Andhra HC (Pre-Telangana)
Singareni Collieries Co. Ltd. vs State Of Bank Of Hyderabad And Ors. on 18 February, 1998
Equivalent citations: 1998(2)ALD440, 1998(4)ALT83
Author: B.S. Raikote
Bench: B.S. Raikote
ORDER
1. This writ petition is filed by gamishee, namely, Singareni Collieries (herein referred to as 'gamishee') seeking appropriate directions of this Court for paying or depositing an amount of Rs.9,98,000/- lying with the petitioner in view of two conflicting orders passed by two different Courts. The petitioner states that he is ready to comply with either of the two orders and prays for a writ of Mandamus or an appropriate directions to that effect.
2. It is the case of the petitioner that the petitioner is Respondent No.7 before the Debt Recovery Tribunal at Bangalore in O.A. No.725/1997. The applicant before the said Tribunal is the State Bank of Hyderabad, claiming certain debts due from M/s Chandra Organics Pvt. Limited, (2nd respondent in this writ petition), and other respondents, who are the directors of M/s Chandra Organics Pvt. Ltd, on the ground that the Bank had advanced a loan of Rs.48,00,000/- and odd. During the pendency of those proceedings, the said Tribunal has passed an interim order in O.A.M.A. No.2 of 1997 in 8-7-1997 directing the 7th respondent-Garnishee (the present petitioner - Singareni Colleries) to deposit an amount of Rs.9,98,000/- with the applicant-Bank, deposited by the 1st defendant Company, with the gamishee, under intimation to the said Tribunal. It was served on the garnishee on 19-7-1997. The petitioner further states that mean while, Sri G. Sambaiah (Respondent No.3 in this writ petition) has filed a separate suit in O.S.No.1183 of 1997 on the file of II Additional Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad and on LA. No.905 of 1997, he has obtained an injunction against the garnishee for paying the said amount to any person. Again on 14-8-1997, there is a further direction to the garnishee to deposit the said amount by 21-8-1997. It is further submitted that on 29-9-1997, the said suit was decreed ex parte and the said Sambaiah has filed E.P. No.75/1997 and on that E.P. he has obtained another order on 1-10-1997 directing the garnishee to deposit an amount of Rs.9,98,000/- in that Court to the credit of the said E.P. The petitioner-garnishee states that he has received these conflicting orders both from the II Additional Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad and also from the Debt Recovery Tribunal, Bangalore. He submits that if he complies with the directions of one Court, the other Court may hold him liable for contempt for not complying with the directions of that Court. So far as the petitioner is concerned, he is ready to comply with any one of these directions, because the total amount held by it is only Rs.9,98,000/-. It is only in these circumstances, the petitioner has approached this Court for necessary direction in this behalf
3. In view of this difficulty pleaded by the petitioner, when the matter had come up for admission on 18-9-1997, after noticing that the order by the Debt Recovery Tribunal, was prior in point of time, being passed on 8-7-1997, I directed the petitioner - gamishee to deposit the said amount with the State Bank of Hyderabad, main branch at Bidar, subject to further orders to be passed in this writ petition and consequently stayed the proceedings in E.P.No.75/1997 in O.S. No.1183/1997 on the file of II Additional Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad. After notice, both the parties have filed counters.
