Telangana High Court
Andem Sudhakar Reddy And Another vs The State Of Telangana And 4 Others on 2 April, 2025
* HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE C.V. BHASKAR REDDY
+ WRIT PETITION No.26921 of 2019
% Date: 02.04.2025
Between:
# Andem Sudhakar Reddy and another. ... Petitioners
AND
$ The State of Telangana
Rep. by its Principal Secretary,
Revenue Department, Secretariat Building, Hyderabad
and others.
... Respondents
! Counsel for the Petitioners : Sri P. Sasidhar Reddy.
^ Counsel for Respondent Nos.1 to 3 : Government Pleader for Revenue
^ Counsel for the Respondent No.4 : Sri J. Suresh Babu
^ Counsel for the Respondent No.5 : ---
> HEAD NOTE:
? Cases referred
1. (2005) 10 SCC 746
2. (1995) SUPP 1 SCR
3. (2024) 4 SCR 506
2
THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE C.V.BHASKAR REDDY
WRIT PETITION No.26921 of 2019
ORDER:
This Writ Petition is filed by the petitioner seeking following relief:
"....to issue writ or order more particularly one in the nature of writ of MANDAMUS to declare the order No.B/963/2014 dt: 07.03.2015 of the respondent No.3 and the orders passed in appeal case No.D/1580/2015 dt: 04.11.2019 of the respondent No.2 are illegal and contrary to the provisions of the ROR Act, 1971 and Rules, 1989 apart from violation of article 14 & 300-A of constitution of India and set aside the same and consequently direct the respondent No.3 to issue new pattedar pass books with regard to subject land held by the petitioners..."
2. It is stated that the petitioners are the absolute owners and possessors of agricultural lands admeasuring Ac.2-00 gts in Sy.No.138 and Ac.4-00 gts in Sy.No.132 situated at Dacharam Village, Mothkur Mandal, Yadadri Bhongir District, having purchased the same under registered sale deed bearing document No.413/2004 dated 05.05.2004 from the respondent No.5. It is further stated that names of the petitioners were mutated in the revenue records and they were issued pattadar passbooks vide patta Nos.675 and 828 as per the provisions of the Telangana Rights in Land and Pattadar Passbooks Act, 1971 (for short "ROR Act, 1971"). It is further stated that the petitioner No.1 has executed a gift 3 settlement deed vide document No.1653/2009 dated 31.01.2009 in favour of his son i.e, petitioner No.2 in respect of land admeasuring Ac.4-00 gts in Sy.No.132. It is the case of the petitioners that when the respondent No.5 and others tried to interfere with their property, they instituted a suit vide O.S.No.86/2014 on the file of Junior Civil Judge, Ramannapet and the same was decreed vide judgment and decreed dated 11.12.2014. While the things stood thus, it is stated that the respondent No.3 has issued mutation proceedings No.B/963/2014 dated 07.03.2015 in respect of lands admeasuring Ac.0-16 gts in Sy.No.138 and Ac.0-12 gts in Sy.No.132 in favour of respondent No.4 without following the procedure prescribed under ROR Act, 1971 and Rules made thereunder. It is stated that aggrieved by the said mutation proceedings, the petitioners filed statutory appeal on the file of the respondent No.2 under Section 5(5) of the ROR Act, 1971 and when the said appeal was not disposed of within reasonable time, the petitioners were constrained to file W.P.No.9618 of 2019 on the file of this Court and the same was disposed of vide order dated 01.05.2019 directing the respondent No.2 to decide the appeal, as expeditiously as possible, preferably within a period of three (3) months from the date of receipt of a copy of the order. In pursuance of the same, the respondent No.2 allowed the appeal partly vide impugned order dated 04.11.2019 in Case No.D/1580/2015 and directed the respondent No.3-Tahsildar to 4 refer the Court decrees for mutation under Section 58B of Telangana Land Revenue Act, 1317 Fasli and after collection of necessary stamp duty, and validating the said decrees under Section 42 of the Registration Act, take further steps in accordance with law. It is the case of the petitioners that the respondent Nos.2 and 3 instead of deciding their case in terms of the provisions of the ROR Act, 1971 have erroneously taken into consideration the orders dated 07.04.1995 passed in I.A.No.275/1991 in O.S.No.367/1989 by the learned Junior Civil Judge, at Ramannapet, wherein the final decree proceedings were issued in a partition suit instituted by the respondent No.4 against the respondent No.5. It is stated that the respondents are not entitled for implementation of the said final decree proceedings after lapse of about 18 years and the respondent No.2 is not having any power under Section 58B of the Telangana Land Revenue Act, 1317 Fasli to validate the said decree. It is further stated that the decrees which are barred by limitation are not enforceable in law and prayed for allowing the writ petition by setting aside the impugned proceedings.
