Telangana High Court
Pallepu Sekhar, Cherlapally vs State Of Telangana, Rep. By P.P on 25 June, 2024
Author: P.Sam Koshy
Bench: P.Sam Koshy
THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE P.SAM KOSHY
AND
THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE SAMBASIVARAO NAIDU
CRIMINAL APPEAL No.13 of 2015
JUDGMENT:(Per the Hon'ble Sri Justice P.SAM KOSHY) The instant is an appeal under Section 374(2) of the Cr.P.C filed by the appellant - accused challenging the judgment of conviction dated 07.10.2014 in S.C.No.616 of 2013 passed by the III Additional District and Sessions Judge, Ranga Reddy District.
2. Heard Ms. G. Jaya Reddy learned counsel for the appellant and the learned Public Prosecutor appearing for the respondent - State.
3. Vide the impugned judgment, the appellant has been found guilty of having committed the offence under Section 302 of IPC, 1860 (for short, 'IPC') and has been sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life with a fine of Rs.1,000/- and in default to suffer simple imprisonment for a period of three (03) months.
4. As could be seen from the impugned judgment, the appellant herein is the husband of Pallepu Niraja (hereinafter, the 'deceased') and they are residents of Bharathnagar, Cherlapally. The prosecution has alleged that the husband of the deceased, who is addicted to alcohol and playing cards, continued to harass the deceased both physically and mentally in drunken condition and also sold her gold Page 2 of 12 and silver ornaments. On 18.06.2013 morning when the deceased was about to go into bathroom, he poured kerosene and set her on fire. Immediately she extinguished the flames with the help of available water. PW.3 (mother-in-law) and co-sister who heard the hue and cries of the deceased called ambulance and admitted her in the hospital.
5. Based on the information received, PW.13 (K.Venkat Reddy, Inspector of Police) registered a case in crime No.330 of 2013 under Sections 489(A), 307 IPC and Section 3 and 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act. Further PW.12 (P.Veera Swamy, Sub Inspector) recorded the statement of witnesses. Subsequently on the requisition of the doctor, PW.9 (M. Hari Naryana, Hon'ble II MM Railway Court) visited the hospital and recorded the dying declaration of the deceased. On 24.06.2013, the deceased died due to burns in Gandhi Hospital. Thereafter, the police altered the Section of law from 307 to 302 IPC and submitted a memo to that extent.
6. Further the learned X Metropolitan Magistrate, Cyberabad at Malkajgiri took cognizance of the case against the appellant for the offence under Section 498 A and 302 of IPC. As the case is within the jurisdiction of sessions, it was committed to the court of Sessions, Metropolitan Sessions Judge, Cyberabad after adopting the procedure as laid down under Section 209 Cr.P.C., who registered a case against the appellant as S.C.No.616 of 2013 for the offence under Sections Page 3 of 12 498A and 302 of IPC and made over to the Court below for trial and disposal in accordance to law. To prove the charges under Section 302 of IPC, the prosecution in all examined twelve (12) witnesses and marked Exs.P1 to P10. No witnesses were examined in defence. The Trail Court after recording the statement of the appellant under section 313 of Cr.P.C finally passed the impugned judgment of conviction which is under challenge in the instant appeal.
7. The present appeal has been filed on the ground that the Trail Court has erred in believing that the witness PWs.1 to 2 are parents of the deceased, hence are interest witnesses. There is no direct eye witness to the incident except the statement of the deceased and the case rests on presumptions. The Trail Court also failed to see that the important links of circumstantial evidence are missing to complete the chain of evidence of the case which was not justified in convicting the appellant.
8. The facts of the case in brief are that the deceased got married to the appellant (Pallapu Sekhar) eight (08) years back and the parents of the deceased gave a significant dowry at the time of the marriage, which included Rs.1 Lakhs in cash, 4 units of gold, and 20 tulas of silver, and even built a house for the couple. The appellant, previously worked as a lorry driver, later worked in a private firm. With the Page 4 of 12 passage of time, he developed an addiction to alcohol and gambling, which led to him harassing the deceased when under the influence of alcohol. When the issue was brought to the attention of the caste elders, the appellant harboured resentment towards the deceased and threatened to kill her. In the morning of 18.06.2013, the deceased was preparing to visit her parents and was in the bathroom to take bath; the accused followed her, doused her in kerosene and set her on fire. Immediately she extinguished the flames with the help of available water and raised hue and cries. On hearing her cries, her mother-in- law and co-sister called ambulance and admitted her in the hospital.
9. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the Trail Court erred in believing that the interested witness PWs.1 and 2 are parents of the deceased. There are no direct witnesses and the case is built on reasonable presumptions backed by circumstantial evidence. Motive is not always necessary for a crime to occur, and its absence does not invalidate the evidence against the appellant, thereby, sought for acquittal of the appellant.
10. Opposing the appeal, the learned Public Prosecutor referring to the deposition of PW.9 who had taken the dying declaration of the deceased contended that the case of the prosecution stands established from the dying declaration which has been subsequently Page 5 of 12 proved from the statement of the Magistrate who recorded the same. Therefore, the impugned judgment does not warrant interference.
11. Thus, the learned Public Prosecutor contended that the case of the prosecution stands established beyond all the reasonable doubts and hence the appeal deserves to be dismissed.
12. Having heard the contentions put forth on either side and on perusal of the records, it would be relevant at this juncture, to take note of the statement of PWs.1 to 4 and the statement recorded by PWs.5 and 9.
13. According to the evidence of PW.1 (Muthaiah) and PW.2 (M.Narsamma) who are the parents of the deceased have unanimously stated that she was happily married to the appellant for three months, after which troubles began. The appellant, who is a driver at a gas company driver, received Rs.1 Lakh cash, four tulas of gold, and other household articles at the time of marriage. Despite further payments made to him, the appellant reportedly beat the deceased one day and drove her out of their home. The incident led PWs.1 and 2 to visit the deceased home and took shelter at a relative's house and held a panchayat meeting with elders the following day. The appellant promised to take care of the deceased, however the very next day, the present incident occurred. PWs.1 and 2 both spoke to the deceased, Page 6 of 12 who claimed that the appellant had poured kerosene on her and set her ablaze as she was about to take bath. She managed to extinguish the flames herself with the water available in the bathroom. Both parents refute claims that the deceased frustrated about not having children, committed suicide or that her saree accidentally caught fire while cooking.
14. Similarly, PW.3 (Savithri), the mother of the appellant, is a crucial witness but her testimony is inconsistent. Initially, she claimed she was informed by the deceased about the appellant's actions, but in a later cross-examination, she contradicted herself by stating that the deceased didn't tell her anything about the incident. This later part of her testimony is unreliable as it appears she may have been influenced to protect her son. However, this statement did not provide any advantage to the appellant. This is primarily due to the fact that this part of PW.3's testimony was recorded in Court three months later when she was recalled for further cross-examination. Given the delay in recording the testimony of PW.3, it cannot be claimed that the evidence of PW.3 is influenced or she has deposed against the appellant because of her personal grievances. It is also important to note that PW.3's evidence was not an isolated one and her statement was corroborated with the evidence provided by the PWs.1 and 2 on significant matters adding more weight to her testimony. Page 7 of 12
15. Likewise, PW.4 (K. Venkatesh) a panchayat elder, attests to the appellant's harassment of the deceased after consuming alcohol. According to him, the deceased stated that the appellant had followed her into the bathroom, poured kerosene on her, and set her on fire. He verifies this claim by stating that he arrived at the scene shortly after the incident where the appellant was present and the deceased confirmed to him the appellant's actions. However, PWs.1 and 2 did not inform him about the alleged dowry related abuse by the appellant in panchayat. The testimony of PW.4 stands corroborated with the prosecution's case, whose statement brought more weight to the prosecution claim.