4. Heard the learned Counsel on both sides.
5. The Counsel appearing for G. Sambiah, the plaintiff in O.S.No.1183/1997 contended that, Sambiah, respondent No.3 in this writ petition has obtained an order in O.S.No. 1183/1997 against the gamishee, in the first instance, directing the gamishee not to disperse the amount to any person and later directing the gamishee to deposit the said amount to the credit of E.P.No.75/1997. He further stated that respondent No.3 -Claimant was not aware of the proceedings pending before the Debt Recovery Tribunal at Bangalore. Subsequently, there is a decree in his favour, directing the gamishee to deposit the said amount in the Executing Court and RespondentNo.3 is entitled to the same. He further stated that order of the Debt Recovery Tribunal has to necessarily yield to the order passed by the competent Civil Court. At any rate, the order of the Tribunal is illegal and without jurisdiction, since the Tribunal has no power to grant such an order in the nature of mandatory injunction to the gamishee in terms of Section 19(6) of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial institutions Act, 1993 (hereinafter referred to as 'Debt Recovery Act')- The Counsel appearing for the State Bank of Hyderabad -1st respondent in this writ petition and plaintiff - applicant before the Debt Recovery Tribunal contended that the Bank has advanced loan of Rs.48,00,000/- and odd to M/s Chandra Organics Pvt. Ltd. and on the applicable filed by the Bank before the Tribunal, the Tribunal has rightly directed the garnishee-petitioner to deposit an amount of Rs.9,98,000/ -, which the debtor has deposited with the garnishee for the purchase of coal, and the said amount is liable to be refunded to the debtor, and the said order not being challenged before any other authority, has now become final, and it has got to be complied with. But only with a mala fide intention, to defeat the order of the Tribunal, the judgment-debtor in collusion has got filed a suit by G. Sambiah, Respondent No.3, in O.S.No. 1183/1997, subsequent to the passing of this order on 1-8-1997 and has obtained an exparte order and thereafter again an ex parte decree against M/s Chandra Organics Pvt. Ltd. He further submitted that this decree is only a make belief decree, to defeat the rightful claim of the Bank, by M/s Chandra Organics Pvt. Ltd. and G. Sambiah. He further submitted that the plaintiff Sambiah in O.S.No. 1183/1997 knew very well the order passed by the Tribunal on 16-7-1997, on which date he filed a third party petition before the Debt Recovery Tribunal contending that he has advanced an amount of Rs. 12,63,440/- in favour of Chandra Organics Pvt. Ltd, on the basis of a promissory note, therefore he was entitled to the amount in question from the garnishee. But when he filed the present suit in O.S.No. 1183/1997, he suppressed the pendency of the proceedings before the Tribunal and also order passed by the said Tribunal on 8-7-1997 and obtained in I.A.No.905/1997 and also in E.P.No.75/1997 an order directing the garnishee to deposit the said amount with the Civil Court. He further submitted that the said decree is a collusive decree. The suit is filed on 1-8-1997 and there is an exparte decree on 29-9-1997, hardly within two months. From this it follows that M/s Chandra Organics Pvt. Ltd. and G. Sambiah intend to overreach the order of the Tribunal and such sharp practice is clearly an abuse of process of Court. He further submitted that order of the Tribunal cannot be said to be without jurisdiction, since the Tribunal has all the power to pass such an order under Sections 5, 17 and 19(6) of the Debt Recovery Act. He stated that in these circumstances, the Bank is entitled to custody of the said amount as per the directions of the Debt Recovery Tribunal and not G, Sambiah. Therefore, the interim direction already issued by this Court to deposit the said amount with the State Bank of Hyderabad Bidra Branch requires to be confirmed. He also relied upon some judgments in support of his contentions, which I will be considering shortly.
6. From the nature of the controversy as detailed by me above, the points that requires to be decided by me are (1) Whether the Debt Recovery Tribunal, Bangalore has the power to pass the interim order in question under Section 19(6) of the Debt Recovery Act and (2) which of the respondents is entitled to the custody of the amount lying with the garnishee.
