Gauhati High Court
Sri Rohit Newar And Ors. Etc. vs State Of Assam And Ors. on 5 May, 2004
Equivalent citations: AIR2005GAU26, (2005)2GLR91, AIR 2005 GAUHATI 26, (2005) 2 GAU LR 91 (2004) 2 GAU LT 272, (2004) 2 GAU LT 272
ORDER B.K. Sharma, J.
1. All the four writ petitions pose common questions of law on same set of facts and thus taken up for a common judgment and order. The core issue involved in all the three writ petitions is whether "River Silt" can be said to be "Minor Mineral" or can be said to be "ordinary clay" as defined in Assam Minor Mineral Concession Rule, 1994 for the purpose of levying royalty by the State Government.
2. According to the averments made in the writ petitions, the petitioners are carrying of the business of transportation of "Brahmaputra River Silt" to various destinations located within the territorial jurisdiction of the Guwahati city for the purpose of earning their livelihood. According to them, they collect/extract "River Silt" from Pahikhaiti, Chunsali, Dompara etc. in and around greater Gauhati and transport the same to various destinations by their own trucks which are used for the purpose of earth feeling. Their grievance is that the Government of Assam in the forest department is insisting for payment of royalty under the provision of the Assam Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 1994. According to them, the "River Silt" being not included in the definition of "Minor Minerals", the State Government is wrong in insisting for payment of royalty.
3. The State Government has contested the claim of the petitioners by filing an affidavit. As per the stand in the affidavit the Government during the period of 5 months from Nov. 2002 to May 2003 has received revenue to the tune of Rs. 6,20,000 in respect of extraction and transportation of "Brahmputra River Silt" in Guwahati. The stand of the respondents has been summarised in paragraph 4 of the affidavit which reads as follows :
"The factual position in respect of river silt under the provisions of different Acts and Rules of the land is as follows :-
Under Section 15 of the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1957 (Central Act 67 of 1957), the Government of Assam adopted Assam Minor Minerals Concessions Rule, 1994. The aforesaid Rule was published in the Assam Gazette in the Extra-Ordinary issue dated 4-5-95. Rule 2(O) of the aforesaid rule defines competent authority as follows :-
"Competent authority" means the Director of Geology and Mining, Assam or the Principal Chief Conservator of Forest or any other authority specified by the Director or the Principal Chief Conservator of Forest or by any Government Notification. Rule 5(A)(ii) of the Rule states as follows :-
The Principal Chief Conservator of Forests or any officer authorized by him on this behalf in respect of the minor minerals for uses other than in industry as specified in Schedule "Y".
"Ordinary clay" other than used in cement manufacturing or in any industry except cottage industry is modified as minor mineral in schedule Y under Rules 4(ii) and 7(i) of the Rule, 1994.
Be it stated here that silt is ordinary clay inasmuch as this material is carried by running water and deposited as a sediment.
"Under Rule 31 of Assam Minor Mineral Concessions Rules, 1994 the Forest Department Is authorized to grant permit for extraction and removal of silt."
4. Thus, the respondents have taken the stand that the petitioners are duty bound under the law and rules to pay royalty for extraction and to take challan for transportation of "River Silt" to the various destination of the Guwahati. According to them the term "Ordinary Clay" is within the definition of "Silt" and the same is included in Schedule 'Y' of Rules 4(ii) and 7(1) of the Assam Minor Mineral Concessions Rules, 1994 (hereinafter referred to as the Rule).
5. Before proceeding further in the matter, it would be appropriate to refer to the notification dated 4-1-94 issued by the Government of Assam in the Forest Department. By this notification private individuals have been allowed to extract "River Sand" from the River Brahmaputra. This was followed by an order dated 27-12-96 issued by the District Magistrate, Kamrup, Guwahati, according permission to private individuals to carry "River Silt" only from the bed of the Brahmaputra. A further order dated 7-3-97 was issued by the Guwahati Municipal Corporation conveying the decision to allow the truck owners as mentioned in the order itself to lift the "Silts and Sands" from the river Brahmaputra by trucks.