16. According to the evidence of PW.5 (C. Sayanna, Head Constable of Kushaiguda Police Station) visited the hospital on the orders of the SHO and recorded the statement of the deceased which reads as under:
"She was married Sekhar about eight years back and they are eking out livelihood by doing coolie work. At the time of marriage her parents have given gold and silver articles and that she is working in a chairs company at Cherlapally and that her husband used to consume liquor every day and he used to come. home and used to quarrel with her and used to beat her demanding her to bring addittonal dowry. She informed the same to her parents and several panchayats were conducted. accused agreed before the elder to look after her with love and alection. When her parents asked her to come with them.sheirformed them that she wil come on the next day. On 18-06-2013, when she was about to prepare food, the accused quareled with her and stated that he will kell her and he will got to the jail and Page 8 of 12 when he tried to beat her and when she went into the bathroom for bath, the accused came behind her and poured kerosene and it ire to her. Then the injured poured water in the Ticket on herself and her co-sister called 108 ambulance and shifted her to Gandhi Hospital."
Subsequently, PW.5 handed over the statement to his SHO. During cross-examination by the defense counsel, the witness didn't reveal any information that could favor the defence.
17. Further the evidence of PW.9 where he recorded the dying declaration of the deceased on the requisition of Dr. Ramya Devi of Gandhi Hospital after asking formal questions and ensuring the deceased to be conscious and in coherent condition to give her statement and also received endorsement from duty Doctor about the mental status of the deceased and proceeded to record the statement of the deceased. In her declaration, the deceased stated that her husband had doused kerosene on her and set her fire at 7:30 AM on 18.06.2013 which further supports the case of the prosecution.
18. According to the evidence of PW.11 (Dr S. Mohan Singh, Asst. Professor, Gandhi Medical College), who performed the autopsy on deceased, corroborated the prosecution's assertion that deceased died due to burn injuries. PW.12 (P. Veera Swamy, Sub-Inspector of Police) and PW.13 (Venkat Reddy, Inspector of Police) served as the investigation officers who registered the case, initiated the investigation and apprehended the appellant and submitted a charge- Page 9 of 12 sheet concluding that the appellant was responsible for his wife's murder.
19. PW.6 (V. Anitha) the sister of deceased and PW.10 (M. Bikshapathi) who is the brother of the deceased corroborated the evidence of PWs.1 and 2 and stated that when they questioned the deceased, she stated that the appellant poured kerosene on her and set fire.
20. Therefore, in the present case, the incident took place in the house of the appellant where no third party had access. The deceased made dying declaration to various individuals, including the PW.5 (Head Constable) and the PW.9 (Magistrate) stating that the appellant poured kerosene on her and set her on fire. The consistency of these declarations and the circumstances surrounding the case point the action on the part of the appellant as intentional and deliberate. Further, the defence counsel's argument that the deceased committed suicide out of frustration or that the incident was an accident does not hold water, especially in light of the consistent dying declaration made by the deceased. The deceased had no enmity towards the appellant that would motivate her to falsely implicate him in her statement.
21. It would be trite at this juncture, to refer to a decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Jayamma and Another vs. Page 10 of 12 State of Karnataka 1 wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court held at paragraph No.14.3 as under:
"14.3. In Sham Shankar Kankaria v. State of Maharashtra [Sham Shankar Kankaria v. State of Maharashtra, (2006) 13 SCC 165, paras 10 and 11 : (2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 663] , it was restated that the dying declaration is only a piece of untested evidence and must like any other evidence satisfy the Court that what is stated therein is the unalloyed truth and that it is absolutely safe to act upon it. Further, relying upon the decision in Paniben v. State of Gujarat [Paniben v. State of Gujarat, (1992) 2 SCC 474, para 18 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 403] wherein this Court (at SCC pp. 480-81, para 18) summed up several previous judgments governing dying declaration, the Court in Sham Shankar Kankaria [Sham Shankar Kankaria v. State of Maharashtra, (2006) 13 SCC 165, paras 10 and 11 : (2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 663] reiterated: (Sham Shankar Kankaria [Sham Shankar Kankaria v. State of Maharashtra, (2006) 13 SCC 165, paras 10 and 11 : (2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 663] , SCC pp. 172-73, para 11) "11. ... (i) There is neither rule of law nor of prudence that dying declaration cannot be acted upon without corroboration. (See Munnu Raja v. State of M.P. [Munnu Raja v. State of M.P., (1976) 3 SCC 104 : 1976 SCC (Cri) 376] );
(ii) If the Court is satisfied that the dying declaration is true and voluntary it can base conviction on it, without corroboration. (See State of U.P. v. Ram Sagar Yadav [State of U.P. v. Ram Sagar Yadav, (1985) 1 SCC 552 : 1985 SCC (Cri) 127] and Ramawati Devi v. State of Bihar [Ramawati Devi v. State of Bihar, (1983) 1 SCC 211 : 1983 SCC (Cri) 169] .);
(iii) The Court has to scrutinise the dying declaration carefully and must ensure that the declaration is not the result of tutoring, prompting or imagination. The deceased had an opportunity to observe and identify the assailants and was in a fit state to make the declaration.
