Andhra HC (Pre-Telangana)
Konijeti Varalakshmamma And Ors. vs Menta Masthan Rao And Anr. on 11 February, 1994
Equivalent citations: 1994(1)ALT320
ORDER Motilal B. Naik, J.
1. In these Civil Revision Petitions common question of Law is agitated and, therefore, they are disposed of by a common order. For the sake of convenience the petitioners are referred to as 'tenants' and the respondents as 'landlords'. The issues raised in these petitions are:
(1) Whether the rent control proceedings are maintainable or not before the Rent Controller; and (2) Whether there is any default committed by the tenants in payment of rents, as alleged by the landlords.
In order to examine the pros and cons of the above issues, it is necessary to trace out few facts of the case as follows:-
The residential building, subject-matter of the rent control proceedings, originally belonged to one Potti Venkateswara Rao. The said Venkateswara Rao was declared as insolvent by the Sub-Court, Vijayawada, in I.P. No. 9 of 1967. The said property was sold to the landlords in a public auction held on 15-3-1978. On 16-3-1978 the Official Receiver who conducted the auction executed the sale-deeds in favour of the landlords and got it registered on 17-3-1978. The landlords pursuant to the said purchase issued notices to the tenants on 27-4-1978 asking to pay the rents to them. The Official Receiver also issued notices under Ex. A-4 dated 23-5-1978 to that effect. During the pendency of I.P. No. 9 of 1967 the tenants were admittedly paying the rents to the Official Receiver.
2. The landlords filed RCC Nos. 11 to 14 of 1979 seeking eviction of the tenants on the ground of wilful default committed by the tenants in payment of rents from 15-3-1978 to 31-12-1978. The tenant-respondent in RCC No. 14 of 1979 contested the matter on the ground that the sons of the insolvent had issued notice requiring him to pay the rents insofar as the tenament in his custody. Therefore, there was reasonable apprehension in his mind as to who is the landlord entitled to receive the rents. Hence, he filed an application under Section 9(3) of the Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960 (for short 'the Act') in RCC No. 123 of 1978, seeking permission to deposit the rents in the Court. Likewise, the tenants-respondents in RCC Nos. 13 and 12 of 1979 also filed similar applications - RCC Nos. 124 of 1978 and 140 of 1978 - under Section 9(3) of the Act. Insofar as the tenant-respondent in RCC No. 11 of 1979 is concerned, the only ground which he urged in the counter-affidavit is that he paid the rents to the sons of the insolvent and, therefore, there was no wilful default on his part. Both the Courts below - the trial Court as well as the Appellate Court - dealing with various contentions raised by the parties, held that there was wilful default on the part of the tenants-respondents in payment of rents and, therefore, directed eviction. Aggrieved by the verdicts of the Courts below the tenants filed the present civil revision petitions.
3. The first and foremost submission made by the learned Counsel for the tenants is on the question of maintainability of the rent control proceedings by the landlords before the original forum. The learned Counsel for the tenants contend that since there was no relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties the rent control proceedings are not maintainable and the Courts below have erroneously directed eviction as if there exists landlord and tenant relationship between the parties. The second submission made by the learned Counsel for the tenants is that there was no wilful default on the part of the tenants in payment of rents to the alleged landlords since the tenants had taken recourse by filing applications under Section 9(3) of the Act, seeking permission to deposit the rents into the Court. It is only after the permission was granted by the Rent Controller, rents were deposited into the Court below. Therefore, the delay in deposit of rents cannot be treated as wilful default on the part of the tenants. As far as the tenant in C.R.P. No. 216 of 1990 is concerned, the learned Counsel submits that, the rents for the period in question were paid to the sons of the insolvent and, therefore there was no wilful default on his part. I am not in agreement with the submission made by the learned Counsel for the tenant I in C.R.P. No. 216 of 1990, since he failed to strengthen the said submission by adducing any documentary evidence. Accordingly, I reject the submission made by the learned Counsel for the tenant in C.R.P. No. 216 of 1990 and accept the findings of the Courts below in this behalf.
4. Shri T. Veerabhadrayya, learned Counsel for the landlords, contends that the Courts below have gone into the above aspects and rightly rejected the same. Therefore, there is no substance in the arguments put forth by the learned Counsel for the tenants. He further contends that it is not disputed that the tenants were paying rents to the Official Receiver during the pendency of I.P. No. 9 of 1967; and that it is also not disputed that the Official Receiver issued notices to the tenants asking them to pay the rents to the auction purchasers-landlords. He also contends that the landlords have also issued notices to the tenants on 27-4-1978 demanding payment of rents and, therefore, there is no justification in the contention of the learned Counsel for the tenants that they moved the Rent Controller by way of filing applications under Section 9(3) of the Act, seeking permission to deposit the rents in the Court. Even otherwise, he contends, that when an application filed under Section 9(3) of the Act is pending, it is obligatory on the part of the tenants to deposit the rents as and when they become due, by obtaining necessary challan from the Court, and deposit the same in the appropriate forum every month. He further contends that when the tenants were served with notices by the landlords as well as by the Official Receiver, the delay in depositing the rents into the Court is not at all warranted simply for the reason that the applications filed under Section 9(3) of the Act are pending decision before the Rent Controller.