7. Admittedly, in this case, the order of the Debt Recovery Tribunal is prior in point of time as against the order passed by the II Additional Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad. As I have already noted above, the said suit in O.S.No. 1183/1997 is filed on 1-8-1997 and in that suit, interim orders are,, obtained on 1-8-1997 in IANo.905/1997 in O.S.No.1183/1997 and another order on l4-8-1997 in IANo.980/1997. Thereafter the further order on 1-10-1997 in E.P.No.75/1997 in O.S.No. 1183/1997. These are all the orders subsequent to the filing of the suit on 1-8-1997. Whereas, the order of the Debt Recovery Tribunal is dated 8-7-1997 and it is thus prior in point of time than the orders passed by the II Additional Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad. In such cases, wherever the orders are passed by two competent Civil Courts, the practice of the Courts appear to" be that, the order passed earlier in point of time shall be given priority to the order passed subsequently and the order passed by a Superior Court shall be given preference as against the order passed by the inferior Court. On the basis of these principles, it is clear that the order of the Tribunal being prior in point of time has to be given preference. As to the ranking of the Court is concerned, the Tribunal is presided over by a District Judge, who is superior in ranking to the II Additional Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad. Section 5 of the Debt Recovery Act provides that Presiding Officer of the Tribunal shall be a person qualified to be a District Judge. In the instant case, it is not in dispute that the Presiding Officer of the Tribunal is of the cadre of District Judge. Even on this ground also, the order of the Tribunal has to be given preference as against the order of the II Additional Judge, City Civil Court Moreover, Section 63(1) of Civil Procedure Code also is to the effect that in case of such conflicting orders, the matter shall be determined so as to giving priority to an order of the Court of higher grade. The ruling relied upon by the learned Counsel for G.Sambiah, respondent No.3, reported in Parachuri Veerayya v. Yalavarti Veeraraghavyya, is the one in relation to Section 63(2) of Code of Civil Procedure, where some action was done by a Court having jurisdiction in ignorance of the existence of a decree of the other Court, the action of the Executing Court may not be invalidated Section 63(2) is only an enabling provision to meet the contingency of a particular case, where irregularity is committed bow fide without knowing the existence of other decree. But in the case on hand Sri Sambiah obtained orders and decree in Civil Court suppressing the order of the Tribunal. Therefore, the principles of that case do not apply to this case. Moreover, Section 63(2) of Code of Civil Procedure cannot be understood to have taken away the effect of Section 63"(1) of Code of Civil Procedure. In this view of the matter, the said judgment of this Court is distinguishable from the facts of this case. In the instant case, we are concerned with the proposition similar to Section 63(1) of Code of Civil Procedure and not to Section 63(2) of Code of Civil Procedure.
8. In this view of the matter, the contention urged by the learned Counsel for G. Sambiah that the order of the n Additional Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad shall be given preference to the order of the Debt Recovery Tribunal merits only for rejection, But the case does not rest at that, since it is further case of the learned Counsel for G. Sambiah that the Tribunal has no power to pass the impugned order under Section 19(6) of Debt Recovery Act. In order to consider this point, I glanced through the entire Debt Recovery Act. I will now proceed to consider the relevant sections for the purpose of point onhand. Sections 17 and 18 of the said Act read as under:--
"17. Jurisdiction, Powers and Authority of Tribunals:
(1) A Tribunal shall exercise, on and from the appointed day, the jurisdiction, power and authority to entertain and decide applications from the banks and financial institutions for recovery of debts due to such banks and financial institutions.
(2) An appellate Tribunal shall exercise, on and from the appointed day, the jurisdiction, powers and authority to entertain appeals against any order made, or deemed to have been made, by a Tribunal under this Act.''
18. Bar of Jurisdiction:-On and from the appointed day, no Court or other authority shall have, or be entitled to exercise, any jurisdiction, powers or authority (except the Supreme Court, and a High Court exercising jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution) in relation to the matters specified in Section 17."
From the above two sections it is clear that the Debt Recovery Tribunal and the Appellate Authority has been constituted with the power and authority to entertain and decide the applications from the Banks and Financial Institutions for the recovery of the debts due to such Banks and Financial Institutions, confirming the jurisdiction and powers relating to such matters, subject to the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. By Section 18, the jurisdiction of all other Courts is excluded in such matters. Before I advert to Section 19, it is necessary for me to note Section 22 of the Debt Recovery Act, which reads as under: -
"22.Procedure and Powers of the Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal :-(1) The Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal shall not be bound by the procedure laid down by the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), but shall be guided by the principles of natural justice and, subject to the other provisions of this Act and of any rules, the Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal shall have powers to regulate their own procedure including the places at which they shall have their sittings.
(2) The Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal shall have, for the purpose of discharging their functions under this Act, the same powers as are vested in a Civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), while trying a suit in respect of the following matters, namely:-
(a) Summoning and enforcing the attendance of any person and examining him on oath;
(b) requiring the discovery and production of documents;
(c) receiving evidence on affidavits;
(d) issuing commissions for the examination of witnesses or documents;
(e) reviewing its decisions;
(f) dismissing an application for default or deciding it exparte;
(g) setting aside any order of dismissal of any application for default or any order passed by exparte',
(h) any other matter which may be prescribed.
