information elicited from the accused if such disclosure was followed by one or more of a variety of causes. Recovery of an object is only one such cause.

Recovery, or even production of object by itself need not necessarily result in discovery of a fact. That is why way Sir John Beaumont said in Pulikuri Kottaya that "it is fallacious to treat the fact discovered in the section as equivalent to the object produced". The following sentence of the learned law lord in the said decision, though terse, is eloquent in conveying the message Page 8 of 12 R/CR.MA/2548/2014 JUDGMENT highlighting the pith of the ratio.(AIR p. 70, para 10) "Information supplied by the person in custody that 'I will produce a knife concealed in the roof of my house' does not lead to the discovery of a knife; knives were discovered many years ago. It leads to the discovery of the fact that a knife is concealed in the house of the informant to his knowledge and if the knife is proved to have been used in the commission of the offence, the fact discovered is very relevant."

(emphasis supplied)"

14. In the case of State Govt. of NCT of Delhi versus Sunil and Another reported in (2001) 1 SCC 652, Hon'ble the Supreme Court has observed in para 19 to 22 as under:

"19. In this context we may point out that there is no requirement either under Section 27 of the Evidence Act or under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, to obtain signature of independent witnesses on the record in which statement of an accused is written. The legal obligation to call independent and respectable inhabitats of the locality to attend and witness the exercise made by the police is cast on the police officer when searches are made under Chapter VII of the Code. Section 100(5) of the Code requires that such search shall be made in their presence and a list of all things seized in the course of such search and of the places in which they are respectively found, shall be prepared by such officer or other person "and signed by such witnesses". It must be remembered that search is made to find out a thing or document which the searching officer has no prior idea where the thing or document is kept. He prowls for it either on reasonable suspicion or on some guess work that it could possibly be ferreted out in such prowling. It is a stark reality that during searches the team which conducts search would have to meddle with lots of other articles and documents also and in such process many such articles or documents are likely to be displaced or even strewn helter-skelter. The legislative idea in insisting on such searches to be made in the presence of two independent inhabitants of the locality is to ensure the safety of all such articles meddled with and to protect the rights of the persons entitled thereto. But recovery of an object pursuant to the information Page 9 of 12 R/CR.MA/2548/2014 JUDGMENT supplied by an accused in custody is different from the searching endeavour envisaged in Chapter VII of the Code. This Court has indicated the difference between the two processes in the Transport Commissioner, Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabad v. S. Sardar Ali, AIR 1983 SC 1225 : (1983 Cri LJ 1506). Following observations of Chinnappa Reddy, J. can be used to support the said legal proposition (para 7 of AIR, Cri LJ) :

"Section 100 of the Criminal Procedure Code to which reference was made by the counsel deals with searches and not seizures. In the very nature of things when property is seized and not recovered during a search, it is not possible to comply with the provisions of sub-section (4) and (5) of Section 100 of the Criminal Procedure Code. In the case of a seizure [under the Motor Vehicles Act], there is no provision for preparing a list of the things seized in the course of the seizure for the obvious reason that all those things are seized not separately but as part of the vehicle itself."

20. Hence it is a fallacious impression that when recovery is effected pursuant to any statement made by the accused the document prepared by the Investigating Officer contemporaneous with such recovery must necessarily be attested by independent witnesses. Of course, if any such statement leads to recovery of any article it is open to the Investigating Officer to take the signature of any person present at that time, on the document prepared for such recovery. But if no witness was present or if no person had agreed to affix his signature on the document, it is difficult to lay down, as a proposition of law, that the document so prepared by the police officer must be treated as tainted and the recovery evidence unreliable. The Court has to consider the evidence of the Investigating Officer who deposed to the fact of recovery based on the statement elicited from the accused on its own worth.

21. We feel that it is an archaic notion that actions of the police officer should be approached with initial distrust. We are aware Page 10 of 12 R/CR.MA/2548/2014 JUDGMENT that such a notion was lavishly entertained during British period and policemen also knew about it. Its hang over persisted during post- independent years but it is time now to start placing at least initial trust on the actions and the documents made by the police. At any rate, the Court cannot start with the presumption that the police records are untrustworthy. As a proposition of law the presumption should be the other way around.

That official acts of the police have been regularly performed is a wise principle of presumption and recognised even by the legislature. Hence when a police officer gives evidence in Court that a certain article was recovered by him on the strength of the statement made by the accused it is open to the Court to believe the version to be correct if it is not otherwise shown to be unreliable. It is for the accused, through cross-

examination of witnesses or through any other materials, to show that the evidence of the police officer is either unreliable or at least unsafe to be acted upon in a particular case. If the Court has any good reason to suspect the truthfulness of such records of the police the Court could certainly take into account the fact that no other independent person was present at the time of recovery.

But it is not a legally approvable procedure to presume the police action as unreliable to start with, nor to jettison such action merely for the reason that police did not collect signatures of independent persons in the documents made contemporaneous with such actions.

22. In this case, the mere absence of independent witness when PW17 recorded the statement of A2 - Ramesh and the nicker was recovered pursuant to the said statement, is not a sufficient ground to discard the evidence under Section 27 of the Evidence Act."

15. In light of the above principles of law laid down by Hon'ble the Supreme Court in the context of the provisions of section 27 of the Evidence Act, when the statement of the accused can become evidence against any accused, it cannot be said that the contents of Page 11 of 12 R/CR.MA/2548/2014 JUDGMENT the panchanama implicating the applicant cannot be considered to have at least prima facie view as regards his involvement in the offences.

16. What prima facie appears is that the co-accused from whom pistol and contract money were recovered by the police executed the work at the instance of the petitioner just for money. These co- accused are from the district of Junagadh which is at the distance of around 250 kms from Ahmedabad. No motive on their part appears for the offences. The applicant who was alleged to have illicit relationship with the wife of the inured then remains the only person who could have motive to eliminate the injured.

17. Learned Advocate Mr. Bhatt however relied on the different judgments to point out that the statements of the co-accused cannot be considered, that the theory of conspiracy against the applicant cannot be based on the statement of co-accused, that the demonstration panchanama cannot be relied as hit by Section 25 of the Evidence Act, that considering the nature of injuries, offence under section 307 of the Code cannot be said to have been made out. I have gone through the above said judgments cited by the learned advocate Mr. Bhatt. However, in the facts of the case, at the stage of considering the application for bail, I find that the said judgments cited by the learned advocate Mr. Bhatt will be of no help to applicant. I have discussed above that the police could collect sufficient material which prima facie suggest involvement of the applicant in the alleged offence. I, therefore, do not deem it fit to exercise my discretion under section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in favour of the applicant. The application is, therefore, rejected. Rule is discharged.

Sd/-

(C.L.SONI, J.) anvyas Page 12 of 12

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