6. It is the case of the petitioners that they have been carrying silt from the river bed without any restriction, but the troubles started in December 2002 when the forest officials seized trucks belonging to the petitioners on their failure to produce challan as a proof of payment of roylaty to the Forest Department of the State. Being confronted with such a situation writ petitions have been filed challenging the legality and validity of such action on the part of the State respondents. By filing the writ petitions, prayer has been made for a declaration that the respondents have no jurisdiction or authority under the aforesaid Rules of 1994 to put unreasonable restriction on the business of collection and transportation of "Brahmaputra River Silt" for earth filling purposes by way of imposing royalty and/or insisting for challans to be obtained against payment of such royalty to the Forest Department.
7. I have heard Mr. N. Dutta, learned senior counsel assisted by Mr. S. Kataki, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the writ petitioners in W.P.(c) No. 7938/03. I have also heard Mr. D. Saikia led by Mr. S.S. Dey learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners in W.P.(c) No. 8862/2003 and 9321/2003 and Mr. P. K. Barman appearing on behalf of the petitioner in WP(c) No. 1571/2004, Mr. H. K. Mahanta, learned State counsel made submissions on behalf of the State respondents.
8. Mr. Dutta, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioners leading the argument submitted that silt is riot a forest produce and that there is also no mining lease in respect of the area in question. He further submitted that the river bed is not a forest. Referring to the definition of "Minor Mineral" as defined in Section 3(e) of the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1957 which definition has been adopted in Rule 2(e) of the aforesaid Rules of 1994 submitted that "River Silt" having not been included in the said definition, the State respondents are precluded from levying any royalty on that account. Placing reliance on dictionary meaning of the words "Silt" and "Clay" Mr. Dutta, submitted that silt is a genus and sand and other materials are species. According to him those species have been defined separately under the Rules and thus "Clay" and for that matter "Silt" to be brought within the purview of "Minor Minerals", same will have to be notified. He referred to three decisions as re-ported in (2003) 2 Gau LT 446 (Brihattar Dispur Mati Truck Malik Santha v. State of Meghalaya); AIR 2003 SC 2455 (V.P. Pichu Pitchai v. Special Secretary and (1990) 4 SCC 557 (Bharat Cooking Coal v. State of Bihar) in support of his submissions.
9. The term "Minor Minerals" as defined in Section 2(e) of 1957 Act referred to above which has also been adopted in the 1994 Rules is quoted below :
"(e) "minor minerals" means building stones, gravel, ordinary clay, ordinary sand other than sand used for prescribed pur-poses, and any other mineral which the Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, declare to be a minor mineral."
10. The Concise Oxford Dictionary, (10th Edition) defines "Silt." as fine sand, clay, or other material carried by running water and deposited as a sediment. The term "Clay" has been defined in Webster's Encyclopedia Unabridged Dictionary of the English language (New Revised Edition) as "1. a natural earthy material which is plastic when wet, consisting essentially of hydrated silicates of aluminum : used for making bricks, pottery, etc., 2. earth; mud. 3. earth esp. regarded as the material from which the human body was formed.
The word "Silt" has been defined in the said dictionary as "earthy matter, fine sand, or the like, carried by moving or running water and deposited as a sediment.
11. In the New Standard Encyclopedia (Vol. 4) the word "Clay" has been defined as an "earthy material composed of very small particles of weathered rock...........Dry clay is usually powdery and feels oily when rubbed between the fingers..........Clay consists of minerals............. Clay in small amounts is necessary for good soil. Clay serves to hold water and other substances that are necessary for plant growth. ..............A soil with too much clay is rock-like when dry and sticky when wet."
12. The clay has been classified into two types : Residual and Sedimentary. "Residual clay comes directly from the weathering of rock into very fine particles. The particles become mixed with water and materials from the surrounding soil. Sedimentary clay is formed when particles of weathered rocks are carried from the place in which they were formed, usually by streams of water, and deposited in another place. It occurs in layers.......... Common clay contains more impurities than fire clay, and does not have as great a resistance to heat.
13. In the said encyclopedia, the "silt" has been referred to "Soil" under sub-title "Physical Properties : Texture". It refers to the fineness or coarseness of the soil. It is determined largely by the relative amounts of sand, silt, and clay particles in the silt. Sandy soils are the coarsest; clay soils are the finest and silt soils are intermediate. Most soils have sand, silt, and clay particles in various proportions. The encyclopedia further elaborates laying down the proportions of soils containing 7 to 27 per cent clay, 28 to 50 per cent silt, and less than 52 per cent sand. Such soils are called loams. Silt loams, sandy loams, sandy clay loams, etc. are soils with relatively higher percentages of sand, silt, or clay.