5. In order to appreciate these contentions, it is necessary to extract Section 2(vi) of the Act, which defines the word 'landlord' as follows:-
"Section 2(vi):- "landlord" means the owner of a building and includes a person who is receiving or is entitled to receive the rent of a building, whether on his own account or on behalf of another person or on behalf of himself and others or as an agent, trustee, executor administrator, receiver or guardian or who would so receive the rent or be entitled to receive the rent, if the building were let to a tenant."
6. Admittedly, the landlords are the auction-purchasers of the property in question. By virtue of the purchase they have become the owners of the property. Therefore, they fall within the said definition and are entitled to initiate rent control proceedings seeking eviction of the tenants. This proposition is well supported by the decision of this Court in S. Krishna Reddy v. N. Venkata Reddy, 1977 (2) An.W.R. 187 which view was affirmed by the Supreme Court in S. Krishna Reddy v. N. Venkata Reddy, 1978 (1) APLJ 8. Therefore, the purchasers who filed the eviction petitions are undoubtedly the owners of the building in question. Therefore, they are the landlords coming within the meaning of Section 10(2)(i) of the Act. As per the inclusive definition if the landlords are entitled to receive the rents of the building, they have to satisfy the definition of 'landlord'. The present landlords by virtue of their purchase of the building in an auction held by the Official Receiver satisfies the requirement of the definition 'landlord' defined under Section 2(vi) of the Act, not only by reason of their being the owners of the building but also by being the persons who are entitled to receive the rent of the building on their own account by reason of their purchase. Therefore, I am of the view that the landlords are competent to maintain rent control proceedings before the Rent Controller against the tenants, who, according to them, have committed wilful default in payment of rents. In view of the above discussion and the settled Law on this aspect, the contentions raised on behalf of the tenants that the rent control proceedings are not maintainable, cannot be accepted.
7. As regards the second contention whether or not there is wilful default on the part of the tenants in remitting the rents to the landlords, it is necessary to note that the Official Receiver issued notices to the tenants under Ex.A-4 dated 23-5-1978 asking them to pay the rents to the purchasers-landlords. It is to be seen that the landlords also got issued notices to the tenants on 27-4-1978 asking them to pay the rents. Therefore, the tenants had sufficient notice as to whom the rents have to be paid. Moreover, prior to the sale, the tenants were paying the rents to the Official Receiver. Therefore, there is no reason for the tenants to take a different stand in discharging their obligation in payment of rents to the landlords, when the tenants received the notices from the Official Receiver asking them to pay the rents to the landlords.
8. The wilful default alleged is for the period of 9 1/2 months from 15-3-1978 to 31-12-1978. The tenants in RCC Nos. 12 to 14 of 1979 have filed applications under Section 9(3) of the Act seeking permission to deposit the rents into the Court. The plea put forth by the tenants to get over this aspect is that they had received notices from the sons of the insolvent and, therefore, they were in bona fide doubt as to who is the owner of the property and as such there is no wilful default on their part. Even otherwise, it is contended, that the Rent Controller decided the matter on 12-2-1980 and in some cases rents were deposited prior to the passing of the order on 12-2-1980. Therefore, there was no wilful default on their part. Section 9(3) of the Act reads as follows:-
"Section 9(1).........(2)...........(3)Where any bone fide doubt or dispute arises as to the person who is entitled to receive the rent for any building the tenant may deposit such rent before such authority and in such manner as may be prescribed and shall report to the Controller the circumstances under which such deposit was made by him, and may continue to deposit any rent which may subsequently become due in respect of the building before the same authority and in the same manner until the doubt is removed or the dispute is settled by the decision of a competent Court or by a settlement between the parties or until the Controller makes an order under Clause (b) of Sub-section (4), as the case may be."
A reading of the said provision makes it clear that when there is a bona fide doubt, a tenant may deposit such rent before such authority and in such manner as may be prescribed. That is to say, the manner prescribed for depositing the rent is traceable to Rule 5 of the Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Rules, 1961 (for short 'the Rules'), which reads as follows:-
"Rule 5(1):- A tenant desirous of depositing the rent under Sub-section (5)of Section 8, or Section 9 or Section 11 shall deposit, the same, if the building concerned is in the City of Hyderabad, in the State Bank of Hyderabad, and if the building is elsewhere, in the Controller's Office, or in the nearest treasury, whichever is convenient after obtaining permission for the deposit of the rent from the Controller, (2) The chalan accompanying the deposit of the rent shall be in the Andhra Pradesh Treasury Code Form No. 10 in triplicate and shall specify:-
(a) the name and address of the tenant by whom or on whose behalf the rent is deposited;
(b) the name and address of the landlord entitled to receive the rent deposited;
(c) the rent at which and the period for which the rent is deposited;
(d) the description of the building in respect of which the rent is deposited;
(e) the provision of the Act including the circumstances under which the rent is deposited; and
(f) the head of account to which the rent is credited. (3) ............
