Jharkhand High Court
Shah Raza Razia Khatoon vs The State Of Bihar Through Secretary on 22 February, 2022
Author: Ravi Ranjan
Bench: Chief Justice, Sujit Narayan Prasad
1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
L.P.A. No. 224 of 2020
with
I.A. No. 271 of 2021
------
Shah Raza Razia Khatoon, aged about 55 years, Wife of Md. Jaki Ullah, Resident of Bangla Road, Lohardaga, P.O. & P.S. - Lohardaga, District-Lohardaga, Jharkhand. ...... Appellant/Petitioner Versus
1.The State of Bihar through Secretary, Human Resources Development Department, AT-New Secretariat, P.O & P.S. - Beilly Road, Dist.-Patna, Bihar
2.Bihar School Examination Board through its Secretary, AT- Beilly Road, P.O. & P.S. - Belly Road, Dist. - Patna, Bihar.
3.The State of Jharkhand
4.The District Superintendent of Education, Lohardaga, At P.O & P.S. - Lohardaga, District-Lohardaga, Jharkhand.
5.The Head Mistress, Government Kasturba Girls High School, At P.O. & P.S. - Lohardaga, District - Lohardaga, Jharkhand.
... Respondents/Respondents
-------
CORAM: HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD
-------
For the Appellant : Mr. Abhishek Kumar Singh, Adv For State of Jharkhand: A.C to AAG IV For State of Bihar : Mr. S.P. Roy, G.A. (Bihar)
-------
Oral Judgment Order No. 06: Dated 22nd February, 2022:
The instant intra-court appeal under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent is directed against the order/judgment dated 10.02.2020 passed by learned 2 Single Judge in W.P. (C) No. 6730 of 2019 whereby and whereunder direction sought upon respondent no. 2- Bihar School Examination Board to issue the certificate of the writ petitioner for Annual Secondary Examination (Matriculation Examination) of year 1979 after making due correction in the date of birth, which was wrongly recorded as 15.01.1961 instead of 15.01.1964 as well as correction of name of her father, was denied while dismissing the writ petition.
2. The brief facts, necessary for consideration of the lis, stand enumerated as hereunder:
The writ petitioner was appointed as Assistant Teacher in Government School. She, after coming into service, made an application sometimes in the year 1994 for making correction in date of birth in the Annual Secondary Examination (Matriculation Examination) Certificate issued in the year 1979.
It is the case of the writ petitioner that even after submitting such application, the necessary correction was not made in the Annual Secondary Examination (Matriculation Examination) Certificate, which led the writ petitioner to approach this Court by filing writ petition being W.P. (C) No. 6730 of 2019. The learned Single Judge, considering the fact that correction in date 3 of birth in the Annual Secondary Examination (Matriculation Examination) Certificate has been sought for after inordinate delay, dismissed the writ petition, which is the subject matter of present intra-court appeal.
Learned counsel for the petitioner-appellant has submitted that the learned Single Judge has not appreciated the factual aspect rather has gone into the principle of delay and laches, thereby serious error has been committed in dismissing writ petition. According to learned counsel for the appellant, the date of birth of the writ petitioner as has been recorded in Teachers' Training Certificate, which was issued in the year 1984, is 15.01.1964 but in the Annual Secondary Examination (Matriculation Examination) Certificate due to wrong committed by the issuing authority instead of recording date of birth as 15.01.1964 has wrongly recorded 15.01.1961. Therefore, submission has been made that date of birth as mentioned in Teachers' Training Certificate ought to have been taken into consideration a conclusive piece of document for date of birth and direction for necessary correction in the date of birth in the Annual Secondary Examination (Matriculation Examination) Certificate by correcting date of birth as 15.01.1964 instead of 15.01.1961. It has further been 4 submitted that the learned Single Judge ought to have taken into consideration that factual aspect of the matter instead of going into the principle of delay and laches. Therefore, the order passed by the learned Single Judge is not sustainable in the eyes of law and same may be quashed and set aside.
3. Learned counsel for the State and the Bihar Secondary Examination Board have submitted that there is no error in the order passed by learned Single Judge as for the cause of action having arisen sometimes in the year 1979, the writ petitioner ought to have filed appropriate application for correction in date of birth well within reasonable period but the same was not filed within reasonable period of time. Further, even accepting the fact that in the Teachers' Training Examination Certificate of the year 1984, her correct date of birth was recorded as 15.01.1964, even then the petitioner sought for correction in date of birth in her Matriculation Certificate after a decade in the year 1994.