14. If we go by the aforesaid definition to "Silt" and "Clay" and the descriptions of its characteristic, river silt is bound to contain ordinary clay and sand. Learned counsel for the petitioner also submitted that silt is a genus and sand and other materials are its species. From the aforesaid descriptions, it is clear that apart from the sand contained in the silt it also contains other materials including clay and/or ordinary clay.
15. Learned counsel for the petitioner argued that "Silt" is not ordinary clay and it having not been incorporated in the definition or description of "Minor Minerals" under the provisions of the aforesaid Act and . Rules, the State Government is not empowered to collect any royalty on river silt. According to him, the slit to be brought within the purview of "Minor Minerals", it will have to be notified by the Central Government. It is in this context the' decisions of the Apex Court in Bharat Cooking Coal (supra) and V.P. Pichu Pitchai, AIR 2003 SC 2455 (supra) have been referred to. Insofar as the decision in Brihattar Dispur Mati Truck Malik Santha (supra) is concerned same is in respect of the Assam Forest Regulation, 1891. The question before the Court was, whether "earth is a minor mineral and hence a forest produce under the Assam Forest Regulation, 1891". The Court after holding that "earth" is a minor mineral held that the same couldn't be subjected to the levy if it is not removed from forest. In other words if the earth is removed from a forest, it being a "Minor Mineral", removal therefrom would attract the levy. This was referred to in view of initial action of Forest Department towards seizure of the trucks carrying silt applying the provisions of the Assam Forest Regulation, 1891. However, in the affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents, the position has been made clear by clarifying that the notification dated 4-1-94 under which such action was taken has since been withdrawn by another notification dated 5-3-99. Thus, the present controversy will have to be decided within the parameters of the provisions of aforesaid rules of 1994 and this Court is not required to answer as to whether the Brahmaputra River Bed from which the river silt extracted or removed is within the forest area or is a forest produce.
16. Mr. H.K. Mahanta, learned State counsel on the other hand submitted that "Ordinary Clay" is in fact the "Silt". He poses the question that what is that ordinary clay if not the river silt to be called as "Minor Mineral". Referring to Rule 48 of the Rules of 1994, Mr. Mahanta submitted that the action of the State respondents in demanding payment of royalty is justified. Referring to the definition of "competent authority" as defined under Section 2(o) of the aforesaid Rules, Mr. Mahanta submitted that Principal Chief Conservator of Forest or any other authority specified by him is competent to levy royalty in respect of "Minor Minerals". He also referred to Schedule 'Y' of the said Rules putting emphasis on the power of the State as the owner of all the Mines and Minerals within its territory to collect revenue, Mr. Mahanta, placed reliance on the decision of the Apex Court as reported in (2001) 1 SCC 429 : (AIR 2001 SC 410) (State of Orissa v. Union of India). Placing reliance on Rule 31 of the aforesaid Rules Mr. Mahanta submitted that the petitioners will have to obtain permit. He finally Submitted that the River Brahmaputra and for that matter any other river undoubtedly belongs to the State and there is nothing wrong in adopting regulatory measures by the State towards extraction/collection of river bed materials.
17. In the case of State of Orissa AIR 2001 SC 410 (supra) on which Mr. Mahanta, learned State counsel placed reliance the land in question was acquired by the State Government and handed over to the Railway Administration for laying railway line. The Railway Administration utilized certain minor minerals like the rock-cut soils and earth from the very land for laying the railway line. The Revenue authority of the State initiated proceedings for realization of royalty and cess under the provisions of the Orissa Minor Minerals Concessions Rules. The Railway administration and the Union of India successfully assailed the same before the High Court. The appellant State contended that it was the owner of the mines and minerals within its territory and in view of Rule 3 of the Orissa Minor Minerals Concessions Rules, 1990, if minor minerals were extracted or removed from one's own land not for any domestic consumption or agricultural operations, but were sold to the public then the State would be justified in levying royalty on such extraction and/or collection. The Apex Court held that the State is the owner of all the mines and minerals within its territory and the minerals vest with the State. It held that the Railway Administration, cannot undertake the quarrying operation unless a permit is granted in its favour and, consequently, if the Railway Administration utilizes the minor minerals from the lands, for the railway track, it would be bound to pay the royalty chargeable under the Orissa Minor Minerals Concessions Rules, 1990.