(See K. Ramachandra Reddy v. Public Prosecutor [K. Ramachandra Reddy v. Public Prosecutor, (1976) 3 SCC 618 : 1976 SCC (Cri) 473] .);
(iv) Where dying declaration is suspicious, it should not be acted upon without corroborative evidence.
1 (2021) 6 Supreme Court Cases 213 Page 11 of 12 (See Rasheed Beg v. State of M.P. [Rasheed Beg v. State of M.P., (1974) 4 SCC 264 : 1974 SCC (Cri) 426] );
(v) Where the deceased was unconscious and could never make any dying declaration the evidence with regard to it is to be rejected. (See Kake Singh v. State of M.P. [Kake Singh v. State of M.P., 1981 Supp SCC 25 : 1981 SCC (Cri) 645] );
(vi) A dying declaration which suffers from infirmity cannot form the basis of conviction. (See Ram Manorath v. State of U.P. [Ram Manorath v. State of U.P., (1981) 2 SCC 654 : 1981 SCC (Cri) 581] );
(vii) Merely because a dying declaration does not contain the details as to the occurrence, it is not to be rejected. (See State of Maharashtra v. Krishnamurti Laxmipati Naidu [State of Maharashtra v. Krishnamurti Laxmipati Naidu, 1980 Supp SCC 455 : 1981 SCC (Cri) 364] .);
(viii) Equally, merely because it is a brief statement, it is not to be discarded. On the contrary, the shortness of the statement itself guarantees truth. (See Surajdeo Ojha v. State of Bihar [Surajdeo Ojha v. State of Bihar, 1980 Supp SCC 769 : 1979 SCC (Cri) 519] .);
(ix) Normally the court in order to satisfy whether the deceased was in a fit mental condition to make the dying declaration look up to the medical opinion. But where the eyewitness has said that the deceased was in a fit and conscious state to make the dying declaration, the medical opinion cannot prevail. (See Nanhau Ram v. State of M.P. [Nanhau Ram v. State of M.P., 1988 Supp SCC 152: 1988 SCC (Cri) 342] );
(x) Where the prosecution version differs from the version as given in the dying declaration, the said declaration cannot be acted upon. (See State of U.P. v. Madan Mohan [State of U.P. v. Madan Mohan, (1989) 3 SCC 390 :
1989 SCC (Cri) 585] .);
(xi) Where there are more than one statement in the nature of dying declaration, one first in point of time must be preferred. Of course, if the plurality of dying declaration could be held to be trustworthy and reliable, it has to be accepted. (See Mohanlal Gangaram Gehani v. State of Maharashtra [Mohanlal Gangaram Gehani v. State of Maharashtra, (1982) 1 SCC 700 : 1982 SCC (Cri) 334] .)"Page 12 of 12
22. For all the aforesaid reasons and the judicial precedents referred above, we are of the considered opinion that the evidences adduced by the prosecution witnesses as also upon scrutiny of the dying declaration, all of which have been discussed in preceding paragraphs, this Bench finds that the prosecution has been able to prove its case against the appellant beyond all the reasonable doubts. Thus, affirming the judgment of conviction passed by the Trial Court, the instant appeal stands dismissed. No costs.
23. As a sequel, miscellaneous applications pending if any, shall stand closed.
__________________ P.SAM KOSHY, J ___________________________ SAMBASIVARAO NAIDU, J Date: 25.06.2024 GSD