(3) Any procedure before the Tribunal or the Appellate Tribunal shall be deemed to be a judicial proceeding within the meaning of Sections 193 and 228, and for the purposes of Section 1%, Indian Penal Code (45 of 1 the Tribunal or the Appellate Tribunal shall be deemed to be a Civil Court for all the purposes of Section 195 and Chpater XXVI of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) From the above provision it is clear that Section 22 states that the Tribunal and the Appellate Authority shall have power to regulate their own procedure including the places they shall have their sitting and they shall not be bound by the procedure laid down under the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. By clause (2) of Section 22 it is further made clear that regarding certain matters, the Tribunal and Appellate Authority may follow Code of Civil Procedure and in such matters, the Tribunal has the powers, which are vested in a Civil Court. Thus, from Sections 17,18 and 22 one thing is certain that Tribunal has all the powers to regulate its own procedure, which is consistent to the principles of natural justice and subject to the other provisions and rules made thereunder. Such power also includes the power to pass appropriate interim orders in appropriate cases, so as to fulfil the object of the Debt Recovery Act and the rules made thereunder, but at the same time, being guided by the principles of natural justice. In otherwords, it can grant say, it can grant injunction, it can issue gamishee orders etc., in order to realise the debts due to Banks and Financial Institutions. Section 19 is only a matter of procedure, prescribed under the said Act, for obtaining the necessary orders, either interim or final by making necessary applications. In this sense only Section 19(6) of the Debt Recovery Act has to be understood and interpreted. For immediate reference, I am extracting Section 19(6) of the Debt Recovery Act, since it is being heavily relied upon by the Counsel appearing for G.Sambiah as under:
"19(6): The Tribunal may make an interim order (whether by way of injunction or stay) against the defendant to debar him from transferring, alienating or otherwise dealing with, or disposing of, any property and assets belonging to him without the prior permission of the Tribunal.'' From the reading of the above clause, it is clear that it enables the Tribunal to make interim order (by way of injunction or stay) against the defendants so as to debar from transfering alienating or otherwise dealing with of disposing of any property or assets belonging to him without prior permission of the Tribunal on an application filed by the plaintiff. This power of passing of appropriate interim orders in terms of this Section is in addition to the power that it can exercise under Section 19(4) of the Debt Recovery Act, which reads as under:--
"' 19(4): The Tribunal may, after giving the applicant and the defendant an opportunity of being heard, pass such orders on the application as it thinks fit to meet the ends of justice".
This clause enables a Tribunal to pass any other appropriate order that it deems just after giving opportunity to both the parties. Thus under Sections 17,19(4) read with Section 22 of the Debt Recovery Act, the Tribunal is invested with all the powers to make appropriate orders, including the orders as contemplated under Section 19(6), subject to the principles of natural justice and it has also power to regulate its own proceeding. Therefore, Section 19(6) itself shall not be taken as if the only provision regulating, determining the power of the Tribunal 4o pass interim orders. In other words, Section 19(6) is not exhaustive in its nature. In fact from the history of legislation, in this behalf, it is clear that the Parliament has constituted a separate Tribunal by providing necessary powers and teeth under Sections 17,18 and 19 to pass and get their orders implemented, whether final orders or interim orders, by ousting jurisdiction of all the Courts under Section 18. In other words, the Tribunal is constituted under this Act, in substitution of the Civil Court, but without the trappings of the Civil Court. Hence, it can pass any kind of order, final or interim order to fulfil the object of the Act without any procedural ramifications, but at the same time being guided by the principles of natural justice;-- In this view of the matter, in my humble opinion the Tribunal has the power to pass a gamishee order in question, even though the power to pass gamishee order is not specifically noted under Section 19(6) of the Debt Recovery Act. More or less to the same effect is the judgment of the High Court of Calcutta reported in M/s Pratap Ch. Dey v. Allahabad Bank, . In that case, the Hon'ble Judge held that the powers conferred by the Debt Recovery Act are very wide and in appropriate case, the Tribunal under the Act may also follow certain provisions of Code of Civil Procedure, if it is necessary in the interest of deciding that particular case and it would be in the interest of justice. Since, the Tribunal has the power to pass appropriate orders and to regulate its own procedure. The Hon'ble Judge by relying upon the judgment of the Supreme Court reported in A.A. Hajamunjuddin v. Indian Railways, , held as under:--