18. I may now refer to certain cases, which may through some light to resolve the controversy. In the case of Amar Singh Modilal v. State of Haryana as reported in AIR 1972 P & H 356, a Full Bench of the High Court had occasion to exhaustively deal with the word "Mineral". The issue involved in that case was whether "brick earth" has validly been declared to be a "Minor Mineral" by virtue of the Central Government notification issued under Section 3(e) of the aforesaid Act of 1957, While answering the issue in the affirmative it went on to discuss vast varieties of issues incidental thereto placing reliance on various dates. It held that the word "Mineral" is devoid of definition and is capable of a vast variety of meanings. It is not a term of art but an English word, which has no fixed connotation. It held that the word "Mineral" is used in so many senses, depending, upon the context, that the ordinary definitions of the dictionary (sic) through but little light upon its signification in a given case. It noticed the wider and comprehensive connotation which has always been attributed to the word "Mineral" in favour of a narrow and constricted meaning therefore. This is first so because admittedly the word "Mineral" is not a term of art, of either Chemistry, Geology or Mineralogy. It is a common English word, which has always been judicially construed in a wide amplitude. The Full Bench of the High Court referred to the American case of Puget Mill Co. v. Duecy in which the Supreme Court of Washington, 96 Pacific Rep 2d, 571 observed as follows :-
"The word "Minerals" standing alone might by itself, under a broad general, popular definition embrace soil, hence include sand and gravel, and all that is to be found beneath the surface"
Referring to the various authorities, it held that it is apparent that there is no warrant in the judicial precedent for confirming the word "mineral" to a narrow scientific definition and indeed the unanimous weight of precedent is to the contrary.
19. In the above case the Full Bench did not rely upon the expert evidence towards attributing a precise meaning of the word "Mineral" and held the same to the both inadmissible and irrelevant to the issue. In that case the expert opinion was to the effect that the "earth" is not mineral. The Court proceeded to hold upon a detail consideration of the matter that common substances like building stone, gravel, ordinary sand and ordinary clays are well within the scope of the word "mineral", although, admittedly, they do not satisfy the acid test of a fixed chemical composition or definite physical properties.
20. In the said case the full Court held that the brick earth is an aggregate of minerals. The argument before the Court was that in its ordinary popular meaning the word "mineral" would not include brick earth within its ambit. The Court observed that the words and language used in the legislation have to be taken in their legal acceptation.
21. The cardinal rule of interpretation is that words should be read in their ordinary, natural and grammatical meaning subject to the rider that in constructing words in a constitutional enactment conferring legislative power the most liberal construction should be put upon the words so that Same may have effect in their widest amplitude. It is well-settled that a peace of legislation should not be construed in a narrow and pedantic sense but should be given a large and liberal interpretation. Thus, the legislative field is extensive and the items of legislation include not merely the main purposes but also all ancillary and subsidiary matters which can fairly, and reasonably be said to fall within the scope of a particular entry.
22. In the case of Laddumal v. The State of Bihar, AIR 1965 Patna 491, a division bench held that unless there be any compelling reason to think that the Parliament wanted to exclude the minor minerals from the Imposition of any royalty whatsoever. Section 15 of the 1957 Act cannot be read to mean such exclusion from the powers of the State Government.