3. Even though the respondent No.4 filed her appearance, she did not chose to file any counter affidavit disputing the contents of the writ affidavit.
4. There is no representation on behalf of respondent No.5. 5
5. Heard the submissions of Sri P.Sasidhar Reddy, learned counsel for the petitioners, learned Government Pleader for Revenue appearing for the respondent Nos.1 to 3, Sri J. Suresh Babu, learned counsel for the respondent No.4 and perused the record.
6. The learned counsel for the petitioners has submitted that the petitioners are the absolute owners and possessors of agricultural lands admeasuring Ac.2-00 gts in Sy.No.138 and Ac.4-00 gts in Sy.No.132 situated at Dacharam Village, Mothkur Mandal, Yadadri Bhongir District, having purchased the same under registered sale deed bearing document No.413/2004 dated 05.05.2004 from the respondent No.5 and their names were mutated in the revenue records. It is further submitted that without following the procedure prescribed under ROR Act, 1971 and Rules made thereunder, the respondent No.3-Tahsildar issued proceedings vide No.B/963/2014 dated 07.03.2015 mutating the name of respondent No.4 in the revenue records in respect of part of the lands purchased by the petitioners. Aggrieved by the same, an appeal under Section 5(5) of the ROR Act, 1971 was preferred by the petitioners on the file of the respondent No.2 and the respondent No.2 in Case No.D/1580/2015 vide impugned order dated 04.11.2019. It is vehemently contended by the learned counsel that as per Section 4(1) of the ROR Act, 1971, any person acquiring the right by succession, survivorship, 6 inheritance, Government patta, decree of a Court or otherwise any right as owner, pattadar, mortgagee, occupant or tenant of a land and any person acquiring any right as occupant of a land by any other method shall intimate in writing his acquisition of such right, to the Mandal Revenue Officer (MRO) within ninety days from the date of such acquisition, whereas the respondent No.4 herein having acquired alleged final decree proceedings in I.A.No.275/1991 in O.S.No.367/1989 by the learned Junior Civil Judge, at Ramannapet on 07.04.1995, did not submit the application within the time stipulated under Section 4(1) of the ROR Act. Therefore, the alleged final decree proceedings cannot be implemented for mutation. An alternative submission is made by the learned counsel that even if the respondent No.4 is entitled for mutation, the final decree proceedings vide orders dated 07.04.1995 passed in I.A.No.275/1991 in O.S.No.367/1989 by the learned Junior Civil Judge, at Ramannapet are not enforceable as the same are barred by limitation and the provisions of Section 58B of the Land Revenue Act, 1317 Fasli are not applicable to the facts and circumstances of the case on hand. Thus the learned counsel prayed to allow the writ petition by setting aside the impugned orders on the ground that the final decree proceedings are not implementable beyond the period of limitation prescribed under Article 136 or 137 of Limitation Act, 1963.
7
7. On the other hand, the learned counsel appearing for the respondent No.4 has submitted that an application submitted to the Court to send decree and papers to Collector to carry out partition is not an application for execution and as per Section 54 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC), the Collector is competent to examine the final decree proceedings for implementation of the same by putting the parties in possession of their respective portion allotted to them. Since the actual possession has not been allotted to the parties, the limitation prescribed in either under Article 136 or 137 of the Limitation Act, does not apply to the case on hand and prayed for dismissal of the writ petition.