"10. It would be seen from the scheme of the Act as discussed hereinabove, that on its coming into force on the appointed day, suits pending in Civil Courts would stand transferred to the Bank Recovery Tribunal if the cause of action of the suit would have fallen within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal after the appointed day. Therefore, from the appointed day a civil suit which was filed in the Civil Court where the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure would have applied, would stand transferred to the Bank Recovery Tribunal and the Bank Recovery Tribunal would be required to dispose of it as such. That is because Section 17 specifically provides that the Bank Recovery Tribunal shall exercise on or from the appointed day all such jurisdiction, power and authorities as were exercisable immediately before that date by any Civil Court in respect of recovery of debts due to banks and financial institutions. Section 19 bars jurisdiction of the Civil Court to entertain and try such suits on and from appointed day. In other words after the appointed day the Bank Recovery Tribunal alone would have jurisdiction to entertain and try claims in respect of the matters referred to in Section 17 of the Act. Section 19 then sets out the procedures to be followed by the Bank Recovery Tribunal. Sub-section (1) of Section 22 states that the Tribunal shall not be bound by the Procedure laid down by the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 but shall be guided by the principles of natural justice and shall have powers to regulate their own procedure including places at which they shall have their sittings. From a plain reading of Sub-Section (1) of Section 22 it is clearly evident that Bank Recovery Tribunal shall not be bound by the procedure laid down by the Court, but if we read sub-sections (1), (2) and (3) of Section 22 of the said Act of 1993 conjointly, it must be held without hesitation in mind that the procedure as enumerated in Section 22 of (he said Act of 1993 has not taken away the power of the Tribunal to invoke the procedure laid down by the Courts if the ends of justice so require. Apart from that from any of the provisions of the Act and/or rules it does not appear that the Code of Civil Procedure has been expressly excluded. It only says that the Tribunal shall not be bound by the procedure laid down by the Code of Civil Procedure and shall have powers to regulate their own procedure including places at which they shall have their sittings. In a similar situation under the Railway Claims Tribunal Act, 1987 which also provides the same provisions as made in the Act, the Supreme Court in the case of A.A. Hajamunjuddin v. Indian Railways, has observed in paragraph 5 which are as follows:
"In other words after the appointed day the Claims Tribunal alone would have jurisdiction to entertain and try claims referred to in clauses (a) and (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 13 of the Act. Section 18 then sets out the procedure laid down by the Code but shall be guided by the principles of natural justice and shall have powers to regulate its own procedure. It is true that sub-section (1) of Section 18 in term states that the Claims Tribunal shall not be bound by the procedure laid down by the Code but that does not mean that it is precluded from invoking the procedure laid down by the Code even if the ends of justice so require. The subsection further states that the Tribunal shall have powers to regulate its own procedure and sub-section (3) of Section 18 enumerates the matters in respect whereof the claims Tribunal is permitted to exercise the same powers vested in a Civil Court under the Code while trying a suit. Rule 44 in terms states that nothing in the Rules shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect the inherent power of the Tribunal to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice. Nowhere in the Act is there any provision which runs counter to or is inconsistent with the provisions of Order 33 of the Code. Although the Act and the Rules do not specifically provide for the application of Order 33 of the Code, there is nothing in the Act or the Rules which precludes the Tribunal from following that procedure if the ends of justice so require."
11. From the aforesaid observations of the supreme Court in the case of A.A. Hajamunjuddin v. Indian Railways, , it can be safely held that the Bank Tribunal under the Act which also provides similar provisions as that of the Railway Claims Tribunal Act, 1987 is not precluded from following the procedure under the Code of Civil Procedure if the ends of justice so require."