(4) ............
(5) ............
(6) ............"
Therefore, the manner prescribed herein is to obtain a chalan from the Rent Controller and deposit the rents into the Court till a bona fide doubt is clarified. There is nothing in the Rules or Sections saying that a tenant has to necessarily wait till a final order is passed by the Rent Controller on the applications filed under Section 9(3) of the Act. Rule 5 of the Rules only enables a tenant desirous to deposit the rent to obtain a chalan with the permission of the Court and deposit the rents in the appropriate forum. The argument that since the tenants had bona fide doubt with regard to the ownership of the property, they could not deposit the rents and the delay in such deposit would not amount to wilful default, cannot be accepted in view of the above Rule. In these cases some of the tenants though deposited the rents pending decision on the applications filed under Section 9(3) of the Act, such deposits appear to be made belatedly. For instance, in C.R.P. No. 32 of 1990 the tenant deposited the rents, pertaining to the period from April, 1978 to July, 1979, on 1-8-1979 under Ex.B-1. When the rents pertaining to the months of April, 1978 to July, 1979, which were expected to be deposited on the last date of every following month, that is to say, the rent pertaining to the month of April, 1978 was to be deposited by 31-5-1978, likewise for the rest of the months also, were deposited on 1-8-1979, which is evidently belated payment, the tenants cannot plead that they had not committed any wilful default. In N.K. Marayya v. P.V.G. Raju, 1985 (1) APLJ 377 dealing with Section 8(5) of the Act this Court held that pendency of proceedings under Section 8(5) of the Act does not entitle the tenant to make default in depositing the rent in Court, regularly when the rent becomes due. In Subbaiah Chietty v. Dhanalakshmamma, 1982 (2) APLJ 10 (SN), this Court held that if the tenant is put on notice with regard to the petition schedule premises being sold, it is not for him to dispute the factum. On the contrary, it is his duty to send the rent to the vendee. If he apprehends nominality of any such transaction he could pay to the vendee on protest, if he so chooses.
9. Admittedly, in the instant case, the tenants did receive notices both from the landlords as well as the Official Receiver, asking to pay the rents to the landlords. Therefore, there is no justifying reason for the tenants to deny the rents to the landlords on one pretext or the other. Mere pendency of the applications filed under Section 9(3) of the Act would not in any way help the tenants to commit wilful defualt in payment of rents. Therefore, the plea set forth on both the grounds fail.
10. In C.R.P. No. 51 of 1990 the landlords had taken two grounds before the Rent Controller seeking eviction on the grounds of wilful default as well as sub-letting, by the tenants, of the premises in question. Both the Courts below accepting the version of the landlords directed eviction. Shri M.Y.K. Rayudu, learned Counsel for the tenant though admits that there was sub-letting of the premises, but states that as on the date of filing of the rent control proceedings the sub-tenant vacated the premises, therefore, the second ground of subletting the premises was not available to the landlords and the Courts below ought to have rejected that ground.
11. In Raghunathi and Anr. v. Raju Ramappa Shetty, AIR 1991 S.C.W. (1) 280 the Supreme Court held as follows:-
"Sub-tenants leaving premises after date of notice - Liability to eviction does not cease."
Therefore, it is abundantly clear that sub-letting of the premises is not denied but the plea that as on the date of filing of the rent control proceedings the said ground was not available to the landlords cannot be accepted in view of the Law laid down by the Supreme Court in the above decision.
12. In view of the above discussion, I hold that the rent control proceedings initiated by the landlords in these cases are maintainable and that there was wilful default on the part of the tenants in payment of rents to the landlords for the period in question. Accordingly, finding no merit in the contentions raised by the learned Counsel for the tenants, I dismiss the Civil Revision Petitions.
13. The building in question was purchased by the landlords in 1970 and execution of the sale-deeds was effected in March, 1978. Since then the landlords are neither in a position to take the possession of the building in question nor in a position to realise the rents from the tenants, as the tenants and the sons of the insolvent are creating numerous problems to them by way of fictitious litigation on one pretext or the other. Therefore, this Court cannot show leniency in granting time liberally to the tenants for delivering the vacant possession of the building to the landlords. In the circumstances, the reasonable time that could be granted to the petitioners/tenants for delivering the vacant possession of the respective tenements, is 45 days from today. No costs.