23. In the case of Bhagwan Dass v. State of U.P. as reported in AIR 1976 SC 1393, the Apex Court held that sand, gravel etc. deposited on lands abutting on rivers as a result of fluvial action are "Minor Minerals". It held that if the deposits left by the residual waters of the river are of the description mentioned in Section 3(e) of the aforesaid Act and the U.P. Minor Minerals (Concession) Rules, 1963, the Rules must come into full play with the result that no mining operation in respect of the deposits can be undertaken except under and in accordance with the terms and conditions of a lease or permit granted by the Government under the Rules of 1963. It held that the deposits in the nature of ordinary sand other than sand used for prescribed purposes, gravel, building stones and bazris fall squarely within the provisions of the Act of 1957 and the Rules of 1963 and therefore "Minor Minerals". The Apex Court further held that it cannot be contended that the sand and gravel are deposited on the surface of the land and not under the surface of the soil and therefore they cannot be called "Minerals". It emphasized that it is wrong to assume that mines and minerals must always be sub-soil and that there can be no minerals on the surface of the earth. It went on to say that such an assumption is contrary to informed experience. "Winning" does not imply a hazardous or perilous activity. Paragraphs 10 and 11 of the said judgment read as follows (at page 1396 of AIR) :-
"10. Evidently the appellant finds it difficult to reconsile himself with the position that what nature and good fortune have bounteously left on his lands should be permitted to be taken away by the Government which has not a vestige of title to the lands; The answer to this difficulty is two fold. In the first place the deposits, by a definition contained in a competent legislation, are "minor minerals" and it is of no relevance that the Act of 1957 and Rules 1963 bring within their compass even those deposits which are left behind by the fluvial action of rivers. If that is the policy and the intendment of law, it is unprofitable to explore whether the statute could not have been more generous or less grudging to riparian owners. Secondly and that bears on equity, prior to the point of time when the flood waters of the river carried the sand and gravel to private lands, the title thereto was vested in the State Government. The Riverbeds and the sand, bajris and building stone lying in the river water are of State ownership. Nature carries those deposits to lands abutting on rivers and what the act and the Rule provide for is to enable the Government to reclaim what is lost without any fault of its own. Halsbury's Laws of England (3rd Edn., Vol. 39, p. "559, Para 775) says that "The soil of the seashore and the bed of estuaries and arms of the sea and of tidal rivers, so far as the tide ebbs and flows, is prima facie vested of common right in the Crown, unless it has been passed to a subject by grant of possessory tide." Paragraph 768 (p. 556) says that the Crown is also "entitle to the mines and minerals under the soil and seas" within certain limits. The sand and grave deposits by a receding waters of the river are truly a part of the soil of the river bed and therefore belong to the State. The fluvial action of the river carries them to riparian lands but such shifting cannot erase the title of the rightful owner.
11. The judgment of Justice Holmes in Norman S. Wear v. State of Kansas (1917) 62 Law ed. 214 at p. 219 turned on another point and involved different considerations altogether but the basis of that decision is instructive. The fact that sand in the bed of a river is migratory and liable to be shifted does not change its character so as to entitle the public to remove the sand as against the State, which owns the bed of stream."
24. In the case of Banarsi Dass v. Lieutenant Governor, Delhi Administration as reported in (1978) 4 SCC 11 : (AIR 1978 SC 1587), the Apex Court while affirming the aforesaid decisions in Laddumal and Amar Singh (supra) held that the word "Mineral" is of sufficient amplitude to include "brick earth". It further observed that if the expression "Minor Mineral" as denned in the Act includes "ordinary clay" and "ordinary sand", there is earthy reason while "brick earth" should not be held to be "any other minerals".
25. The Calcutta High Court in the case of Industrial Fuel Marketing Co. v. Union of India as reported in AIR 1983 Calcutta 253 had the occasion to decide whether the sludge or slurry which are rejected during washing operations carried on by the coal fields limited in their washieries and the collection of the same by the statement holder could be said to be a mining operation. The Court after noticing that the sludge after first settling in slurry ponds gets deposited also in adjoining fields and river beds, held that the expression "winning" in the definition of mining operation is specious enough to comprehend every activity by which the mineral is extracted or obtained from the earth irrespective of whether such activity is carried out. on the surface or in the bowels of the earth. It held that winning does not necessarily need extracting a mineral by excavating earth or soil, it means also collecting of mineral from the surface of the earth such as the coal particles lying on the river bed as well as on the field nearby. In that case also royalty was levied. Placing reliance upon the decision of the Apex Court in B. Dass's case (supra), the Calcutta High Court observed that it is wrong to assume that mines and minerals must always be sub-soil and there can be no minerals on the surface of the earth.
26. The Calcutta High Court in yet another decision as reported in AIR 1986 Cal 1, Chandeswar Prosad Singh v. Sub-Divisional Land Reforms Officer negatived the contention of the petitioners that clay, brick earth or silt deposits from rivers are not minerals and cannot be validly classified as "Minor Minerals" Paragraph 39 of the judgment reads as follows (para 39) :-
"The Supreme Court in Bhagwan Dass v. State of U. P., (AIR 1976 SC 1393) and Banarasi Dass Chadha & Bros. v. Lt. Governor, Delhi Admn. (AIR 1978 SC 1587) (supra) has clearly held that 'brick earth' like ordinary clay or silt or sand falls within the genus 'mineral' and has been validly notified under the Act as minor mineral.