As such, the writ petitioner ought to have approached to this Court in the year 1984 or within a reasonable period but the same has not been done. Therefore, since the learned Single Judge has come to the conclusive finding that the writ petition has been filed after 5 inordinate delay without explaining any reason, the same cannot be said to suffer from any error.
4. This Court has heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the materials available on record as also the findings recorded by learned Single Judge.
5. The undisputed facts, as per the pleadings made by learned counsel for the parties, in this case is that the writ petitioner passed Matriculation Examination sometimes in the year 1979. In the Matriculation Certificate her date of birth was recorded as 15.01.1961. The writ petitioner thereafter done Teachers Training and after its completion Teachers Training Certificate was issued in which her date of birth was recorded as 15.01.1964.
It is case of the writ petitioner-appellant that sometimes in the year 1994, she made application for correction of date of birth in her Matriculation Examination before Bihar School Examination Board but no decision was taken. Therefore, she approached to this Court by filing writ petition being W.P. (C) No. 6730 of 2019.
6. It is evident from the pleadings available on record that the petitioner woke up for the first time in the year 1994 for redressal of her grievance by submitting 6 application before Bihar School Examination Board and thereafter kept mum fairly for a long period of about 25 years and thereafter invoked the jurisdiction of writ Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India by filing writ petition, being W.P. (C) No. 6730 of 2019. The learned Single Judge has considered the aforesaid aspect of the matter and instead of going into the merit of the issue went into the issue of delay and laches in approaching the authorities as also the Court of law and dismissed the writ petition.
7. It is true that for filing writ petition the law of limitation does not apply, but, the principle of delay and laches applies where the aggrieved party approaches the Court after inordinate delay, as has been settled by Hon'ble Apex Court in the judgment rendered in U.P. Jal Nigam & Anr. V. Jaswant Singh & Anr. [(2006) 11 SCC 464], wherein on the ground of principle of delay and laches as under paragraph nos. 9 to 11, it has been held that the delay disentitles a party to discretionary relief under Article 226 or Article 32 of the Constitution of India.
For ready reference paragraph nos. 6, 9 to 11 of the judgment are reproduced as under:-
"6. The question of delay and laches has been examined by this Court in a series of decisions and laches and delay has 7 been considered to be an important factor in exercise of the discretionary relief under Article 226 of the Constitution. When a person who is not vigilant of his rights and acquiesces with the situation, can his writ petition be heard after a couple of years on the ground that same relief should be granted to him as was granted to person similarly situated who was vigilant about his rights and challenged his retirement which was said to be made on attaining the age of 58 years. A chart has been supplied to us in which it has been pointed out that about 9 writ petitions were filed by the employees of the Nigam before their retirement wherein their retirement was somewhere between 30-6- 2005 and 31-7-2005. Two writ petitions were filed wherein no relief of interim order was passed. They were granted interim order. Thereafter a spate of writ petitions followed in which employees who retired in the years 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004 and 2005, woke up to file writ petitions in 2005 and 2006 much after their retirement. Whether such persons should be granted the same relief or not?
9.Similarly in Jagdish Lal v. State of Haryana reported in (1997) 6 SCC 538 this Court reaffirmed the rule if a person chose to sit over the matter and then woke up after the decision of the court, then such person cannot stand to benefit. In that case it was observed as follows: (SCC p.
542) 'The delay disentitles a party to discretionary relief under Article 226 or Article 32 of the Constitution. The appellants kept sleeping over their rights for long and woke up when they had the impetus from Union of India v. Virpal Singh Chauhan reported in (1995) 6 SCC 684. The appellants' desperate attempt to redo the seniority is not amenable to judicial review at this belated stage'
10.In Union of India v. C.K. Dharagupta reported in (1997) 3 SCC 395 it was observed as follows: (SCC p. 398, para 9) '9. We, however, clarify that in view of our finding that the judgment of the Tribunal in R.P. Joshi v. Union of India gives relief only to Joshi, the benefit of the said judgment of the Tribunal cannot be extended to any other person. The respondent C.K. Dharagupta (since retired) is seeking 8 benefit of Joshi case. In view of our finding that the benefit of the judgment of the Tribunal dated 17-3-1987 could only be given to Joshi and nobody else, even Dharagupta is not entitled to any relief.'