8. A careful examination of the records would reveal that the petitioners claims to have purchased agricultural lands admeasuring Ac.2-00 gts in Sy.No.138 and Ac.4-00 gts in Sy.No.132 situated at Dacharam Village, Mothkur Mandal, Yadadri Bhongir District, under registered sale deed bearing document No.413/2004 dated 05.05.2004 from the respondent No.5 and their names were mutated in the revenue records and issued pattadar passbooks vide patta Nos.675 and 828 under the provisions of the ROR Act, 1971 and the Rules made thereunder. While the matter stood thus, basing on the final decree proceedings vide orders dated 07.04.1995 passed in I.A.No.275/1991 in O.S.No.367/1989 by the learned Junior Civil 8 Judge, at Ramannapet, the respondent No.4 obtained mutation proceedings from the respondent No.3 vide proceedings No.B/963/2014 dated 07.03.2015. Questioning that the said proceedings is contrary to Sections 4(1) and 5(3) of the Act, the petitioners have filed statutory appeal under Section 5(5) of the Act, on the file of the respondent No.2 vide case No.D/1580/2015. The respondent No.2 vide impugned order dated 04.11.2019 taking into consideration the final decree proceedings dated 07.04.1995 passed in I.A.No.275/1991 in O.S.No.367/1989 by the learned Junior Civil Judge, Ramannapet, permitted the respondent No.4 to validate the final decree proceedings under Section 58B of the Telangana Land Revenue Act, 1317 Fasli.
9. As seen from the material placed on record, the respondent No.4 instituted a partition suit vide O.S.No.367/1989 on the file of learned Junior Civil Judge, Ramannapet, against the respondent No.5 and others in respect of lands admeasuring Ac.0-31 gts in Sy.No.131/A, Ac.0-36 gts in Sy.No.132, Ac.0-16 gts in Sy.No.138/A, Ac.0-08 gts in Sy.No.148/2, Ac.0-06 gts in Sy.No.52/2 situated at Dacharam Village, Mothkur Mandal, Nalgonda District. A preliminary decree was granted on 30.04.1991 and thereafter final decree was passed vide orders dated 07.04.1995 passed in I.A.No.275/1991 in O.S.No.367/1989 by the learned Junior Civil Judge, at Ramannapet. 9 The parties to the said proceedings have not taken any steps for implementation of the said decree by making an application under Section 4 of the ROR Act, 1971. It is relevant to refer Section 4 of the ROR Act, 1971 which reads as follows:
"Section 4 - Acquisition of rights to be intimated:
(1) Any person acquiring by succession, survivorship, inheritance, partition, Government patta, decree of a court or otherwise any right as, owner, pattadar of a land and any person acquiring any right as occupant of a land by any other method shall intimate in writing his acquisition of such right, to the Tahsildar within thirty days from the date of such acquisition. The Village Revenue Officer on noting the acquisition of rights in his jurisdiction shall intimate the Tahsildar within one(1) day as prescribed. The Tahsildar shall give or send a written acknowledgement of the receipt of such intimation to the person making it:
Provided that where the person acquiring the right is a minor or otherwise disqualified, his guardian or other persons having charge of his property shall intimate the fact of such acquisition to the Tahsildar.] (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Registration Act, 1908 (Central Act 16 of 1908), every registering officer appointed under the Act and registering a document relating to a transaction in land, such as sale, mortgage, gift, lease or otherwise shall intimate the Mandal Revenue Officer of the Mandal manually or electronically in which the property is situate of such transaction.
Explanation-I: The right mentioned above shall include a mortgage without possession and a right determined by civil court. Explanation-II: A person in whose favour a mortgage is discharged or extinguished, or a lease is determined, acquires a right within the meaning of this section."
10
10. The respondent Nos.2 and 3 passed impugned orders basing on the final decree proceedings passed vide orders dated 07.04.1995 in I.A.No.275/1991 in O.S.No.367/1989 by the learned Junior Civil Judge, at Ramannapet. The respondent No.4 has made an application seeking mutation of her name in the revenue records on 23.12.2013 and 14.11.2014. It is apt to refer Articles 136 and 137 of Limitation Act, 1963, which reads as under:
Period of Article Description of suit Time from which period beings to limitation run 136 For the execution of Twelve When the decree or order becomes any decree (other years. enforceable or where the decree or than a decree any subsequent order directs any granting a payment of money or the delivery of mandatory any property to be made at a certain injunction) or order date or at recurring periods, when of any civil court. default in making the payment or delivery in respect of which execution is sought, takes place:
Provided that an application for the enforcement or execution of a decree granting a perpetual injunction shall not be subject to any period of limitation.