The contention of the petitioners that clay, brick earth or silt deposits from rivers are not minerals and cannot be validly classified as minor minerals, therefore cannot be sustained. It follows that in including the said items in the said Act or in the Notification thereunder the Parliament and the Central Government have not gone beyond the scope of Entry 54 of List of the Constitution. If clay or brick earth or silt are held to be minerals then the declaration contained in the said Act validly covers the said items in the category of minor minerals is only a matter of classification which has not been challenged otherwise nor has been shown to be unreasonable".
27. In the first decision i.e. Brihattar Dispur (supra) referred to by Mr. Dutta, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioners this Court held that 'earth' is a 'Minor Mineral', it being a specie of minerals. It held that 'earth' is an essential ingredients of a forest and the law makers must have comprehended it to be a mineral in order to advance the purpose for which the Forest Regulation, 1891 was perceived and framed. However, the Court held that although 'earth' is a minor mineral, it cannot be subjected to levy in terms of the impugned notification there, if the same is not removed from a forest. This decision was pressed into service to counter the earlier stand of the Government that "River Silt" is a forest produce within the aforesaid Regulation of 1891. However, the impugned notification issued thereunder was withdrawn in 1999 and the stand of the Government is royalty is being levied under the provisions of the 1999 Rules.
In the second case i.e. Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. (supra) the Apex Court considering that the State's executive power under Article 162 of the Constitution, is co-extensive with its legislative power held that when the State is denuded of its legislative competence on a subject in respect of which the parliament is exclusively competent to legislate State's executive power does not extend to that subject. Likewise in the third case i.e case of Pithupitchai (supra) the Apex Court posing itself the question that having regard to the fact that the 1957 Act is a Central Government's legislation which occupies the field, whether the State Government was competent to have decided the issue as to whether a particular substance was a mineral or not for the purposes of the Act held that the determination that seashell is limeshell and a mineral within the meaning of the Act was riot based on any materials.
28. While the first case has lost its relevance in view of the subsequent stand of the State Government to the issue involved in the instant case, the other two decisions relate to legislative competence and determination of two distinct and different shells as the same and the one. Same is not the case at hand. The term "River Silt" will have to be understood in the context it has been used, which has been noticed above. The State Government while withdrawing the earlier notification dated 4-1-94 by notification dated 5-3-99 laid stress on maintaining ecological order and exploring the possibilities of generation of Govt. revenue from the extraction of 'river sand', which term has been made use of in reference to Silt Mahal. Even in the earlier notification of 1994, 1996 and 1997 the term "River Silt" has been made use of in reference to 'sand' and thus it will have to be understood in that context only. Under the provisions of the Rules, the State Government in the Forest Department is empowered to issue permit for extraction and removal of silt. Rule 5(ii) of the Rules empowers the Principal Chief Conservator of Forest, Assam or any officer authorized by him to grant mining lease in respect of minor minerals as specified in Schedule 'Y'. Specifying minor minerals which include 'Ordinary Clay' and 'Ordinary Sand'.
29. The Supreme Court of United States in the case of Northern Specific Railway Company v. John Sodrberg, (1902) 47 Law Ed 575 : 188 US 526) which has been referred to by the Apex Court in the case of Banarsi Dass Chadha, AIR 1978 SC 1587 (supra) referred to several English cases where stone for road making or paving was held to be "Mineral", as also granite, sand stone, flint stone, gravel, marble, fire clay, brick clay and the like. It has already been noticed that the word "Mineral" is capable of a vast variety of meanings. The Parliament has used it in its widest connotation and hence the word "Mineral" includes building stone, gravel, ordinary clay, ordinary sand etc. The full Court of Punjab & Haryana in the case of Amar Singh (AIR 1972 P & H 356) (FB) (supra) observed that the word "Mineral" when used in a legal document or in an Act of Parliament must be understood in its widest significance, unless there be something in the context or in the nature of the case to control its meaning. In that case the full Court even declined to accept the expert testimony as inadmissible or irrelevant.