In view of the above law declared by the High Court of Calcutta, with which, I am in humble agreement and also in view of my interpretation to Sections 17,18 19 and 22 of the Debt Recovery Act, the Tribunal has the power to pass the impugned order in question. However, the learned Counsel for G.Sambiah relied upon the judgment of the High Court of Delhi reported in Delhi High Court Bar Association vs. Union of India, . By the reading of the said judgment, it is clear that the entire Act has been struck down by the High Court of Delhi and i am told that the said judgment has been stayed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. But in the instant case, I am not concerned with the vires of the Act and I have to interpret the provisions, as they stand in the statute book. The observations of the High Court of Delhi contrary to the interpretation that I have laid on Sections 17, 18, 19 and 22 of the Debt Recovery Act, in my humble opinion, are not acceptable to me. Even the other judgment of the Delhi High Court reported in Cofex Exports Ltd. vs. Canara Bank, II (1997) BC 438 (DB) is a judgment consistent to its earlier judgment referred to 3 supra, striking down the entire Act. Moreover, the facts of those cases are clearly distinguishable from the facts of this case, and accordingly, I reject the contention of the learned Counsel for G. Sambiah urged in this behalf.
9. Moreover, even on the merits of the case, I find that Respondent No.3 G. Sambiah has (sic 'no') equity in his favour, in the sense that he has obtained order at the hands of the II Additional Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad by suppressing the order passed by the Debt Recovery Tribunal. As I have already stated above, the Debt Recovery Tribunal passed the order directing the garnishee to deposit an amount of Rs.9,98,000/-as on 8-7-1997 only. In fact, he (G. Sambiah) filed his objection to the said order before the Tribunal on 16-7-1997 slating that he was entitled to the said amount, being the loanar to M/s Chandra Organics Pvt. Ltd. From this it follows that he knew very well the existence of the order passed by the Debt Recovery Tribunal alleast by 16-7-1997. But fifteen days thereafter, he filed the suit on 1-8-1997 without disclosing these facts in the suit and on I. A.Nos. 905/1997 and 980/1997, he has obtained orders. To the said suit, the State Bank of Hyderabad, who is the plaintiff before the Tribunal is not made as one of the defendants and even the gamishee was not one of the defendants in the suit. But only subsequently, interim orders are obtained against the gamishee on 1-8-1997,29-8-1997 and 1-10-1997 both in the suit as well as in the E.P., as I have already noted above. It is only thereafter, the gamishee filed an objection in E.P on 20-8-1997 for the first time, stating that there is an order of the Tribunal. Thus, the Civil Court was made known the existence of order of the Tribunal, for the first time on 20-8-1997, that too by gamishee and not by Sambiah. From these facts it follows that the final order and interim orders were obtained by Sambiah from II Additional Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad, suppressing the proceedings before the Debt Recovery Tribunal. If the proceedings before the Tribunal were brought to the notice of the II Additional Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad, he would not have passed the interim orders, nor the decree in favour of G. Sambiah - Respondent No.3. In these circumstances, there is an attempt on the part of G. Sambiah to overreach the order of the Tribunal so as to get an order in his favour. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has come down heavily such practice of abuse of the process of Court in its judgment reported in Municipal Corporation of Delhi vs. Kamla Devi, and levied exemplary costs of Rs.5,000/-. Having regard to this law declared by Hon'ble Supreme Court and also having regard to the fact that G. Sambiah -Respondent No.3 specifically suppressed the proceedings pending before the Debt Recovery Tribunal, Bangalore in the Civil Court and obtained orders at the hands of the Civil Court. I think this is also one such case where This Court has to impose some costs on him.
10. For all the above reasons, I pass the order as under:--
This writ petition is disposed of by holding that the order of the Debt Recovery Tribunal shall have to be given preference and accordingly, the gamishee has to deposit the amount in question in the State Bank of Hyderabad, as directed by the Debt Recovery Tribunal. It is stated before me that as directed by Debt Recovery Tribunal, the amount has already been deposited with the State Bank of Hyderabad and if that is so, that deposit shall be subject to further orders to be passed by the Debt Recovery Tribunal. Respondent No.3-G. Sambiah shall pay an exemplary costs of Rs.5,000/- to the Bank in addition to its advocate fee fixed at Rs.5,000/-.