137 Any other Three When the right to apply accrues.
application for which years.
no period of
limitation is provided
elsewhere in this
Division.
11. There is no doubt that Article 136 of Limitation Act equally applies to the partition suits. The partition decree is enforceable from the date of passing of the decree but not from the date of engrossing the same on the stamp paper. Even if there is direction by the Court 11 for furnishing of stamp papers on a particular date for the purpose of engrossing of the decree, the period of limitation begins to run from the date when the decree is passed but not from the date when the decree is engrossed on the stamp papers supplied by the parties.
Since in the instant case, the final decree has been passed on 07.04.1995, the applications dated 23.12.2013 and 14.11.2014 submitted by the respondent No.4 for mutation are hopelessly barred by limitation. Further, as per Section 4 of ROR Act, 1971, the parties who acquire rights from the Court decrees, mandates that mutation application shall be filed within 90 days from the date of acquisition of such rights. It is settled law that even in the absence of any time limit being prescribed under the statute, the time prescribed under Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963 would apply to all the cases.
12. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Chiranji Lal (Dr.) v. Hari Das 1, observed as follows:
"25. The engrossment of the final decree in a suit for partition would relate back to the date of the decree. The beginning of the period of limitation for executing such a decree cannot be made to depend upon date of the engrossment of such a decree on the stamp paper. The date of furnishing of stamp paper is an uncertain act, within the domain, purview and control of a party. No date or period is fixed for furnishing stamp papers. No rule has been shown to us requiring the Court to call upon or give any time for furnishing of stamp paper. A party by his own 1 (2005) 10 SCC 746 12 act of not furnishing stamp paper cannot stop the running of period of limitation. None can take advantage of his own wrong. The proposition that period of limitation would remain suspended till stamp paper is furnished and decree engrossed thereupon and only thereafter the period of twelve years will begin to run would lead to absurdity. In Yeswant Deorao Deshmukh v. Walchand Ramchand Kothari [1950 SCC 766 : 1950 SCR 852 : AIR 1951 SC 16] it was said that the payment of court fee on the amount found due was entirely in the power of the decree-holder and there was nothing to prevent him from paying it then and there; it was a decree capable of execution from the very date it was passed.
26. Rules of limitation are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics, but seek their remedy promptly. As above-noted, there is no statutory provision prescribing a time-limit for furnishing of the stamp paper for engrossing the decree or time-limit for engrossment of the decree on stamp paper and there is no statutory obligation on the court passing the decree to direct the parties to furnish the stamp paper for engrossing the decree. In the present case the Court has not passed an order directing the parties to furnish the stamp papers for the purpose of engrossing the decree. Merely because there is no direction by the Court to furnish the stamp papers for engrossing of the decree or there is no time-limit fixed by law, does not mean that the party can furnish stamp papers at its sweet will and claim that the period of limitation provided under Article 136 of the Act would start only thereafter as and when the decree is engrossed thereupon. The starting of period of limitation for execution of a partition decree cannot be made contingent upon the engrossment of the decree on the stamp paper. The engrossment of the decree on stamp paper would relate back to the date of the decree, namely, 7-8-1981, in the present case. In this view the execution application filed on 21-3-1994 was time-barred having been filed beyond the period of twelve years prescribed under Article 136 of the Act. The High Court committed illegality in coming to the conclusion that it was not barred by limitation.
13
13. Culmination of the facts of the case on hand would lead to conclusion that for implementation of the decrees/enforceability of the same, the limitation would start from the date of passing of the decree. The decree holders submitting the stamp paper for engrossing the decree would not extend/suspend the limitation. Seeking implementation of the final decree, an application for execution necessarily has to be filed within a period of 12 years from the date of the decree and the said decrees which have become non- est in law after the period of limitation are not enforceable under any of the statute. In this context, it is also necessary to examine that non-implementation of the decree in time, or implementation of the decree beyond the period of limitation would have an impact on the settled position over the rights of the third parties. Further, the law is well settled that Courts never tolerate an indolent litigant since delay defeats equity - the Latin maxim vigilantibus et non dormientibus jura subveniunt (the law assists those who are vigilant and not those who are indolent).
14. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, while dealing with the issue relating to undue delay and laches, in the case of State of Maharashtra vs. Digambar 2, observed as under:
"A three-Judge Bench of this Court in Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation v. Shri Balwant Regular Motor Service, Amravati & Ors.2
(1995) SUPP 1 SCR 14 [1969 (1) SCR 808], reiterated the said principle of laches or undue delay as that which applied in exercise of power by the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution.
Therefore, where a High Court in exercise of its power vested under Article 226 of the Constitution issues a direction, order or writ for granting relief to a person including a citizen without considering his disentitlement for such relief due to his blame- worthy conduct of undue delay or laches in claiming the same, such a direction, order or writ becomes unsustainable as that not made judiciously and reasonably in exercise of its sound judicial discretion, but as that made arbitrarily. XXX Thus, when the writ petitioner (respondent here) was guilty of laches or undue delay in approaching the High Court, the principle of laches or undue delay adverted to above, disentitled the writ petitioner (respondent here) for discretionary relief under Article 226 of the Constitution from the High Court, particularly, when virtually no attempt had been made by the writ petitioner to explain his blame- worthy conduct of undue delay or laches. The High Court, therefore, was wholly wrong in granting relief in relation to inquiring into the allegation and granting compensation for his land alleged to have been used for scarcity relief road works in the year 1971-72......."
15. In Mrinomy Maity vs. Chhanda Koley and others3, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed as under:
"This Court time and again has held that delay defeats equity. Delay or laches is one of the factors which should be born in mind by the High Court while exercising discretionary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a given case, the High Court may refuse to invoke its extraordinary powers if laxity on the part of the applicant to assert his right has allowed the cause of action to drift away and attempts are made subsequently to rekindle the lapsed cause of action"3
(2024) 4 SCR 506 15
16. In the instant case, the respondent No.4 relying on the final decree proceedings dated 07.04.1995 passed in I.A.No.275/1991 in O.S.No.367/1989 by the Junior Civil Judge, at Ramannapet, filed mutation applications on 23.12.2013 and 14.11.2014. Except stating that she has obtained the final decree, no reasons whatsoever are forthcoming from the respondent No.4 for making an application for mutation nearly after a period of more than 18 years after passing of the final decree. As per Section 4(1) of the ROR Act, 1971, the person acquiring rights by a decree of the Court or otherwise any right as an owner, has to make an application to the MRO within 90 days from the date of such acquisition of right. It is not the case of the respondent No.4 that application was made within three years to extend the benefit of limitation prescribed under Article 137 of Limitation Act, 1963. The present case squarely falls within the limitation prescribed under Article 136 of the Limitation Act. Viewing the case from any angle, the respondent No.4 is not entitled for mutation of her name in the revenue records vide impugned orders basing on the time barred final decree dated 07.04.1995 passed in I.A.No.275/1991 in O.S.No.367/1989. The respondent No.2 miserably failed to examine the facts properly and erroneously stated that Section 58B of the Telangana Land Revenue Act, 1317 Fasli would apply to the facts of the case. In fact, Section 58B applies to 16 the occupancy rights which are declared non-transferrable without sanction of the District Collector.
17. For the aforesaid reasons, this Writ Petition is allowed and the impugned proceedings No.B/963/2014 dated 07.03.2015 issued by the respondent No.3 and the orders passed in appeal Case No.D/1580/2015 dated 04.11.2019 by the respondent No.2 are set aside. The respondent Nos.1 to 3 are directed to delete the name of respondent No.4 in the revenue records and issue pattadar passbooks to the petitioners, in accordance with law in force.
As a sequel, miscellaneous applications if any pending shall stand closed. No costs.
} __________________________ C.V. BHASKAR REDDY, J Date: 02.04.2025 Note: L.R Copy to be marked: YES/NO (b/o) scs