11. In Govt. of W.B. v. Tarun K. Roy reported in (2004) 1 SCC 347, Their Lordships considered delay as serious factor and have not granted relief. Therein it was observed as follows: (SCC pp. 359-60, para 34) 34. The respondents furthermore are not even entitled to any relief on the ground of gross delay and laches on their part in filing the writ petition. The first two writ petitions were filed in the year 1976 wherein the respondents herein approached the High Court in 1992. In between 1976 and 1992 not only two writ petitions had been decided, but one way or the other, even the matter had been considered by this Court in State of W.B. v. Debdas Kumar reported in (1991) Supp (1) SCC 138.
The plea of delay, which Mr Krishnamani states, should be a ground for denying the relief to the other persons similarly situated would operate against the respondents. Furthermore, the other employees not being before this Court although they are ventilating their grievances before appropriate courts of law, no order should be passed which would prejudice their cause. In such a situation, we are not prepared to make any observation only for the purpose of grant of some relief to the respondents to which they are not legally entitled to so as to deprive others therefrom who may be found to be entitled thereto by a court of law." Likewise, in the judgment rendered in Govt. of West Bengal v. Tarun K. Roy & Ors. [ (2004) 1 SCC 347], Their Lordships considered delay as serious factor and not granted relief, and hold at paragraph 34 as under:-
"34.The respondents furthermore are not even entitled to any relief on the ground of gross delay and laches on their 6 9 part in filing the writ petition. The first two writ petitions were filed in the year 1976 wherein the respondents herein approached the High Court in 1992. In between 1976 and 1992 not only two writ petitions had been decided, but one way or the other, even the matter had been considered by this Court in State of W.B. v. Debdas Kumar reported in (1991) Supp (1) SCC 138. The plea of delay, which Mr Krishnamani states, should be a ground for denying the relief to the other persons similarly situated would operate against the respondents. Furthermore, the other employees not being before this Court although they are ventilating their grievances before appropriate courts of law, no order should be passed which would prejudice their cause. In such a situation, we are not prepared to make any observation only for the purpose of grant of some relief to the respondents to which they are not legally entitled to so as to deprive others therefrom who may be found to be entitled thereto by a court of law."
8. In the given facts of the present case, the cause of action arose in the year 1979 when the Matriculation Certificate was issued by the Bihar School Examination Board, but, application for correction in date of birth was submitted before the authority concerned in the 1994 i.e., after 15 years of cause of action. Thereafter also, the writ petitioner did not opt to approach the Court of law and only in the year 2019, she approached this Court by filing W.P. (C) No. 6730 of 2019 i.e, after 25 years of submitting application for correction in date of birth.
10
Therefore, according to our considered view, the writ petition has been filed after inordinate delay and as such the principle of delay and laches is applicable.
9. So far as merit of the issue is concerned, it is settled principle of law that if there is any dispute in date of birth, the date of birth mentioned in the Matriculation Certificate is considered to be conclusive piece of evidence, as per judgment rendered in Kamta Pandey Vs. B.C.C.L [2007 (3) JLJR 726 (F.B.)], wherein the Hon'ble Full Bench of this Court taking into consideration catena of judgments rendered by Hon'ble Apex Court has come to the conclusion at paragraph 29, which reads as under:
29.In view of the above discussion, our answer to the question raised in this case is as follows: The date of birth recorded in the Matriculation Certificate duly authenticated by the Education Board is a conclusive proof of age and no other records, including service records as both the parties are governed by Implementation Instruction No. 76 of National Coal Wage Agreement III.
[Emphasis supplied] Therefore, the date of birth mentioned in the Matriculation Certificate will prevail over the Teachers Training Certificate which was issued later and date of birth mentioned in the Matriculation Certificate is considered to be correct date of birth.11
10. The learned Single Judge, considering the aforesaid aspect of the matter, has refused to pass any positive direction which according to our considered view requires no interference.
11. Accordingly, the appeal fails, and is dismissed.
12. Consequently, pending Interlocutory Application, if any, also stands disposed of.
(Dr. Ravi Ranjan, C.J.) (Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.) Alankar/ -
N.A.F.R.