30. We have already noticed the definition of "Minor Mineral". It is clear from the definition that the term "Minor Mineral" is inclusive and is not exhaustive. "Silt" according to its dictionary meaning means fine sand, clay or other soil, carried by moving or running water and deposited as a sediment on the bottom or beach. The expression "earth" is of wider vocation. It means the material of which the surface of the ground is composed i.e. soil, mould, dust, clay etc. The expression "clay" according to its dictionary meaning is found in beds or other deposits at various depths and forms with water a tenacious paste, which may be moulded into any shape and hardens when dried. It is used loosely for earth, moist earth. Silt, therefore, according to its dictionary meaning is "clay" which is included in "earth" in all its forms.
31. It has already been noticed above that the petitioners were accorded permission by notification dated 4-1 -94 to extract river sand from the river Brahmaputra which was followed by the order dated 27-12-96 permitting to carry "river Silt" from the bed of the River Brahmaputra. By yet another order dated 7-3-97 the petitioners were allowed to lift "Silts and sands". The definition of "Minor Minerals" includes amongst others ordinary clay and ordinary sand other than sand used for prescribed purposes. The intention of the authorities was to allow the petitioners to lift the river silt which includes the ordinary sand and ordinary clay. We have already considered the term "Silt" as explained in the New Standard Encyclopedia. According to which a reference has been made to soil with Sub-title Physical Properties : Texture. Texture refers to the fineness, coarseness of the soil. It is determined largely by the relative amount of sand, silt and clay particles in the soil. We have also noticed that silt soils are intermediate and that most soils have sand, silt and clay particles in various proportions. Soils containing less than 52% sand and called loams. Silt Loams, sandy loams, sandy clay loams etc. are soils with relatively higher percentage of sand, silt, or clay as indicated by the name. Halsbury's Laws of England (4th edition, Vol. 31) dealing with "particular minerals" has referred to numerous cases in which specific substances have been decided or assumed to be "Minerals" which include 'loam'. Its larger import cannot be reduced to limited confines of a chemical formula. Its precise meaning in a given case will have to be fixed with reference to the particular context and in relation to the surrounding circumstances of the particular case. When a word has many etymological meanings attributed to it, the same will have to be understood in the context in which it is used. The words take their colour from the context in which they are used.
32. The rule of ejusdem generis or the rule of noscitur a sociis for invocation of which there must be a distinct genus or category and the words must apply not to different object of a widely differing character but to something which can be called a class or kind of objects. In an enumeration of different subjects in an Act, general words following specific words may be construed with reference to the antecedent matters, and the construction may be narrowed down by treating them as applying to things of the same kind as those previously mentioned, unless, of course, there is something to show that a wider sense was intended. If a particular words exhaust the whole genus, then the general words are construed as embracing a larger genus. The Apex Court in the case of Kavalappara Akottarathi Kochunni v. State of Madras as reported in AIR 1960 SC 1080 observed (para 50) :
"The rule of ejusden generis is that when general words follow particular and specific words of the same nature, the general words must be confined to the things of the same kind as those specified. But it is clearly laid down by decided cases that the specific words must form a distinct genus or category. It is not an inviolable rule of law, but is only a permissible inference in the absence of an indication to the contrary."
33. By the first notification issued in 1994, the private individuals were allowed to extract "River Sand", By order of 1996, permission was accorded to carry "River Silt". By yet another order issued in 1997 such permission was accorded for "Silt and Sands". It is in this context the word "River Silt" will have to be understood. Apart from the fact that "River Silt" consists of ordinary sand, clay etc. and does riot have its own and separate entity to the exclusion of the other components, the aforesaid notification and orders also notified "River Silt'' in that context only and identified 'it as "Sand" which is included as 'minor minerals', 'definition of which is only inclusive and not exhaustive. It is in this context the principles involved in the rule of ejusden generis and noscitur a sociis comes into play.
34. In view of the foregoing reasons and discussions in the factual as Well as legal context of the matter, I am of the considered opinion that the respondents are within the legal competence to levy royalty in respect of the "River Silt". The "River Silt" necessarily contains ordinary sand, clay etc. and thus, is within the inclusive definition of the term "Minor Minerals". Further, the context in which the term has been used as notified above also justifies the action of the respondents. I cannot but disagree with the submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner that because nobody speaks of "River Silt" as a "Mineral" it is not a "Minor Mineral" as defined in the aforesaid State Rules of 1994.
35. In view of the above all the four petitions shall stand dismissed, leaving the parties to bear their own cost.